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Of LiMcoln's Iim, Esq., Barrister-aUlMw'; Late Begistrar qf the Swgreme 
Cmwrt of Hang Kong; 


BISTORT 1786 1890 " ; " index to the laws of the straits SETTLEMENTS " ; " THE LAW AND 





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(by permission), 

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the Cornell University Library. 

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The dicta of our ChaiiceUors and Judges are so numerous and often so 
good that regret has often been expressed that a record, in accessible form, 
has not been made of them. Many excellent specimens of judicial rules 
generally and of forensic wit he buried, however, among a vast quantity 
of duU material scattered in the law hbraries, and an attempt on a large 
scale has now been made, for the first time it is believed, to consult the 
treasures they contain, and as far as is possible, to disinter and codify them. 
The author's object in producing this work has been to digest this kind of 
learning, and thus exhibit in a compendious and accessible form those 
sayings embodied in judicial decisions which cannot be traced without 
considerable research and difSculty : often difficulty upon any terms, for 
the books are not always accessible, or if accessible, the quotations them- 
selves are often as not quoted without folio or page or wrongly quoted. 
In this lies the primary importance of this work, which is therefore a 
supplementary digest in itself which it is hoped may obtain a wide sphere. 
The Judges of England have long enjoyed a weU-eamed reputation for 
eminence and dialectic feeling, and a study of their thoughts from their 
opinions and judgments show the numerous sayings, both grave and gay, 
that have proceeded from the judicial bench. It was a Bishop of London, 
the late Bishop Creighton, who once said that he found special virtues in 
old books * ; and so did the famous Lord Bacon." How far this is correct as 
regards books of ordinary literature most people will agree, but vrith regard 

1 Addressing some students of Burling- each one written after that date he was 

ton School on the 7th July, 1900, he confident they would be better employed." 

advised them " to occupy their leisure in '^ " For hoping weU to deliver myself 

taking up some particular study and pur- from mistaking, by the order and perspi- 

suing it to the end. The happiest years cuous expressing of that I do propound, 

of his life were the ten during which he I am otherwise zealous and affectionate to 

kept to a resolution that he would read no recede as little fiom antiquity, either in 

books which were written after the year terms or opinions, as may stand with 

1600. He would not have them adopt so truth, and the proficience of knowledge." 

stringent a course, but if they were to —Adv. of Learning . 
read three books written before 1800 for 

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to law books this may be true in abstract only, for law' grows or changes 
as age progresses, and taken as a whole, both ancient and modern works 
axe of equal importance. Those who have looked into the pages of the 
old black-letter editions of the Law Reports in search of a precedent to 
illustrate some obscure point of law, know how much of our English 
history lies buried in them. The luminous expressions here collected are 
the products of a careful perusal of the cases from both ancient and 
modern reports down to the present time, without reference to digests, 
headnotes, or indices, and herein lies the author's hope that the work 
may prove of utility, for the headnote, " the fair epitome of the decision," ' 
offers in this instance absolutely no clue to the origin or source of the 
quotations. Discrimination has been carefully studied, and although 
some of the quotations may not be in themselves of much practical value, 
yet, having come across them in the course of his own reading, it has been 
deemed expedient by the author to err more on the side of fulness than 
to have omitted them, besides which, the moral they teach or their 
quaintness, in many instances suggestive of the age of their utterance, 
make them all the more worthy of preservation, and thus prove of interest 
to others besides the legal profession. 

The method of classification throughout has necessitated an intermingling 
of the sayings of modem Judges with those of their early or remote 
predecessors. A remarkable circumstance to be noticed in many instances 
is how much some of the dicta agree or seem to fall within the spirit at 
least of previous rulings or the principles of rulings previously propounded, 
suggestive of the great study and learning in respect of which o\ir Judges 
have always been so renowned. By means of references below each 
quotation, those quotations which are of a similar nature in principle will 
aU be found duly connected one with another, thus facilitating the work 
of reference without having recourse moreover to the full index which also 
accompanies this digest. A few quotations from Iiish and Scotch Judges 
met with in the course of researches have also been thought worthy 
of preservation. The vast extent of the subjects embraced, extended 
far beyond the author's original plan, — ^for many books on investiga- 
tion have been productive of nothing for the purposes of this work, — 
has rendered the task of selection, compression, and of connection one of 

1 See Judicial Decisions, 25, in/rd,. 
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considerable labour, nurtured and matured for many years either during 
spare time or amidst the distractions of official life, for, as Coke has it, 
" as unda gignit undam, so commonly one labour cometh not alone . . . 
labor lahori laborem addit." ^ The quotations are strictly confined to those 
whose fame lies exclusively in the domain of jurisprudence and the actual 
practice of the law. Reference to Judge, case, page of the report from 
which the dictum or quotation has been extracted, and the year wherein 
the case was decided, are aU given, and a glanbe at the names wiU prove, 
in a way that is at once convincing and gratifying, how largely the 
members of the Judicial Bench have contributed to the simphfication 
of our laws as well as to the authorship of famous phrases which have 
become familiar in our mouths as household words wherever English is 
spoken or English laws are known and prevail. 


Lincoln's Inn, 
October, 1904. 

I 2 Bep. IV., V. 

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The Judges are probably the best known of all our public men. A great 
politician addresses the House of Commons on various occasions in the 
course of a session, but to the pubUc at large he is but a name representing 
particular political opinions ; a Judge, on the other hand, transacts aU his 
business in public. He is constantly brought into direct personal relations, 
not only with the members of a large and active profession, but with men 
in aU ranks of life, and on every sort of subject. He is, moreover, totally 
independent of those with whom he has to deal. His position is as secure 
as law and public feeling can make it. From the excellence of our 
Constitution, the dignity of our laws, the abilities of those by whom they 
are administered, and the learning and authority of our reporters through 
a long series of ages, no anxiety is felt in submitting to public examination 
the collection of dicta contained in this work. For this purpose it has 
been found necessary to creep centuries backward through the Enghsh 
reports. The strongest impression that they leave in one's mind is the 
simplicity and imafEectedness of the Judges who, while displaying some- 
times a keen sense of himiour far reaching in its effects, have not allowed 
it to interfere in the least with the dignified and most powerful expression 
they have so often given to the public mind. There are, however, very few 
anecdotes to be gleaned from their opinions and judgments for the first 
three or four hundred years after the Conquest. The Judges in those days, 
apart from frequently taking God's name in vain, and talking of their 
conscience,^ occasionally swore when on the bench ; at least, we may so 
conjecture from the language used by John de Mowbray in 44 Edw. HI., as 
reported in the Year-book, who called out to the Bishop of Chester, a 
defendant in an action tried before him, " Allez au grand didble ! " But 
so late as in 1899, we find a learned Judge using an expression often 
hurtful to ears pohte when, in alluding to a case, he stated that the noble 
Lords, though not overruling it, " damn the case with faint praise, decUne 
in terms to apply it . . . and refuse to extend its operation one iota." ^ 
John de Cavendish, who was one of the Judges in the latter part of the 

1 See Blasphemy, infra. (1899), L. B. 1 Q. B. D. 825. See also 

^ Per Grantham, J., Burrows v. Ehodes infr&, Couets, 3, n. 

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reign of Edward III., seems to have had a spice of dry humour in him. 
A case occurred before him in which a question arose as to a lady's age, 
and her counsel urged the Court to call her before them and decide for 
themselves whether she was within age or not. But women are the same 
in aU time, and the Judge showed that he knew them when he observed : 
" II n'ad nut home en Angleterre que puy adjudge a droit deins age ou de 
plein age ; car asaun femes que sent de age de XXX. ans voilent apperer 
d'age de XVIII. ans." It is singular how illustrations for the decision of 
one case, often, in the early days, given with a seriousness that can hardly 
be mistaken, find repetition afterwards on the judicial bench sometimes 
jocularly or in a light totally different from that which formed the original 
utterance. Thus, in reference to a woman's age, we again find some 
centuries after, another learned Judge, who probably had the foregoing 
mentioned case before his eyes, thus aUude to the subject when deciding 
an action upon a wager and in illustration of it. Said Mr. Justice Grose 
in 1790 :— 

" I am of opinion that a bet on a lady's age, or whether she has a mole 
on her face, is void. No third person has a right to make it a subject of 
discussion in a Court of justice, whether she passes herself in the world as 
being more in the bloom of youth than she reaUy is, or whether, what is 
apparent in her face to every one who sees her is a mole or a wart : and 
yet these are circumstances which cannot in a Court of law be stated as an 
injury ; for if a man say that a young woman who passes for twenty-three 
years of age is thirty-three, or that she has a wart in her face (wliich is 
considered as a nasty thing), no action will lie for it." ^ 

Turning now to criminal cases, we find that in the interval between the 
abohtion of the Star Chamber and the revolution of 1688, the character of 
English Judges was degraded to a pitch to which it never sank before or 
since ; and the infamy of Scroggs and Jefferies,^ whose unbridled fury in 
reviling witnesses' and prisoners was, perhaps, the greatest scandal of 
those violent times, may very properly have been an inducement to later 
Judges to consult the dignity of their office by abstaining as far as possible 
from all interference with the course of the proceedings which covli look 
like partisanship. The most conspicuous part of the criminal law in 

1 Per Grose, J., Good against Elliott but the last spelling is that which is found 
(1790), 3 T. E. 699. in his patent of peerage, and which he 

2 Lord Cavipiell (" Lives of the always used afterwards." 
Chancellors," III., 495) remarks : — " The ^ " Ask him what questions you will," 
name is spelt no fewer than eight different said Jefferies, L.G.J., in Lady Ivy's Trial 
ways — ' Jeffries,' ' Jefferies,' ' Jefferye,' (1684), " but if he should swear as long 
'Jeffereys,' 'JefEereyes,' ' JefEi-ys,' 'Jeff ryes,' as Sir John Falstaff fought, I would never 
and ' Jeffreys,' and he himself spelt it believe a word he says." (10 How. St. Tr. 
differently at different times of his life ; 570. 

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those times was the law of treason, and the manner in which political 
offences had been prosecuted under the Stuarts gave a ghastly reahty to a 
rule which has at present a merely formal and technical application to 
criminal procedure. The character of an Enghsh lawyer has been properly 
defined by Lord Holt as a minister of right and justice ; who by the very 
maxims of his profession is to be above mercenary and sordid interests ; 
and who is admitted to the fullest and most distinct view of our laws, the 
accumulated wisdom of above a thousand years, and of the wonderful and 
divine fabric of this our Constitution. 

"The impromptu reply," said Moh^re, "is precisely the touchstone 
of the man of wit." Our modern legislators axe not, as a body, particu- 
larly blessed in the power of repartee. The gift of momentarily turning 
the tables as an aggravating interrupter is possessed only by a few, 
and the younger students might imitate with pleasure and advantage 
the sound principles evinced and uttered from the judicial bench, often on 
the spur of the moment when traversing the tangled skeins of our law, for 
the law is injured if as a science it be thought so dry and jejune a study 
as some have conceived it to be.^ As an example of immediate conception 
and deep erudition may be mentioned a case full of instruction that came 
before a former Master of the RoUs, wherein he " hkened the plaintiff's case 
to a colander, because it was so fuU of holes." ^ Similarly will a case of 
" entanglement " be found so recently as in 1899, when deciding upon the 
construction of a notice to quit given by a landlord to a tenant, a learned 
Judge observed : " It is said that the principles laid down in Doe v. Culli- 
ford(4 D. & E. 248), and acted upon in Doe v. Smith (5 A. & E. 350), have 
been overruled by Doe v. Morphett (7 Q. B. 577). In my opinion those 
two earUer cases were right, and entitle us to uphold this notice. As I 
have already pointed out. Doe v. CuUiford was cited to the Court in 
Doe V. Smith, and the Court in giving their decision expressed no dissent 
from it. It was not tiU nine years later that, in Doe v. Morphett, a Court 
consisting of Denman, C.J., Patteson, Williams, and Coleridge, JJ., said 
that they could not agree with Bayley, J., in Doe v. Culliford, and that 
they thought that case was bad law. I do not agree in that view, and I 
think we have ample authority for holding that this notice was good, or, 
to use the classic expression of Denman, C.J., in Doe v. Smith, that it was 
' weU enough.' " ' 

The principles enunciated by many of our eminent Judges, past and 
present, wiU be found, on the other hand, most carefuUy set out. There 

1 See Law, 1, n., m/rd. ' Per Darling, J., In Wride v. Dyer 

2 Per Jessel, M.R., Hx parte Hall, Inre (1899), L. E. 1 Q. B. D. [1900J, p. 27. 
Cooper (1882), L. E. 19 C. D. 584. 

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is no intention, however, except perliaps in the case of Lord Mansfield, for 
reasons presently shown, of making any invidious mention or comparisons : 
on that point the reader may judge for himself, as the slightest acquaint- 
ance with the history of our law and the bead-roll it contains wUl show 
the eminence of the men from whose decisions the quotations here given 
are taken. With regard to Lord Mansfield, "whose conspicuous and 
exalted talents conferred dignity upon the profession, whose enlightened 
and regular administration of justice made its duties less difficult and 
laborious, and whose manners rendered them pleasant and respectable," ^ 
numerous quotations have been selected from his judgments for the benefit 
of those in whom he took especial iuterest, namely, the students^ for " very 
great deference is always due to whatever fell from so able a Judge." ^ As 
has been truly remarked of him, he was the most accomplished, scholarly 
and literary figure which the profession of the law has produced. " Wlien 
Le became Chief Justice," says Lord Campbell, " he was in the constant 
habit of explaining the intricacies of the case tried before him, and giving 
the reason of his judgments, not only to satisfy the parties, but, as he 
expressed it, ' for the sake of the students.' " ^ The researches of the author 
wiU enable the student to gather for himself under their proper headings 
aU that has fallen from that great Judge on the subject. It is certain that 
no books include so much brUliant talent and genius of the first order as 
is to be found in the Law Reports. Li them, in addition to legal dicta, 
are also to be found a number of miscellaneous and excellent material 
which are now quoted principally on account of the interest they afford. 
To review or refer in this introduction to any of the quotations would, it 
wiU readily be conceded, prove a delicate and difficult task, besides adding 
considerably to the already sufficiently onerous labours of the author. 

Between the growing mountains of publications with hundreds of 
individual explorers burrowing at their own mandate for historical or legal 
evidence, the student or reader can complain only of an embarrassment of 
riches. Whatever in this work may tend to communicate any useful prece- 
dents to the furtherance of justice, the discouragement of iniquity, the 
honour of the laws, and consequently of the profession and the public at 
large, the author shall be happy to have imparted. 

1 See Ann. Meg. for 1788, p. 241 ; Hale's 7 T. E. 295, and per Lord Kenyan, C.J., 
" Common Law," Vol. I. (5th ed.) p. xl. in Oraufuid v. Hunter (1798), ST. E. 22. 

2 See generally per Lawrence, J., in ^ See LAW Ebpouts, 3, «., infra. 
King V. The College of Physicians (1797), 

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Administration of Justice. 







Court Leet. 





American Decisions. 

Criminal Justice. 





















Bill of Lading. 


Bills of Sale. 














1 Jharity. 







Foreign Law. 






Freedom of Speech. 

Common Law. 








Contempt of Court. 




Husband and Wife. 



Inns of Court. 


International Law. 








Judicial Decisions. 

Judicial Proceedings. 







Law Reports. 

Legal Profession. 


Liberty of the Press. 

Liberty of the Subject. 




Married Woman. 
Master and Servant. 

J For references or other heads arisiTig tlierefrom, consult the Index at the end of 

the volume. 

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Specific Performance. 


Privy Council. 







Text Books. 








Public Policy. 



Public Servant. 

Trade Union. 

New Trial. 
Notice to Quit. 

Eailway Company. 

Transfer of Eight of . 


Trial for Life. 



Obiter Dicta. 


Opening Speech. 







Parent and Child. 





Payment into Court. 


















Solicitor and Client. 





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Abbott, C.J. 

Abinger, Lord ... 
Abney, j. 
Alderson, B. 
Allybone, J. 
Alvanley, Lord ... 
Alverstone, Lord 
Ashhuist, J. 

Ashton, 7. 

Ask, J 

Aston, J. 

Atkyns, Sir E., L.C.B 

Bacon, G.J. 
Bacon, J. 
Bacon, Lord 
Bacon, V.-C. 
Barnes, J. 
Harrington, J. 
Bayley, B. 
Bayley, J. 

Bereford, J. 
Berrewik, J. 
Best, C.J. 
Best, J. ... 
Blackburn, J. 
Blackburn, Lord 
Blackstone, J. ... 
Blackstone, Sir Wm. 

Bowen, L.J. 

Brampston, L.C.J. 
Bramwell, B. ... 
Bramwell, J. 
BramweU, Lord 
Brett, L.J. 
Brett, M.E. 
Bridgman, C.J. ... 
Bridgman, Lord, C.B. 
Brougham, Lord 


I, 2, 10, 33, 42, 64, 81, 86, 89, 136, 137, 138, 180, 188, 
191, 209, 220, 228. 

42, 251. 

17, 165. 

21 n., 33, 58, 89, 171, 173, 205. 


10, 88, 80, 93, 111, 148, 174, 227, 248 n., 249. 
39 n., 50 71., 54 n. 

9, 16, 31, 35, 63, 96 «., 146, 153, 163, 171, 203, 208, 

234, 237. 

25, 118 n., 140. 
30 n., 35, 41 n., 110 n., 112 to., 150, 164, 173, 176 n., 

189 n., 195, 225. 



23 TO., 79 TO., 80 TO., 147 n., 152 to. 

34, 75, 128, 152, 202, 245. 

149, 166 TO. 



6 TO., 17, 27, 57, 64, 98, 106, 111, 125, 132, 150, 156, 

157, 173, 180, 186, 197, 208, 235. 

29, 55, 76, 89, 108, 151, 159. 

4 TO., 7, 15, 27, 46, 60, 108, 122, 136, 151, 159, 160, 208. 
44, 45, 95, 97, 121, 151, 179, 209, 231. 
44 TO., 62, 65, 100 to., 200. 
27 TO., 64, 78 TO,, 80 to., 81, 83 n., 92 to., 110 to;, 114 to., 

146 TO., 147 TO., 151 TO., 181, 189 to., 207 to., 219 «., 

243 TO. 
2, 14, 16, 34, 38, 45, 46, 57, 66, 72, 100, 107, 131, 170, 

171, 179, 185, 188 to., 232. 
41 n., 44, 54, 94, 169, 218, 236. 

II, 13 TO., 218, 222. 

26 TO., 83, 94, 118, 171, 213 to., 217, 241. 

9, 12 TO., 33, 61, 87, 95, 128, 163, 164 to., 217. 

11, 36, 53, 102, 139, 154, 188 to., 210 to., 235. 
187, 234. 

62, 67, 225, 243. 

83, 93, 144, 158, 166 to., 172, 221, 226. 

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BuUer, J. 

Burnett, J. 
Burrough, J, 

Butt, J 

Byles, J 

Caiens, Lord ... 
Campbell, Lord... 
Camden, J. 
Camden, Lord ... 

Cave, J 

Chamberlain, J. 
Chambre, J. 
Channell, J. 
Chappie, J. 
Charles, J. 
Chelmsford, Lord 
Chitty, J. 
Cleasby, B. 
Clerk, L. J. 
Clonwell, Earl of 
Cookburn, C.J. ... 


Coleridge, J. 
Coleridge, Lord . . . 

Coleridge, Sir J. T. 
Cottenham, L.C. 
Cotton, L.J. 
Cowper, L.C. 
Cozens-Hardy, J. 
Crampton, J. ... 
Cranworth, Lord 
Creswell, J. 
Crewe, C.J. 

Dallas, C.J. ... 
Davey, L.J. 

Day, J 

De Grey, C.J. ... 
Denison, J. 
Demnan, Lord ... 
Dolben, J. 
Dyer, C.J. 

Eldon, C.J. 
Eldon, L.C. 
Ellenborough, Lord 

Ellesmere, Lord 
Ellis, Serjt. 

... 21, 33, 34, 35, 41, 43 n., 54, 87, 95, 96, 101, 117 n., 
186, 140, 144, 145, 146, 151, 153, 158 n., 182, 195, 
207, 213, 244, 246, 247, 248. 
... 177, 241, 244. 

..'. 12ro., 74, 223. 
... 63. 

... 32,48. 

... 5, 19 n., 84, 39 n., 62, 84 n., 131, 152, 169 n., 193. 

... 243. 

... 42, 74, 84, 156, 160, 213, 239, 245 n. 

... 7, 19, 122, 199, 224. 

... 86 TC. 

... 38. 192, 230. 

... 59, 243. 

... 5 n. 

... 237 n. 

70 102 193. 

... 32i 44 n., 48, 94, 150, 170, 246. 

... 240. 

... 65. 

... 56 TC., 107, 142, 152, 198. 

... 12 n., 53, 65, 75, 85, 92, 105, 115, 144, 154, 173, 209. 
210, 228, 231, 285. 

... 5 n., 20, 21 n., 27 n., 30, 31, 33 n., 87 n., 41, 43 n., 
49, 52 n., 64 n., 65 n., 69 n., 73 n., 74, 77 n.,85 n., 
86 n. , 91 TO., 93 n., 94, 97, 103, 106 n., 109 n., 113 n., 
116 n. , 125 n., 127, 128 n., 136 n., 147, 149, 153, 155, 
156 M., 157, 163 n., 166 n., Ill n., 173 n., 187 n., 
189, 205, 210, 215 n., 217 n., 237, 238, 244 n. 

... 110,192,194,214. 

... 25, 29, 82, 60, 75, 76, 81, 85, 88, 98, 114, 115, 132, 141, 
148, 150, 152, 193 «., 218, 219, 242, 244. 

... 147 »i. 

... 81. 

, . . 6, 12 n., 18 n., 25, 72, 154, 168, 196, 245 n. 

... 88 n., 187, 176, 242 n., 245. 

.. 204. 

... 74,92,199,202. 

... 4, 24, 193 n., 227. 

... 199 n. 

... 20. 

... 243. 

.. 6, 21n. 

.. 65, 122, 222 «. 

... 97. 

... 5 M., 15, 52, 99, 112 «., 138, 243. 

... 47, 96, 285 ra. 

... 89. 

... now. 

... 40, 81, 82, 137, 163, 164, 187, 244. 

.. 129, 131, 152. 

... 3, 6 n., 7, 18 71., 27 n., 80, 34, 35. 42 n., 60 88 lOn 

25^80 ^*°' ^*^' ^^^' ^^^' ^^^' ^^°' ^^^■^^^' 226 

..'. 197 n'. 

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Erie, J 90,147,151. 

Erie, O.J 26,47,64,66,234,241,245,249. 

Erskine, J 90. 

Erskine, The Hon. T 63 n. 

ErsMne, L.0 145 n., 191. 

Esher,Iiord 6,9, 11, 39, 48, 57 m., 89, 107, 130, 132, 135, 137, 153 «., 

165, 173, 180, 193 n., 200, 231. 

Eskgrove, Lord 105. 

Eyre, C.J 30, 51, 63 n., 87, 90, 99, 120, 141 n., 167, 172, 195, 

202, 212, 234, 237, 247 «., 248. 
Eyre, C.B 83, 181, 183, w., 215. 

Field, J. 214, 222 w. 

Finch, 0.J 8, 124, 176 n., 206, 224. 

Fitzgerald, J 200. 

Fitzgerald, Lord 110, 120 w., 135, 149, 174. 

Forster, O.J 170. 

Fortesoue, J 159. 

Fortescue, O.J 35, 61, 62. 

Foster, J 17, 21, 61, 92, 157, 158, 169, 181, 198, 203, 232, 243. 

Fry, J 4, 11, 12 «., 13 TO., 25 «., 121, 123, 211. 

Gabmond, J 155. 

Gaselee, J 186. 

George, B 60. 

Gibbs, O.J 52, 69, 127. 

Gonlbum, Or 22. 

Gould, J. 192. 

Graham, B 91. 

Grant, M.B 178,248. 

Grantham, J 54 to., 219 m. 

Grose, J 31, 114, 120 m., 179, 208, 229. 

Grove, J 98, 114, 181, 227, 287. 

Hale, C.B 244. 

Hale, 0.J 21 to., 23, 28, 59, 168, 169, 173. 

Halsbury, L.C 12,20,43,70,73,194,200,201. 

Hannen, SirJ 31,208. 

Harcourt, Lord Keeper ... 31. 

Hardwicke, C.J. 87. 

Hardwioke, Lord 17, 28, 45, 79, 80, 83, 85, 94 to., 95 M., 96, 98, 103, 116, 

139, 140, 170, 176 m., 198, 202, 204, 218. 

Hatherley, Lord 20, 105, 123 to., 170, 188. 

Hawkes, Sir J 118 to. 

Hawkins, J 3,18,62,157,198. 

Heath, J 10, 13, 22, 30, 34, 43, 72, 96, 97, 111, 194, 238. 

Herbert, C.J 156. 

Hermand, Lord ... ... 18. 

Herschell, Lord 33. 

Hide, O.J 165. 

Hobart, O.J 1, 28, 29, 100, 109, 110 to., 115, 148, 165, 169, 171, 198, 

212, 219, 229, 230, 241, 250. 

Hobhouse, Lord 58. 

Holroyd, J 88, 208. 

Holt, C.J 1,8, 10,16to., 34, 49, 51, 53, 60, 66, 69, 70,78,81,92, 

101, 104, 114, 116, 117 M., 119, 120 to., 122, 130, 
187, 138, 142, 148, 165, 166, 167, 159, 169, 180, 190, 
192, 210, 211, 214, 215, 219, 220, 235, 236, 237, 246, 



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Hoiiham, B 86. 

Hotham, L.C 146. 

Hull, J 162 TO. 

Hyde, J 28,102,109,165. 

Hyde, O.J 3,4,125,206. 

James, Sir W. M., L.J. ... 12 n., 24, 26, 37, 40, 71, 75, 90, 122, 129, 224. 

James, Sir W. M., V.-C. ... 80. 

Jefferies, C.J 10, 19, 25, 51 w., 52, 57 w., 61 »., 62, 156 ra., 173,187, 

205, 240, 241, 243, 250. 

Jekyll, M.E 84, 180 w. 

Jennin, J. 66 w., 67 w. 

Jervis, C.J 230 n. 

Jessel, M.E 3, 23, 24, 28 n., 89, 42, 44 n., 46, 58, 71, 72, 82, 87, 

94, 98, 109, 114, 117, 129, 130, 154, 159, 164, 176, 

188, 192, 193 n., 203, 212. 
Jeune, Sir P. H 114 n., 178, 247. 

Kay, J 50, 72, 83, 107, 148, 167, 189, 204, 205. 

Keating, C.J 67, 114, 222. 

Keble, C.J 20 to., 66, 67, 155, 240. 

Keble, M. Pres 28. 

Kekewioh, J 11, 13, 14, 24, 55, 109, 121, 130, 131, 137, 146, 166, 

171, 177, 178, 195, 203, 211, 213, 232, 243, 245 n. 

KeUy, C.B 28. 

Kelynge, J 137 to. 

Kenyon, C.J 2, 8, 4, 7, 13, 14 to., 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 27, 34, 36,40 w., 

43 TO., 49, 52, 56, 59 to., 60, 61, 62, 66, 68, 76, 77, 
78, 80, 81, 83, 85 to., 87, 89, 91, 92, 99, 104, 107, 108, 
109, 124, 125, 127, 142, 144, 145, 148, 158, 158 m., 
160, 161, 163, 164, 165, 168, 172, 178, 180, 183, 19,5, 
197, 199, 207, 215, 216, 219, 225,227, 228, 229, 236, 
238, 242, 243, 250. 

Kindersley, V.-C 79. 

King, L.C 104. 

Knight-Bruce, L.J 14, 122, 171, 179. 

Knight-Bruoe, V.-C 242. 

Lahgdale, M.E., Lord ... 1, 14 n., 15, 26, 44, 168, 179, 203, 204, 232, 248, 249. 

Lawrence, J 54 to., 59, 134, 138, 164, 173, 242. 

Leach, M.E 129. 

Lee, C.J 5,195. 

Lefroy, C.J 232. 

Legge, B. 178 to., 194 to. 

Lindley, L.J 21 m., 22, 28, 38, 75, 76 to., 82, 97, 118, 130, 177 ra., 

188, 210, 211, 218, 223, 231, 234, 245 to., 247 n. 

Lindley, M.E 12, 93, 222, 237, 238. 

Lisle, Ld. Pres 219. 

Littledale, J 30 to., 115, 131, 192, 209. 

Littleton, Sir Ed 132 to., 182, to. 

Littleton, Lord 243 to. 

Lopes, L.J 76 TO., 79, 89, 114, 234. 

Loughborough, Lord 58, 77, 181 n., 211. 

Lushington, Dr 77, 102, 138. 

Lush, L.J 17,165. 

Lyndhurst, C.B 39, 68 to. 

Lyndhurst, L.C 127 to., 225, 226. 

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Macnaghtbn, Lord 31, 85, 97, 157, 162, 175, 192, 212, 230. 

Malins, V.-C 24, 40, 101, 159, 177, 220, 221. 

MaUet, J. 30, 101 TO., 136 w., 207 w. 

Mansfield, Lord 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 14, 22, 31, 83, 35, 38, 42, 43, 47, 

48, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 60, 62, 65, 66, 69, 73, 75, 79, 
86, 92, 94, 98, 99, 104, 106, 108, 110, 111, 113, 115 n., 
116, 118, 120 n., 121, 123, 128, 139, 140, 141, 144, 
145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 158, 160, 161, 162, 
168 n., 169, 170 n., 172, 177, 178, 181 n., 182, 183, 
186, 187, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203,204,205, 
206, 207, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 219, 220, 221, 226, 
227, 228, 230, 231, 238, 239, 241, 242, 247, 250. 

Manwood, 3 177. 

Marlay, C.J 91, 233. 

Martin, B 65,85,250,251. 

Mathew, J 229 n. 

Maule, J 40, 58, 69, 93, 101, 108, 172, 209. 

McDonald, C.B 155. 

MeUor, J 6,75. 

Miohel, J 156. 

Moreton, 3 137 n. 

Morris, Lord 46. 

Mounteney, B 175,249. 

NlCHOUc, Sir J 2,68,105,224. 

North, C.J 36,41,78,228,240. 

North, J 26,54,132,173. 

North, Lord Keeper 84 m. 

Nottingham, Lord 21. 

O'Hagan, Lord 26,47,188. 

Page, 3 204. 

Park, J 97, 196, 220. 

Parke, B 41, 159, 194. 

Parke, J 186 n. 

Parker, C.J 51, 101, 173, 188 n., 188, 232 M. 

Parker, L.C 42. 

Patteson, J 28, 138, 230 «. 

Pearson, J 20,122,246. 

Pemberton, O.J 20, 55, 57. 

Pennefather, C.J 63, 145. 

Penzance, Lord 36,181,154,201. 

Perrin, J 74, 107. 

Phillimore, Sir B 77 to. 

Pigott,B 105. 

Plowden, Sir Edm 10 n. 

Plumer, M.E 85. 

PoUexfen, C.J 78 »., 176, 241. 

PoUock, B 11,230. 

Pollock! C.B 2, 26, 37, 53, 54, 55, 60, 88, 105, 107, 139, 215. 

Popham,C.J 115,148. 

Powel, B 83. 

Powel, J 7,167. 

PoweU,J 21 «., 40, 118, 46 m., 183 w., 221, 247 n. 

Powis, J 57. 

Powys, J 21 w., 108, 151, 191. 

Pratt, J 152. 

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Pratt, G.J 13, 52, 63, 78, 87 n., 112, 126, 144 n., 147, 164, 187, 


Probyn, J. ... , 138, 143. 

Puleston, J 19m. 

Bbdesdalb, Lord 171. 

Richards, L.C.B 63 w., 212. 

Bidley, J 183. 

Rigby, L.J 73 n., 188, 222, 247. 

Eokeby, J 78. 

Kolf, Serjt 5 n. 

Kolfe, B 220. 

BoUe, C.J 17,189,250. 

Romer, J 47, 76 tc. , 152 w. 

RomUly, M.R 29, 30, 31, 39, 48, 76 n., 81, 95, 178 n., 193, 218, 221, 

236, 250. 

Rooke, J. 30, 68, 76, 83, 96 «., 115, 120 re., 142, 157, 161, 189, 

212, 227, 229. 

Roubury, J 45. 

Russell of Killowen, Lord ... 161,176: 

Ryder, C.J 70. 


Scott, Sir W 32, 58, 86, 103, 104, 106, 108, 137, 146, 165, 170, 

182 211 231. 

Soroggs, C.J 62, 124, 240, 249. 

Selborne, L.C., Lord 19, 26, 38, 40, 87, 94. 

Seymour, Sir Ed. 64 w. 

ShadweU,V.-C 165. 

Smith, A. L., L.J 16,73. 

Smith, A. L., M.R 213. 

Stephen, J 63 to., 130, 193. 

Stirling, J 405, 14 7i., 114 to., 149 w., 202. 

St. Leonards, Lord 37, 84, 100, 162 to., 193 to. 

Story, J. (U.S.) 162to.,236to. 

StoweU, Lord 93,156. 

Strange, Sir J 247. 

Stuart, Sir John, V.-C. ... 42,76,128,228. 

Swinton, Lord 215. 

Talbot, L.C 80. 

Talfourd, J 5. 

Taney, O.J. (U.S.) 49 to. 

Tenterden, C.J 8. 

TerriU, J 101 to., 136 w., 207 TO. 

Thesiger, L.J 25, 50, 79. 

Thorpe, B 19 to. 

Thurlow, L.C 151. 

Tindal, Ci.J 11, 43, 47, 58, 94, 104. 129, 162, 166, 214, 234, 249. 

Treby, C.J 247. 

Trevor, Sir John, M.R. ... 79 to. 

Truro, Lord, L.C 193 to., 210. 

Turner, L.J 39, 41, 139. 

Twisden, J 10, 100, 101 to., 136 to., 137 to., 161, 169, 207 to., 230. 

Vaughan, J 30, 73, 121, 157, 172, 235. 

Vaughan, L.C.J 43, 85, 87, 143. 

Vaughan Williams, J 114 to., 175. 

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Walcot, 3 

Ward, J 

Watson, Lord 

Webster. M.R 

Wensleydale, Lord 
Westbury, Lord 

Wightman, J 

WUd. J 

Wilde, C.J 

WUde, Sir J. P. 

WUde, B 

WiUes, J 

WiUes, L.C.J 

Williams, J 

Wills, J 

WUmot, J 

Wilmot, L.O.J 

Winnington, Sir F. 

Withins, J 


Wood, B 

Wood, Sir W. Page, V.-C. 

Wright, J 

Wright, L.G.J 

Wynf ord, Lord 

Wyndham, J 



... 12 n., 13 n., 22, 72, 95, 131, 162, 221. 

... 38. 

... 4A. 

... 90, 149 TO., 248. 

... 131 TO. 

... 42 TO., 180. 
... 90, 246. 
... 138. 
... 17, 26, 41, 86, 99, 148, 155, 163, 167, 168, 170, 178, 

181, 214, 217, 228, 235, 241 to., 242. 
... 19 TO., 20, 37, 42 TO., 124. 
... 46, 58, 187, 206, 234. 

38 90 97 125 163. 
'..'. 20! 2i'to.,'43, 62, 68, 93, 103, 141, 222, 229, 232, 250. 
... 36, 82, 95, 98, 142, 150, 174, 205, 214, 217, 225, 226 »., 

... 197 TO. 
... 25 TO. 
... 152 TO. 
... 128. 
... 42, 171. 
... 5 TO., 176, 199 TO. 
... 54, 57 TO., 88, 120, 153, 187 to., 241. 

... 137 TO., 188. 

Yates, J.... 

16, 17. 37. 58. 103 to.. 107. 163. 167, 179, 199, 202. 
220, 222. 238. 244. 

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Men will not commonly steal women that are nothing worth.* — 
EdbaH, C. J., Bruton v. Morris (1614), Hob. Rep. 182. 

Ldministration of Justice. 

1. The way to do complete justice indeed, is to let in the one side 
without prejudicing the other.* — Lord Mansfield, Rex v. Phillips 
(1758), 1 Burr. Part IV. 304. 

See also 10, 19, helow ; Criminal Justice, 1, 7 ; Evidknce, 21 ; Jdet. 
8 ; REiiiEF, 3. 

2. It is fit that justice shoidd be administered with great caution. — 
Ahhott, C. J., Rex v. Bowditch (1818), 2 Chit. Rep. 281. 

iSee also Judges, 16 ; Pleadings, 3 ; Precedents, 20 ; Statutes, 10. 

3. Justice can be peaceably and effectually administered there only 
where there is recognised authority and adequate power. — Lord Lang- 
dcHe, M.R., Duke of Brunswick v. Eang of Hanover (1844), 6 Beav. 49. 

See also Courts, 10, 14 ; Judicial Decisions, 26 ; Law, 59. 

4. The law hath respect not only to Courts of records and judicial 
proceedings there, but even to all other proceedings, where the 
person that gives his judgment or sentence hath judicial authority. — 
Holt, C.J., Philips V. Bury (1788), 1 T.R. 357. 

See also Couets, 10, 14 ; Law, 59. 

1 This is forcibly illtistrated in B. v. Oxford Circuit in 1804. — Ibid. 596 (note). 

Iwendsen (1702), where in a prosecution See also heading Motives, 2, sv,prk. ^ 
or felony on stat. 3 Hen. VII. c. 2, for ^ This seems to be the true way to come 

he forcible abduction and marriage of at justice ; and what we therefore ought 

n heiress, the offence was held complete, to do : for the true text is " boni justieis 

hough, after the forcible taking, the est, ampliare justitiam," not "jurisdic- 

roman consented to the marriilge. — 14 tionem," as it has been often cited. That 

law. St. Tr. 595. The same point was is what I would wish to do, if we can do 

ecided by Lawrence, J., in a case on the it. — Id. 304. 

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Administration of Justice — contiimed. 

5. In drawing an inference or conclusion from facts proved, regard must 
always be had to the nature of the particular case, and the fecility 
that appears to be afforded, either of explanation or contradiction. 
No person is to be required to explain or contradict, until enough has 
been proved to warrant a reasonable and just conclusion against him, 
in the absence of explanation or contradiction. — Abbott, C.J., King v. 
Burdett (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 140. 

See also 8, helow ; Chaeacter, 2 ; Coktempt of Coxjet, 3 ; CEnnNAL 
Justice, 2, 16 ; Evidence, 10, 14 ; Pleaddjgs, 12 ; Peopeett, 14 ; 
Reputation ; Witness, 2, infra. 

6. I should be extremely sorry to find that in a fictitious proceeding, 
instituted for the more easy attaining of justice, different rules were 
to obtain in the different Courts. — Lord Kenyan, C. J., Goodright v. 
Rich (1797), 7 T. R. 334. 

See also Couets, 1 ; Peaotice, 25, 27, siupra. 

7. Courts of justice cautiously abstain from deciding more than what 
the immediate point submitted to their consideration requires. — Sir 
John Nicholl, Goods of King George m., deceased (1822), 1 St. Tr. 
(N. S.) 1278. 

See also 9, 14, helxm; Judges, 70; Motives, 13. 

8. Like my brothers who sit with me, I am extremely reluctant to decide 
anything except what is necessary for the special case, because I 
believe by long experience that judgments come with far more weight 
and gravity when they come upon points which the Judges are boimd 
to decide, and I believe that obiter dicta, like the proverbial chickens 
of destiny, come home to roost sooner or later in a very uncomfortable 
way to the Judges who have uttered them,' and are a great source of 
embarrassment in future cases. Therefore I abstain from putting a 
construction on more than it is necessary to do for this particular 
case. — Bowen, L.J., Cooke v. New River Company (1888), L. R. 38 
C. D. 70. 

See also 5, above ; Construction ; Judges, 11 ; Pleadings, 8. 

9. This statute is indeed as obscure a one as any in the statute-book : it 
is difficult to ascertain its true meaning. Therefore I do not chuse 
to give any direct opinion about its extent ; imless it should become 
absolutely necessary for me to do so.^ — Lord Mansfield, Case of John 
Wilkes (1770), 19 How. St. Tr. 1091. 

iSee also Peaotice, 6. 

1 On this point see post, heading Die- ' See also per Lord Ke/nyon, C.J., in 

TtJM ; Obitbb Dicta. KoUestou i\ Hibbert (1789), 3 T. R. 412. 

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Ldministration of Justice— contrnwed 

10. It is the great duty of eveiy Court of justice to administer justice as 
weU as they can between the litigating parties ; another, and not less 
material, duty is to satisfy those parties that the whole case has been 
examined and considered.— Lord Kenyan, C.J., Booth v Hodeson 
(1795), 6 T. R. 408. 

See also 1, above; 15, 19, helaw ; Judges, 52. 

11. I am not, as I consider, to decide cases in favour of fools or idiots, 
but in fevour of ordinary English people, who understand English 
when they see it, and are not deceived by any difference in type, but 
who have before them a very plain statement. — Jessel, M.R., Singer 
Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson (1876), L. R. 2 C. D. 447. 

See also Cases, 15 ; Jdiiges, 62 ; Law, 65 ; Notice to Quit ; Will, 8. 

12. We do not use to judge of cases by fractions. — Finah, L.C.J., 
Hampden's Case (1637), 3 How. St. Tr. 969. 

13. I think it is not best for us to declare our opinions by piece-meals, 
but upon all the case together, and as you are a stranger to the 
return, so are we ; and there be many precedents and acts of Parlia- 
ment not printed, which we must see. — Hyde, C.J., Proceedings on 
Habeas Corpus— Sir T. Darnel and others (1627), 3 How. St. Tr. 31. 

See ielow, 14. 

14. As a general rule, I beg that it may be understood, that a case is 
not to be cut into parts, but that when it is known what the question 
in issue is, it must be met at once. — Lord EUenborough, Rees v. Smith 
and others (1816), 2 Starkie, 32. 

See also 7, above ; Evidence, 24 ; Pleadings, 11. 

15. No system of judicature can be suggested in which occasionally 
failure to insure complete justice may not arise.' — Hawkins, J., The 
Queen v. Miles (1890), L. R. 24 Q. B. 433. 

See also Cases, 21 ; Chanoeey, 10 ; Ckiminal Justice, 29, 36 ; 
Evidence, 22 ; Judges, 17 ; Law, 55, 62 ; Mistakes ; Parliament, 
3, n. ; Statutes, 2 ; Will, 18, n. 

16. It has been often said that Courts of justice have nothing to do with 
what are called principles of honour, and there is a weU-known case in 

' Mr. SneU's excellent definition of principles of natural justice ; for there 

luity appropriately illustrates this : are many matters of natural justice which 

Squity in its general sense is that quality the Courts have wholly unprovided for, 

the transactions of mankind which partly from the diflSculty of framing rules 

cords with natural justice, or with to meet them and partly from the donbt- 

nesty and right. . . . But in its ful policy of attempting to give a legal 

:idical sense, that is to say, as admin- sanction to duties of so-called imperfect 

ered by the Courts, equity embraces obligation, such as charity, justice and 

jurisdiction much less wide than the kindness." — .SneZZ, Eq. Part I., Ch. l,p. 1. 

1 2 

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Administration of Justice — continued. 

the books, with which those who practise in the Courts are very 
familiar, in which, upon a counsel saying to Lord Thurlow, " Your 
lordship must think in point of honour" so and so. Lord Thurlow 
said, "Upon that ground you must apply to the person himself; I 
do not give any opinion upon that subject." — Lord Cranworth, Smiths. 
Kay(1859), 7H.L.Cas.773. 

17. Upon your honour, sir ! pray speak by your honesty. — Hyde, C.J., 
Turner's Case (1664), 6 How. St. Tr. 596. 

See Law, 26. 

18. If we were sitting in a court of honour, our decision might be 
diSerent?— Fry, L.J., In re Cawley & Co. ; Ex parte HaUett (1889), 
58 L. J. Rep. C. D. 645. 

See also Chanoeey, 9 ; Judges, 29 ; Law, 40 ; Moeals, 3 ; Public 
Policy, 7. 

19. Where a real ground is laid, the Court wiU take care that justice is 
done to the defendant as well as to the plaintiff. — Lord' Mansfield, 
Mostyn v. Fabrigas (1775), Cowp. 161. 

See 1, 10, above ; Criminal Justice, 7 ; Evidence, 21 ; Juet, 8 ; 
Practice, 26. 

20. I desire that after I have given the judgment of the Court, that 
judgment may not be talked about ; I have given it upon my oath, 
and am answerable to my country for it. I have been before reminded 
that these things are not passing in a comer, but ia the open face of 
the world ; I hope I need not be admonished that I am to administer 
justice ; if I have done amiss, let the wrath and indignation of Parliar 
ment be brought out against me ; let me be impeached ; I am ready 
to meet the storm whenever it comes, having at least one protection ; 
the consciousness that I am right.^ In protecting the dignity of the 
Court, I do the best thing I can do for the public : for if my conduct 
here is extra-judiciaUy arraigned, the administration of justice is 
arraigned and affronted, and that no man living shall do with 
impunity. — Lord Kenyan, Proceedings against the Dean of St. Asaph 
(1783), 21 How. St. Tr. 875. 

See also Contempt of Court, 9 ; Courts, 3, 4 ; Judges, 19, 26, 37, 73 ; 
Jltjicial Proceedings, 11 ; Politics, 4. 

21. I win not suffer any impertinent interposition in causes, in those 

' " We think the conscience of the case right I know not. It is enough for me as 

is entirely on your side."— Zm'd Mans- an Englishman to be myself satisfied that 

Jield, James v. Price (1773), LofEt. 221. I have done so."— Trialqf Sir F. Burdett 

2 See also per Best, J. : "Whether I (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 120. 
shall persuade others that I have acted 

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Administration of Justice — continued. 

who are no parties in the cause.' — Kenyan, L.C.J., Proceedings against 
the Dean of St. Asaph (1783), 21 How. St. Tr. 862. 
See also CoKTEarPT of Court, 2 ; Judges, 19, n. ; Toet, 8. 

22. A man may judge impartially even in his own cause. — Lord Mansfield, 
Rex V. Cowle (1759), 2 Burr. Part IV., p. 863. 

23. It is of the last importance that the maxim that no man is to be a 
judge in his own cause should be held sacred. And that is not to be 
confined to a cause in which he is a party, but apphes to a cause in 
which he has an interest.^ — Lord Campbell, Dimes v. Proprietors of the 
Grand Junction Canal and others (1852), 3 H. L. Cas. 993. 

24. As to any inconveniences that may be suggested from imagination, 
" the heeping strictly to the rule of not permitting a man to he judge 
in his own cause," is of more consequence than any such supposed 
inconveniences can weigh against.* — Lee, C.J., Rex v. Inhabitants of 
Great Chart (1742), Burrow (Settlement Cases), 197.* 

25. The maxim " that no man shaU. be a judge in his own cause," is 
founded on the palpable inconsistency between the situations of party 
and Judge, which must prevent the decisions of any one uniting both 
characters from being satisfactory, even though they should be per- 
fectly just.— raZ/ourd, J., Brownlow v. Egerton (1854), 23 L. J. Rep. 
Part 5 (N. S.) Ch., p. 361. 

26. Of course the rule is very plain, that no man can be plaintiff or 

1 Interference ■with the course of justice interested: he therefore could not be a 
by a stranger to the suit, a high public judge." 

injury.— SAynoortA'* Case (1866), L. B. 3 * "I cannot help transcribing from the 

Q. B. 230. See also infra. Judges, 81. Year-look of 8 H. 6 " (says the Eeporter) 

2 Iniquum est aliquem rei sues esse "a very singular passage. It is in 
jiidieem. In propria causa nemo judex to. 20 J. Serj. Rolf, who argued for the 
git. — 12 Co. 13. Chancellor of Oxenford, says : " Jeo vou3 

Judex lion potest esse testis in propria dirra un fable. En aucuus temps fuit un 

eawsd. — 1 Trust. %Ti. Pape ; et aver' fait un graund offence. 

Judex non potest injuriam siU datam Et le Cardinal:! viendroient a luy, et 

punire. — 12 Co. 113. disoient a Inj—Peocafti. Et il dit — 

JVemo debet esse judex in propria sua Judica me. Et ils disoient — mn pos- 

causa. \2Rep.\Vi. sumus ; quia Caput es Ecolesiae : Judiea 

" It is against reason," says Littleton Te ipmm. Et 1 Apostoil dit — Judloo me 

(sect. 212), " that if wrong be done any cremari ; Et fuit combustus. Et en 

man that he thereof should be his own ce'cas, il fuit son Juge demesne : Etapres 

judge " ; and Lord Coke, in commenting fuit un Seint." " Et iffint," says the 

on this passage says, " it is a maxim in Serjeant, " n'est pas inconvenient, que un 

law, aliquis non debet esse judex in pro- Home soit son Juge demesne." 
pi-ia camsa. " Olaus Magnus (de Gentibus Septentno- 

3 The three other Judges [Chappie, nalibus) teUs a like story of a northern 
"Wright and Denison JJ.] were unani- king, who was hanged in pursuance of his 
mous, and held it to be a fundamental own sentence : But it don't appear that 
rule of reason, and of natural justice, he was afterwards made a samt.' — irf. 
"'that no nian can be judge in his own p. 197, n. 

cause.' Mr. Yoke is here stated to be 

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Administration of Justice — eovtinued. 

prosecutor in> any action, and at the same time sit in judgment to 
decide in that particular case, either in his own case, or in any case 
where he brings forward the accusation or complaint in which the 
order is made. — Cotton, L.J., Leeson v. General Council of Medical 
Education and Registration (1889), L. R. 43 C. D. 379. 

27. It is exceedingly desirable that justice should be administered by 
persons who could not be suspected of any, even indirectly, interested 
motive.^— MeZZor, J., Reg. v. AUan (1864), 4 B. & S. 915 ; 33 L. J. 
Mag. Cas. 98. 

28. Nothing can be more important than to maintain intact the principle 
that a man shall not be a judge in his own cause, and to preserve 
every tribunal which has to adjudicate upon the rights, or status, or 
property of any of Her Majesty's subjects from any suspicion of 
partiality." — Davey, L.J., Allinson v. General Council of Medical 
Education and Registration (1894), L. R. [1894], 1 Q. B. p. 764. 

See also Judges, 38, 58, 61. 

29. In the administration of justice, whether by a recognised legal Court 
or by persons who, although not a legal public Court, are acting in a 
similar capacity, public policy requires that, in order that there should 
be no doubt about the purity of the administration, any person who is 
to take part in it shoxild not be in such a position that he might be 
suspected of being biassed.— Lord Esher, M.R., Allinson v. General 
Council of Medical Education and Registration (1894), L. R. [1894], 
1 Q. B. p. 758. 

See above, 28, and references tliere given. 

1 The first maxim of a free State is, The legislature should legislate, i.e., con- 
that the laws be made by one set of men, struct grand laws on scientific principles 
and administered by another ; in other of jurisprudence, but it must respect the 
words, that the legislative and judicial independence of the Executive as it desires 
characters be kept separate. — Archdeacon its own independence to be respected. It 
Paley, " Principles of Moral and Pohtical must not criticise the Government, and, 
Philosophy," Bl£. 6, c. 8. " The judicial," as its legislative labours are essentially of 
writes Lord Brougham, " ought to be kept a scientific kind, there can be no reason 
entirely distinct from the legislative and why its debates should be reported." 
executive power in the State. This separa- Napoleon to Sieyes, quoted by Sir J. Seeley 
tion is necessary both to secure the inde- in " Introduction to Political Science," 216. 
pendence of the judicial functions and to a It is of the greatest importance that 
prevent their being influenced by the the administration of justice should not 
interests of party or by the voice of the only be free from spot or blame, but that 
people." — British ConstitutioJi, 322, 323. it should be, so far as human infirmity 

" No one," Napoleon is reported to have could allow it to become, as free from aU 

said, "can have greater respect for the suspicion. — Lord Ellenbormigh, C.J., 

independence of the legislative power than Baylev,Z., King r. Hunt (1820), 2 Chit. 

I : but legislation does not mean finance, Eep. 134. The administration of justice 

criticism of the administration, or ninety- should not only be chaste, but should not 

nineoutof the hundred things with which even be suspected. — Blac. Comm. Bk. 3, 

in England the Parliament occupies itself. Ch. 25, p. 380. 

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Administration of Justice — continued. 

30. It is always difficult, as it seems to me, for a man to decide between 
kis duty and his interests ; that is acknowledged upon aU hands.— 
Gave, J., In re Marten (1888), L. R. 21 Q. B. 34. 

31. No man should be allowed to have an interest against' his duty. — 
Lord EUe^orough, Thompson v. Havelock (1808), 1 Camp. 528. 

32. I have acted upon this occasion with the firmness which the times 
in which we live particularly require, but I trust I have not lost sight 
of that which ought in all times to guide a Judge in this country, 
where every magistrate is reminded by the oath of his Sovereign, that 
it is his first duty to administer justice in mercy .^ — Best, J., Trial of 
Sir F. Burdett (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 120. 

See also Criminal Jostioe, 23 ; Law, 48 ; Paedon, 3 ; Punishment, 
5 ; Trial for Life, 1. 

33. The interest of the public is never better advanced than when we 
can inculcate by our rules the advantage of acting honestly. — Lord 
Kenyon, C.J., Cuming v. Sharland (1801), 1 East, 413. 

See also Discretion, 9 ; Judges, 38, 76 ; Practice, 17, 25 ; 
Reasonable, 4. 

34. Qvxint al Judge & Officer, le general regie prise en nostre Livers, est, 
lou le Court ad jurisdiction, nul action gist vers le Judge ou Officer : 
" No action wiU lie against a judge of record for any matter done by 
him in the exercise of his judicial functions." — Powel, J., Gwinne 
V. Poole (1692), Lutw. 935, 1560.^ 

See helow, 35. 

35. This freedom from action and question at the suit of an individual 
is given ^y the law to the Judges, not so much for their own sake as 
for the sake of the public, and for the advancement of justice, that 
being free from actions they may be free in thought and independent 

1 The Judge dispenses mercy ; mercy is " guilty with extenuating circumstances." 

the prerogative of the Crown. The Judge We do it rudely by the jury's recom- 

pronounces the law's doom ; it is the mendation to mercy. But motives are 

privilege of the Sovereign to modify and often misrepresented and misunderstood 

mitigate a sentence according to the out of Court, where the facts that call for 

circumstances of the case. The crime is mitigation are not known. The public 

not always the measure of guilt. A small look broadly at the crime and take no 

crime may involve greater criminality account of the circumstances of the 

than a great crime ; a great crime may criminal, and they exclaim against lenity, 

have less of guilt in it than a small one. or against severity, ignorant of the causes 

The law cannot measure this — at least our that in either case determine the actual 

law does so but imperfectly ; and public amount of criminality, 

opinion still more imperfectly. In a See also Floyd v. Barker, 12 Co. 24 ; 

France, provision is made for such a Dr. Groenveldt v. Dr. Burwell and others, 

frequent state of things, by the power 1 Ld. Baym. 454 ; Hamond v. Howell, 1 

given to the jury of finding a verdict of Mod. 184 ; 2 Mod. 218. 

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Administration of Justice— eontintied. 

in judgment, as all who are to administer justice ought to be. And 
it is not to be supposed beforehand that those who are selected for 
the administration of justice wiU make an iU use of the authority 
vested in them.' Even inferior justices, and those not of record, 
cannot be called in question for an error in judgment, so long as they 
act within the bounds of their jurisdiction.'' In the imperfection of 
human nature' it is better, even, that an individual should occasionally 
suffer a wrong,* than that the general course of justice should be 
impeded and fettered by constant and perpetual restraints and 
apprehensions on the part of those who are to administer it.^ 
Corruption is quite another matter ; so, also, are neglect of duty and 
misconduct in it. For these, I trust, there is and always wiU be 
some due course of punishment by public prosecution.^ — Lord 
Tenterden, C.J., Garnett v. Ferrand (1827), 6 B. & C. 624, 625.' 
See above, 34 ; Counsel, 12, 13, n. 


1. A man shall not sue in the Admiralty, only because it is a ship.® — 
HoU, C.J.. Shermoulin v. Sands (1697), 1 Raym. 272. 

1 See Judges, 20, n. ; 27 ; Public 
Servant, 8. 
" See Magibteates, 4, 6. 
' See Miscellaneous, 63. 

* See TOET, 23. 

• See CoMMEECE, i ; Disceetion, 12 ; 
Bquitt, 8 ; Public Policy, 9. 

" See Discretion, 9. 

'' See also R. «. Mather, 2 Barnard, 249 ; 
R. «. Jackson, 1 T. R. 653 ; R. v. Borron, 
3 B. & Aid. 432 ; B. n. Badger, 7 Jur. 
(0. S.) 216 ; and other cases cited in Hawk. 
P. C. b. 2, c. 8, s. 74. For a conviction 
made maliciously and without any reason- 
able or probable cause, in case such con- 
viction shall have been quashed, there is 
an action upon the case, by stat. 43 
Geo. III. c. 141 (see Burley v. Bethune, 5 
Taunt. 583). The doctrine which holds 
a Judge exempt from a civil suit or indict- 
ment for any act done or omitted to be 
done by him sitting as Judge, has a deep 
root in the common law. It is to be found 
in the earliest judicial records, and it has 
been steadily maintained by an undis- 
turbed current of decisions in the English 
Courts, amidst every change of policy and 
through every revolution of their Govern- 
ment. A ishort view of their cases will 
teach us to admire the wisdom of our 

forefathers and to revere a principle on 
which rests the independence of the 
administration of justice. — Chan. Kent, 
Tates V. Lansing, 5 Johns. (U. S.) Rep. 

8 This dictum relates to Admiralty 
jurisdiction. It is explained by a remark 
of Dr. Lushington in the judgment of the 
Case of r/te Volara (1842), 1 W. Bob. 387 : 
" The jurisdiction of the Court does not 
depend upon the existence of the ship, 
but upon the origin of the question to be 
decided, and the locality." Now under 
the Judicature Acts certain matters are 
assigned to the Admiralty Division, so 
that the question of jurisdiction is set at 
rest ; but before the Judicature Acts there 
were many decisions on whether actions 
of certain classes lay within the Admiralty 
jurisdiction or not. As far back as the 
reign of Edward III. it exercised juris- 
diction : 1, over matter of prize, &c. ; 2, 
over delicts and ofiences in British ports 
and over the high seas ; 3, over contracts 
and other matters regulated by the laws 
of Oleron and other special Ordinances ; 
and 4, over maritime causes in general, 
but still under the Admiralty Court Act, 
1861 (24 Vict. c. 10), it was not properly 
a Court of record and could not fine, yet 

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Admiralty — coiitinued. 

2. I for one will not re-open the floodgates of Admiralty jurisdiction upon 
the people of this country. — Lord Esher, M.R., The Queen v. Judge of 
City of London Court (1891), L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 299. 

3. The difficulty of dealing with Admiralty Reports by way of authority 
is, that there is no necessity in that Court that the Judge should, in 
the exposition of the grounds of his judgment, discriminate strictly 
between the proposition of law which is to be satisfied by all the facts 
of the case, and the rule of interpretation of the direct facts of 
maritime vicissitudes given in evidence, by which he desires to bind 
himseM and his successors as to the inference of fact he and they 
ought, as a general rule, to draw from those facts. — Brett, L.J., 
Akerblom v. Price (1881), L. R. 7 Q. B. 132. 


No admission of the party . . . can make that legal which is in its 
nature illegal.— As^ifewrst, J., Atherfold v. Beard (1788), 1 T. R. 615. 
See also Consent, and references therefrom; Peactice, 24. 


1. We cannot try the merits upon affidavit.^ — Lord Mansfield, Rex ». 
Blooer (1760), 2 Burr. Part IV. 1045. 
See Practice, 11. 

by the custom of the Court, it could are matters to be considered besides that 

amerce the defendant for his default at its the subject-matter is a ship or that the 

discretion. (The Case of the Admiralty cause of action occurred in connection 

(1609) (7 Jac. I.), 6 Eep. Pt. XIII. 53 ; 6 with one. 

viner's Abridg. 521). American cases ' This means that an affidavit states 
have decided that the jurisdiction is facts, and if those facts are denied, the 
founded for the most part on the subject- deponent, as we know, can be cross- 
matter : Gardner v. The New Jersey, 1 examined on his affidavit. But they 
Pet. Adm. 241. (The whole subject is (affidavits) are only used, as a rule, in inter- 
now laid down in Parsons on Admiralty locutory applications and in chambers, 
Law, V. 11, p. 506.) But in our law the and when the merits of a matter are con- 
place has also been important, and tested, the issue is sent into Court where 
formerly the local limits of Admiralty witnesses are examined, and it is tried 
jurisdiction were very doubtful. Thus like an issue in a suit. That in fact, 
the Courts did not take cognizance of affidavit and counter-affidavits are not 
torts in any foreign river, save in Turkish sufficiently facile and flexible to enable 
waters (l?ie Ida (1860), 1 Lush. 8) ; also the Court or Judge satisfactorily to 
Admii-alty causes must be causes arising adjudicate on a. contested issue. Oral 
wholly upon the sea and not within the examination and cross-examination in 
precincts of any country, either by land or open Court are more desirable. Formerly 
water nor of any vreeck of the sea, for that in Chancery actions, evidence was given 
must 'be cast on land before it becomes by affidavit, before the Judicature Acts 
a wreck (E v. Forty -nine Casks of Brandy had amalgamated the procedure, and at 
(1836) 3 Hag. Adm. 282). Therefore in present evidence can only be taken by 
short this ruling of Lord Holt means that, affidavit by consent. As a proof of the 
to give the Admiralty jurisdiction, there unsatisfactory nature of affidavits to 

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Affidavit — eontimted. 

2. So many affidavits, so studiously and artfully penned, to be safely 
sworn in one sense and read in another, are an aggravation. — 
Urd Mansfield, Rex v. Beardmore (1759), 2 Burr. Part IV. 795. 

See also Criminal Justice, 36; Evidence, 2, 3, 22; Jury, 26; 
Pleadings, 11. 

3. "We cannot suffer a person by his affidavit to arraign the whole 
justice of the country and its administration. — Abbott, C.J., Case of 
Edmonds and others (1821), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 924. 

See also Bible, 1, n. 


Every general reprisal is a hostile aggression. — Heath, J., Beale v. 
Thompson (1803), 3 Bos. & PuU. 426. 


1. Blessed is the mending hand.* — Twisden, J. 

2. Whatever at common law might be amended in civil cases, was at 
common law amendable in criminal, and so it is at this day. — 
Holt, CJ., Poioell and Pmms, JJ., The Queen v. Tutchin (1704), 
1 Salk. 51 pi. 14. 

3. The rule is " that whilst all is in paper, you may amend." — Lord 
Mansfield, Bondfield v. Milner, (1760) 2 Burr. Part IV., p. 1099. 

4. "Mr. Attorney, I have often heard say, 'Blessed is the mending 
hand.' " — Sir George Jefferies, L.C.J., Trial of Sir S. Bamardiston 
(1684), 9 How. St. Tr. 1,366, 1,637. 

5. Amendments ought not to be made, except in cases where the alteration 
is of such a nature as that no one can be misled by it. — Lord Alvanley, 
C.J., Ex parte Motley et uxm- (1801), 1 Bos. & Pull. 456. 

6. We must judge upon the case as stated. If it is mis-stated, you 
must apply to amend it. — Lord Mansfield, Doe v. Lewis (1758), 
1 Burr. Part IV., p. 617. 

7. I am very free to own that the strong bias of my mind has always 
leaned to prevent the manifest justice of a cause from being defeated 
or delayed by formal slips, which arise from the inadvertence of 

decide a case upon its merits, it has been i This quotation in regard to amend- 

ruled that although there has been an ments is attributed to Sir Thomas TwUden, 

agreement to give evidence by affidavit a Judge of the Court of King's Bench, 

and the affidavits have been read, yet the 1660—1682. See 12 How. St. Tr. 258. 

Court may order the witnesses to be But Coke attributes it to Sir Edm. 

examined orally. — Lutelly.Wallis[\8ii'6), Plowden. See concluding portion of 

.153 L. J. Ch. 494. Coke's Epilogue in 4 Co. Inst, (at the end 

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Amendments — continued. 

gentlemen of the profession ; because it is extremely hard on the 
party to be tnmed round, and put to expense, from such mistakes of 
the counsel or attorney he employs. It is hard, also, on the 
profession.' — Lord Mansfield, Bristow v. Wright (1781), 2 Doug. 666. 

8. It is between the stirrup and the ground, Brother ; but you 
may amend by replying.^ — Tindal, C.J., Spincer v. Spincer (1841), 
5 Jul-. (0. S.) 102. 

9. The test as to whether the amendment should be allowed is whether 
or not the defendants can amend without placing the plaintiff in such 
a position that he cannot be recouped, as it were, by any allowance of 
costs or otherwise. — Pollock, B., Steward v. Metropolitan Tramways 
Co. (1885), 16 Q. B. D. 180. 

10. However negligent or careless may have been the first omission, how- 
ever late the proposed amendment, the amendment should be allowed 
if it can be made without injustice to the other side. There is no 
injustice if the other side can be compensated by costs. — Brett, M.R., 
Clarapede & Co. v. Commercial Union Association (1883), 32 W. R. 262. 

11. My practice has always been to give leave to amend imless I have 
been satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that 
by his blunder, he had done some injury to his opponent which could 
not be compensated for by costs or otherwise.— JSramieell, L.J., 
Tildesley v. Harper (1878), L. R. 10 C. D. 396. 

12. I have said frequently, and I repeat it, that there is no Judge on 
the bench who is more wiUing to allow amendments, even at the last 
moment, than I, provided there is no surprise. — Kekevnch, J., James 
V. Smith (1890), L. R. 1 C. D. [1891], p. 389. 

13. I do not think I ought to allow an amendment for the mere purpose 
of enabling the defendant to raise a purely technical objection to the 
plaintiff's title to sue.— Fry, J., Collette v. Goode (1878), 7 C. D. 847. 

14. An amendment ought not to be allowed if it wiU occasion injustice ; 

but if it can do no injustice, and wiU only save expense, it ought to 

be made.— Lord Esher, M.R., Roberts v. Plant (1895), L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 

[1895], p. 603. 

of the volume), where he says : " And we clerical error ought not to hurt. — JenJi. 

will conclude with the aphorisme of that Cent. 23. 

great lawyer and sage of the law, Edm. a This was in reply to Serjt. Stephens, 

Plowden (which we have heard him often who had asked for leave to amend his 

say) Messed be the amending hand." For plea. 

a full exposition of the rise and history of " Between the stirrup and the ground 

amendments, see 1 BLbk. 3, c. 25, p. 407 ; He mercy sought and mercy found." 

also per Lord Mansjield in Bex. ■». Wilkes, See Eomancbs. 

4 Burr. Part. IV. 2567. With regard to the term " Brother " in 

' Vitimit cleriei nocere nan debet : A this quotation, see post, JUDKES, 53, n. 

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Amendments — continued. 

15. I do not mean to say that the Court could not give leave to amend, 
but I cannot conceive that the Conrt wonld listen to an application 
for leave to amend after the trial. That could not have been intended : 
it would be opposed to aU principles of justice.— Lindley, M.R., Lowe 
V. Lowe (1899), L. R. P. D. C. A. [1899], p. 209. 

American Decisions. 

1. We shoxdd treat with great respect the opinion of eminent American 
lawyers on points which arise before us, but the practice, which seems 
to be increasing, of quoting American decisions as authorities, in the 
same way as if they were decisions of our own Courts, is wrong. 
Among other things it involves an inquiry, which often is not an easy 
one, whether the law of America on the subject in which the point 
arises is the same as our own.— Lord Halsbury, L.C., In re Missouri 
Steamship Company (1889), L. R. 42 C. D. 330.' 

2. Arguments from the American statute are not of much force, because 
Englishmen are not bound to know it. — Pollock, C.B., Attorney- 
General V. SUlem and others (1864). The Alexandra, 12 W. R. 261. 

3. Decisions in the American Courts are entitled to great respect, but 
are not binding here ; and there are many circumstances affecting 

' " I also have been struck by the waste 
of time ocoasioaed by the growing practice 
of citing American authorities. — Fry, 
L.J., id. 

" I have often protested against the 
citation of American authorities." — Cotton, 
L.J., id. 

" I have no power to follow the 
authorities cited to me from the United 
States if by so doing I were to coutravene 
the law of England." — Butt, J., The Avon 
and Thomas JoUffe (1890), L. R. 1 Pro. 
Div., p. 8. 

" To us the judgments of Courts in the 
United States are merely what our 
decisions have been to them. To us they 
are merely the opinions of eminent and 
learned men on a question of law, which 
is common to them and to us. Eminent 
Judges have given their opinion one way, 
and other eminent Judges have given their 
opinion another way." — James, L.J., The 
Queen V. Castro (1880), L. E. 5 Q. B. D. 
603. Also pf.r Lord Watson, Castro v. 
The Queen (1881), L. R. 6 App. Gas. 249 ; 
50 L. J. Q. B. 507. 

"I need hardly say that I am always 
anxious to hear if there be any American 

decisions bearing upon the question before 
me, not because they are binding authori- 
ties upon me, but in order that I may get 
the very assistance which I have over and 
over again derived from the decisions of 
accomplished Judges, who are dealing with 
what is very much the same law as our 
own." — Brett, L.J., The Queen c. Castro 
(1880), L. R. 5 Q. B. D.516. 

" Although American decisions are not 
binding on us in this countrj', I have 
always found those on insurance law to be 
based on sound reasoning and to be such 
as ought to be carefully considered by us 
and with an earnest desire to endeavour 
to agree with them." — Brett, L.J., Cory 
V. Burr (1882), L. R. 9 Q. B, D. i69. 

" Although the decisions of the American 
Courts are of course not binding on us, 
yet the sound and enlightened views of 
American lawyers in the administration 
and development of the law — a law, 
except so far as altered by statutory 
enactment, derived from a common source 
with our own — entitle their decisions to 
the utmost respect and coniidence on our 
part." — CocJtburn, C.J., Scaramanga v. 
Stamp (1880), L. R. 5 Com. PL Div. 303. 

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American Decisions — continued. 

questions arising between the laws of different States which may or 
may not be applicable to qu-sstions arising lieTe.^—Kekewieh, J., In re 
De Nicols. De Nicols v. Cnrlieb (1898), L. R. 1 C. D. [1898], p. 410. 


I hope that there is no jealousy, or even ground of jealousy, on the part 
of the Americans, but that they know that when their rights come to 
be discussed here the greatest attention will be paid to their interests. 
They have long been acquainted with the habits of this country, and 
with the mode of administering justice here : until within these few 
years their causes used to come over here to be discussed, and I never 
heard that the decisions in our Courts ever awakened the least 
jealousy in the breasts of the inhabitants of that country. — Lard 
Kenyan, C.J., Wilson v. Marryat (1798), 8 T. R. 44. 


The inhabitants have a right to take their amusements in a lawful way. — 
Eeath, J., Fitch v. Fitch (1797), 2 Esp. 544. 


1. It is the glory and happiness of our excellent constitution, that to 
prevent any injustice no man is to be concluded by the first judgment ; 
but that if he apprehends himself to be aggrieved, he has another 
Court to which he can resort for relief ; for this purpose the law 
furnishes him with appeals, with writs of error and false judgment.— 
Pratt, L.C.J., King v. Chancellor, &c., of the University of Cambridge 
(1720), 1 Str. Rep. 564. 
See helow, 4 ; Judicial Pboceedings, 11 ; Justice, 6 ; Nonsuit. 

' See also per Brum well and Cotton, American Courts adopt a principle of the 

LL.JJ., in Bradlaugh v. The Queen (1878), Eomau law compelling the creditor to sue 

L. E. 3 Q. B. D. 620, 640 ; and also the the principal debtor before having recourse 

following ^er Lord Watson in Huntington to the sureties. It is not adopted in our 

V. AttriU, 62 L. J. Eep. P. C. C. 1893, law but in most countries which follow 

p. 49 : " A number of American authorities the Roman civil law, and is quoted to 

were cited in the course of the argument, show that American principles are not 

which may be briefly noticed, seeing that always in accord with our own : " A rule 

they were made the subject of comment of such general adoption shows that there 

in both Courts below." And per Fry, J., is nothing in it inconsistent with the 

in Steel v. Dixon (1881), L. E. 17 C. D. relative rights and duties of principal and 

831 : " In coming to that conclusion, as T surety, and that it accords with a common 

do upon principle, I am much strengthened sense of justice and the natural equity of 

by the American authorities to which my mankind." — Chancellor Kent, Hayes v. 

attention has been caWeA."— Id. 50 L. J. Ward 1819), 4 Johns. (U. S.) Ch. Eep. 

Ch. 593. 132. 

The following statement shows that the 

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Appeals — continued. 

2. I tliink it beyond question that it is generally the duty of an 
appellate Judge to leave undisturbe'd a decision of which he does not 
clearly disapprove. I conceive that, in our Court, as in the civil law, it 
is the lade that " gravely to doubt is to affirm." — Knight Bruce, L.J., 
The Attorney-General v. The Corporation of Beverley (1854), 24 L. J. 
Rep. (N. S.) Part 7, Chan. p. 376. 

See Judges, 49. 

3. It is needless to enter into many reasons for quashing the conviction, 
when one alone is fully sufficient. — Lord Mansfield, Rex v. Jarvis 
(1756), 1 Burr. Part IV., p. 152. 

See also Magistrates, infra. 

4. It has not been deemed improper by the best of Judges to say that 
it would be a satisfaction not to them only, but to the profession at 
large, if a point of novelty and difficulty were taken to the Court of 
A^peaV—Eekewich, J., In re England, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. [1895], p. 109. 

See also above, 1 ; Ceimqial Justice, 1, n. ; Privy Council. 

5. If no appeal were possible, I have no great hesitation in. saying that 
this would not [be a desirable country to live in. . . . It is quite 
true that there is enough difficulty in appeaUng as it is ; but if there 
is to be no appeal at aU possible the system would be intolerable. — 
Bowen, L.J., The Queen v. Justices of County of London, &c. (1893), 

L.R. 2Q.B. 492. 

6. A decision of the House of Lords requires no sanction.^- — Kekewieh, J., 
In re Weall, Andrews v. Weall (1889), L. R. 42 Ch. D. 679. 

See also Judges, 48, n. ; 56, «. ; Parliament, 18, 19, supra. See also 
Privy Council. 

7. A solemn decision of a competent Judge is by no means to be 
disregarded, and I ought not to overrule it without being clearly 

1 I should be desirous that my opinion Zord Lamgdale, M.R., "Wilson v. Eden 

should not be conclusive on the parties, if (1850), 12 Beav. 459. 
there were any mode by which our judg- I trust I have not misinterpreted the 

ment could be reviewed in a Court of views of the Court of Appeal in a matter 

eTvov.— Lord Xenyon, C.J., Petrie v. of so much importance, and, further, that 

White (1789), 3 T. K. 9. it I have, any misconceptions of mine 

I am desirous that the case should be may be speedily removed by the decision 

brought under the consideration of a of a higher tribunal. — Stirling, J., Vemer 

higher tribunal, without any unnecessary v. General, &c. Trust (1894), L. E. 2 C. D. 

delay, and to afford eveiy facility in my [1894], p. 260. 

power for the correction of any error into 2 A decision of the House of Lords upon 

which T may have fallen.— ior^ Langdale, a question of law is conclusive, and binds 

M.R., Tullett 4). Armstrong (1838), 1 the House in subsequent cases. An 

Beav. 31. erroneous decision can be set right only by 

, It is a great satisfaction for me to find, an Act of Parliament.— iomrfoM Street 

that this matter will undergo investigation Tramways Co. •^. London Courtty Council 

elsewhere, before it is finally decided.— (1898), L. E. Ap. Ca. [1898], 375. 

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Appeals — continued, 

satisfied in my own mind that the decision is erroneous. — Lord 
Langdcde, M.R., Ward v. Painter (1839), 2 Beav. 93. 
See also Judges, 49 ; Jddioial Decisions, 7. 


Many cases occur, in which it is perfectly clear, that by means of a 
reference to arbitration, the real interests of the parties will be much 
better satisfied than they could be by any litigation in a Court of 
justice. — Lord Langdale, M.R., The Earl of Mexborough v. Bower 
(1843), 7 Beav. 132. 
See also Compromise ; Evidence, 33, n. 


1. The British army has fought for the establishment of our nation, and 
on all these occasions it is known that the disciphne which exists in 
that army has not destroyed its spirit. It is, thank God, what it was, 
still ; and they will meet again with the same spirit when called on on 
a future occasion, and I hope and trust, whether men mean it or not, 
no man wiU be able to render a British soldier other than he is, one of 
the most respectable. — Best, J., King v. Burdett (1820), 1 St. Tr. 

See also Schoolmaster, 3. 

2. A Serjeant is a soldier with a halbert, and a drummer is a soldier 
with a drum. — Denison, J., lioyd v. Wooddall (1748), 1 Black. 30. 


1. I vnsh to say a word or two about the position of the Attorney-General, 
because in my judgment it is of importance in this case, and his 
position appears likely to be lost sight of. Everybody knows that he 
is the head of the English Bar. We know that he has had from the 
earliest times to perform high judicial functions which are left to his 
discretion to decide. For example, where a man who is tried for his 
life and convicted alleges that there is error on the record, he cannot 
take advantage of that error unless he obtains the fiat of the Attorney- 
General, and no Court in the Kingdom has any controlling jurisdiction 
over him. That perhaps is the strongest case that can be put as to the 
position of the Attorney-General in exercising judicial functions. 
Another case in which the Attorney-General is pre-eminent is the 
power to enter a Twlle prosequi in a criminal case.' I do not say that 

I See also post, POLITICS, i, n. ; General of England, p. 109. Apropos ot 

Sovereignty, 9 ; and the author's trea- this quotation, it may be interesting to 

tise upon the Law and Privileges relating relate an anecdote told on the subject of 

to the Attorney-General and Solicitor- the absolute authority of the Attorney- 

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Attorney-General — aontirmed. 

when a case is before a Judge a prosecutor may not ask the Judge to 
allow the case to be withdrawn, and the Judge may do so if he is 
satisfied that there is no case ; but the Attorney-General alone has 
power to enter a nolle prosequi, and that power is not subject to any 
control. Another case is that of a criminal information at the suit of 
the Attorney-General, a practice which has, I am sorry to say, feUen 
into disuse. The issue of such an information is entirely in the 
discretion of the Attorney-General, and no one can set such an 
information aside. There are other cases to which I could refer to be 
found in old and in recent statutes, but I have said enough to show 
the high judicial functions which the Attorney-General performs.— 
A. L. Smith, L.J., Reg. v. GomptroUer-General of Patents (1899), L. R. 
Q. B. D.Vol. 1[1899], p. 913. 
See also Judges, 79. 

2. Though the mere opinion of an Attorney- or Solicitor-G«neral ought not 
to be cited, yet coupled with the fact, it may have some weight as 
showing the general sense of professional men. — Ashhurst, J., King v. 
Pasmore (1789), 3 T. R. 243. 

3. At common law, the Attorney-General is, when he is exercising his 
functions as an officer of the Crown, in no case that I know of a Court 
in the ordinary sense. — Bowen, L.J., In the matter of Van Gelder's 
Patent (1888), 6 Rep. Pat. Cas. 28. 


The Court must have ministers : the attornies are its ministers. — Yates, J., 
Mayor of Norwich v. Berry (1766), 4 Burr. Part IV., p. 2115. 
See also Counsel, 20 ; Legal Profession, 1 ; Solicitoe and Client, 1 ; 
Witness, 3. 

General to grant aiiolle prosegmi. It is demanded his business, was thus addressed: 

to be found in an amusing anecdote in " I come to you a prophet from the Lord, 

connection with a band of fanatics called who has sent me to thee, and would have 

the " Prophets " which existed in Chief thee grant a nolle prosequi for John 

Justice Holt's time (A.D. 1689—1710), and Atkins, his servant, whom thou hast cast 

to which he had a particular antipathy. into prison." Chief Justice Holt : " Thou 

Holt, after having dealt with one of the art a false prophet, and a lying knave. 

false prophets named Lacy, some time If the Lord God had sent thee it would 

after committed another of this brother- have been to the Attorney-General, for He 

hood, called John AtMns, to take his trial. knows that it belongeth not to the Chief 

Lacy subsequently called at the Chief Justice to grant a. nolle prosequi ; but I, 

Justice's house, and desired to see him. as Chief Justice, can grant a warrant to 

Servant : " My lord is unwell to-day, and commit thee to bear him company." This, 

cannot see company." Zacy (in a very it may be added, was immediately done, 

solemn tone) : " Acquaint your master and both prophets were convicted and 

that I must see him, for I bring a message punished. See Butt's "Life of Calamy," II., 

to him from the Lord God." The Chief pp. Ill, 112. Also CliOTp. " Lives of the 

Justice having ordered Lacy in, and Ch. Jus." Vol. 2, p. 173. 

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It is the duty of the auditor to see that the authority to charge is not 
made a pretext for extravagance or favouritism. — Luah, J., Queen v. 
Cumberlege (1877), L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 370. 
See PoBLio Servant, 7. 


1. Ideas are free. But while the author confines them to his study, they 
are like birds in a cage, which none but he can have a right to let fly : 
for till he thinks proper to emancipate them, they are under his own 
dominion. — Yates, J., Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. Part IV., 
p. 2,379. 

See Books, 1 ; Miscellaneous, 55 ; Motives, 9. 

2. It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice that a stranger should 
reap the beneficial pecuniary produce of another man's work.* — 
Willes, J., Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. Part TV., p. 2334. 

See LrrERATUBE, 2. 


Bankers have no right to establish a customary law among themselves, 
at the expence of other men. — Foster, J., Hankey v. Trotman (1746), 
1 Black. Rep. 2. 


1. Bankruptcy in my opinion ever was and yet is considered as a crime, 
whatever tradesmen may now think of it. It was anciently punished 
with corporal punishment. — Abney, J., Tribe v. Webber (1744), Willes, 
466 n. (o). 

2. Bankruptcy is considered as a crime, and the bankrupt in the old 
laws is called an offender : but it is a principle of natural justice, and 
of our law, that actus non faeit reum nisi mens sib rea. — Lord 
Kenyan, C.J., Fowler v. Padget (1798), 7 T. R. 514. 

3. A man may be a bankrupt, and yet be honest, for he may become so 
by accident, and not of purpose to deceive his creditors. — Boll, C.J., 
Rooke V. Smith (1651), Style's Rep. 274. 

4. The privileges of creditors to come in under a bankruptcy, and of 
bankrupts to be discharged, are co-extensive and commensurate. — 
Lord Eardvncke, Ex parte Groome (1740), 1 Atk. 115. 

5. Taking out a commission of bankruptcy is a weU-known mode of 
recovering a debt.— Bayley, J., Ghithrie v. Fisk (1824), 3 B & C. 183. 

1 Jure natwrm cequuni est, neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri loou- 

D.L.Q. 2 

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1 rejoice to think that since the days of Queen Elizabeth, onx laws have 

been so far humanized that a bastard child is no longer a mere thing 
to be shunned by an overseer, — whose existence is unrecognised until 
it becomes a pauper, and whose only legitimate home is a work- 
house, that it is no longer permissible to punish its unfortunate 
mother with hard labour for a year, nor its father with a whipping at 
the cart's taiF ; but that even an illegitimate child may find itself a 
member of some honest family, and that the sole obligation now cast 
upon its parents is that each may be compelled to bear his and her 
own fair share of the maintenance and education of the xmiortunate 
offspring of their common failing. — Hawkins, J., Hardy v. Atherton 
(1881), L. R. 7 Q. B. 269. 


1. I do not know how far I ought to sit here and suffer a gentleman at 
the bar to bring forward parts of the Bible in this way. It is for you, 
gentlemen of the jury, to say whether you wish to hear them read." 
—Lord Kenyan, Williams' Case (1797), 26 How. St. Tr. 683. 

2. If the purity of the Bible is to be maintained, it must be by the King, 
who is the Tiead both of our civil and religious establishments. It is 
not only his right, but it is his duty, to preserve the purity of the 
scriptures. — Lord Hermand, Manners and others v. The King's 
Printers (1826), 2 St. Tr. (N. S.) 225. 

See Religion, 1. 

3. Kissing the Book. 

Morris. My lords, I except against this Brooke. 

' SeelSBliz. 0. 3, and Datum's Justices sible for the Court to foresee when a 

of the Peace, Si. sentence begins how it will end, and, 

2 Upon reflecting upon my conduct sometimes, mischief is done before we are 
duiing the trial, I have reason to accuse sure that the sentence wiU conclude in an 
myself of improper conduct for permitting offensive manner. I must say this, to 
such arguments to be used. For, if I show that I ought not to have suffered 
remember the conduct of the Court in what was spoken upon the trial in some 
causes of this nature, I should have re- parts of the defence. — Lord SJenyon, id. 
membered the opinion of the whole Court 709. See also post, Eeligion, 1. 

in the case of the King and Woolston, in Even in affidavits, on occasions of 

2 Strange, 834. The Court would not much less importance, where there is 

endure, would not sufier anything to be impertinent matter introduced, the Court 

said against the established religion of the will not permit it to be read ; much less 

country. The order and decorum of the will they sufier such grievous and abusive 

Court, which has been observed in almost observations on the scriptures. — Lord 

every instance through my long profes- Ellenborotigh, Eaton's Case (1812), 31 

sional life, has been guarded against any- How. St. Tr. 941. See also anth, Afpi- 

thing of that kind : it has been protected davit, 3. 
by the decorum of the bar. It is impos- 

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Bible — continued. 

Court. Sir, lie is sworn, and you speak too late. 

Morris. My lord, I appeal to him -^yhether he be sworn or no. 

Brooke. Sir, I am not to answer you, but the Court. My lord, I did 

not kiss the book. 
Court} Sir, that is no matter, it's but a ceremony.^ 
Morris' Case (1649), 4 How. St. Tr. 1255. 

Bill of Lading. 

The primary office and purpose of a biU of lading, although by mercan- 
tile law and usage it is a symbol of the right of property in the 
goods, is to express the terms of the contract between the shipper and 
the shipowner. — Lord Selbome, L.C., Glyn, MiUs & Co. v. East and 
West India Dock Co. (1882), 7 App. Cas. 596. 

Bills of Sale. 
There is no darker page in the annals of Enghsh jurisprudence than 
that which contains the law relating to biUs of sale, for, recent as it 
is, it is illogical, uncertain, and fuller of doubts and difficulties than 
any other part of our law. — Gave, J., In re Yarrow Bank (1889), 
L. J. R. 59 Q. B. D. 20. 


God knows how often all of us have taken the great name of God in 
vain : or have said more than becomes us, and talked of things we 
should not do.' — Jefferies, L.J., Hampden's Case (1684), 9 How. 
St. Tr. 1103. 
See also Religion ; Teuth, 11. 

1 Cm-am : Pulenton, J., and Thorpe, B. ness of this statement (and Jefferies him- 
— ForasimilaTrulingsee^erWilleSjL.C.J., self particularly sinned in that respect — 
Omichund v. Barker (1744), WiUes' Eep. see, for example,^o«t, Criminal Justice, 
548. 20 ; Truth, 11), and if it issued as a 

2 According to Lord Campbell, when warning, it was very a propos. The 
Bradshaw, Terryll and Fountain were Judges of old, as if to give more emphasis 
appointed new Commissioners of the Great to their sayings or to show how conscien- 
Seal in 1659, the oath was administered tious they were, frequently " took God's 
to them " holding up their hands," from name in vain," or in the words of Lord 
which he conjectured that the ceremony Campbell, " talked perpetually of their 
of kistmg tlie look was then abolished. conscience" (see post. Equity, 31, m.). 
Lives of the Ld. Clian., Vol. 3, 3rd ed., which is so clearly shown by some of the 
p. 73. See the origin of lifting up the quotations given in this work. The 
hand when taking an oath, set out in expressions or exclamations "Par Dieu," 
Glove Law and Customs, by the Author " By God," "Please God," and "In God's 
(1901), p. 96. name," are of common occurrence in the 

3 There can be no doubt of the correct- Year-books and later authorities. More- 


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1. Books are published with an expectation, if not a desire, that they 
will he criticised in reviews, and if deemed valuable that parts of 
them wiU be used as affording illustrations by way of quotation, or 
the like, and if the quantity taken be neither substantial nor material, 
if, as it has been expressed by some Judges, "a fair use" only be 
made of the publication, no wrong is done and no action can be 
brought. — Lord Eatherley, Chatterton v. Cave (1877), L. R. 3 App. 
Cas. 492. 

See Author, 1. 

2. Observe reader your old books, for they are the fountains out of 
which these resolutions issue. — Lord Goke, Spencer's Case (1583), 
3 Co. 33. 


1. Many of the old cases are strange and absurd : so also are some of 
the modem ones. — Wilrmt, J., PiUans v. Van Mierop (1764), 3 Bxirr. 
Part IV., p. 1671. 

2. Some modem cases have in my opinion gone too far. — Lord Kenyon, 
Walford v. Duchess de Pienne (1797), 2 Esp. 555. 

See also Counsel, 18. 

3. In our law every case hath its stand or fall from a particular reason 
or circumstance.— Crewe, C.J., Suiy v. Pigot (1625), Popham, 166. 
See also Tudor's L. C. on Real Property (2d. ed.), 139. 

See Statutes, 3. 

4. Every case stands upon its own bottom. — Sir F. Pemherton, L.C.J., 
Fitzharris' Case (1681), 8 How. St. Tr. 280. 

5. I have the strongest disinclination, as I beUeve every other Judge 
has, that any case should be decided otherwise than upon its merits. 
—Pearson, J., Haigh v. Haigh (1885), 31 L. R. C. D. 482. Also per 
Willes, J., Taylor v. Fisher and others (1774), LofEt. 769 ; also per Lord 
Ealsbury, L.C., In re Bulwer Lytton's Will (1888), L. R. 38 C. D. 22. 

6. The Court has not time to indulge in the discussion of imaginary cases. 
—Lord Langdale, M.R., Sidebotham v. Barriagton (1841), 3 Beav. 529. 

See Counsel, 18, 22. 

over, for example, see trial of the Lady of what is in you; for the fear of God is 

Alice Lisle for high treason, 1685, in 11 before our eyes as well as yours, and what 

How. St. Tr. 343, 346, where " Blessed we do, we shall have comfort in, in that it 

God," or "Jesus God " become favourite is according to the laws of England, the 

expressions of Jefferies. Taken with the rules of which we are sworn to observe 

foregoing, the foUowing precept may not and every man will do righteous things as 

be considered out of place : " Never talk weU as you."— Per KeUe, C.J., Lilburne's 

of that which is within you ; God is in us, Case (1649), 4 How. St. Tr. 1313. 
as well as in you : never make a flourish 

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Cases — continued. 

7. We axe obliged to follow settled establislied rules already fixed by 
former determinations in cases of the same kind. — Foster, J., Rex v. 
Wbeatly (1760), 2 Bun-. Part IV. 1129. 

See hdow, 21 ; Cases, 21 ; DooTErNE, 1 ; Peeoedents, 8, 13. 

8. We must not overturn the cases. — Buller, J., Ablett v. EUis (1798), 
2 Bos. & PuU. 249. 

See Statutes, 13. 

9. The use of cases is to establish principles ; if the cases decide 
different from the principles, I must foUow the principles, not the 
decisions.' — Lord Kenyan, Duke of Leeds v. New Radnor (1788), 

2 Brown's Rep. (by Belt), 339. 

See also 21, helmv; Common Law, 4; Doctrine, 2 ; Jddioial Deci- 
sions, 9 ; Law, 2, 53 ; Pbecedents, 18. 

10. Pray let us so resolve cases here that they may stand with the 
reason of mankind, when they are debated abroad. ShaU that be 
reason here that is not reason in any part of the world besides ? — 
Lord Nottingham, Duke of Norfolk's Case (1680), 3 Ch. Ca. 33." 

See Judges, 7, 50. 

11. The reason and spirit of cases make law ; not the letter of 
particular precedents.- — Lord Mansfield, Fisher v. Prince (1763), 

3 Burr. 1364. 

See Precedents, 8. 

12. The case in Levins was about an himdred years ago : Put a marginal 

1 The same doctrine was laid down by the way I might be of another opinion." — 

Lord Kenyon in Walpole c. Lord Choi- Pueueii, J., Kendall ». John (1706), Fortesc. 

mondeley (1797), 7 T. E. 148, and it might Kep. 125. 

be multiplied ad iiifinitum: and Judges Per Wilmot, J., in Rex. v. Marsden 

have not been slow in dealing viithprece- (1765), 3 Burr. Part IV., p. 1818 : " This 

dents (i?.!-.) as they have thought fit. The case (i.e., Case of Hertford (Quo Warranto), 

following may be quoted as examples from liSalk.374)I own is a great authority and 

a very early period : In reference to the staggers one." 

case of Tayler c. Sayer (1599), regarding a Aldermn, B., in Hearing e. Hellings 

devise (Cro. 743), Bale, C.J., in 1672, said (1845), 14 M. & W. 712, said : " I accede 

that that case was " a little too rank." to the authority of that case (Hastelow v. 

(King «. MeUing, 1 Ventr. 229 ; also quoted Jackson, 8 B. & U. 221), although I think 

in Eobinson «. Robinson (1756), 1 Burr, it a very strong decision. It does not 

Part. IV. 49). convince me ; it overcomes me." 

In Ashby v. White (1703), Powyt, J., Said Lindlcy, L.J., in reference to an 

said : " This being an unprecedented case, argument before him in Be Lands Allot- 

I shall conclude vsrith a saying of my lord ment Company (1894) : " I cannot be 

Coke: Omnis innovatio plus nuvitate per- party to any decision so supremely 

turbat quam vtilitate prodest" (See absurd."— L. E. Ch. D. Vol. 1, 1894, 

Foorde v. Hoskins (1614), 2 Bulst. 338.) p. 631. 

" As long as that case (Soams and 2 Quoted by Savey, L.J., in Wigram v. 

Bamaxdiston's Case, 2 Sid. 168) is law, I Buckley, L. B. 3 Ch. Div. [1894], p. 497. 
must judge so, if that case was out of 

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Cases — oontinued. 

note, and it will serve an hundred years hence.^ — Lord Mansfield, 
Bolton V. Smith (1774), Lofft. 465. 
See Peeoedents, 16. 

13. Never trust any note cited, when not consonant with the general 
principles of law, justice, and equity. It must be wrong.— Lord 
MansfiMd, Anonymous (1774), Lofft. 610. 

See 9, above, and references ; Commeece, 20. 

14. A case may not be the less doubtful because I entertain no doubt on 
the subject ; but that is doubtful concerning which learned men 
differ.^— Heat/i, J., Cox v. Morgan (1801), 1 Bos. & Pull. 413. 

See CoNBTRUOTioN, 28 ; Judges, 72 ; Miscellaneods, 2. 

15. This is an English case, which it is my duty to decide according to 
the principles of Enghsh law. — Lord Watson, Ewing v. Orr Ewing 
(1883), L. R. 9 App. Ca. 48. 

See helow, 21 ; AjDMiinsTEATioN of Justice, 11 ; CraraTEUoriON, 8 ; 
Courts, 14 ; Judges, 62 ; Pbeoedents, 18. 

16. I can only regret that I am obliged to give a decision which conflicts 
with the justice of the case, and wrongs those to whom I woidd rather 
that justice shoidd be done.^ — GouTbum, Cr., Ex parte Baldwin, bank. 
(1860), L. R. L. T. Rep. Vol. 2 (N. S.) 226. 

See helow, 20 ; Judicial Decisions, 23 ; Precedents, 15. See also 
Law, 42, 43. 

17. I confess that when I am sought to be driven to a conclusion which 
appears to me unreasonable and unjust, I at once suspect the validity 
of the premises, even if I can detect no flaw in the reasoning from 
them.— Undley, L.J., In re HoUord (1894), L. R. 3 Ch. 45. 

18. Without an express authority, so strong as not to be gotten over, we 
ought not to determine a case so much against reason, as that the 
Parliament should be obliged to interfere to set it right. — Lord 
Mansfield, Mayor, &c. of Colchester v. Seaber (1765), 3 Burr. Part IV., 
p. 1870. 

19. For several reasons we should not depart from these adjudged cases ; 
but chiefly, from the inconvenience of altering and overturning settled 
determinations. It is best, stare decisis. The overturning settled 
determinations would be of very bad consequence : they ought not to 

1 This was an action for toll wherein 3 so diametrically opposite to justice. Upon 
Lev. 734 was cited. form, against another, it is very well ; but 

2 " The most learned doubteth most." — by way of serious conclusion, it is unjust 
Co. Lit. 388 a. and unconscientious." — Lord Mansfield, 

3 " I would have it understood from this Lord Mexborough v. Sir John Delaval 
judgment, that no principle of law exists (1773), Lofft. 314. 

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Cases — continued. 

be shaken. — Lord Mansfield, Rex v. Inhabitants of Underbarrow and 
Bradley-Keld (1766), Burrow (Settlement Cases), 548. 
See also Dooteime, 1 ; Precedents, 13. 

20. Whatever might have been my opinion, had this been a new case, 
I must hold myself bound by decided cases. — Lord Kenyan, Cross v. 
Glode (1797), 2 Esp. 575. 

See dhofce, 9, 16 ; Law, 44. 

21. The only use of authorities, or decided cases, is the establishment of 
some principle which the Judge can follow out in deciding the case 
before him. There is, perhaps, nothing more important in our law 
than that great respect for the authority of decided cases which is 
shown by our tribunals. Were it not for that, our law would be in a 
most distressing state of uncertainty, and so strong has that been my 
view, that when a case has decided a principle, although I myself do 
not concur in it, and although it has been only a decision of a tribunal 
of co-ordinate jurisdiction, I have felt bound to foUow it when it is 
of respectable age and has been used by lawyers as settling the law, 
leaving to the Appellate Court to say that case is wrongly decided if 
the Appellate Court should so think. — -Jessel, M.R., In re HaUett's 
Estate. KnatchbuU v. HaUett (1879), L. R. 13 C. D. 712 ; 49 L. J- 
Ch. 419. 

See also above, 7, 9, 13, 20 ; Common Law, 12 ; Constbuction, 19, 28 ; 
Counsel, 17, n. ; Courts, 14 ; Doctruse, 1, 2 ; Judges, 10, 48, 50, 
70 ; Judicial Decisions, 5, 9, 12 ; Law, 53, 73 ; Peaotioe, 5 ; Prece- 
dents, 18, 20 ; Privy Council ; Will, 9. 


1. I hope the Chancery will not repeal an Act of Parliament.^ Waste 
in the house is waste in the curtilage ; and waste in the haU is waste 
in the whole house.— Hale, C.J., Cole v. Forth (1672), 1 Mod. Rep. 95. 

See Dictum, 4. 

2. I do not think it is the business of the Court of Chancery to inquire 

1 Chancery is ordained to supply the happens inconsistent with the design of 

law and not to subvert the law.— Xorrf the legislator, or is contrary to natural 

Bacon, Bac. Speech, 4 ; Bac. Works, 488, justice, may find relief here. For no man 

In Chancery, every particular case stands can be obliged to anything contrary to the 

upon its own circumstances, and although law of nature ; and indeed no man in his 

the common law will not decree against senses can be presumed wiUmg to oblige 

the general rule of law, yet Chancery doth, another to it.— 1 Fonil. Eci. B. 1, c. I, S rf ; 

so as the example introduce not a general Story, Eq. J. 10. 
mischief. Every matter, therefore, that 

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Chancery — continued. 

into motives. — Sir W. M. James, L.J., Denny v. Hancock (1870), 
L. R. 6 Ap. Ca. 10. 

3. It is surely desirable that the rules of this Court should be in 
accordance with the ordinary feelings of justice of mankind. — 
Sir W. M. James, L.J., PUcher v. Rawlins (1872), L. R. 7 C. Ap. 
Ca. 273. 

4. It is not agreeable to any man to be a defendant to an adverse 
Chancery suit, and I should be very sorry to sanction any principle 
which might lead to an increase in the number of defendants, and to 
the mxdtipHcation of litigant parties. — Sir B. Malins, V.-C, Clark v. 
Lord Rivers (1867), L. R. 5 Eq. Ca. 96. 

See Litigation, 2 ; Teansfee of Right of Action. 

5. The Court of Chancery is not a Court of Record, and a Judge in 
Chancery is not the keeper of the records of his own CoTirt. — 
Sir G. Jessel, M.R., In re Berdan's Patent (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 
Ca. 347. 

See CocBTS, 13. 

6. Bom and bred, so to say, in Chancery, I have a strong leaning towards 
the rule of the Court of Chancery, of requiring full discovery. — 
Keltemeh, J., Ashworth v. Roberts (1890), L. J. Rep. (N. S.) 60 C. D. 28. 

See also Discovery, 2. 

7. This Court is not a Court of penal jurisdiction. It compels 
restitution of property unconscientiously withheld; it gives full 
compensation for any loss or damage through failure of some equitable 
duty ; but it has no power of punishing any one.' — Sir W. M. James, 
L.J., Vyse V. Foster (1872), L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. Ca. 333. 

See ante, Administration of Justice, 18 ; and references there given. 

8. In the Coiu"t of Chancery, I think we are obliged to cut the knot as 
to the question of time, by naming some time. — Lord Cranworth, 
Smith V. Kay (1859), 7 H. L. Cas. 772. 

See also Miscellaneous, 22 ; Time, supra. 

9. This Court is not, as I have often said, a Court of conscience, but 
a Court of Law. — Jessel, M.R., In re National Funds Assurance Qo. 
(1878), L. R. 10 C. D. 128. 

See also Administration of Justice, 18, and references there given. 

10. The cause why there is a Chancery is, for that men's actions are so 
divers and infinite, that it is impossible to make any general law, 
which may aptly meet with every particular act, and not fail in some 

' See also per Lord Oranworth in Att.-Gen. i,. Alford, 4 D. M. & G. 843. 

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Chancery — continued. 

circumstances.— Lord Ellesmere, Earl of Oxford's Case (1661), 
Rep. in Ch. 4 
See also Administeation of Justice, 15 ; Common Law, 9 ; Couetb, 
14; Ceiminal Justice, 29; Equity, 19, 20; Law, 55, 62; 
Parliament, 3, n. ; Peaotice, 5 ; Statutes, 2. 

11. The Court of Chancery never decrees that shall be evidence, which 
in its nature is not evidence. — Aston, J., Ludlam on the Demise of 
Hunt (1773), Lofft. 364. 

12. For us to reverse the judgment of a Lord Chancellor would require 
a tremendous case — ^a case of a clear error .^ — James, L.J., Wheeldon v. 
Burrows (1879), 12 Ch. D. 47 ; per Thesiger, L.J., 48 L. J. Ch. 859. 
Also per Cotton, L.J., in In re Watts, Cornford v. Elliott (1885), 
29 Ch. D. 953 ; 55 L. J. Ch. 334. 

See 13, beUrw; also Gounos Law, 10; Peactioe, 5. 

13. I may say I do not consider the decision of a Lord Chancellor is 
absolutely binding upon us, because every Lord Chancellor's decision 
was liable to be reheard not only by himself but by his successor, and 
there are known instances of it. When I was sitting with Lord Justice 
Mdlish we did rehear decisions of Lord Chancellor Selhome. There 
is always this to be considered, that it is the decision, no doubt, of a 
superior Court of Appeal; but it is always qualified by this, that 
according to the old practice of the Court of Chancery it was liable to 
be reheard.-^awies, L.J., Ashworth v. Munn (1880), L. R. 15 C. D. 377. 
See also per Jessel, M.R., in Henty v. Wrey (1882), L. R. 21 C. D. 346. 

See 12, ahove, and references there given. 


1. I think there should be no occasion on which it is absolutely, as a 
point or rule of law, impossible for a man to redeem his character. — 
Lord Coleridge, C.J., In re Brandreth (1891), L. J. 60 Q. B. D. 504. 

2. To rake into the whole course of a man's life is very hard.^ — Jefferies, 
L.C.J., Hampden's Case (1684), 9 How. St. Tr. 1103. 

See 4, helow; Administkation of Justice, 5; Ceiminal Justice, 4; 
Evidence, 14 ; Misceixaneous, 18 ; Witness, 2. 

3. An accused man should have the benefit of the presumption of 

' I think the Lord Chancellor, where- ' We would not suflEer any raking into 

ever he is sitting and whatever cases he is men's course of life, to pick up evidence 

trying, is still Lord Chancellor, and that that they cannot be prepared to answer, 

his decision is binding on me. — Fry, L.J., — Withins, J., Hampden's Case (1684), 9 

Ux parte Vicar of St. Mary, "Wigton How. St. Tr. 1103. 
<1881), L. B. 18 0. D. 648. 

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Character — continued. 

integrity ■which, arises from the virtue of a lifetime. — Lord O'Hagan, 
Symington v. Symington (1875), L. R. 2 Sc. & D. 428. 
See Repdtation, supra, and references there given. 

4. You have no right, for the purpose of justifying a libel, to inquire 
into a man's life and opinions. — Pollock, C.B., Derby v. Ouseley (1856), 
4 W. R. 464. 

See 2, above, and references there given. 

5. There is in many, if not in all men, a constant inward struggle 
between the principles of good and evil; and because a man has 
grossly fallen, and at the time of his fall added the guilt of hypocrisy 
to another sort of immorality, it is not necessary, therefore, to believe 
that his whole life has been false, or that all the good which he ever 
professed was insincere or imreal. — Lord SeWome, Symington v. 
Symington (1875), L. R. 2 Sc. & D. 428. 

See also Miscellaneous, 18 ; Reputation, swprci, and references there 

6. In my opinion the best character is generally that which is the least 
talked about.— SrZe, C. J., The Queen v. Rowton (1865), 34 L. J. M. C. 63. 

See Judges, 26, n. 

7. Means of knowledge is the foundation of the general inference of 
character.— BrZe, C.J., Reg. v. Rowton (1865), 10 Cox, C. C. 34. 

See also Judges, 74. 

8. In a doubtful case, a good character will have some weight with the 
Court, but in a clear conviction, it can be of no avail. — WUles, J., 
R. V. Bembridge (1783), 22 How. St. Tr. 160. 

See also Administration of Justice, 33 ; Criminal Justice, 25 ; 
Punishment, 5. 


1. There is no charitable purpose which is not a benevolent purpose.^ — 
Lord Langdale, M.R., Kendall v. Granger (1842), 5 Beav. 302. 

See post, Cheistianitt, 11. 

2. I do not see any difference between a gift to keep in repair what is 
called " Ood's house " and a gift to keep in repair the churchyard 
round it, which is often called "God's acre."^ — North, J., In re 
Vaughan, Vaughan v. Thomas (1886), L. R. 33 C. D. 192. 

' But see contrd, per Lord Bramwell, 2 Qmd datum est ecclesim,datwn est Deo. 

" Every benevolent purpose is not charit- (What is given to the Church is given to 

able." — Commissioners of Income Tax v. God.) — 2 Inst. 2. With regard to the 

Pemsel '1891), 61 L. J. Eep. Q. B. 281. application of the term, " God's acre " to 

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1. The Christian religion is from heaven. The gates of hell shall not 
prevail against it, and its professors are not afraid of its being 
examined. It has stood for eighteen hundred years, and it will 
stand long}— Best, J., Trial of Mary Ann GarUle (1821), 1 St. Tr. 
(N. S.) 408. 

See Courts, 3, n. 

2. The Court has no fears for the safety of the Christian reUgion. It 
does not believe that the rock upon which Christianity stands can 
ever be shaken.^— Bot/Zei/, J., Trial of Mary Ann Carlile (1821), 1 St. Tr. 
(N. S.) 1050. 

3. The Christian religion is part of the law of the land.* — Kenyon, L.C. J., 
William's Case (1797), 26 How. St. Tr. 704. 

See also Religion. 

churchyards, Longfellow commences one 
of his poems thus : 

"I like that ancient Saxon phrase, which 
The burial ground God's Acre. It is 
It consecrates each grave within its walls, 
And breathes a benison o'er the sleep- 
ing dust." 
By a " Saxon phrase " Longfellow un- 
doubtedly meant German. In Germany, 
Guttex-acker is a name for churchyard ; 
and it is to be found in Wachter's 
Glvusurium Germanicum, as well as in 
modem dictionaries. Very interesting are 
also the other allegorical names which 
have been given to the burial places of 
the dead. They are enlarged upon in 
Minshew's Guide to Tonguet, under the 
head " Church-yard" : — " Coemeterium 
(from the Greek) signifying a dormitory 
or place of sleep. And a Hebrew term 
(so llinshew says), Beth-chajun, i.e., 
domus viventium, ' The house of the 
living,' in allusion to the resurrection." 
The term Goi^s Acre, as applied to a 
church garth, would seem to designate 
consecrated ground set apart as the rest- 
ing-place of His faithful departed, sown 
with immortal seed (1 Cor. xv. 38), which 
shall be raised in glory at the great 
harvest (Matt. xiii. 39 ; Kev. xiv. 15). 
The church-yard is "dedicated wholly 
and only for Christian burial," and " the 
bishop and ordinary of the diocese, as 
God's minister, in God's stead accents it 
as a freewiU offering, to be severed from 
all former profane and common uses, to 
be held as holy ground," and " to be God's 

storehouse for the bodies of His saints 
there to be interred." — See " Bishop 
Andrewes' Form of Consecration of a 
Churchyard," Minor Works (1846), 
pp. 828—333. 

1 I will not suffer the Christian religion 
to be reviled, while I sit in this Court, 
and possess the power of preventing it. — 
Zord Elleriborough, Eaton's Case (1812), 
31 How. St. Tr. 939. 

» The preservation of Christianity as a 
national religion, is, abstracted from its 
own intrinsic truth, of the utmost con- 
sequence to the civil state. — Sir Win. 
Blackstone (1765), Com. Bk. 4 Ch. iv., 
p. 35. 

Eoclesia, non moritur : The Church does 
not die.— 2 Irist. 3. 

3 The first case which is said to have 
decided that Christianity is part and 
parcel of the common law of England is 
in the Year-book [34 Hen. VI., p. 40] : The 
case was quare impedit against the Bishop 
of Lincoln ; and the passage, which is 
obscure, is as follows : — " Prisot. A tielx 
Leis que ils de Saint Bglise ont en ancien 
Scripture, covient a nous a donner 
credence ; car ces Common Ley sur quel 
touts manieres Leis sont fondes. Et 
auxy, Sir, nous sumus obliges de conustre 
lour Ley de Saint Eglise : et semblable- 
ment ils sont obliges de conustre notre 
Ley." — J. Humphrey Bohun i). John 
Broughton, Henry VI. Anno 34. It may 
be thus translated : " As to such laws as 
they of holy Church have in ancient 
Scripture, it is proper for us to give 
credence ; for that [is as it were] common 
law, on which all sorts [of] laws are 

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Christianity— eontinwet^. 

4. It is certain that the Christian religion is part of the law of the land. 
—Patteson, J., Rex v. Hetherington (1841), 5 Jur. (0. S.) 530. 

5. We have no law practised in this land but is the law of God ; and so 
did the lawyers maintain it before the King in Henry the Sth's time, 
the pope's legates, and chief archbishops and bishops of England ; 
and did then prove it to them, that there was no law practised in 
England but the law of God, which our ministers are loth to touch, 
and busy themselves to study. — KMe, L.P., Christopher Love's Case 
(1651), 5 How. St. Tr. 238. 

See also 8, below; Law, 56, 57, supra. 

6. Christianity came in here by external spiritual force, and discipline, 
was introduced as a custom, and is part of the law. — Hale, C.J., 
Taylor's Case (1675), 1 Vent. 293; 3 Keb. 607, 621; see also Rex v. 
Woolston, Fitz. 64 ; 2 Str. Rep. 834. 

See Reugion, 4. 

7. I apprehend that it is the duty of every Judge presiding in an 
English Court of justice, when he is told that there is no difference 
between worshipping the Supreme Being in chapel, church, or 
synagogue to recoUect that Christianity is part of the law of England. 
— Lord Hardioicke, L.C., In re Masters, &c. of the Bedford Charity 
(1819), 2 Swanston's Rep. 527 ; per KeUy, C.B., Cowan v. Milbourn 
(1867), 15 W. R. 751. See also Att.-Gen. v. Pearson, 3 Mer. Rep. 353. 

See also Religion, 1. 

8. The second ground of the law of England is the law of God.' — 
Hyde, J., Manby v. Scott (1663), 1 Mod. Rep. 126. 

See 5, above, and references there given. 

9. The laws of the realm do admit nothing against the law of God. — 
Bohart, C.J., Colt v. Glover (1614), LordHobart's Rep. 149 

10. It is no longer true in the sense in which it was true when these 

diata were uttered, that " Christianity is part of the law of the land." 

Nonconformists and Jews were then under penal laws, and were 

hardly allowed civil rights. But now, so far as I know the law, a Jew 

might be Lord Chancellor. Certainly he might be Master of the 

Rolls, and the great Judge whose loss we have all had to deplore ^^ 

might have had to try such a case, and if the view of the law supposed 

founded. And thus, Sir, we are obliged our law giveth credence, et contra." — 

to take cognizance of their law of holy Maxlnes, p. 6. For a further exposition 

Church ; and likewise they are obliged to of this subject, the reader is referred to 

take the same cognizance of our law." the Law Times, July 3, 1880, p. 170. 

Wingate evidently grounds his third i See also Dr. & St. o. 6, fo. 10. 

maxim on the above passage : " To such 2 gir George Jessel was undoubtedly 

lawes as have warrant in Holy Scripture, the Judge here referred to. 

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Christiaiiity — continued. 

be correct, he -would have had to tell the jury, perhaps partly com- 
posed of Jews, that it was blasphemy to deny that Jesus Christ was 
the Messiah, which he himself did deny, and which Parliament has 
allowed him to deny, and which it was part of " the law of the land " 
that he might deny.— Loj-d Coleridge, L.C.J., Reg. v. Ramsay and 
Foote (1883), 15 Cox, C. C. 235. 

11. The duty of relieving his feUow creature in distress is imposed 
on the Christian irrespective of religious doctrines and tenets, and 
notwithstanding that the object of charity may worship God in an 
erroneous manner, but in that which he beheves to be most acceptable 
to his Creator. — Sir John Romilly, M.R., Att.-Gen. v. Calvert (1857), 
23 Beav. 258. 

See ante, Chakitt, 1 ; Protection, 2, and references there given. 

12. There is no act which Christianity forbids, that the law wiU not 
reach ' : if it were otherwise, Christianity would not be, as it has 
always been held to be, part of the law of England. — Best, C.J., Bird 
V. Holbrook (1828), 4 Bing. 641. 


1. Minister doth not always import an inferior to him to whom he doth 
minister : for the Psalm saith, God hath made man paulo inferiorem 
Angelis ; and yet in the first chapter to the Hebrews it is said, that 
the Angels are ministering spirits, sent forth for the good of God's 
saints. — Hobart, C.J., Pits v. James (1614), Lord Hobart's Rep. 124. 

2. Though all good men be called God's servants in their general 
vocation, yet they cannot be called the minister of God but to a 
more special use. — Edbart, C.J., Pits v. James (1614), Lord Hobart's 
Rep. 125. 


Clubs are very pecuhar institutions. They are societies of gentlemen 
who meet principally for social purposes, superadded to which there 
are often certain other purposes, sometimes of a literary nature, some- 
times to promote political objects, as in the Conservative or the Reform 
Glvh. But the principal objects for which they are designed are 

1 This is nonsense. For example, a man the un-Christian doctrine of caveat emptor. 

may do a selfish and malicious act on his Perhaps what the judge here says is to be 

own land on purpose to injure his neigh- read in connection with his remark in 

bour and 'the common law does not forbid Robertson v. M'Dougall (1828), i Bing. 

it so long as it is not a public nuisance. 679, " the law has respect to human 

In like manner he may take advantage of infirmity." See post, IjAW, 35. 

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Club — continued. 

social, the others are onlj' secondary. It is, therefore, necessary that 
there should be a good understanding between aU the members, and 
that nothing should occur that is likely to disturb the good feeling 
that ought to subsist between them. — Lord Romilly, M.R., Hopkinson 
V. Marquis of Exeter (1867), L. R. 5 Eq. Ca. 67. 


Cock-fighting must be considered a barbarous diversion. — Lord Ellen- 
horough, Squires v. "Whisken (1811), 3 Camp. Rep. 141. 
See also Gambling. 
Legal coercion is a course which the law aUows.^ — Rooke, J., Cox v. 
Morgan (1801), 1 Bos. & PuU. 410. 


1. The greatest lawyer, Sir Edward Coke.^ — Mallet, J., Harrison's Case 
(1660), 5 How. St. Tr. 1030. 

2. The learning and industry of that great man Sir Edward Oohe, whose 
name ought never to be mentioned in a Court of law without the 
highest respect.*— iJj/re, C.J., JefEerson v. Bishop of Durham (1797), 
2 Bos. & Pull. 123. 

3. Jeo concede que est le opinion Seigniour Coke, mes salva reverentia 
al ey grand sage et pere del ley. (I grant that it is the opinion of 
Lord Coke, but salva reverentia to so great a sage and father of the 
hM).—Vav^han, J., Tustian v. Roper (1670), Jones's (Sir Thos.) 
Rep. 35. 

4. That great lawyer was much heated in the controversy between the 
Courts at Westminster and the Ecclesiastical Courts.* In every part 
of his conduct his passions influenced his judgment. Vir aeer et 
vehemens. His law was continually warped by the different situations 
in which he found himself.*— Feat/i, J., Jefferson v. Bishop of Durham 
(1797), 2 Bos. & PuU. 131. 

1 "Good old Sir Hdward Coke "~a.n * "Yet we are obliged," says Lord 
allusion to this great man by counsel in Campbell, " to regard a man with so little 
Campbell v. Hall (1774), LofEt. 695. about him that is ornamental or enter- 

2 " Sir B. Coke, a chief justice of great taining, or attractive, as a very consider- 
learning, and of as great integrity."— /Si?- able personage in the history of his 
R. Atkyvji, L.C.B., Trial of Sir Edw. country. Belonging to an age of gigantic 
Hales (1686), 11 How. St. Tr. 1237. intellect and gigantic attainments, he was 

3 " The ecclesiastical courts are not admired by his contemporaries, and time 
inferior to the Courts at Westminster HaU." has in no degree impaired his fame. He 
—Per Littledale, J., Ricketts v. Bodenham is most familiar to us as an author. Smart 
(1836), 4 A. & E. 446. legal practitioners, who are only desirous 

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Coke — eontinned. 

5. Don't quote the distinction, for the honour of my lord Coke.'— Lord 
MansfieU, CampbeU v. HaU (1774), Lofft. 16. 


1. This being an island, all imaginable encouragement ought to be given 
to trade. — Hareourt, Lord Keeper, Brown v. Litton (1711), 1 P. Wms. 

2. The great source of the flourishing state of this kingdom is its trade 
and commerce. — Ashhurst, J., Jordaine v. Lashbrooke (1798), 7 T. R. 

3. The freedom of trade, like the liberty of the Press, is one thing ; the 
abuse of that freedom, like the licentiousness of the Press, is another. 
God forbid that this Court should do anything that should interfere 
with the legal freedom of trade.— Grose, J., King v. Waddington 
(1880), 1 East, 163. 

See LlBEHTT OF THE Pkess, 5. 

4. It is essential, when persons in trade come into this Court, that they 
should remember that the administration of equity is founded on 
perfect truth, and that if persons attempt to mislead the public by 
stating that which is not true,'' this Court wiU restrain them upon a 
dear case being made out against them. — Lord RomiUy, M.R., Cocks 
V. Chandler (1871), L. R. 11 Eq. Ca. 449. 

See Contract, 6 ; Teuth, 2, 8. 

5. Some confidence there must be between merchant and manufacturer. 
In matters exclusively within the province of the manufacturer the 
merchant relies on the manufacturer's skill, and he does so all the 
more readily when he has had the benefit of that skiU before. — Lord 
Macnaghten, Drummond v. Van Ingen (1887), L. R. 12 Ap. Cas. 297. 

6. An energetic tradesman naturally develops and extends his business. 

of making money by their profession, make, any proficiency, must peruse him 
neglect his works, and sneer at them as withdelight." — Livesof the Chief Justices, 
pedantic and antiquated ; but they con- Vol. 1, 338. See also the comments on 
tinue to be studied by all who wish to Coke in the Wengleydale Peerage Case 
know the history and to acquire a (1856), 8 St. Tr. (N. S.) 551. 
scientific and liberal knowledge of our ' Exclamation in reference to CalviiCs 
judicial and political institutions. His Case (7 Go. 17), wherein appears a dis- 
Omjbs Magnvm is .his Commentary upon tinction between counties vesting by 
Littleton, which in itself may be said to conquest and descent. It was argued 
contain the whole common law of England that " the doctrine imputed to the Judges 
IB it then existed. Notwithstanding its by my Lord Coke was not entirely extra- 
want of method and its quaintness, the judicial," and this brought forth the above 
luthor writes from such a full mind, with remark. 

such mastery over his subject, and with ^ "Let me have no lying; it becomes 

such unbroken spirit, that every law none but tradesmen. — Wilder' s Tale,iv.i. 
'tudent who has made, or is ever likely to 

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Commerce — continued. 

One business runs into another, and the line of demarcation is often 
indistinct and undefined. The linen draper of to-day in the course of 
a few years may come to be the proprietor of an establishment provid- 
ing everything that man wants, or woman either, from the cradle to 
the grave. — Lord Maenaghten, Tailby v. Official Receiver (1888), L. R. 
13 Ap. Cas. 545. 

7. The English trader is generally too much occupied with his business 
to devote much time to the invention of new or fancy words, and he is 
not always gifted with that degree of fancy which is capable of coining 
new words. Besides the English public is not so ready, apparently, 
to buy articles passing under an entirely new name, which may give 
rise to a suspicion of adulteration. — Ghitty, J., In re Trade-Mark 
" Alpine " (1885), L. R. 29 C. D. 880. 

8. The word commission sounds sweet in a merchant's ear. — Sir W. 
Scott, The Gratitudine (1801), 3 Rob. Adm. Rep. 240. 

9. What is one man's gain is another's loss. — Lord Coleridge, Connor v. 
Kent (1891), 61 L. J. Rep. Mag. Ca. 18. 

See 10, helow. 

10. It must be remembered that aU trade is and must be in a sense 
selfish ; trade not being infinite, nay, the trade of a particular place or 
district being possibly very limited, what one man gains another loses.' 
In the hand to hand war of commerce, as in the conflicts of pubUc life, 
whether at the bar, in Parliament, in medicine, in engineering (I give 
examples only), men fight on without much thought of others, except 
a desire to excel or to defeat them. Very lofty minds, like Sir Philip 
Sidney with his cup of water, will not stoop to take an advantage, if 
they think another wants it more. Our age, in spite of high authority 
to the contrary, is not without its Sir Philip Sidneys ; but these are 
counsels of perfection which it would be silly indeed to make the 
measure of the rough business of the world as pursued by ordinary 
men of business. The line is in words difficult to draw^. . . .—Lord 
Coleridge, C.J., Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. (1888), 
L. R. 21 Q. B. D. 553. 

See 15, helow ; Gambling. 

11. Merchants know perfectly well what they mean when they express 
themselves, not in the language of lawyers, but in the language of 
courteous mercantile communication.— Lor-d Cairns, Shepherd v. 
Harrison (1871), L. R. 5 Eng. & Ir. App. Cas. 133. 

1 See 9, above; Text Books, i. formedtokeeptradeintheirownhandsand 

2 This case decided that an association not for injuring another is not unlawful. 

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Commerce — Continued. 

12. The experience we have in Courts of justice leads us to know that 
persons who trade without due caution often find their hopes deceived : 
they find in the result that they have parted with goods for which they 
never can obtain the money. — Abbott, C.J., Montague v. Benedict 
(1825), 3 B. & C. 673. 

iSee also Money, 2 ; Peopertt, 12 ; Title, 4. 

13. It is when merchants dispute ahout their ovm rules that they invoke 
the law.— Brett, J., Eobinson v. Mollett (1875), L. R. 7 Eng. & Ir. Ap. 817. 

14. The great object of the law is to encourage commerce. — Gharnhre, J., 
Beale v. Thompson (1803), 3 Bos. & Pull. 421. 

See helow, 32. 

15. It is admitted that there may be fair competition in trade, that two 
may offer to join and compete against a third. If so, what is the 
definition of fa,ir competition ? What is unfair that is neither forcible 
nor fraudxdent. — Lord Bramwell, Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 
Gow and others (1892), 66 L. T. R. 6. 

See 10, above. 

16. I should regret to find that the law was powerless to enforce the 
most elementary principles of commercial morality. — Lord Hersehell, 
Reddaway v. Banham (1896), L. R. App. Ca. [1896], 209. 

See 13 ahove. 

17. A trader is trusted upon his character and visible commerce : that 
credit enables him to acquire wealth. If by secret liens a few might 
swallow up all, it would greatly damp that credit. — Lord Mansfield, 
Worseley v. Demattos (1758), 1 Burr. Part IV., p. 483. 

18. Men lend their money to traders upon mortgages or consignments of 
goods, because they suspect their circumstances, and wiU not run the 
risque of their general credit.— Lord Mansfield, Foxcroft v. Devonshire 
(1759), 2 Burr. Part IV., p 942. 

See Money, 2. 

19. It is the privilege of a trader in a free country, in all matters not 
contrary to law, to regulate his own mode of carrying it on according 
to his own discretion and choice.^— Alderson, B., Hilton v. Eckersley 
(1856), 6 Ellis & B. 74. 

20. The law merchant is a system of equity, founded on the rules of 
equity, and governed in all its parts by plain justice and good faith. 
—Buller, J., Master v. MiUer (1763), 4 T. R. 320. 

See 29, helow. 

1 Arlntrio domini res astimari dchet : The price of a thing ought to be fixed by its 
owner. — 4 Inst. 275. 

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Commerce — continued. 

21. There are many situations in life, and particularly in the commercial 
world, where a man cannot by any diHgence inform himself of the 
degree of credit which ought to he given to the persons with whom he 
deals ; in which cases he must apply to those whose sources of intelli- 
gence enable them to give that information. The law of prudence 
leads him to apply to them, and the law of morahty ought to induce 
them to give the information required. — Lord Kenyan, C.J., Pasley 
V. Freeman (1789), 3 T. R. 51. 

22. An imiversal custom is a law, and I know no distinction between 
lex mereatoria axid consuetudo meraatoruin. — HoU, C.J., Cramlington ■«. 
Evans (1680), Show. 4. 

23. Convenience is the basis of mercantile law. — Lord Mansfield, Medcalf 
V. HaU (1782), 3 Doug. 115. 

24. When a general usage has been judicially ascertained and established, 
it becomes a part of the law merchant, which Courts of justice are 
bound to know and recognise. — Lord CampheU, Brandao v. Bamett 
(1846), 12 CI. & F. 805. 

25. Nothing can fall within the custom of trade but what concerns trade. 
—Eeaih, J., Houghton v. Matthews (1803), 3 Bos. & Pall.494. 

26. The law merchant respects the religion of different people.— Lord 
Ellenborough, Lindo v. Unsworth (1811), 2 Camp. 603. 

See Religion, 1. 

27. Persons in trade had better be very cautious how they add a fic- 
titious name to their firm, for the purpose of gaining credit. — Lord 
Ellenhoroiigh, Guidon v. Robson (1809), 2 Camp. 304. 

28. A proceeding may be perfectly legal and may yet be opposed to 
sound commercial principles. — Lindley, L.J., Verner v. General, &c. 
Trust (1894), L. R. 2 C. D. [1894], 264. 

See 29, lehw; Text Books, 4. 

29. It has been uniformly laid down in this Court, as far back as we 
can remember, that good faith is the basis of aU mercantile transactions. 
—Buller, J., Salomons v. Nissen (1788), 2 T. R. 681. 

See 20, 28, above. 

30. Prudent business men in their dealings incur risk. — Bacon, V.-C, 
In re Godfrey, Godfrey v. Faulkner (1883), L. R. 23 C. D. 493. 

See also Miscellaneous, 35 ; Motives, 11. 

31. Most businesses require liberal dealing.— Bowen, L.J., Hutton v. 
West Cork Railway Co. (1883), L. R. 23 C. D. 672. 

32. I have always thought it highly injurious to the pubUc that different 
rules should prevail in the different Courts on the same mercantile 

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Commerce — continued. 

case. My opinion has been uniform on that subject. It sometimes 
indeed happens that in questions of real property Courts of law find 
themselves fettered with rules, from which they cannot depart, because 
they are fixed and established rules' ; though equity may interpose, 
not to contradict, but to correct, the strict and rigid rules of law. But 
in mercantile questions no distinction ought to prevail. The mercantile 
law of this country is founded on principles of equity ; and when once 
a rule is established in that Court as a rule of property, it ought to be 
adopted in a Court of law. For this reason Courts of law of late years 
have said that, even where the action is founded on a tort, they would 
discover some mode of defeating the plaintiff, unless his action were 
also founded on equity ; and that though the property might on legal 
grounds be with the plaintiff, if there were any claim or charge by 
the defendant, they would not consider the retaining of the goods as a 
conversion.— BuZZer, J., Tooke v. Hollingworth (1793), 5 T. R. 229. 
See 13, 14, above ; Companies, 4, 7 ; Gambling ; Judges, 69 ; Text 
Books, 4. 

33. Paper currency, guarded by proper regulations and restrictions, is the 
life of commerce. — Ashhurst, J., Jordaine v. Lashbrooke (1798), 7 
T. R. 605. 

34. Whether a transaction be fair or fraudulent is often a question of 
law : it is the judgment of law upon facts and intents. — Lord Mansfield, 
Worseley v. Demattos (1758), 1 Burr. Part IV. 474. 

See Companies, 7. 

Common Law. 

1. We ourselves of the present age, chose our common law, and consented 
to the most ancient Acts of Parliament, for we lived in our ancestors 
1,000 years ago, and those ancestors are stiU living in us. — Sir B. 
Atkyns, L.C.B., Trial of Sir Edw. Hales (1686), 11 How. St. Tr. 
n. p. 1204. 

See Statutes, 11, 14, 24. 

2. It is difficult to struggle with the common law. — Lord Ellenhorough, 
Kerr v. WDlan (1817), 2 Starkie, 54. 

3. Common law is common usage, and where there is no law there can 
be no transgression. — Forteseue, J., Rex v. Curl (1727), 2 Str. Rep. 
790 ; 17 How. St. Tr. 159. 

See Precedents, 10. 

1 See Discretion, 12, and references there given. 


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Common Law — continued. 

4. The common law does not consist of particular cases decided upon 
particidar facts : it consists of a number of principles, which, are 
recognised as having existed during the whole time and course of the 
common law. The Judges cannot make new law by new decisions ; 
they do not assume a power of that kind : they only endeavour to 
declare what the common law is and has been from the time when it 
first existed. But inasmuch as new circumstances, and new com- 
plications of fact, and even new facts, are constantly arising, the 
Judges are obliged to apply to them what they consider to have been 
the common law during the whole course of its existence, and there- 
fore they seem to be laying down a new law, whereas they are merely 
applying old principles to a new state of facts. — Brett, M.R., Mimster 
V. Lamb (1883), L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 599. 

See Cases, 9 ; Judges, 65 ; Law, 55 ; Statutes, 2. 

5. I am not for stirring a single pebble of the common law. — Wilmot, 
L.C.J., CoUinsu. Blantem (1767), 2 Wils. 341. 

See Mischief, 1 n. 

6. There is no doubt whatever that as far as common law is concerned, 
the Courts in this country have been bound, most of them, by in- 
flexible rules handed down in great measure from the time of the 
Plantagenets, and tmtil certain modem statutes were passed there was 
no possibility of altering or improving them. — Lord Penzance, Cowan 
V. Duke of Buccleuch (1876), L. R. 2 Ap. Ca. 355. 

See Statutes, 21, 22. 

7. The common law, though not to be found in the written records of 
the realm, yet has been long well known. It is coeval with civilised 
society itself, and was formed from time to time by the wisdom of 
man. Good sense did not come with the Conquest, or at any other 
one time, but grew and increased from time to time with the wisdom 
of mankind.— Zrf)rd Kenyan, Rex v. Rusby (1801), Peake's N. P. Cases, 

8. The common law is the custom of the kingdom, and we are bound to 
know it, and must be all governed by it. — North, C.J., Whitebread's 
Case (1679), 8 How. St. Tr. 860. 

See Equity, 20. 

9. The common law of England must direct the determination of a 
common law question. By common-law determinations we are 
bound ; and to them we must always adhere : for, these are the 
proper constitutional declarations of the law of the land. They are 
so considered, even by the Court of Chancery itself. When any 

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Common Law — continued. 

doubt arises in a cause of equity concerning a point of common law, 
it is usually referred to the determination of a Court of Common Law.^ 
—Yates, J., Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. Part IV. 2377. 
See Equitt, 2, 8, 12, 18, 20, 21 ; Precedents, 10. 

10. Great attention and respect is undouttedly due to the decisions of 
a Lord Chancellor : but they are not conclusive upon a Court of 
common hm.^— Yates, J., MiUarw. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr, Part IV. 2377. 

See Chanceey, 12, 13. 

11. I shall always as far as I can by law endeavour to support the 
common law of the land and that excellent method of trial by juries, 
upon which all our hves, liberties and properties depend ; and I shall 
endeavour as far as I can to prevent the encroachment of any juris- 
diction whatever that proceeds by another law and another method of 
trial.*— WiZZes, L.C.J., WeUes v. Trahem (1740), WUles' Rep. 241. 

See JuEiSDicTioN, 2 ; Law, 18. 

12. In a perfectly new case — a. case altogether primoB impresswnis — I 
think the Judges are bound to hold fast to the principles of the 
common law — to remember the maxim, " Salus reipuhliooB suprema 
lex," and if the condition be reaUy in principle against the public 
good, to pronounce it in their judgment void. — Pollock, C.B., Brown- 
low V. Egerton (1854), 23 L. J. Rep. Part 5 (N. 8.) Ch. 382. 

See also 9, above ; Cases, 21 ; Consteuotioit, 19, 28 ; Equity, 8 ; 
Judicial Decisions, 5 ; Law, 2 ; Litigation, 2 ; Pakuament, 13 ; 

POOE, 2. 


1. It appears to me that the atmosphere of the temple of Justice is 
polluted by the presence of such things as these companies. — Jarn^s, 
L.J.,. Wilson V. Church (1879), L. R. 13 C: D. 44. 

2. A company is perfectly responsible in every sense. — Pearson, J., 
Dyke 17. Stephens (1885), L. R. 30 C. D. 191. 

3. It is a very lamentable state of things, but I see no help for it. The 
money in such cases is gone — gone by mismanagement always, often 
by fraud and jobbery, and by the time that such questions come before 
the Courts it is a mere suggestion upon whom the loss shall fall. It 
is rarely borne by the persons whose ignorance, mismanagement, or 

1 The Court of Common Pleas is the Court of Chancery would do upon the 
lock and key of the common law. — Co. same question. — Id. p. 2381. 

2 Ingt. 22. ' Whatever is by the common law, can 

2 I here give my opinion as a Common only be affected by statute. — Co. JUtt. 
Lawyer ; not presuming to say what the 115 b. 

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Companies — continued. 

dishonesty has caused the loss, as they are abnost always without 
means, and have generally speculated as badly for themselves as for 
those who have put them in office. I see no help for it but in that 
which appears to be a plant of slow growth, caution on the part of 
persons liable to be affected by the ruin of these societies. — Wills, J., 
In re Companies Acts, Ex parte Watson (1888), L. R. 21 Q. B. 308. 

4. In matters where a company is not restrained by Parliament they 
have a right to make reasonable regulations ; but it will always be a 
question whether their regulations are reasonable or not. — Lord 
Alvanley, C.J., Eagleton v. East India Co. (1802), 3 Bos. and Pull. 67. 

5. The office of director ... a man ought not to fill without quali- 
fication.— Lor^ SeWome, Brown's Case (1873), L. R. 9 C. App. 102, 

6. The director is reaUy a watch-dog, and the watch-dog has no right 
without the knowledge of his master to take a sop from a possible 
wolf. — Boioen, L.J., In re North Austrahan Territory Co. (1891), L. J. 
Rep. 61 C. D. 136. 

7. In their desire to check dishonest and reckless trading Courts must 
be careful not to put tighter fetters on companies than the Legislature 
has authorised. — lAndley, J., Verner v. General and Commercial In- 
vestment Trust (1894), L. R. 2 Ch. 267. 

See Commerce, 14, 32. 

8. I do not wish in any way to depart from the principle that a wrong- 
doing director, whether he be morally or legally wrong, should be 
made liable for the highest amount which could have been obtained 
from the property wrongly taken by him while it was in his hands. — 
Webster, M.R., Shaw v. Holland (1900), L. R. 2 C. D. ; C A. [1900], 
p. 310. 


I think it is better, as it is a family-affair, to stand over for the chance 
of a compromise.' — Lord Mansfield, Strong v. Cummin (1758), 2 Burr. 
Part IV., p. 769. 
See also Conbest, 5, and references there given ; Criminal Justice, 
41, 42 ; Evidence, 33 ; Family ; Litigation, 3 ; Paedon, 4. 

1 For the definition of "family," see here. But if the parties will have it 

post, heading Family. In a case that decided, we must give cm- opinion. Com- 

came before him some years after, after passion will not, on the one hand, nor 

recommending an arrangement between inconvenience on the other, be to decide, 

the parties which however failed in its but the law : in which the difficulty will 

result, Lord Mansfield thus expressed be principally from the inconvenience on 

himself afterwards : " On its first coming both sides." — Lord Mansfield, Somerset v. 

before me, I strongly recommended it Stewart (1772), Lofft. 17. 
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1. You cannot consent to a thing unless you have knowledge of it. — 
Jessel, M.R., Ex parte Ford ; In re Caucliey (1876), L. R. 1 C. D. .528. 

2. Parties cannot by consent give to the Court a power which it would 
not have without it-^— Lord Esher, M.R., In re Ayhner ; Ex parte 
BischofEshiem (1887), L. J. 57 Q. B. 168. 

See cdso, ante. Admission ; supra, Jheisdiotion, 9 ; Rights, 3 ; Statutes, 

3. I have very often had occasion to say, that acquiescence is founded 
on knowledge, and that a man cannot be said to acquiesce in a trans- 
action if he is not proved to have had knowledge of it. I think that 
this principle requires to be attended to in aU cases turning upon 
acquiescence. — Sir G. J. Turner, L.J., Stewart's Case (1866), L. R. 
1 Ch. Ap. Ca. 587. 

See PRACTicaE, 24. 

4. It is not reasonable afterwards to allow the party to complain of that 
irregularity, of which, if he had availed himself in the first instance, 
£ill the expense would have been rendered unnecessary.' — Lord 
Lyndhurst, St. Victor v. Devereux (1845), 14 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 246. 

See also Xreegolaeitt. 

5. If a dient be present in Court, and stand by and see his solicitor 
enter into terms of an agreement, and makes no objection whatever to 
it, he is not at liberty afterwards to repudiate it.' — Sir J. Bomilly, 
M.R., Swinfen i;. Swinfen (1857), 24 Beav. 559. 

See also Diligence, 2 ; Equity, 15, 33 ; Pleadings, 4, 5. 


1. When a general principle for the construction of an instrument is 
once laid down, the Court will not be restrained from making their 
own application of that principle, because there are cases in which it 

' See per Lord Campbell, C.J., in clearly established that counsel appearing 

Andrews v. EUiott, 5 E. & B. 503; for a party in an action is held out as 

Lawrence v. Wilcock, 11 A. & E. 941. having authority, and has full authority. 

See also Eeg. v. Bertrand, L. E. 1 P. C. as to all matters which relate to the con- 

520. duct of the action and its settlement, and 

2 Consensus tollit errorem. — ^2 Inst. 123. further that, notwithstanding a limit may 

This decision shows that irregularities have been placed upon the authority of 

cannot be objected to after implied waiver counsel, the party for whom he appears is 

of them by acquiescence. bound by such settlement unless the fact 

^ A man who does not speak when he that the counsel's apparent authority had 

ought, shall not be heard when he desires been limited was communicated to the 

to speak. — V Artumreux v. Viseher, 2 other side." — Z. T. Bep. Vol. 18, p. 392, 

Cornstook (New York) E.. 281. See also and authorities there cited. On appeal 

per Lord AVcerstone in Neale v. Gordon afBrmed, T. L. R., Vol. 18, p. 791. 
Lennox (1902) : " I think it is now 

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Construction — continued. 

may have been applied in a difierent manner.' — Lord Eldon, C.J., 
Browning v. "Wright (1799), 2 B. & P. 24. 

2. One of the most sacred principles of law is, that a written instrument 
must he construed upon the face of it, and that no parol evidence can 
be used for the purpose of inserting any words not therein contained. 
—Sir B. Malins, V.-C, Inre Bayer's Trusts (1868), L. R. 6 Eq. Ca. 321. 

See 31, helow ; Wiix, 8. 

3. Words having a distinct meaning must bear their primary legal 
impoit.'— Sir W Page Wood, V.-C, Alger v. Parrott (1866), L. R. 3 Eq. 
Ca. 330. 

See also Statutes, 15 ; Will, 8. 

4. We can judge of the intent of the parties only by their words. — 
Powell, J., Idle v. Cooke (1704), 2 Raym. 1149. 

See 2, above; 15, 31, helow; Fraud, 14 ; Will, 8, 14, supra. 

5. Nothing can be more mischievous than the attempt to wrest words 
from their proper and legal meaning only because those words are 
superfluous.— Lord SeUboitie, L.C., Giles v. Melsom (1873), L. R. 6 Eng. 
& Ir. Ap. 33. 

See 32, helow. 

6. One would wonder, when a word was m use two hundred years ago, 
that there should remain now any do^iibt what it is. — Asliton, J., 
Vallezjo V. Wheeler (1774), Lofft. 646. 

See also Judicial Decisions, 20 ; Law, 73. ' 

7. An enactment for the favour and liberty of the subjectt ought to have 
a liberal construction. — Mavle, J., Johnson v. Harris (18014), 3 W.R. 104. 


8. No Court ought to depart from the plain meaning of [plain English 
words, unless coerced to do so by some very serious in'/ustice, a hard- 
ship which would arise from a literal interpretatioii, for instance, 
where the legal interpretation would, in the opinion of the Court, 
operate so harshly that the Court would be driven to suppose that 
there must have been some clerical mistake in the language of the 
Act, or deed, or whatever may be under consideration. — James, L.J., 
Ex parte Rashleigh ; In re Dalzell (1875), L. R. 2 C. D. 13. 

See also 2, 4, above; 31, 32, helow; Cases, 15; Foreign Law, 5; 
Statutes, 3, 6, 8 ; Will, 10. 

' The same doctrine was laid down by fienda est : In the absence of ambiguity 

Lord Kenyon in Lord Walpole v. Lord no exposition shall be made which is 

Cholmondeley, 7 T. K. 148. opposed to the express words of the 

2 Quotiesin verbis nuUaestambigaitaa, instrument. — Witig. Max. 24. 
ibi nulla expositio contra verba expressa 

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Construction — continued. 

9. Wherever a law is productive of tyranny, I shaU ever give my consent 
to narrow the construction. — WiZZes, J., Jones v. Smart C1785^ 
1 T. R. 49. ^ ^' 

See Game ; Motives, 15. 

10. I confess a law clearly penned shall have its force in cases it does 
reach, though it does not reach aU cases ; but where a law is penned, 
that it may be expounded one way or other, and there is a question 
of the meaning of it, it is more natural to believe it was meant in that 
way that is clear, and that reaches all cases that are in parity of reason, 
than in that way that has absurd consequences, both by including 
those which were not intended, and leaving out those which stand in 
the same degree— North, C.J., Carter v. Crawley (1681), Sir Thos. 
Ray. Rep. 505. 

See also 31, 32, below; Motives, 15 ; Statutes, 15 ; Will, 8. 

11. If in the vast majority of possible cases — in all of ordinary occur- 
rence — the law is in no degree inconsistent or imreasonable, construed 
according to its plain words, it seems to me to be an untenable pro- 
position, and unsupported by authority, to say that the construction 
may be varied in every case because there is one possible, but highly 
improbable one, in which the law would operate with great severity, 
and against our own notions of justice.^ — Parke, B., MiUer v. Salomons 
(1852), 7 Ex. Rep. 549. 

See also Statutes, 3, 7. 

12. A casus omissus can in no case be supplied by a Court of law, for that 
would be to make laws. — Buller, J., Jones v. Smart (1785), 1 T. R. 52. 

13. It is vei-y mischievous for a Court to propound views of the law 
different from those taken by another Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. 
— Sir G. J. Turner, L.J., Ex parte Fachiri ; In re Fachiri (1867), 
L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 372. 

See Judicial Decisions, 16, 17 ; Juhisdiction, 4, 12 ; Law, 53. 

14. Such construction is always to be made of a deed that aU the words 
(if possible) agreeable to reason and conformable to law, may take 
effect according to the intent of the parties without rejecting of any, 
or by any construction to make them void. — Lord Coke, Shelley's Case 
(1581), 1 Co. 233, Part I. 95 b. 

See 15, 29, 31, 32, behw. 

1 This is in relation to the maxim ad aceidunt," and not for rare and extra- 
ct {"j^^/rejjieraWJlwaccifZwiJ^ttraaiiapifflw- ordinary events and accidents. — Sir R. 
tur : The laws are adapted to those cases Atkyns, L.C.B. See 1 1 How. St. Tr. 
which most frequently occur. — 2 Iruft. 1208. Also per BrtMnwell, B., in Eastern 
137. Counties, &c. Companies v. Marriage 

Laws are fitted " ad ea quce freqiiewtiiis (1860), 9 H. L. Cas. 52. 

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Construction — continued. 

15. The rules laid down in respect of the construction of deeds are 
founded in law, reason, and common sense : That they shall operate 
according to the intention of the parties, if hy law they may : And if 
they cannot operate in one form, they shall operate in that, which by 
law will effectuate the intention. — Lord Mansfield, C.J., Goodtitle v. 
Bailey (1777), 2 Cowp. 600.' 

See 4, 8, 14, above ; 29, helmo; Will, 14. 

16. It is the duty of Courts of Justice to give that construction which 
most fairly carries out the manifest purpose. — Sir John Stuart, V.-C, 
In re Warner and Powell's Arbitration (1866), L. R. 3 Eq. Ca. 266. 

See also Statutes, 7 ; Will, 14. 

17. Does not everybody see from hence, that you must first examine the 
law before you can apply the rule of construction ? For the law must 
not be bent by the construction, but that must be adapted to the spirit 
and sense of the law. — Camden, L.C.J., Case of Seizure of Papers 
(1765), 19 How. St. Tr. 1060. 

18. But surely it is a rule, both in law and equity, so to construe the 
whole deed or will, as that every clause should have its effect. — 
Parker, L.C., Butler v. Duncomb (1719), 1 P. Wms. 457. 

See Will, 7. 

19. How far Judges may be, or ought to be, able to defeat a rule of law 
of which they disapprove, I cannot say. I think it is the duty of a 
Judge not to allow himself to be so influenced, but to construe the 
instrument in a proper way, to arrive at its meaning independently of 
the residts, and then apply the law. — Jessel, M.R., Cunliffe v. Brancter 
(1876), L. R. 3 C. D. 399. 

See Cases, 16, 21 ; Common Law, 4 ; Judges, 1 ; PAEHiMEur, 13. 

20. Definition, founded upon etymology, is not satisfactory, etymology 
being often in itself unsettled. — Wood, V.-C, Forbes v. Forbes (1854), 
23 Law J. Rep. Part 2 (N. S.) Ch. 726. 

See Will, 8. 

21. The words of a deed are to be construed like those of any other 
writing, according to the ordinary use and apphcation of them.^ — 
Ld. Abinger, C.B., Bain v. Cooper and another (1842), 9 M. & W. 708 ; 
11 L. J. Ex. 327. 

See also 32, below; Will, 7, 8, 14. 

1 See also per Willes, C.J., in Smith r. 12 ; per Abhott, C.J.,m Evans v. Vaughan 
Packhurst (1741), 3 Atk. 136 ; per Lord (1825), 4 B. & C. 266 ; per Wilde, C.J., 
EUenborougli, C.J., in Barton r. Fitz- Walker v. Giles (1849), 6 C. B. 702 : 18 
Gerald (1812), 15 East, 541; per Id. L. J. 0. P. 330. 

Sicklemore v. Thistleton (1817), 6 M. & S. 2 Expressions used in particular cases 

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Construction — continued. 

22. Very unequal would that interpretation be, which would construe 
the same words for the plaintifE according to the real substantial truth 
of the thing, in opposition to legal forms ; and against the defendant 
according to legal notions and forms, contrary to real truth, more 
especially when the law, from the nature of it, ought to be taken 
liberally in favour of defendants. — Lord Mansfield, Johnson v. Smith 
(1759), 2 Burr. Part IV., p. 961. 

23. If once we go upon niceties of construction, we shall not know where 
to stop. For one nicety is made a foundation for another ; and that 
other for a third; and so on, without end.^ — Wilmot, J., Rex v. 
Inhabitants of CaverswaU (1758), Burrow (Settlement Cases), 465. 

See Judges, 13. 

24. The Court will always incline to lean against niceties in matters of 
variance. But where it is in the description of a statute or record, it 
is fatal.— Lord Mansfield, Rann v. Green (1776), 2 Cowp. 476. 

25. When a person undertakes to explain his own meaning, we are not 
to extend the same by construction. — Reath, J., Lord Nelson v. Tucker 
(1802), 3 Bos. & PuU. 276. 

See Statutes, 19 ; Wnx, 8, 15. 

26. I should regret to place a narrowing construction upon rules intended 
to remove expense and delay. — Lord Halsbury, Jay v. Budd (1897) 
66 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) 864. 

See Costs, 2 ; Delay, 1. 

27. We shoid-d not be too strict in construing instrimients or contracts 
generally drawn up on the spur of the moment. — Tindal, C.J., 
Newbery v. Armstrong (1829), 3 M. & P. 513. 

28. Where the law is known, and clear, though it be inequitable and 
inconvenient, the Judges must determine as the law is, without 
regarding the unequitableness or inconveniency, but where the law is 
doubtful and not clear, the Judges ought to interpret the law to be as 
is most consonant to equity, and least inconvenient. — Vaughan, L.C.J., 
Dison V. Harrison (1669), Vaughan's Rep. 37, 38, Fortesc. 392, 393. 

See also Cases, 14, 16, 21 ; Common Law, 12 ; Equity, 10 ; Judges, 
13, 34 ; Judicial Decisions, 5 ; Law, 22, 55, 71 ; Paeliament 13 ; 
Statutes, 3, 4. 

29. I am bound to administer the law here according to the best 

are to be understood with relation to the Lord Coke says that arguments ai incon- 

subject-matter then before the Court. — ■B««ieH<ioughtto have great weight. — Lord 

Bvller, J., Moss r. GalHmore (1780), Kmiyon, C.J., Sadgrove v. Kirby (1795), 

Dougl. 279. 6 T. K. 486. But see also JUDGES, post, 

1 In questions of difficulty and nicety, 13. 

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Construction — continued. 

construction that I can put upon the intent and meaning of the 
authorities applicable to the cases before me. — Lord Lan^dale, M.R., 
Carpmael v. Powis (1845), 9 Beav. 19. 

See also 14, 15, 28, above; Statutes, 14 ; Will 9. 

30. I have been long and deeply impressed with the rule, now, I believe, 
universally adopted, at least in the Courts of law in Westminster 
Hall, that in construing wills and indeed statutes, and all written 
instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to 
be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some 
repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which 
case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, 
so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther. This 
is laid down by Mr. Justice Burton, in a very excellent opinion, which 
is to be found in the case of Warhurton v. Loveland} — Lord Wensleydale, 
Grey and others v. Pearson (1857), 6 H. L. C. p. 106 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 481. 

See also Statutes, 6, 7, 17 ; Will, 7, 16. 

31. The golden rule of construction is, that words are to be construed 
according to their natural meaning,^ unless such a construction would 
either render them senseless, or would be opposed to the general 
scope and intent of the instrument, or unless there be some cogent 
reason of convenience in favour of a different interpretation. — 
Bramwell, B., Fowell and another v. Franter and others (1864), 
3 H. & C. 461 ; 34 L. J. Ex. 7. 

See also 2, 4, 8, 29, above ; 32, helow; Judges, 13 ; Will, 8, 15. 

32. It has been a general rule for drawing deeds and other legal 
documents from the earliest times, which one is taught when one 
first becomes a pupil to a conveyancer, never to change the form of 
words unless you are going to change the meaning, and it woiild be 
as well if those who are engaged in the preparation of Acts of 
Parliament wotdd bear in mind that that is the real principle of 
construction. — Blackburn, J., Hadley v. Perks (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 457. 

See also 2, 5, 8, 10, 14, 21, 31, above ; Conveyance, 2 ; Statutes, 

2, 3, 14 ; WoEDS, 5, 9. 

1 1 Huds. & Brooke (Ir.) 648. See the for construing all written instruments." 

same case in error in the House of Lords, See also per Jessel, M.R., in Ex parte 

wXiiLoid Cliief Justice Tindal's opinion Walton; In re Levy (1881), L. R. 17 

on the same matter, delivered on behalf C. D. 750 ; 50 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 659 ; per 

of all the Judges, 2 Dow & C. 493, and in Chitty, J., in Spencer r. Metropolitan 

the Smsex Peerage Case, 11 Clark & F. Board of Works (1882), L. R.22 C. D.148. 
143. See also Caledonian Railway Co. «. 2 As a Judge sitting here to interpret 

North British Railway Co. (1881), L. R. 6 the rule, I must take it exactly as it is. — 

App. Cas. 131, where Lord Blackburn Chitty, J., Besley 0. Besley (1888), L. B. 

quotes Zord Weiisley dale's " golden rule 37 C. D. 650. 

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Contempt of Court. 

1. The phrase "contempt of court" often misleads persons not lawyers, 
and causes them to misapprehend its meaning, and to suppose that a 
proceeding for contempt of court amounts to some process taken for 
the purpose of vindicating the personal dignity of the Judges, and 
protecting them from personal insults as individuals. Very often it 
happens that contempt is committed by a personal attack on a Judge or 
an insult offered to him ; but as far as their dignity as individuals 
is concerned, it is of very subordinate importance compared with 
the vindication of the dignity of the Court itself ; and there would 
be scarcely a case, I think, in which any Judge would consider 
that, as far as his personal dignity goes, it would be worth while 
to take any steps.— Blaekbum, J., Skipworth's Case (1873), L. R. 
9 Q. B. Ca. 232. 

See 10, lelow ; Judges, 19, 75 ; Morals, 1. 

2. The object of the discipline enforced by the Court in case of contempt 
of court is not to vindicate the dignity of the Court or the person of 
the Judge, but to prevent imdue interference with the adminis- 
tration of justice. — Bowen, L.J., HeUmore v. Smith (2) (1886), 
L. E. 35 C. D. 455. 

See helow, 6 ; Administration of Justice, 21 ; Courts, 6 ; Jury, 20. 

3. There are three different sorts of contempt. One kind of contempt 
is scandalizing the Court itself. There may be hkewise a contempt of 
this Court, in abusing parties who are concerned in causes here. 
There may be also a contempt of this Court, in prejudicing mankind 
against persons before the cause is heard. There cannot be anything 
of greater consequence than to keep the streams of justice clear and 
pure, that parties may proceed with safety both to themselves and 
their characters. — Lord Hardwicke, Case of Printer of St. Jameses 
Evening Post (174:2), 2 Atk. 471. 

See 10, helow; Administration of Justice, 28 ; Husband and Wife, 5. 

4. Viis mis dirrez en un autre manere comment yl est plus proeheyn 
Tieyr, ou vous demurrz sanz manger et heyre jekes demyn matyn endos. 
(You shall tell us in another way how he was next heir, or you shall 
remain shut up without eating or drinking until to-morrow morning.) 
— Roviury, J., Pleas in the Common Bench (1293), Y. B. 21 & 22 
Ed. I., p. 272. 

See 8, lelow; Jury, 20. 

5. It seems to me that this jurisdiction of committing for contempt being 
practically arbitrary and unlimited, should be most jealously and care- 
fully watched, and exercised, if I may say so, with the greatest reluctance 

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Contempt of Couit — contiwmd. 

and the greatest anxiety on the part of Judges to see whether there is 
no other mode which is not open to the objection of arbitrariness, and 
which can be brought to bear upon the subject. — Jessel, M.R., In re 
Clements, Clements v. Erlanger (1877), 46 L. J. Oh. 383. 
See lelaw, 10 ; Justice, 6. 

6. The law has armed the High Court of Justice with the .power, and 
imposed on it the duty of preventing hrevi manu and by summary 
proceedings any attempt to interfere with the administration of 
justice. It is on that ground, and not on any exaggerated notion of 
the dignity of individuals that insults to Judges are not allowed. 
—Bowmen, L.J., In re Johnson (1887), L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 74. 

See 2, above. 

7. It is truly remarked that aU the particular instances of contempts it 
woxdd be endless to enumerate. — Williams, J., Miller v. Knox (1838), 
4 Bing. N. C. 589. 

8. From the earliest period of our history this authority has been 
exercised.' The Year-books record instances of such commitments. — 
Best, J., R. V. Davison (1821), 4 B. & A. 340. 

See 4, above. 

9. Committals for contempt of Court are ordinarily in cases where some 
contempt ex facie of the Court has been committed, or for comments 
on cases pending in the Courts. However, there can be no doubt that 
there is a third head of contempt of Court by the publication of 
scandal matter of the Court itself. . . . Committal for contempt of 
Court is a weapon to be used sparingly, and always with reference to 

/ the interests of the administration of justice. Hence, when a trial has 
taken place and the case is over the Judge or the jury are given over 
to criticism. Committals for contempt of Court by scandahsing the 
Court itself have become obsolete in this country. Courts are satis- 
fied to leave to public opinion attacks or comments derogatory or 
scandalous to them. — Lord Morris, McLeod v. St. Aubyn (1899), 
L. R. App. Cas. [1899], p. 561. 
See Administration of Justice, 20 ; Husband and Wife, 5 ; Judges, 
18, 82 ; Judicial Peoceedings, 1, 7, 11. 

10. There are many ways of obstructing the Court. Endeavours are not 
wanting either to disturb the Judge or to influence the jury, or to keep 
back or pervert the testimony of witnesses, or by other methods, accord- 
ing to the emergency of the occasion, to obstruct the course of justice. 
These powers are given to the Judges to keep the coui-se of justice 

' I.e., the power that a Judge of a Court of record has to fine or imprison for contempt. 

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Contempt of Court — continued. 

free * : powers of great importance to society, for by the exercise of 
them law and order prevail ; those who are interested in wrong are 
shown that the law is irresistible. It is this obstruction which is 
called in law contempt, and it has nothing to do with the personal 
feelings of the Judge, and no Judge would allow his personal feelings 
to have any weight in the matter. According to my experience, the 
personal feelings of the Judges have never had the sHghtest influence 
in. the exercise of these powers entrusted to them for the purpose of 
supporting the dignity of their important office ; and so far as my 
observation goes, they have been uniformly exercised for the good of 
the people.— BrZe, C.J., Ex parte Fernandez (1861), L. J. C. P. 332. 

See 1, 3, 5, above ; Couets, 3, 4 ; Joey 19. 
11. The privilege of committing for contempt is inherent in every 
deliberative body invested with authority by the Constitution.^ — Loi-d 
Denman, C.J., Stockdale v. Hansard (1837), 3 St. Tr. (N. S.) 854. 

See 10, above. 


1. Judicial decision on one contract can rarely help us to the under- 
standing of another. — Lord O'Hagan, Ehodes v. Forwood (1876), 
L. R. 1 Ap. Ca. 275. 

2. There is a great principle which I think ought to be adhered to by 
this Court, and by every Court where it can possibly do so ; that is to 
say, that a man shall abide by his contracts, and that a man's contracts 
should be enforced as against him. — Bomer, J., Biggs v. Hoddinott, 
Hoddinottu Biggs (1898), L. R. 2 C. D. [1898], p. 313. 

See also 6, below; Equity, 38 ; Fraud, 14 ; Miscellaneous, 11 ; Toet, 
16 ; Teuth, 8. 

3. As to the hardships upon foreigners, if they enter into contracts in 
England, and apply to our Courts of judicature to enforce a per-, 
formance of them, they must submit themselves to be judged by the 
laws of this kingdom, and to our exposition of them. — Lord 
Mansfield, Pray v. Edie (1786), T. R. 315. 

See FoEEiGN Law, 4 ; Law, 24 ; Toet, 1. 

4. It is to be remembered that contracts in restraint of trade are in them- 
selves, if nothing more appears to show them reasonable, bad in the 
eye of the law. — Tindal, C.J., Homer v. Graves (1831), 7 Bing, 744. 

J Seg Sj abore. 63 ; Fenton ■». Hampton, 11 Moo. P. C. 

2 Compare Beaumont v. Barrett, 1 Moo. 347 ; Doyle v. Falconer, L. E. 1 P. C. 328. 
P. C. 59 ; Kielby v. Carson, i Moo. P. C. 

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Contract — continued. 

5. A contract requires two parties to it, and a man in one character can, 
with difficulty, contract with himself in another character. — Sir John 
Bomilly, M.R., Collinson v. Lister (1855), 20 Beav. 370 ; 24 L. J. 
Ch. 766. 

6. It seems to me that whenever circumstances arise in the ordinary 
business of life in which, if two persons were ordinarily honest and 
careful, the one of them woidd make a promise to the other, it may 
properly be inferred that both of them understood that such a promise 
was given and accepted. — Lwd Esher, M.R., Ex parte Ford (1885), 
L. R. 16 Q. B. D. 307 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 407. 

See 2, above ; Commerce, 4 ; Truth, 4. 


1. There is no magical meaning in the word " conveyance " ; it denotes an 
instrument which carries from one person to another an interest in 
land. Now, an instrument giving to a person a charge upon land, 
gives him an interest in the land — if he has a mortgage already, it 
gives him a further interest.' — Lord Cairns, L.C., Credland v. Potter 
(1874), L. R. 10 Ch. Ap. 12. 

See Words, 1. 

2. The difficulty I really feel is the danger of doing anything which may 
imperil what has been going on for centuries among conveyancers. 
Conveyancers have not always stated exactly the truth upon the face of 
their deeds. No doubt at the present day greater care is taken, but 
there are some forms which are known, and which are in common use. 
— Ghitty, J., Cairitt'!?. Real and Personal Advance Company (1889), 
L. R. 42 Ch. 272. 

See also Construction, 32 ; Statutes, 2, 3 ; Will, 4. 


1. We ought not to encourage vexatious prosecutions, which tend to 
throw corporations into confusion. — Lord Mansfield, Rex v. Wardroper 
(1766), 4 Burr. Part IV. 1965. 

See Process, 2 ; Tort, 19. 

2. The Court are bound to consider aU the circumstances of the case, 
before they disturb the peace and quiet of any corporation. — Lord 
Mansfield, King v. Stacey (1785), 1 T. R. 6. 

1 This ruling as to the definition of the was a conveyance within the meaning of 

word " conveyance " arose from the ques- the West Riding Registry Act (2 & 3 

tion whether an instrument not under seal Anne, c. 4). 
giving a charge on the equity of an estate 

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Corporations — continued. 

3. That corporations are the creatures of the Crown nmst be universally 
admitted.— Lord Kenyan, C J., King v. Ginever (1796), 6 T. R. 735. 

4. The situation the Lord Mayor holds is the first officer of the first 
city in the world in point of commerce and riches, and everything that 
can constitute the magnificence of a city. He is a judicial officer, 
and a municipal officer too, and from these combined characters there 
are duties incumbent upon him, which by aU the ties that can bind a 
man to the discharge of duty, he is bound to discharge. It stands at 
the head of his duties, next after protecting the religion which binds 
us to Grod, to govern that civil pohcy which binds government 
together, and prevents us from being a state of anarchy and confusion. 
—Lord Kenyon, Eaton's Case (1793), 22 How. St. Tr. 820. 

5. We ought, as far as we can by law, to support the government of aU 
societies and corporations, especially this of the city of London ; and 
if the mayor and aldermen should not have power to punish offenders 
in a summary way, then farewell the government of the city. — 
EoU, C.J., Clark's Case (1696), 5 Mod. Rep. 320. 

6. Corporations cannot commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor excommu- 
nicate, for they have no souls." — Coke, Case of Sutton's Hospital (1612), 
5 Rep. 303 ; 10 Rep. 32 b. 

1 Lord Coke gravely informs us that If a man give lands, says Sir Edward 

corporations cannot be excommunicated, Coke, to a mayor and commonalty, or 

because they have no souls, and they other body aggregate, consisting of many 

appear to be as destitute of every feeling persons capable, without naming suc- 

as if they had also no bowels. It is cessors, the law construes it to be a fee 

certain that one consequence of the simple, because, in judgment of law, they 

division of responsibility which attends never die : where the sense is plain that 

the union of a great number of individuals these natural persons, though capable to 

is, that the collective body is guilty of take in their natural capacities jointly, 

things, of which few of the persons com- which the law would adjudge an estate for 

posing' it but would shrink from com- lives : yet the grant being made to them 

mitting ; there is, in truth, but one point in their corporate name, they take in that 

through which they are vulnerable, and capacity, and the grant is not determin- 

that is the keyhole of the cash box. A able on the death of any of the individuals, 

good many cases might be cited in support but continues as long as the corporation 

of this proposition : Thus, in a contract to continues. In support of the idea of the 

carry goods and passengers, corporate immortality of corporations, a passage is 

bodies may be held responsible even also cited from Grotius ; which, however, 

through the negligence of their servants. when fairly considered, is so far from 

"Cities are immortal." — 6froti'iis,DeJ\iTe justifying the conclusion drawn from it. 

Belli et Pacis, lib. 2, cap. 9. See also 1st that it proceeds on the supposition that 

Inst fol. 9 b. 3 Coke, 60 a. ; 2 Bulstr. 233; they may cease to exist." — Kyd on 

21 Edw. VI. f. 13. Corporations, 17. 

"When it is said that a corporation is A corporation can have no legal existence 

immortal, we are to understand nothing out of the boundaries of the sovereignty 

more than that it is capable of an by which it is created.— rasMey, C.J., 

indefinite duration, and the authorities Bank of Augusta v. Barle, 13 Peters' Sup. 

cited to prove its immortality, do not Court Eep. (U. S.) 588. 
warrant the conclusion drawn from them. 

j),jja. Digitized by Microsoft® 4 


Corporations — continued. 

7. It is a fiction, a shade, a nonentity, but a reality for legal purposes. 
A corporation aggregate is only in ahstracto — it is invisible, immortal, 
and rests only in intendment and consideration of the law. — Coke, 
Case of Sutton's Hospital (1612), 5 Rep. 303 ; 10 Rep. 32 b. 
See 6, n., above. 


1. A Judge ought to be severe in awarding costs when he finds that 
expenses have been incurred through a wrongful suppression of 
material documents. — Thesiger, L.J., Jones v. Monte Video Gas Co. 
(1880), L. R. 5 Q. B. 559. 

2. It is unconscionable in a defendant, to take advantage of the apices 
litigandi, to turn a plaintiff rotmd, and make him pay costs where his 
demand is just. Against such objections every possible presumption 
ought to be made, which ingenuity can suggest. How disgraceful 
then would it be to the administration of justice to allow Chicane to 
obstruct Bight ; by the help of a legal fiction contrary to the help of the 
fact \—Lord Mansfield, Morris v. Pugh (1761), 3 Burr. Part IV. 1243. 

See also Constedotion, 26 ; Dklay, 1 ; Discretion, 11, 15 ; Pleadings, 10. 

3. I wiU be no party to paying out of charity property costs which are 
not properly payable out of it. — Kay, J., In re St. Stephen, Coleman 
Street ; In re St. Mary the Virgin, Aldermanbury (1888), L. R. 39 
C. D. 507. 

4. By the rule of law, the King neither receives or pays costs.' — Lord 
Mansfield, King v. Jenkinson (1785), T. R. 83. 

See helow, 5. 

5. The Crown was always an unequal match for the subjects : but if the 
weight of costs were thrown into the scale, this would become such an 
addition as woxdd make its prosecutions heavier than they would be 

1 See the Author's treatise on the law Vict. c. 90, ss. 1, 2, the subject of costs in 

and privileges relating to the Attorney- all legal proceedings by or on behalf of the 

General, &c., pp. 73, 98, 103, n. Also for Crown in matters relating to the public 

this principle of the common law, see Bl. revenue, were placed upon the same foot- 

Com. III. 402 ; Att.-Gen. v. ShiUibeer, i ing as in actions between subject and 

Ex. 606; Burton, Office of Pleas (Exchequer subject. But "on the other hand, as 

Practice) 248 ; Chitty, Prerogatives of the incidental to departmental administration 

Crown, 310 ; Manning, Practice of the there must often be litigation which does 

Exchequer, 69 ; The Queen v. Beadle, 7 not directly affect any prerogative of the 

Ell. & Bl. 492 ; West on Extents, 227. Crown and as to which no good reason 

The maxim on the point is that " Roy can be assigned for the denial of costs to 

n'est lie per ascun Statute, si il ne soit the successful party." — Per Lord Alrer- 

expressement nosme " : The King is not stone in Rex v. Archbishop of Canterbury 

bound by any statute, if he be not expressly and another (1902), T. L. R. Vol. 18, 888, 

named to be so bound. — Jenk. Cent. 307 ; and authorities there collected. 
Wing. Max. 1. By the statute 18 & 19 

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Costs — eontinued. 

able to bear.— Porfeer, C.J., Reg. v. Ballivos, &c. de Bewdlev QTIS") 
1 P. Wms. 226. 
See 4, above ; Foefeituee. 


1. A gentleman of Lincoln's-inn.i— EoZt, C.J., Butler's Case (1699), 13 
How. St. Tr. 1259. 

2. A gentleman at the Bar. — Lord Mansfield, "Windham v. Ohetwynd 
(1757), 1 Burr. Part IV. 427. 

See helow, 6, 15 ; Esquire, 2. 

3. No counsel in the world that understand themselves, can argue any- 
thing against what has been often settled and always practised. 
—Holt, C.J., Parkyn's Case (1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 134. 

See 10, below ; Precedents, 12. 

4. If any whimsical notions are put into you, by some enthusiastic 
counsel, the Court is not to take notice of their crotchets. — Je-ffenes, 
C.J., Hayes' Case (1684), 10 How. St. Tr. 314. 

5. In a common case, it is the usual course for the coiuisel to take the 
memorandiuns in his hand, for the cross-examination. — ^yre, L.C.J., 
Trial of Thomas Hardy (1794), 24 How. St. Tr. 824. 

6. It is impossible the cause can go on, unless the gentlemen at the bar 
will a little understand one another, and by mutual forbearance, 
assist one another ; you are a little too apt to break out, and I think 

1 Eemark of the Judge on the witness St. Tr. 770, 771, 791. See also the follow- 

replying that he belonged to the Honour- ing insulting remark of JefEeries to counsel 

able Society of Lincoln's Inn on the in SaelieverelVs Case (1684) : " You are a 

question, " What profession are you of?" gentleman of the long robe and should 

Members of the Bar were formerly desig- have known better." (10 How. St. Tr. 91.) 

nated by the Inn to which they belonged. " As for geitdlemen" says Sir Thomas 

The following is another later example in Smith, " they be made good cheap in this 

reference to the Honourable Society of kingdom ; for whosoever studieth the laws 

Lincoln's Inn : "I was prevented by a of the realm, who studieth in the TJniver- 

sudden fit of illness from attending ; but I sities, who professeth the liberal sciences, 

learnt from a gentleman of lAncoVrCs Inn, and (to be short) who can live idly, and 

that the order was confirmed." — Kiiig v. without manual labour, and will bear the 

Waller (1772), LofEt. 50. See also as to a port, charge, and countenance of a gentle- 

" Gentleman of Gray's Inn," Coubts, man, he shall be called master, and shall 

4, n., sv^ra. " Gentlemen of the Eobe," be taken for a gentleman." — Cammonw. 

or "of the Long Eobe," or "Long of Eng., b. 1, o. 20 ; Steph. Com., Vol. 2 

Eobe" simply, was the familiar term by (9th ed.), 619. Also stated on the same 

which the members of the various Inns of page that to esquires, may be added 

Court, i.e., "the Pour Bars "were generally barrister - at - law. See also heading 

known in former times. This is frequently EsQUIBB, 1, 2, 3, sa^ra ; E. «. Brough, 1 

seen in the old Books and Parliamentary Wils. 244. It is stated in Blount's Law 

Debates which also speak of matters Diet, and Glossary, that barristers were 

referred to a " Committee of the Long named esquires in the Acts for poll- 

Eobe." — See Proceedings against Thomas money. 
Earl of Damby (1678—1685), 11 How. 

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Counsel — continued. 

there has been a little inclination sometimes to observe more upon that 
than the occasion calls for. — Eyre, L.C.J., Hardy's Case (1794), 24 How. 
St. Tr. 688. 

7. It is fit they should speak what they can for the advantage of their 
client.— WaZcot, J., Hampden's Case (1684), 9 How. St. Tr. 1104. 

See Judges, 4. 

8. It has been always the practice heretofore, that when the Court have 
delivered their opinion, the counsel should sit down and not dispute 
it any further.' — Jefferies, C.J., Case of Titus Gates (1685), 10 How. 
St. Tr. 1186. 

See Liberty of the Subject, 1. 

9. Consider a little how you treat the Court ; the objection hath been 
solemnly taken in this Court, argued and adjudged by this Court, 
and now you come to arraign that judgment that was then given. — 
Pratt, C.J., Layer's Case (1722), 16 How. St. Tr. 313. 

10. The point now before us is a settled case, and therefore there is no 
need to enter into arguments about it. — Denison, J., Rex v. Jarvis 
(1756), 1 Burr. Part IV. 154. 

See 3, ahove. 

11. There is usually a decency about counsel which prevents them from 
pressing that to a conclusion which can never be concluded. — Gibhs, 
C.J., Tomkins and others v. WiUshear (1813), 5 Taunton, 431. 

See also Peaotice, 22, 23. 

12. Counsel are frequently induced, and they are justified in taking the 
most favourable view of their clients' case ; and it is not fair to pass 
over any piece of evidence they find difficult to deal vrith, provided 
they cite, fairly and correctly, those parts of the evidence they com- 
ment upon. — Lord Kenyon, Case of Earl of Thanet and others 
(1799), 27 How. St. Tr. 940. 

See also 14, helow ; Ceimqtal Justice, 1 ; Judges, 51 ; Nonsuit, n. ; 
Opening Speech, 4 ; Practice, 22. 

13. A counsel's position is one of the utmost difficulty. He is not to 
speak of that which he knows ; he is not' called upon to consider 
whether the facts with which' he is dealing are true or false. What 
he has to do, is to argue as best he can, without degrading himself, 

' " And let not the counsel at the bar eredendum esse non judici : It is absurd 

chop with the Judge, nor wind himself to say, after judgment, that any one else 

into the handling of the cause anew, than the Judge should be hearkened to. 

after the Judge hath declared his sentence." ^12 Co. 25. See also anti, ADMimsiKi.- 

— Bacon, " Essay on Judicature." tion op Justice, 21, n. 

Abturdmn est affirmare (re judicata) 

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Counsel — continued. 

in order to maintain the proposition which will carry with it either 
the protection or the remedy which he desires for his client. If 
amidst the difficulties of his position he were to he called upon duriag 
the heat of his argument to consider whether what he says is true or 
false, whether what he says is relevant or irrelevant, he would have 
his mind so embarrassed that he could not do the duty which he is 
called upon to perform. For, more than a Judge, infinitely more than 
a witness, he wants protection on the ground of benefit to the public. 
The rule of law is that what is said in the course of the administration 
of the law is privileged ; and the reason of that rule covers a counsel 
even more than a Judge or a witness.^ — Brett, M.R., Mimster v. 
Lamb (1833), L. R. 11 Q. B. 603. 

See also Administeatiou of Justice, 34, 35 ; Evidence, 29 ; Judges, 

47, 51 ; Judicial Proceedings, 13 ; Opening Speech, 3 ; Practice, 22. 

14. It is expected you should do your best for those you are assigned 

for, as it is expected in any other case, that you do your duty for your 

client.— HoZt, C.J., Rookwood's Case (1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 154. 

See 12, above; Judges, 4. 
15. The Court is greatly obliged to the gentlemen of the Bar who have 
spoke on the subject ; and by whose care and abilities so much has 
been effected, that the rule of decision will be reduced to a very easy 
compass. I cannot omit to express particular happiness in seeing 
young men, just called to the Bar, have been able so much to profit by 
their reading. — Lord Mansfield, Somerset v. Stewart (1772), Lofft. 18 ; 
id. The Negro Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 80. 

See also post. Law 1, n. ; note to Law Reports, 3, supra. 

16. No man has a higher sense of the importance of the rights and 
privileges of counsel in discharge of their arduous and important 
duties, and I should regret if they had not that privilege, not for their 
sake only, but for the sake of the whole community. — Goekbum, C.J., 
Ex parte Pater (1864), 9 Cox, C. C. 553. 

See Miscellaneous, 7. 

17. You need not cite cases that are familiar.'— Sir F. Pollock, C.B., 
Reg. V. Baldry (1852), 5 Cox, C. C. 525. 

1 See 3 Bl. Com, 125 ; Odgers, Libel quickness of conceit in catting ofi 

and Slander (2nd ed.), 187 ; Folkard, Law evidence or counsel too short, or to prevent 

of Slander and Libel (5th ed.), 192 ; 3 (anticipate) information by questions. 

Broom, Com. 132. though pertinent. — Essay of Judicature. 

An overspeaking Judge is a no well- See further. Bacon's advice to Mr. Justice 

timed cymbal. It is no grace to a Judge Hntton, post, Judge, 26, n. ; Jury, 15. 

first to find that which he might have ^ " You need not cite cases : 'Tis a 

heard in due time from the Bar, or to show principle." — Lord Mamsfield's remark to 

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Counsel — continued. 

18. I remember Lord Eldon saying to counsel, " You have told us how 
far the cases have gone, wiU you now tell us where they are to stop ? " 
I think it is now time that we should say where the cases are to stop. 
—Pollock, C.B., PhiHips V. Briard (1856), 4 W. R. 487. 

See also Cases, 2, 6. 

19. A man's rights are to be determined by the Court, not by his 
attorney or counsel. It is for want of remembering this that foolish 
people object to lawyers that they will advocate a case against their 
own opinions. A chent is entitled to say to his coimsel, I want your 
advocacy, not your judgment ; I prefer that of the Court. — BramweU, 
B., Johnson v. Emerson (1871), L. R. 6 Ex. 367. 

See 27, helow. 

20. When counsel addresses an argument on the ground of natural 
justice to a Court of law, he addresses it to the wrong tribunal. It 
may be a good argument for inducing the legislatxire to alter the law ; 
but in a Court of law all that we can deal with is the law of the land 
as we find it.—NoHh, J., In re Gregson (1887), L. J. 57 C. D. 223. 

See Judges, 34. 

21. First settle what the case is, before you argue it. — Wright, L.C.J. , 
Trial of the Seven Bishops (1688), 12 How. St. Tr. 342. 

22. Don't you foist in a proposition which is not allowed.' — JUyrd Mans- 
field, Crosser v. Miles (1774), LofEt. 595. 

See also Cases, 6 ; Judges, 70; Pi^adings, 12. 

23. It seems to me that the argument of the defendant's counsel blows 
hot and cold at the same time.s — Buller, J., I' Anson v. Stuart (1787), 
1 T. R. 753. 

See Pleadings, 9. 

counsel in the course of the argument in traria iivn est audiendus (Jetik. Cent. 16) : 

Morgan I'. Jones (1773), LofEt. 165. See "He is not to be heard who alleges 

also ptr Lord Alverstvne in Eex r. things contradictory to each other." 

Archbishop of Canterbury and another This elementary rule of logic expresses, 

(1902), T. L. E. Vol. 18, 388. in technical language, the saying that a 

1 The recent rejoinder of Mr. Justice man shall not be permitted to " blow hot 

Grantham to counsel for foisting a pre- and cold " with reference to the same 

posterous argument upon the Court will transaction, or insist, at different times, on 

serve to illustrate the point, when his the truth of each of two conflicting 

lordship observed that " a grosser per- allegations, according to the promptings 

version of English justice it is impossible of his private interest. Says the Satyr, if 

to imagine, and I should indeed be sorry you have gotten a trick of blowing hot 

if, under any circumstances, it could be and cold out of the same mouth, I've e'en 

proved to be English law." — Burrows v. done with ye. — L' Estrange. 

Ithodes [1899], L. K. 1 Q. B. D. 823. " Hot and cold were in one body fist ; 

''.... This would be blowing hot and And soft with hard, and light with heavy 

cold. — Lavyreiice, J., Berkeley Peerage mixt." — Dry den. 
Case (1811), i Camp. 412. AUegans con- 
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Counsel — eontirmed. 

24. It is the duty of all Courts to keep counsel to the points before 
them.— Pemberton, L.C.J., Ktzharris' Case (1681), 8 How. St. Tr. 296. 

25. I wish to uphold counsel in the exercise of their discretion. — Keke- 
loich, J., In re Somerset ; Somerset v. Earl Poulett (1893), L. R. 
[1894], 1 Ch. 249. 

Compare Evidenoe, 13 et seg., infra ; Jcdges, 4. 

26. I cannot allow that the counsel is the agent of the party. — Best, 
C.J., CoUedge v. Horn (1825), 3 Bing. 121. 

See 27, helow. 

27. I always said, I wiQ be my client's advocate, not his agent. To hire 
himself to any particidar course, is a position in which no member of 
the profession ought to place himself. — Pollock, C.B., Swinfen v. Lord 
Chelmsford (1860), L. T. Rep. Vol. 2 (N. S.) 413. 

See 19, 26, above. 

Court Leet. 

These Courts were very properly adapted to the customs, manners, 
genius and policy of a people upon their first settlement : but, like aU. 
other human jurisdictions, vary in the course and progress of time, 
as the Government and manners of a people take a diEEerent turn, and 
fall under different circumstances.^ — Lord Mansfield, Colebrooke v. 
Elliott (1765) 3 Burr. Part IV., p. 1863. 
See Law, 3. 


1. It was said by a very learned Judge, I^ord Macclesfield, towards the 
beginning of this century that the most effectual way of removing 
land marks would be by innovating on the rules of evidence ; and so 
I say.^ I have been in this profession more than forty years, and 
have practised both in Courts of law and equity ; and if it had fallen 
to my lot to form a system of jurisprudence, whether or not I should 
have thought it advisable to establish two different Courts with different 
jurisdictions, and governed by different rules, it is not necessary to 
say. But, influenced as I am by certain prejudices that have become 
inveterate with those who comply with the systems they found estab- 
lished, I find that in these Courts proceeding by different rules a 
certain combined system of jurisprudence has been framed most 

1 For definition of Court Leet, consult sessions. It is expressly kept up by sect. 40 

M. Cum. IV. 318. This Court has fallen of the Sheriffs Act, 1887. 
into desuetude and its business has 2 See Bacon's advice to Mr. Justice 

gradually devolved upon the quarter Hutton, suprii, Judges, 26, n. 

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Courts — continued. 

beneficial to the people of this country, and which I hope I may be 
indiilged in supposing has never yet been equalled in any other 
country on earth.' Our Courts of law only consider legal rights : our 
Courts of equity have other rules, by which they sometimes supersede 
those legal rules, and in so doing they act most beneficially for the 
subject. We all know that, if the Courts of law were to take into 
their consideration all the jurisdiction belonging to Courts of equity, 
many bad consequences would ensue. To mention only the single 
instance of legacies being left to women who may have married 
inadvertently : if a Court of law could entertain an action for a legacy, 
the husband would recover it, and the wife might be left destitute : 
but if it be necessary in such a case to go into equity, that Court wiU 
not suffer the husband alone to reap the fruits of the legacy given to 
the wife ; for one of its rules is that he who asks equity must do 
equity,^ and in such a case they will compel the husband to make a 
provision for the wife before they will suffer him to get the money. I 
exemphfy the propriety of keeping the jurisdictions and rules of the 
different Courts distinct by one out of a multitude of cases that might 
be adduced. . . . One of the rules of a Covirt of equity is that they 
cannot decree against the oath of the party himself on the evidence of 
one witness alone without other circumstances : but when the point 
is doubtful, they send it to be tried at law, directing that the answer 
of the party shall be read on the trial ; so they may order that a party 
shall not set up a legal term on the trial, or that the plaintiff himself 
shall be examined ; and when the issue comes from a Court of equity 
with any of these directions the Courts of law comply with the terms 
on which it is so directed to be tried. By these means the ends of 
justice are attained, without making any of the stubborn rules of law 
stoop to what is supposed to be the substantial justice of each parti- 
cular case ; and it is wiser so to act than to leave it to the Judges of 
the law to relax from those certain and established rules by which 
they are sworn to decide. — Lord Kenyan, C.J., Bauerman v. Badenius 
(1798), 7 T. R. 667. 
See also Administration of JnsTiCE, 6 ; Law, 23 ; Magistrates, 4 ; 

PEECEn)ENTS, 3, 71. 

^ It is unnecessary to show what passes It is our duty to administer justice in 

in England, a country as famed for such a way as to give satisfaction to all 

justice, and other great qualifications, as parties. — IJarl of ClonweU, C.J., Jackson's 

any other country : justice is there Case (1795), 25 How. St. Tr. 798. 

administered in such a manner as to exalt ^ See post, EQUITY, 12. 
it above the other countries of the earth. 

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the city not to 
V. Sir Gilbert 

grant this (writ) 
Heathcot (1711), 

Courts — eorainued. 

2. It will make a greater heat in 
than otherwise. — Pmins, J., R 
Fortesc. 293. 

See Judges, 9 ; Magistrates, 4 ; ' Peooess, 2. 

3. So long as Courts of justice remain Courts of justice there must be 
decency maintained.' — Bayley, J., Trial of Hunt and others (1820), 
1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 382. 

See Magistrates, 6. 

4. Let us have no breaking of the peace in Court.' — Pemberton, L.C.J., 
Trial of Lord Grey and others (1682), 9 How. St. Tr. 186. 

See also Administration of Justice, 20 ; Contempt, 9 ; Judges, 73, 76. 

5. An English Court cannot judge by the hght of nature. — Bowen, L.J., 
Hyman v. Hehn (1883), L. R. 24 C. D. 544. 

6. Courts do not exist for the sake of discipUne, but for the sake of 

' Strong expressions in Courts of justice, 
according to present views, must be 
repressed ; and the fastidiousness of 
people's ears is not to be allowed to form 
their rule of conduct. It is curious to 
notice the change which a few years has 
produced in this respect. Mr. Hayward, 
Q.C., in his " Biographical and Critical 
Essays," says (p. 140) : " During the first 
quarter of the century the best bred 
people swore. . . . Mr. Justice Best (the 
first Lord Wynford) during the trial of 
Carlisle for blasphemy, audibly exclaimed 
to a brother Judge, ' I'LL be d — d to h — 1 if 
I sit here to hear the Christian religion 
abused.' [His words, as reported, will, 
however, be found slightly different under 
the heading Cheistianitt, 1, supra,.} 
Lord Eldon was in the habit of revising 
drafts of biUs during prayers in the 
House of Lords. He had just risen from 
his knees when, in reply to an ironical 
comment of Lord Grey, he said, ' D — ^n it, 
my lord, you'd do the same if you were as 
hard worked as I am.' " Swift's line may 
thus be adopted in its integ rity : " Never 
mention Hell to ears polite. " 

"The Master of the Eolls is always 
amusing, but he rarely indulges in such 
homely wit as he did on a recent occasion 
when a junior before him cited the Law 
Beports as ' 2 Q. B. D.' ' That is not the 
way you should address us,' said Lord 
Esher. The learned gentleman protested 
that he merely meant to use the brief and 
ordinary formula for the second volume of 
the Queen's Bench Division Reports. ' I 

might as well,' retorted his lordship, ' say 
to you, ' U. B. D.' "—Pall Mall Gazette ; 
id. L. T., Vol. 102, April 21, 1897, p. 576. 
2 " I hope we are now past that time of 
day that humming and hissing shall be 
used in Courts of justice ; but I would 
fain know that fellow that dare to hum or 
hiss while I sit here ; I will assure him, be 
he who he wiU, I will lay him by the heels 
and make an example of him. Indeed, I 
knew the time when causes were to be 
carried according as the mobile hissed or 
hummed ; and I do not question but they 
have as good a will to it now. Come, Mr. 
Ward, pray let us ha ve none of your f ragran- 
cies, and fine rhetorical flowers, to take the 
people with." — Jefferies,Jj.C.J., Pritchard 
■V. PapiUon (1684), 10 How. St. Tr. 337. 
" Pray let us have no laughing, it is not 
decent." — Wright, L.C.J., Trial of the 
Seven Bishops (1688), 12 How. St. Tr. 344. 
At the trial of the Seven Bishops, great 
disorder prevailed, especially after their 
acquittal. The Solicitor-General seeing 
several persons shouting, moved that they 
might be committed, " whereupon a gentle- 
man of Gray's Inn was laid hold of," but 
was soon after discharged. After the 
shouting was over, the Lord Chief Justice 
(Wright) "reproving the gentleman," said : 
" I am glad as you can be that my lords 
the bishops are acquitted, but your manner 
of rejoicing here in Court is indecent ; you 
might rejoice in your chambers, or else- 
where, but not here." — Id. 431. See also 
ante, Counsbl, 1, n. 

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Courts — continued. 

deciding matters in controversy. — Bowen, L.J., Croppers. Smith (1884), 
L. R. 26 C. D. 710. 
See Contempt of Court, 2. 

7. The criminal suit is open to every one, the civil suit to every one 
showing an interest.— Sir William Soott, Turner v. Meyers (1804), 1 
Hagg. Con. 415, n. 

See Equity, 36. 

8. The Court is to be guided by equity and good conscience, and the 
best evidence.— Lorti Hohhouae, Moses v. Parker (1896), L. R. Ap. Ca. 
[1896], p. 248. 

See Equitt, 33. 

9. It is not necessary in a Court of law to inquire into the modes of 
proceeding by which Courts of equity are guided. — Lord Loughborough, 
Rondeau v. Wyatt (1792), 2 Hen. Black. 68. 

See 14, helow. 

10. The Courts can take no notice of anything but what comes judicially 
before them.— Fates, J., Rex v. Wilkes (1769), 4 Burr. Part IV. 

See also 14, helow; Administration of Justice, 3, 4. 

11. The Courts of law are not provided at the public expense, and were 
not intended by those who so provided them, for the settlement of any 
but differences which do arise in the ordinary course of business. — 
Alderson, B., Brownlow v. Egerton (1854) (H. of L.), 23 L. J. Rep. 
Part 5 (N. S.), Chan. 365. 

See Morals, 3, and references therefrom. 

12. I think Courts of justice must always act upon the theory of very 
great probabiHty being sufficient. — Sir G. Jessel, M.R., Pattisson v. 
Gilford (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. Ca. 264. 

13. Every Court is the guardian of its own records, and master of its 
own practice.— Tindal, C.J., Scales v. Cheese (1844) 12 M. & "W. 687. 

See also Chancery, 5 ; Judicial Decisions, 26 ; Practice, 2. 
14> By common courtesy, credit is given to Courts which have pro- 
nounced the law, that they have proceeded legally. — Williavis, J., 
In re Cams Wilson (1845), 6 St. Tr. (N. S.) 192. 

See also 10, above; Administration of Justice, 3; Cases, 15; 
Chanceey, 10 ; Doctrine, 4 ; Evidence, 10 ; Law, 37, 59. 


After a hard frost a man might wake in the morning and find he was 
breaking a covenant. — Maule, J., Stokes v. GrisseU (1854), 2 W. R. 466. 

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Criminal Justice. 

1. There is no difference between ci-viland criminal cases as to evidence ; 
whatever is proper evidence in one case is in the other. With respect 
to criminal cases, if there is any doubt, one would lean in favour of a 
defendant, for the reason mentioned by my lord yesterday,^ because 
that is not to be set right afterwards. — Laurence, J., Stone's Case 
fl796), 25 How. St. Tr. 1314. 

See also 5, helow ; Counsel, 12 ; EvroENCSE, 1, 10. 

2. Judges should be, and I beheve generally are, careful not to allow 
proof of other acts of the prisoner besides those the subject of the 
indictment to be given, unless those acts have a clear bearing on some 
issue raised by the indictment. — Ghannell, J., Reg. v. Ollis (1900), 
L. R. 2 Q. B. D. [1900], p. 782. 

See 16, 37, helow; Administration of Justice, 5; Evibence, 20; 
Reputation ; Witness, 2. 

3. The natural leaning of our minds is in favour of prisoners ; and in 
the mild manner in which the laws of this country are executed, it 
has rather been a subject of complaint by some that the Judges have 
given way too easily to mere formal objections' on behalf of prisoners, 
and have been too ready on slight grounds to make favourable 
representations of their cases. Lord B^ale himseK, one of the greatest 
and best men who ever sat in judgment, gonsidered this extreme 
facility as a great blemish, owing to which more offenders escaped 
than by the manifestation of their innocence.* We must, however, 
take care not to carry this disposition too far, lest we loosen the bands 
of society, which is kept together by the hope of reward, and the fear 

' •' Keally 1 wish 1 was more acquainted 29 How. St. Tr. 1750; ojiii Appeals, 4, 

than I am, with the course of criminal svpra, and references there giren. 

jurisdiction — if the qnestion had never ^ See post, Pleadings, 12. 

been decided, I should have extreme ^ Lord Kenyan again expressed himself 

doubts upon it, and those extreme doubts very much to the same effect some time 

which I should have would lead me in a after in the case of King o. Airey, reported 
criminal case to do otherwise than I . in 2 East, 34 : "1 once before had 

should do in a civil case — in every civil occasion to refer to the opinion of a most 

case [I speak in the hearing of a grpat eminent Jadge, who was a great Crown 

many professional gentlemen] wherever I lawyer, upon the subject, I mean Lord 

have serious doubts, I follow the doctrine Hale* ; who even in his time lamented 

which I have collected to be laid down by the too great stiictness which had been 

Lord Hardwicke ; I receive the evidence, required in indictments, and which had 

giving the jury the best instruction I can grown to be a blemish and inconvenience 

upon the effect of it ; and I do it in the in the law ; and observed that more 

case of civil proceedings, without running offenders escaped by the over easy ear 

the risk of doing any hurt, because if I given to exceptions in indictments than 

receive it improperly, a season will come by their own innocence." 

when the Court can correct my error." — 

Lord Kenyan, id. 1272. See alto per ♦ See 2 Hale, 193. 
Serjt. Begt, Trial of Lord Melville (1806), 

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Criminal Justice — continued. 

of punishment. It has been always considered, that the Judges in 
our foreign possessions abroad were not bound by the rules of 
proceeding in our Courts here. Their laws are often altogether 
distinct from our own. Such is the case in India and other places. 
On appeals to the Privy Council from our colonies, no formal objections 
are attended to, if the substance of the matter or the corpus delicti 
sufficiently appear to enable them to get at the truth and justice of 
the case. — Lord Kenyan, C.J., King v. Suddis (1800), 1 East, 314. 
See also 30, 32, 37, helow; Law, 54; Pleadings, 12; Punishment, 
1, 4. 

4. It is the pride of our laws to labour more for the acquittal than the 
conviction of the accused, however black the allegations of offence. — 
George, B., Redmond's Case (1803), 28 How. St. Tr. 1313. 

See also 7, 16, 30, 37, below; CHARAcrrEE, 2, 3; Law, 48; Mis- 
cellaneous, 18 ; Witness, 2. 

5. It has been solemnly decided that there is no difference between the 
rules of evidence in civil and criminal cases. If the rules of evidence 
prescribe the best course to get at truth, they must be and are the 
same in aU cases and in aU civilized countries. — Best, J., King v. 
Burdett (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 113. 

See also 1, above, and references there given. 

6. We must follow the old authorities and precedents in criminal 
matters.— Lor(^ Coleridge, C.J., Queen v. Sowerby (1894), L. R. 2 
Q. B. D. [1894], p. 175. 

7. God forbid that the defendant should not be allowed the benefit of 
every advantage he is entitled to by law. — Lord Mansfield, Case of 
John Wilkes (1763), 4 Burr. Part IV., p. 2539. 

See also 4, above; Abministeatign of Justice, 1, 19 ; Evidence, 21 ; 
Tort, 2. 

8. In a criminal case I can presume nothing. — Lord Mlenborough, 
King V. Brett (1806), 5 Esp. 261. 

See Evidence, 1, 10. 

9. In cruninal cases you always begin by proving the corpus delicti, and 
then connect the prisoner with it. — Pollock, C.B., Queen v. Bernard 
(1858), 8 St. Tr. (N. S.) 922. 

10. It is abominable to convict a man behind his back. — Holt, C.J., 
The Queen v. Dyer (1703), 6 Mod. 41. 

11. The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to 
make his defence, if he has any.^ I remember to have heard it 

1 Out of thine own mouth will I judge thee. — Luhe xix., 22. 
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Criminal Justice — continued. 

observed by a very learned, man upon such an occasion, tliat even Gk)d 
himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon 
to make his defence. Adam (says God), where art thou ? Hast thou 
eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not 
eat? And the same question was put to Eve also.' — Fortescue, J., 
The King v. Chancellor, &c. of the University of Cambridge (1723), 
1 Str. 566. 

12. Justice requires that a party shoidd be duly sxunmoned and fully 
heard before he is condemned.^ — Lord Kenyan, C.J., King v. Stone 
(1801), 1 East, 649. 

13. Without resorting to authorities in a plain case, the common sense 
and feeling of mankind, the voice of nature, reason, and revelation, 
all concur in this plain rule, ThM no man is to he condemned unheard ; 
and consequently no trial ought to proceed to the condemnation of a 
man who by the providence of God is rendered totally incapable of 
speaking for himself, or of instructing others to speak for him. — 
Foster, J., Sir John Wedderburn's Case (1746), Foster's Cr. Ca. 
34, 35. 

See lelow, 14, 15. 

14. I take it to be contrary to the first principles of English juris- 
prudence and English law that a man should be condemned unheard. 
—Brett, J., Lovering v. Dawson, No. 1 (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 722. 

See above, 13 ; hdow, 15. 

15. It is necessary to the administration of justice that every person 
who is accused of a crime should have an opportunity of being heard 

i eenensiii.9,U. " L.C.J. (Lord Jefieries) : No, God 

When Paul stood before the pagan forbid, Mrs. Lisle ; that was a sort of 

governor, and the Jews required judgment practice in your husband's time ; you 

against him, the governor replied : It is know very well what I mean : But God 

not the manner of the Romans to con- be thanked, it is not so now ; the King's 

demn any man, before he and his accusers Courts of law never condemn without 

be brought face to face, to justify their hearing." 

accusation. See Acts xxv., 16. It may be mentioned that the prisoner 

Avdi alteram partem (hear the other was the widow of John Lisle, who had 

side). — Broom's M. 113 ; In re PoUard, been one of the judges of King Charles 

L. E. 2 P. C. 106. the First. Hence the reference to her 

The principle is to be found recorded husband showing ofE JefEeries in his 

in the earliest books extant, and even a atrocious method of reviHng both prisoner 

Judge like JefEeries is found to have and witnesses, which was never more 

expressed himself on the subject, as seen apparent than in this case, 

in the following case (^Trial of the Lady a gee S. C. 8 East, 164 ; WiUisr. Gipps, 

Alice Lisle fon- High Treason (1685), 11 5 Moo. P. C. 379 ; Smith v. Queen, L. E. 

How. St. Tr. 351) :— Ap. Cas. 614 ; Capel v. Child, 2 0. & J. 

" Lisle : My lord, I hope I shall not be 558 ; Eeg. v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 

condemned without being heard. 1 E. & E. 559. 

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Criminal Justice — continued. 

in his defence against the charge of which he is accused.' — Lord 
Kenyan, C J., The King v. Justices of Surrey (1794), 6 T. R. 78. 
See below, 31 ; Administration of Justice, 5 ; Judicial Proceedings, 7. 

16. It is of the essence of justice not to decide against any one on 
grounds which are not charged against him, and as to which he has 
not had an opportunity of offering explanations or calling evidence. — 
Lord Blackburn, O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke (1877), L. R. 2 Ap. Ca. 834. 

See 2, above; 19, below; Administration of Justice, 5; Witness, 2. 

17. It is certain that natural justice requires that no man shall be 
condemned without notice. — Fortescue, J., R. ■;;. Cleg (1735), 1 Str. 475. 

18. There must he an opportunity given to every person before judg- 
ment is passed upon him of being heard in his defence, and it is 
essential that the charge should always be intimated to the supposed 
dehnquent. —Lord Campbell, C.J., Bartlett v. Kirwood (1853), 23 L. J. 
Rep. (N. S.) Part 1, Q. B. p. 13. 

Compare Administration of Justice, 1; see also 15, 16, 17, above; 
Property, 14. 

19. Every man ought to have the fullest opportunity of establishing his 
innocence if he can. — Hawkins, J., Queen v. Dennis (1894), L. R. 2 
Q. B. D. [1894], p. 480. 

See 18, above. 

20. Would to God you were innocent, that is the worst wish I wish you. 
—Jefferies, L.C.J., Hampden's Case (1684), 9 How. St. Tr. 1104. 

21. The word " innocent " hath a double acceptation, innocent in respect 
of malice, and innocent in respect of the fact. — Brid^man, L.C.B., 
Lilbum's Case (1660), 5 How. St. Tr. 1205. 

22. God forbid that the rights of the innocent should be lost and 
destroyed by the offence of individuals. — Wilmot, J., Mayor, &c. of 
Colchester v. Seaber (1765), 3 Burr. Part IV. 1871. 

See 51, below. 

23. As anger does not become a Judge, so neither doth pity ; for one is 
the mark of a foolish woman, as the other is of a passionate man. — 
Seroggs, C.J., King v. Johnson (1794), 2 Shower, 5. 

See Miscellaneous, 54 ; Truth, 13. 

24. If his sorrow was honest and sincere it may go very far in mitigation. 
—Lord Mansfield, The King v. Williams (1774), Lofft. 763. 

See Character, 8. 

1 It is an invariable maxim in our law 2d. Rex r. Benn and another ri795") 6 
that no man shall be punished before he T. R. 198. 
has had an opportunity of being heard. — 

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Criminal Justice— cowtinwed 

25. This Court will always know to temper mercy with justice where there 
is room for it}— Ashhurst, J., Holt's Case (1793), 22 How. St. Tr. 1237. 

See Administration of Justice, 32 ; Law, 48 ; Pahdon, 3 ; Punish- 
ment, 5. 

26. We sit here in this Court of Queen's Bench under the same obliga- 
tion as the Queen holds her Crown, to administer justice with mercy 
according to the laws of the land. — Pennefather, L.C.J., Queen v. 
O'ConneU and others (1843), 5 St. Tr. (N. S.) p. 692. 

See Parliament, 6 ; Punishment, 5. 

27. In aU cases whatever it is usual for either plaintiff or defendant to 
speak by their counsel. You are assisted by a most able counsel, aiid 
you would not be guilty of any impropriety if what you wish to offer 
to the Court were first suggested to him, for he would then determine 
of the propriety of suggesting it to the Court. — Barrington, J., Case of 
the Dean of St. Asaph (1783), 21 How. St. Tr. 876. 

28. You have a right to discourse with your counsel, but you must do 
it in such a manner as the jury may not hear.= — Pratt, C.J., Layer's 
Case (1722), 16 How. St. Tr. 177. 

29. Wise and practical regulations must contemplate and provide for 
the occasional oversights and inadvertences which, by the law of 
chances, are certain to happen among the thousands of criminal trials 
before all sorts of jurisdictions every year in England. — Byles, J., 
Eeg. V. MeUor (1858), 5 Cox, C. C. 482. 

Compare Administration of Justice, 15. See also Chancery, 10; 
Law, 62 ; Mistakes ; Parliament, 3, n. ; Statutes, 2. 

30. I agree with Mr. Pitt Taylor that, iu many of the cases, justice and 
common sense have been sacrificed,^ but not, as it appears to me, at 

1 Every human tribunal ought to take prisoner after counsel had been heard in 
care to administer justice, as we look his defence, that he had " also a right to 
hereafter to have justice administered to be heard in his own person, if he thought 
ourselves. — The Son. Thomas DrsMne, fit to ofier anything to the jury." On 
Stockdale's Case (1789), 22 How. St. Tr. this point, see also ^er Stephen, 3., Reg. v. 
283. Doherty (1887), 16 Cox, C. C. 306, where 

2 As to the right of a prisoner to the same privilege was allowed a prisoner ; 
address the Court after a verdict of Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 ; Rex. v. 
acquittal, see the following : — Pope, 18 T. L. R. 717 ; and cases collected 

" You wiU understand one thing, and in Warburton's L. C. in Cr. Law, 243 — 

that is, that having been acquitted, you 246, ed. 1892. And contra see per 

have no right to address one word either Sie/iards, L.C.B., in Edmonds and others 

to the Court or the jury. At the same (1821), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 863 : " We 

time, I do not wish to hold you strictly to cannot hear the client and counsel too, it 

that right ; but conduct yourself properly, is against all rules." 
and I will not stop yon." — Uyre, L.C.J., ^ Justice and common sense seem to 

Tooke's Case (1794), 25 How. St. Tr. 746. have been sacrificed on the shrine of 

In Croisfielffs Cage (1796), 26 How. mercy. — Ta/ylor on Mnd. 597. 
St. Tr. 167, the same Judge informed the 

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Criminal Justice—continued. 

the shrine of mercy — rather at the shrine of guilt, because I regard 
a wrongful acquittal as unmerciful to the prisoner, whose real interests 
are sacrificed by his escape, as well as to society.' — Erie, J., Reg. v. 
Baldry (1852), 5 Oox, C. C. 531. 
See 3, above ; Judges, 74 ; Punishment, 4. 

31. The law of England is anxious for the interests of persons against 
whom charges may be made. If a man commits a crime, there is a 
legal and constitutional mode by which that crime may be brought 
into discussion. He is Hable to be tried, but though his crime may 
be as great and as aggravated as possible, he ought to have a full, 
fair, dispassionate, and temperate investigation of his conduct at the 
time of trial.— Bayley, J., Trial of Sir Francis Burdett (1820), 1 St. Tr. 
(N. S.) 162. 

Compare 15, 16, above. See also Judges, 80 ; Teial for Life, 1. 

32. It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent 
sufEer."— Sir Wm. Blackstone (1765), Com. Bk. 4, Ch. 27, Vol. IV. 
p. 358. 

See also 3, above ; 35, below ; Evidence, 30, n. 

33. Felony stands on a very different ground from misdemeanour ; and 
the assertion that a misdemeanour can be tried in that county alone 
wherein any part of it was committed, appears to me to have been 
built upon a mistake of the true ground and reason of the doctrine in 
Mony.— Abbott, C.J., King v. Burdett (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 147. 

34. The true ground of the doctrine in felony is this : if a felony be 
compounded of two distinct acts, one of which takes place in one 
county and the other in another county, the concurrence of both being 
necessary to constitute the felony, the party may not be triable in 
either, because, ex hypothesi, there is no felony committed in either. 
—Abbott, C.J., King V. Burdett (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 148 

1 Minatur innoeentihus, qui pareit Criminal Law of England, &c., noteD. 
nocentihus : He threatens the innocent " Unless civil institutions ensure protec- 
who spares the guilty. — 4 Co. 45. tion to the innocent, all the confidence 

2 I am of the same opinion with the which mankind should have in them 
Roman who, in the case of Catiline, would be lost." — BoswelV a Life of Johnson, 
declared he had rather ten guilty persons Vol. 2, p. 473, 1st ed. 

should escape than one innocent should The escape of one delinquent can never 

suffer.— Si?- Ed. Seymour, counsel for produce so much harm to the community 

prisoner : Sir John Fenwick's Case (1696), as may arise from the infraction of a rule. 

13 How. St. Tr. 565. upon which the purity of public justice 

See this maxim contested in Arch- , and the existence of civil liberty essen- 

deacou Paley's Principles of Moral and tially depend. — Archdeacon Paley, Prin- 

Politioal Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 310, and dples of Moral and Political Philosophy, 

vindicated by Sir Samuel Romilly in Bk. 6, o. 8. 

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Criminal Justice — continued. 

35. The criminal law ought to be reasonable and intelligible. — Martin, B. , 
The Queen v. Middleton (1873), L. R. 2 Crown Ca. Res. 57. 

See 49, heloic ; Judges, 48. 

36. There are frequently things sworn to which are so improbable that 
one does not believe them. It is one of the conmionest things in the 
world in a criminal case to have the most positive oral evidence given 
on oath to establish a matter which neither the jury nor the Judge 
can believe, although it is sworn to. — Lord Blaakhurn, Gardner v. 
Gardner (1877), L. R. 2 App. Ca. 738. 

See Administration of Justice, 15 ; Affidavit, 2 ; Evidence, 2, 22. 

37. In a criminal proceeding the question is not alone whether sub- 
stantial justice has been done, but whether justice has been done 
according to law. All proceedings in paenam are, it need scarcely be 
observed, strietissimi jwis; nor should it be forgotten that the 
formalities of law, though here and there they may lead to the escape 
of an offender, are intended on the whole to insure the safe adminis- 
tration of justice and the protection of innocence, and must be 
observed. A party accused has the right to insist on them as matter 
of right, of which he cannot be deprived against his will ; and the 
Judge must see that they are followed. — Coekhum, O.J., Martin v. 
Mackonochie (1878), L. R. 3 Q. B. 775. 

See 2, 3, 31, 32, above ; Judges, 52 ; Law, 54. 

38. Running away from justice, must always be considered an evidence 
of guHt.— CZerfe, L.J., Muir's Case (1793), 23 How. St. Tr. 230. 

39. Flight, in criminal cases, is itself a crime. If an innocent man flies 
for treason or felony, he forfeits aU his goods and chattels. Outlawry, 
in a capital case, is as a conviction for the crime : And many men 
who never were tried have been executed upon the outlawry. — Lord 
Mansfield, Rex v. Wilkes (1769), 4 Burr. Part IV., p. 2549. 

40. Flight, or an escape from arrest for felony, is an acknowledgment 
of guUt . . . every man, who is accused, is bound to submit him- 
self to the judgment of the law ; and, whether it be a trespass, or 
whether it be a felony with which he is charged, it may, with truth, 
be said of him who shrinks from trial — f acinus fatetur qui judicium 
fugU.^—Day, J., Johnson's Case (1805), 29 How. St. Tr. 192. 

See Law, 37. 

41. The duty to prosecute, or not to prosecute, is a social and not a legal 
duty, which depends on the circumstances of each case. It cannot be 
said that it is a moral duty to prosecute in aU caaes. The matter 

1 He who flees judgment confesses his guilt. — 3 Inst. 14. 

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Criminal Justice — contimied. 

depends on. considerations, which varj^ according to each case. But the 
person who has to act is bound morally to be influenced by no indirect 
motive. He is morally boimd to bring a fair and honest mind to the 
consideration and to exercise his decision from a sense of duty to 
himself and others. — Bowen, L.J., Jones v. Merionethshire Permanent 
Benefit Building Society (1891), L. R. 1 C. D. [1892], p. 183. 
See 42 helow. See also CoMPEOMrsE ; Evidenck, 33 ; Money, 1 ; 
Pardon, 4 ; Rewaed. 

42. It is to the interest of the pubhc that the suppression of a prosecu- 
tion should not be made matter of private bargain. — Erie, C.J., 
Clubb r. Hutson (1865), L. R. 18 C. B. Rep. (N. S.) 417. 

See 41, above; Litigation, 3. 

43. If people with the very best intentions carry on prosecutions that are 
oppressive, the end may not always perhaps sanctify the means. — Lord 
Kenyon, WiUiams' Case (1797), 26 How. St. Tr. 704. 

See JuuY, 30 ; Misoeijlaneous, 56 ; Necessity, 2. 

44. Shall we indict one man for making a fool of another ? — Holt, C. J., 
Reg. V. Jones (1703), 2 Raym. 1013. 

45. I do not approve of indicting, where there is another remedy : it 
carries the appearance of oppression. — Lord Mansfield, Rex v. Boyall 
(1759), 2 Burr. Part IV. 834. 

See Phooess, 2. 

46. You shall have the laws of England, although you refuse to own 
them in not holding up your hand ; for the holding up of the hand 
hath been used as a part of the law of England these five hundred 
years.'— ZebZe, C.J., Lilbume's Case (1649), 4 How. St. Tr. 1330. 

1 Lm-d KeUe : The holding up of your My lord hath given you this one reason 

hand, we will tell you what it means and already ; which, 1 say, is, that he be 

signifies in law : the calling the party to notified by holding up the hand to all 

hold up his hand at the bar, ia no more the beholders, and those that be present, 

but for the special notice that the party and hear him that he is the man. But 

is the man enquired for, or called on ; besides this, there is more in it ; that is 

and therefore if you be Mr. John Lil- thus: Apure, innocent hand does set forth 

burne, and be the man that we change, do u, clear unspotted heart; that so the lieart 

but say that you are the man, and that and liand together might ietohen innocency. 

you are there, and it shall suffice. And therefore hold up your hand, that 

Jermin, J. : You have desired to have thereby you may declare you have a pure, 

the right of the law of England ; and yet innocent heart. If you refuse to do this, 

you do question a fundamental thing, you do wilfully deprive yourself of the 

that hath been always used in case of benefit of one of the main proceedings 

criminal offences. . . . There be two and customs of the laws of England. Now 

reasons why holding up the hand hath for this, do what you think fit. — Lilburne's 

been used always : First, for notice that Caste, id. p. 1289, 1290. 

those that are called for capital and When the prisoner is brought to the 

criminal offences, that they hold up their bar, he is called upon by name to hold up 

hands, is to declare that they are the men. his hand : which though it may seem a 

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Criminal Justice — continued. 

47. The law is plain, that you are positively to answer, guilty, or not 
guilty, which you please. — Keble, C.J., liilbTirne's Case (1649), 4 How. 
St. Tr. 1293. 

48. He that doth refuse to put himself upon his legal trial of God and 
the Country, is a mute in law ; and therefore you must plead guUty or 
not guilty. Let his language be what it will, he is a mute in law.' — 
Bridgman, L.C.B., Axtel's Case (1660), 5 How. St. Tr. 1007. 

See 49, hehw ; Trial for Life, 1. 

49. Truly I think it one of the most reasonable laws in the world, that 
a man be tried by his county, by the neighbourhood ; and it has given 
ground to a good English proverb : " He that has an ill-name, is half 
hanged."^ A man's repute among his neighbours goes a great way in 
this matter, when his neighbours shall say they never knew iU by 
him. — Keating, L.C.J., Case of John Price and others (1689), 12 How. 
St. Tr. 626. 

See 35, 48, n., above ; Libel, 6 ; Miscellaneous, 18 ; Trial for Life, 1. 

50. Nothing could be of worse consequence, than that an officer of the 
Court shoxdd combine with a criminal to frustrate the sentence of the 

tri flin g circumstance, yet is of this import- 
ance, that by the holding up of his hand 
constat de jiersona, and he owns himself 
to be of that name by which he is called. — 
2 Sale, P. C. 219. 

However, it is not an indispensable 
ceremony ; for, being calculated merely 
for the purpose of identifying the person, 
any other acknowledgment will answer 
the purpose as well : therefore, if the 
prisoner obstinately and contemptuously 
refuses to hold up his hand, but confesses 
he is the person named, it is fully sufiB- 
cient. — Maym. 4-08. See also SawJi. P. C, 
Bk. 2, c. 28, 8. 2. 

1 To be tried by God and your Country, 
no more is meant by it than thus : by 
God, as God is everywhere present, yea in 
all Courts of justice, and sits and knows 
all things that are acted, said, and done : 
the other part of it, by your Country, 
that is, by your County or neighbour- 
hood ; the Country is called Patria, because 
your neighbour and your equals, which 
you are willing to put yourself upon the 
trial of. By force of that word, the 
Country, a jury of the neighbourhood for 
trial of you are summoned. — Jermin, J., 
Lilbume's Case (1649), 4 How. St. Tr. 
1295. Sacramental importance was at- 
tached for centuries to the speaking of 
these words. If a prisoner would not say 

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them, and even if he wilfully omitted 
either "by God" or "by my country," 
he was said to stand mute, and a jury was 
sworn to say whether he stood " mute of 
malice" or "mute by the visitation of 
God." If they found him mute by the 
visitation of God the trial proceeded. 
But if they found him mute of malice, if 
he was accused of treason or misdemean- 
our, he was taken to have pleaded guilty, 
and was dealt with accordingly. If he 
was accused of felony, he was condemned, 
after much exhortation, to the peine foiie 
et dure, that is, to be stretched, naked on 
his back, and to have "iron laid upon 
him as much as he could bear and more," 
and so to continue, fed upon bad bread 
and stagnant water on alternate days, till 
he either pleaded or died. This sti-ange 
rule was in force till the year 1772, when 
it was abolished by 12 Geo. III. o. 20, 
which made standing mute in cases of 
felony equivalent to a conviction. In 
1827 it was enacted, by 7 & 8 Geo. IV. 
o. 28, 8. 2, that in such cases a plea of not 
guilty should be entered for the person 
accused.— PJ/ie, "Hist, of Crime," II., 195, 
283 ; Steph. " Hist, of Crim. Law," I. 298. 
2 "He that hath an ill name is half 
hang'd ye know." — J. JBeywood, " Pro- 
verbs," Bk. II. c. vi. 



Criminal Justice — continued. 

Court. — Wilmot, J., Eex v. Beardmore (1759), 2 Btut. Part IV., 
p. 175. 

See also Parliament, 11 ; Practice, 9 ; Public Servant, 10. 

51. I think that a man who has been guilty of an indictable ofEence 
ought not to have the assistance of the lavr to recover the profits of his 
crime ; and that whether his agents be innocent or criminal, privy 
or not privy, his claim against those agents is equally inadmissible in 
a Court of law.' — Bodke, J., Fanner v. Russell (1798), 2 Bos. & 
PuU. 301. 

See also 22, above ; Fraud, 33 ; Law, 6 ; Public Policy, 7 ; Relief, 2. 

52. There are certain irregularities which are not the subject of criminal 
law. But when the criminal law happens to be auxiliary to the law 
of morahty, I do not feel any inclination to explain it away. — Lord 
Kenyan, C.J., Young and others v. The King (1789), 3 T. R. 102. 

See Administration of Justice, 15, and referenaes therefrom; 

53. A conviction is in the natxure of a verdict and judgment, and there- 
fore it must be precise and certain. — Lord Kenyan, C.J., King i> 
Harris (1797), 7 T. R. 238. 

54. A conviction must be good in aU its parts ; the information must be 
supported by the evidence, and the judgment must be supported by 
both.— Per- Our., King v. Salomons (1786), 1 T. R. 251. 

55. I take it that the judgment is an essential point in every conviction, 
let the punishment be fixed or not. — Lord Kenyan, C.J., King v. 
Harris (1797), 7 T. R. 239. 


These Courts are not presumed to be the best acquainted with the rights 
and prerogatives of the Crown : in regard to such matters, we must 
look differently and respectfully to other authorities. — Sir John 
Nicholl, Goods of King George HI. (1822), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 1283. 
See Parliament, 2, 13, and references therefrom. 


1. Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, 
but likewise as a pxmishment to the guilty, to deter from any such 
proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury 

' See also per Lord Lyndhm-st, C.B., Rhodes (1899), L. E. 1 Q. B. D. [18991, 
Colbum i: Patmore (1834), 1 C. M. & E. p. 824. 
83, quoted by Grantham, J., Burrows i . 

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Damages — eontinued. 

to tlie action itself. — Lord Mansfield, Case of John Wilkes (1764) 
19 How. St. Tr. 1167 ; Lofft.'s Rep. 19. 
See PmnsHMENT, 3 ; Rewakd ; Tort, 15. 

2. I wish to know, in a case where a man disregards every principle 
which actuates the conduct of gentlemen, what is to restrain him 
except large damages ?'—Gi66s, C.J., Merest v. Harvey (1813), 
5 Taunton, 443. 

See Public Servants, 3. 

3. Every injury imports a damage, though it does not cost the party one 
ferthing, and it is impossible to prove the contrary ; for a damage is 
not merely pecuniary, but an injury imports a damage, when a man is 
hereby hindered of his right. As in an action for slanderous words, 
though a man does not lose a penny by reason of the speaking them, 
yet he shall have an action. So if a man give another a cuff on the 
ear, though it cost him nothing, no, not so much as a little diachylon, 
yet he shall have his action, for it is a personal injury. — HoU, C.J., 
Ashby V. White (1703), Ld, Raym. 955. 

4. To excuse himself from damage, must say, was ready always and at 
all times.— HoZt, C.J., Horn v. Lewins (1698), Fortesc. 235. 

5. Nominal damages are in effect, only a peg to hang costs on. — 
Maule, J., Beaumont v. Greathead (1846), 3 D. & L. 636. 

6. " Nominal damages," is a technical phrase which means that you 
have negatived anything like real damage, but that you are affirming 
by your nominal damages that there is an infraction of a legal right 
which, though it gives you no right to any real damages at aU, yet 
gives you a right to the verdict or judgment because your legal right 
has been infringed. But the term "nominal damages" does not 
mean small damages. The extent to which a person has a right to 
recover what is called by the compendious phrase damages, but may 
be also represented as compensation for the use of something that 
belongs to him, depends upon a variety of circumstances, and it 
certainly does not in the smallest degree suggest that because they are 
small they are necessarily nominal damages. Of course, the whole 
region of inquiry into damages, is one of extreme difficulty. You very 
often cannot even lay down any principle upon which you can give 
damages ; nevertheless, it is remitted to the jury, or those who stand 

1 Vita reipvMica pax, et animus magis pleetuntur peeunia ; plebes vera 
Uberta»etlibeHabui,firmissiiiimi,propvg- in corpure: The higher classes are more 
naculimmaeuiguedmnuslegibiismmdta. punished in money; but the lower in 
—Loft., " Elements of Law." NoUles person.— 3 Inst. 220. 

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Damages — continued. 

in place of the jury, to consider what compensation in money shall be 
given for what is a wrongful act. — Earl of Halshury, L.C., Owners 
of Steamship " Mediana " v. Owners, Master, and Crew of Lightship 
"Comet" (1900), L R. App. Ca. [1900], H.L. 116. 
See also Evidence, 33. 


I think the better day the better deed.' — EoU, C.J., Sir Wm. Moore's 
Case (1703), 2 Raym. 1028. 


1. Delay wiU frequently have, as it ought to have, considerable influence 
upon the judgment which ought to be formed upon the evidence 
adduced.— Lord Chelmsford, Cuno v. Cuno (1873), L. R. 2 Sc. & D. 302. 

See CoNSTEUOTioN, 26 ; Costs, 2 ; Judges, 16, n. ; Miscellaneous, 
17, n. ; 23. 

2. It is not to be imagined that the King will be guilty of vexatious 
delays." — Ryder, L.C.J., Rex v. Berkley and another (1754), Sayer's 
Rep. 124. 

See Construction, 26 ; Diligence, 1 ; Discretion, 11. 


1 never did approve, when at the Bar, and I do not approve now, when 
on the Bench, of the practice of not deciding a substantial question 
when it is fairly raised between the parties and argued, simply 
because it is raised by demurrer. It is a great benefit to aU parties 
to have the question in the case speedily and cheaply determined, and 
the practice of demurring ought, if possible, to be encouraged. — Sir 
G. Jessel, M.R., FothergiH v. Rowland (1873), L. R. 17 Eq. Ca. 139. 

' Walker. nothing obliges the conductors to avoid 

2 Lax dilationes semper exhorret : The the straight road, and drag him along the 
law always abhors delays. — 2 Iiist. 240. crooked one : nor would they ever have 
-Liex reprohat moram : The law dislikes given themselves any such trouble, had it 
delay. — Jeiih. Cent. 35. not been for the turnpikes, the tolls of 

There is some truth in the following which are so regularly settled, and the 

severe censure : " In the one case, there tiUs in such good keeping : learned feet, 

is a straight road of a mile long, and with- could they be prevailed on, are no less 

out a turnpike in it : in the other case, capable of treading the short road than 

you may go to, or at least towards, the unlearned ones." — The Law's 

same place by a road of a hundred miles Benthamiana, or Select Extracts from 

in length — ^fuU, accordingly, of turnings the Works of Jeremy Bentham, 1843, 

and windings — full, moreover, of quick- p. 419. iSee a?.w <S7taifc«. " Hamlet," Act III., 

sands and pitfalls, and equally fuU of Sc. 1, The law's delay ; Miscellaneous, 

turnpikes. In conducting the traveller, 37, infra. 

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1. How necessary it is carefully to consider the language of learned 
Judges, especially wken you are dealing with language which is 
admitted to be only a dictum and not a decision, and when it is 
attempted to use that language for the purpose of founding on it an 
article of a code of law. — James, L.J., Dawson v. Bank of Whitehaven 
(1877), L. R. 6 Ch. D. 226. 

See ielow, 3 ; Practice, 4. 

2. Speaking for myself, I do not pay much attention to the dicta of 
modem Judges, as I consider it my duty to decide for myself. This, 
of course, does not apply to decisions of modem Judges, nor to 
old recognised dicta by eminent Judges. — Jessel, M.R., Quilter v. 
Heady (1883), L. R. 23 C. D. 49. 

3. I never allow my construction of a plain enactment to be biassed in 
the slightest degree by any number of judicial decisions or dicta as to 
its meaning, when those decisions or dicta are not actually binding 
upon me. I read the Act for myself. If I think it clear I express my 
opinion about its meaning, as I consider I am bound to do. Of course, 
if other Judges have expressed different views as to the construction, 
and their decisions are binding on this Court, this Court has simply 
to bow and submit, whatever its own opinion may be. But when 
there is no such blading decision, in my view a Judge ought not to 
allow himself to be biassed in the construction of a plain Act of 
Parliament (for it appears to me to be plain) by any number of dicta 
or decisions which are not binding on him. The Judge ought with 
aU due respect to examine into them, but he must not allow any 
number of dicta, or even decisions which are not binding on him, to 
affect his judgment, except in one peculiar case. That case is pecidiar, 
and therefore I will mention it. Where a series of decisions in in- 
ferior Courts have put a construction on an Act of Parliament, and thus 
have made a law which men follow in their daily dealings, it has been 
held, even by the House of Lords, that it is better to adhere to the 
course of the decisions than to reverse them, because of the mischief 
which wotdd result from such a proceeding. Of course, that requires 
two things, antiquity of decision, and the practice of mankind in 
conducting their aSaiTS.—Jessel,'M..R., Ex parte WUley ; In re Wright 
(1883), L. R. 23 C. D. 127. 

See 1, above; Judges, 71. 

4. In the books there are some loose dicta that an Act of Parliament and 
the common law should respectively stand as originals according to 
the circumstances of the case ; but this is not law, unless it be confined 

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Dictum — continued. 

to prohibitions for excess of jurisdiction and to restrain waste. — 
Heath, J., Jefferson v. Bishop of Durham (1797), 2 Bos. & Pull. 129. 
See also Chancery, 1 ; Jurisdiction, 1 ; Obiter Dicta, 2. 
5. There are old dicta of great Judges, which have been followed by 
many decisions and have become maxims of the law; but modem 
dicta are but attempts to embody in a short form the result of decisions 
or statutes which any lawyer can examine for himself. — Kay, L.J., 
Dashwood v. Magniac (1891), L. R. 3 0. D. 376. 
See Equity, 18 ; Judges, 65, 71 ; Law, 58 ; Obiter Dicta, 1. 


1. The using of legal diligence is always favoured and shall never turn 
to the disadvantage of the creditor. The maxim Vigilantibus et non 
dormientibus suacurrunt jura is one of those that we learn on our 
earliest attendance in Westminster Hall. — Heath, J., Cox v. Morgan 
(1801), 1 Bos. & PuU. 412. 

2. It is a reasonable presimiption that a man who sleeps upon his rights 
has not got much right.' — Bowen, L.J., Ex parte HaU ; In re Wood 
(1883), L. R. 23 C. D. 653. 

See Consent, 5 ; Delay, 2 ; Equity, 15, 33, 34 ; Rights. 


1. Discovery is a matter of remedy, and not matter of right. — Lord 
Watson, Ind, Coope & Co. v. Emmerson (1887), 12 L. R. Ap. Ca» 309. 

2. Now, in deciding whether discovery ought to be given, we must first 
consider whether it will help the plaintifiE at the trial. If it wiU not, 
but will only be of use if the plaintiff obtains a decree, then ... we 
consider whether it is fair that the defendant shoidd be obliged to 
give it at this stage of the proceedings, or whether to compel bim to 
give it would be oppressive.^ — Jessel, M.R., Parker v. Wells (1881), 
L. R. 18 C. D. 483. 

See Chancery, 6 ; Tort, 2. 

3. The Court is always unwilling before the right to relief is established 
to make an order for discovery which may be injurious to the defen- 
dant, and win only be useful to the plaintiff if he succeeds in 
establishing his title to reUef. — Cotton, L.J., Fennessy v. Clark (1887), 
L. R. 37 C. D. 186. 

1 Vigilantibus ncm dormientibus jura * This statement is in relation to the 

suiveniunt : Laws come to the assistance stage at which discovery ought to be 

of the vigilant, not of the sleepy. — Wing. allov?ed. 

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Biscovery — continued. 

4. This is the kind of order which makes the administration of justice 
stink in the nostrils of commercial men.'^iil. L. Smith, L.J., Graham 
V. Sutton, Garden & Co. (1897), L. R. 1 Ch. D. [1897], p. 765. 


1. "Discretion" means, when it is said that something is to be done 
withia the discretion of the authorities that that something is to be done 
according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private 
opinion ^ ; according to law and not humour. It is to be not arbitrary, 
vague, and fenciful, but legal and regular. And it must be exercised 
within the limit, to which an honest man, competent to the discharge 
of his office, ought to confine himseK.* — Lord Halsbury, L.C., Sharp v. 
Wakefield (1891), 64 L. T. Rep. 180 [1891], Ap. Ca. 173. 

See Reasonable, 4. 

2. Discretion, when applied to a Court of justice, means sound discretion 
guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour: it 
must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular. — 
Lord Mansfield, Case of John Wilkes (1763), 4 Burr. Part IV. 2539. 

See below, 6. 

3. Le impress de authority done "par le Boy doit silencer inquiry al 
discretion dun Judge * ; le Boy sole est le proper Judge del ability de 
ses Ministers et les Chef Justices sont deins le Statute de Scand (The 
stamp of authority given by the King ought to silence any inquiry 
into the discretion of a Judge ; the King alone is the proper Judge of 
the ability of his ministers, and the Chief Justices are withia the 
Statute of Scandal). — Vaughan, J., Bushel's Case (1670), Jones's (Sir 
Thos.) Rep. 15. 

4. The discretion of a Judge is the law of tyrants : it is always unknown. 
It is different in different men. It is casual, and depends upon con- 
stitution, temper, passion. In the best it is oftentimes caprice ; in the 
worst it is every vice, folly, and passion to which human nature is 

1 This was in reference to what was ' Wilson v. RaataU, 4 T. R. App. 757. 
correctly termed by the learned Judge a * The discretion of the Judges ought to 
"very large order" for discovery and be thus described : DisoretioeHdiscenmre 
inspection of books and documents, per legem quid sit Justuiit ; this is prov'd 
Rigiy, L. J. , also said : " As regards the by the Common Law, in the case of a 
plaintiff ... he was wrong in asking for special verdict, et nup' totmn materiam 
such an extravagant order, and wrong petvM discretionem Justiciar iorum ; i,i!. 
in insisting upon having his pound of they desire that the Judges would discern 
flesh. . . . That is the sort of thing which, by law what is just, and so give judgment 
if permitted, brings the administration of accordingly. — t Inst, i, 12 R. 2, cap. 13 ; 
justice into odium." — Id. p. 766. Fwteaoue, Rep. 393. 

2 Rooke's Case, 5 Rep. 100 a. 

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Discretion — continued. 

liable.— Lor-d Camden, L.C.J., Case of ffindson and Kersey (1680), 
8 How. St. Tr. 57. 
See Equity, 31, n. ; Jury, 11. 

5. The exercise of a discretion has been characterised as odious ; but 
where the necessity exists for its exercise, a Judge is not bound to 
shrink from the responsibility devolving on him. — Crampon, J., 
Conway and another v. The Queen (1845), 1 Cox, C. C. 217. 

6. I must not forget that the discretion given to me must be exercised 
judicially, not fancifully or arbitrarily. — Bvit, J., Stoker v. Stoker 
(1889),L. R. MPro. D. 61. 

See above, 2. 

7. A Judge must determine, not by the crooked cord of discretion,' but 
by the golden mete-wand of the law ! I admit that corruption is not 
to be imputed or supposed in any Judge, but faUibUity must be 
admitted— /iMTTianMm est errare ; neither would I subject the opinion 
of a Judge upon matters of fact to be canvassed before, or submitted 
to the consideration of juries. — Perrin, J., Conway and another v. The 
Queen (1845), 1 Cox, C. C. 216. 

See Practice, 3 ; Sovereignty, 10, 14. 

8. Discretion is a science of imderstanding, to discern between falsity 
and truth, between wrong and right, between shadows and substance, 
between equity and colourable glosses and pretences, and not to do 
according to their (men's) wiUs, and private affections; for, as one 
saith, talis diseretio discretionem conundit? — LiOrd Coke, Rooke's Case 
(1598), 5 Rep. 99 b. 

9. It is true, as Mr. Folkard put to us, as the Judges of old felt, there 

are instances in which discretionary power might be grievously 

abused, and was abused in times such as I trust this country wiU 

never see again. At the same time, men are open to the infirmities 

which unfortunately attach to human nature. There may be dishonest 

and corrupt Judges among us, though I trust to God that will never 

happen. I agree you are to frame your rules so as to keep the 

administration of justice as far as you can beyond the possibility of 

corruption. On the other hand, if a rule is essential for the convenient 

administration of justice, you must trust to the honesty of those to 

whom you commit that most important department of the State. You 

must trust to the means you ha,ve of punishing corruption and 

' See R. V. Walcott, 4 Mod. 401. cited per Tindal, C.J., Queen v. Govemore 

2 The maxim Diseretio est scire per of Darlington School (1844), 6 Q. B. 

legevi quid sit justmri is here further (Adol. & EU.) 700. 

quoted.— 10 Co. 140. See also 4 Inst. 41, 

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Discretion — continued. 

dishonesty if you find it operating on the minds of those judicial 
officers.— Cocfctttm, C J., Reg. v. Charlotte Winsor (1866), 10 Cox, 
C. C. 313. 
See Administration of Justice, 33, 35 ; Evidence, 25 ; Judges, 72 ; 
Miscellaneous, 53 ; Reasonaele, 4. 

10. The word " discretion " has been frequently used. . . . What does 
it mean ? In honest, plain language it means " do as you like.'' A 
direction which is to be actively exercised must be exercised honestly 
and intelligently, but the discretion which a man chooses to exercise 
by remaining supine is a duty, if it is a duty, of imperfect obligation. 
If no shadow of suspicion can be brought against him, if no culpable 
negligence can be alleged against hun, what liability does a man in 
whom the discretion is vested incur by doing nothing ? Attention 
should be paid to the meaning of the word, and the effect of it in the 
various cases in which its operation is called in question. — Bacon, V.-C, 
In re Norrington ; Brindley v. Partridge (1879), L. R. 13 CD. 659. 

11. We are to exercise a just discretion and not to promote vexation. — 
Lwd Mansfield, Rex v. Wardroper (1766), 4 Burr. Part IV., p. 1965. 

See Costs, 2 ; Delay, 2. 

12. It appears to me wrong in principle for any Court or Judge to 
impose fetters on the exercise by themselves or others of powers which 
are left by law to their discretion in each case as it arises. — lAndley, 
L.J., Saunders v. Saunders (1897), L. R. Prob. D. [1897], p. 95. 

See Administration of Justice, 35 ; Commerce, 32 ; Judges, 37, 65, 69, 

13. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with the exercise of a 
judicial discretion. — Sir W. M. James, L.J., Bush v. Trowbridge 
Waterworks Co. (1875), L. R. 10 Ch. Ap. Ca. 463. 

14. A Judge must have discretion, because without it the business could 
not go on, the criminal justice of the country could not be adminis- 
tered.— MeZZor, J. Reg. ■;;. Charlotte Winsor (1866), 10 Cox, C. C. 321. 

15. I was brought up under a system in which discretion when given 
was practically absolute. It was the unbroken tradition of West- 
minster Hall. I believe that system worked justice and saved 
expense. I hope I may be forgiven if, with what energy remains to 
me, I strive after many years' experience and drawing near the close 
of my judicial career, to preserve this unfettered discretion which in 
my opinion, was given me by Parliament, and which I have never, at 
least intentionally abused. — Lord Coleridge, C.J., Huxley v. West 
London Extension Railway Co. (1886), L. R. 17 Q. B. D. 383. 

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Discretion — continued. 

16. However much men may honestly endeavour to limit the exercise of 
their discretion by definite rule, there must always be room for 
idiosyncracy ; and idiosyncracy,'as the word expresses, varies with the 
man. But there is, besides this, that of which every student of legal 
history must be aware, the leaning of the Courts for a certain time in a 
particular direction, balanced at least, if not reversed, by the leaning 
of the Courts for a certain time in a direction opposite. The current 
of legal decision runs often to a point which is felt to be beyond the 
bounds of soimd and sane control, and there is danger sometimes that 
the retrocession of the current should become itself extreme.' — Lord 
Coleridge, C.J., Reg. v. Labouchere (1884), 15 Cox, C. C. 425. 


1. The old and received law for above a century is not to be broken in 
upon by any new doctrine. — Lord Kenyan, Rex v. Walter (1799), 
3 Esp. 22. 

See Cases, 7, 21 ; Construction, 28 ; Law, 73 ; Precedents, 16, 17. 

2. The law of England is vsdsely reluctant to admit any doctrine which 
is repugnant to the settled principles and policy of its own institution. 
—Stuart, V.-C, Brook v. Brook (1858), 6 W. R. 452. 

See Cases 9, 15, 21 ; Precedents, 15. 

3. That doctrine cannot be law which injures the rights of individuals, 
and will be productive of evil to the Church and to the community.^ — 
Best, C.J., Fletcher v. Lord Sondes (1826), 3 Bing. 590. 

See Mischief, 1 ; Parijament, 9, 13 ; Tort, 4. 

4. I can never assent to a doctrine so discreditable to our Courts of law 
as that, because it is equitable and just, that it is therefore not 
strictly legal. — Rooke, J., Oppenheim v. Russell (1802), 3 Bos. and 
Pull. 50. 

See Courts, 14. 


The question of domicil prima, facie is much more a question of fact 
than of law. The actual place, where a person is, is primd facie to a 

' Foi- further (iioto on the subject of this The Queen v. Bishop of London, L. K. 24 

heading, see also _pfir Lord RomiUy in La Q. B. D. (1889), p. 246. 
Blache D. Eangel ; The "Nina" (1868), 2 "A most unjust doctrine and I shall 

L. E.2P. C.Ap.Ca. 49; ^er iU(i%,L.J., not extend it." —Said by Rmmr, J., in 

in Be The Earl of Radnor's Will Trusts reference to the doctrine expounded in 

(1890), L. E. 45 C. D. 424 ; id. in Young Tweedale «. Tweedale, 23 Beav. 341. See 

0. Thomas (1892), L. R. 2 0, D., p. 136 ; Minter <•. Oarr (1894), L. R. 2 C. D. [1894j, 

id. in Wood v. Wood, L. R. 1 Pro. D. p. 323. 
(1891), p. 275; and per Lopes, L.J., in 

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Somicil — continued. 

great many given pm-poses his domicil. You encounter that, if you 
shew, it is either constrained, or from the necessity of his affairs, or 
transitory ; that he is a sojourner, and you take from it all character 
of permanency. If, on the contrary, you shew that the pkce of his 
residence is the seat of his fortune ; if the place of his birth, upon 
which I lay the least stress ; but if the place of his education, where 
he acquired aU his early habits, friends, and connexions, and all the 
links that attach him to society are found there ; if yoa add to that, 
that he had no other fixed residence upon an establishment of his 
own, you answer the question. — Lord Loughhorough, Bempde f. 
Johnstone (1796), 3 Ves. jr. 201. 


1. A decorous simplicity is the characteristic of the Church of England.^ 
— Dr. Lushington, Westerton v. Liddell and Beal v. Liddell (1855), 
4 W. R. 179. 

2. The popish religion is now unknown to the law of this country .^ — 
Lm-d Kenyon, Du Barr6 v. Livette (1791), Peake's N. P. Cases, 79. 

1 The basis of the religious establish- 
ment in this realm was, I am satisfied, 
intended by the Constitution and the law 
to be broad and not narrow. Within its 
walls there is room, if they would cease 
from litigation, for both parties ; for that 
which is represented by the promoter and 
for that which is represented by the 
defendant ; for those whose devotion is 
so supported by simple faith and fervent 
piety that they derive no aid from 
external ceremony or ornament, and who 
think that these things degrade and 
obscure religion ; and for those who think 
with Burke, that religion " should be per- 
formed, as all public solemn acts are 
performed, in buildings, in music, in 
decorations, in speech, in the dignity of 
persons according to the customs of man- 
kind taught by their nature, that is, with 
modest splendour and unassuming state, 
with mild majesty and sober pomp ; " 
who sympathize with Milton the poet 
rather than with Milton the puritan; 
and who say that these accessories of 
religious rites, — 
" . . . . dissolve them into ecstacies, 

And bring all heaven before their eyes." 
St. Chrysostom and St. Augustine repre- 
sented difierent schools of religious 
thought ; the primitive Church held them 

both. Bishop Taylor and Archbishop 
Leighton differed as to ceremonial observ- 
ances, but they prayed for the good estate 
of the same Catholic Church ; they held 
the same faith " in the unity of spirit, in 
the bond of peace, and in righteousness of 
life ; " and the English Church contained 
them both. There is surely room for both 
the promoter and the defendant in this 
Church of England, and I should indeed 
regret if, with any justice, it could be 
said that this judgment had the slightest 
tendency either to injure the Catholic 
foundations upon which our Church rests, 
or to abridge the liberty which the law 
has so wisely accorded to her ministers 
and her congregations. — Sir M. Philli- 
more, Martin v. Mackonochie ; Flamank 
■e. Simpson (1868), 16 W. E. 636. 

Eeclesia est domiis mansionali^ Omni- 
potentis Dei : The Church is the mansion- 
house of the Omnipotent God. — 2 Inst. 

2 It was proposed in this case to call as 
a witness a party whose knowledge had 
been acquired by having previously acted 
as interpreter between the defendant, 
when under a criminal charge, and his 
attorney ; and in support of the admis- 
sibility of his evidence, a case was cited, 
in which a Protestant clergyman had 

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Ecclesiastical — eontimied. 

3. Rokehy, J : I do not think but a Popish doctor may be a good doctor 
to a Protestant patient ; but I do not think that a Popish governor 
can be a good governor for a Protestant subject. 

Holt, C.J. : Aye, but a Popish censor is not so proper to supervise and 
inspect all the Protestant physicians.' — King against Dr. Burrel 
(1699), 5 Mod. 432. 

4. The bishop is in the nature of an ecclesiastical sheriff. — North, C.J., 
Walwyn ?). Awberry and others (1678), 1 Mod. 260. 

5. It is notorious that the Reformation, which was begun in Henry the 
Eighth's time, was, by the unwearied diligence of the priests and 
Jesuits, very much broke in upon and interrupted, so that it cannot 
be said to have been complete tiU the reign of Queen Elizabeth, who 
had many and great struggles with the Papists. — Pratt, L.C.J., 
Thomby v. Fleetwood (1770), 1 Str. Rep. 375. 

6. The discussion which was made by Luther, Melancthon, and the 
other persons who preceded the Reformation, opened the eyes of the 
pubHc ; and they got rid of the delusions which had been spread by 
the Pope of Rome, and emancipated mankind from the spiritual 
tyranny they were under, and brought about the establishment of that 
religion which we now enjoy in this countrv.^ — Lord Kenyan, Reeves' 
Case (1754), 26 How. St. Tr. 591. 

been compelled to disclose a confession Pollexfen, C.J., in I6tfl, that he thought 

made to him by a Papist, and upon which " Englishmen have no greater enemies 

evidence the prisoner was convicted and than the French and the Papists." — Case 

executed. This evidence was rejected by of Sir Richard Grahme and others, 12 

Lord Kenyon to the above effect, adding How. St. Tr. 741. The introduction of 

that it was not necessary for the prisoner the French here together with the Papists 

to make that confession to aid him in his will at this date not prove a surprise, 

defence. having regard to that period of our 

' Taken with quotation 2 in this head- history, 
ing, and the toleration of opinions both as 2 "Xhis venerable body of men (the 

to race and creed now happily existent in clergy) being separate and set apart from 

England and the British dominions, former the rest of the people, in order to attend 

dicia from the judicial bench relative to the more closely to the service of Almighty 

Papists at this date can only be considered God., .had formerly much greater 

ridiculous and of bad taste, however privileges, which were abridged at the 

much reason may have existed for their time of the Reformation on account of 

pronouncement in former times. With the ill-use which had been made of 

the increase of population in England, them."— /Sir Wm. Blackstone (1765), 

Papists have also mcreased in proportion Com. Vol. I., p. 343. The records of the 

both as to quantity and quality, and Courts in which the canon law was 

Englishmen, with the spirit of the times, administered in England would probably 

can well afford no longer to look upon be of high interest. A well-known passage 

their Papist brethren m the light in which at the commencement of Chaucer's Friar's 

they were regarded in days of old by high Tale, descriptive of an Archdeacon's 

judicial dignitaries and others who even Court, can hardly fail to whet the 

considered them enemies of the country. appetite of the investigator into the laws 

In illustration of this we have it from and manners and customs of our ancestors. 

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Ecclesiastical — continued. 

7. The spectacle of a clergymaa imprisoned for persistence in illegal 
ritualistic practices may shock the pubhc conscience, and raise 
sympathy for a man who reaUy deserves none, whUe the spectacle of 
a man suspended after due warning from an office, the laws attaching 
to which he disregards, or from a benefice obtained under conditions 
which he wiU not fulfil, is one which must commend itself to every 
reasonable man. — Lord Thesiger, L.J., Martin v. Mackonochie (1879), 
L. R. 4 Q. B. 724. 


1. An ejectment is an ingenious fiction, for the trial of titles to the 
possession of land. — Lord Mansfield, Fair-claim, &c. v. Sham-title 
(1761), 3 Burr. Part IV., p. 1294. 

2. This case of removing a man who lives upon his own, is a case of a 
tender nature : and the Court ought not to give too readily in to it. — 
Lord Eardidake, Rex v. Inhabitants of Sundrish (1734), Burrow 
(Settlement Cases), 9. 


1. A Court of equity ought to foUow the law.' — Eindersley, V.-C, Wynch 
V. Grant (1854), 3 W. R. 6. 

2. Equity and common law are two distinct systems, unlike any exist- 
ing in any foreign country.^ — Lopes, L.J., In re Henderson (1887), 
L. J. Rep. (N. S.) 57 C. D. 383. 

See Common Law, 9. 

The archdeacon is described as exercising, does also assist the law, where it is defec- 

inter alia, the following jurisdiction : — tive and weak in the constitution (which 

" Whilom there was dwellyng in my is the life of the law), and defends the 

countre, law from crafty evasions, delusions and 

An erchedeken, a man of great degre, mere subtleties, invented and contrived 

That boldely did execucioun, to evade and elude the common law. 

In punyschyng of fomicacioun, whereby such as have undoubted right 

Of wicchecraft, and eek of banderye, are made remediless. And thus is the 

Of difiamacioun, and avoutrie, office of equity to protect and support 

Of chirche — reves, and of testajnentes, the common law from shifts and contriv- 

Of contractes, and of lak of sacraments, ances against the justice of the law. 

And eek of many another maner cryme, Equity, therefore, does not destroy the 

Which needith not to reherse at this tyme." law, nor create it, but assists it. — Sir 

' JEquitas seqmtur legem. For illustra- John Ti-evor, M.R., Dudley v. Dudley, 

tion of this maxim, see Snell, Prin. of Preced. in Ch. 241, 244 ; 1 Wooddeson, 

Eq. 18. See also 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 730. Lect. VII. 192 ; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. 13. 

JLeoe aliqvMndo seqmtm ceqvMatem : Law a All nations have equity. But some 

sometimes follows equity. — 3 Wils. 119. have law and equity mixed in the same 

Equity is no part of the law, but a Court, which is worse ; and some have it 

moral virtue, which qualifies, moderates, distinguished in several Courts, which is 

and reforms the rigor, hardness and edge better. — Lard Baoon, 4 Bao. Works, 274. 
of the law, and is a universal truth. It 

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Equity — eontintied. 

3. I do not think that Courts of equity ought to go otherwise than the 
Courts of ]aw.^— Talbot, L.C., Lord Glenorchy v. Bosville (1733), 
W. & T. Leading Cas. in Eq. 16. 

See Peecedents, 4. 

4. Equity will go no further than the hm.—Lord Kenyan, C.J., Tooke 
V. HoUingworth (1793), 5 T. R. 225. 

5. It is true that Courts of equity, in administering justice, sometimes 
go further than the Courts of law. — Lord Alvanley, C.J., Houghton v. 
Matthews (1803), 3 Bos. & PuU. 497. 

6. A Court of equity can mould interests differently from a Court of law ; 
and can give relief in cases where a Court of law cannot.* — Ijyrd 
Kenyan, C J., Clayton v. Adams (1796), 6 T. R. 605. 

7. Courts of equity make their decrees so as to arrive at the justice of 
the case without violating the rules of law. — Lord Kenyan, C.J., 
Clayton v. Adams (1796), 6 T. R. 605. 

See Practice, 3. 

8. Nor doth the law of the land speak against him. But that and 
equity ought to join hand in hand, in moderating and restraining aU 
extremities and hardships. . . . They both aim at one and the 
same end, which is, to do right.' — Lord Ellesmere, Earl of Oxford's 
Case (1616), Rep. in Ch. 3, 4. 

See Common Law, 9 ; Law, 50. 

9. The course of equity is a part of the constitution of the law and 
judicial proceedings in this kingdom. — Lard Hardicieke, Garth v. 
Cotton (1750), 1 Ves. 524. 

10. It appears to me to be the duty of every Court, whether a Court of 
equity or a Court of law, to give effect to the plain meaning of the 
Legislature, whatever may be the views entertained of its policy 
or apphcability in particular cases. — Sir W. M. James, V.-C, 

1 The popular idea of a Court of equity for the public good, than equity without 
is, that it sits (as Relden has it), "a law. — Sir Wm. Blackstone (1765), Com. 
roguish thing " (see post. Equity, 20, a.), Bk. I., sec. 2, p. 41. 

the Chancellor, like an Eastern Cadi, ' Equality is equity. " A Judge ought 

doing of his own mere notion what he to prepare his way to a just sentence, as 

thinks meet and just. Nor is it only God useth to prepare his way, by raising 

among the vulgar that the notion is enter- valleys and taking down hills : so when 

tained. Dr. SamuelJohnson means some- there appeareth on either side a high 

thing very like it when he says : " The hand, violent prosecution, cunning advan- 

ChanceUor hath power to moderate and tages taken, combination, power, great 

temper the written law, and subjecteth cownsel, then is the virtue of a Judge seen 

himself only to the law of nature and to make inequality equal ; that he may 

reason." plant his judgment as upon even ground." 

2 Law, without equity, though hard — Baoon, " "Essaj on Judicature." 
and disagreeable, is much more desirable 

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Equity — contirmed. 

Daun V. City of London Brewery Co. (1869), L. R. 8 Eq. Ca. 

See also Consteuotion, 28 ; Law, 22 ; Parliamentary, 17 ; Statutes, 

11. A Court of equity knows its own province. — Lord Kenyan, Mayor, 
&c. of Southampton v. Graves (1800), 8 T. R. 592. 

12. A party who seeks equity must dp equity.' — Cottenham, L.C., 
Sturgis V. Champneys (1839), 5 My. & Cr. 105. 

13. I do not pretend to dispense equity at large, but only by the con- 
sent of the parties, upon a rule of Court. — Holt, C.J., Anonymous 
(1699), 3 Salk. 213. 

14. Courts of equity in ancient times, were more in the habit of taking 
to themselves the decision of questions of fact than they have 
thought wise and discreet in later times. All the Judges have 
demonstrated their opinion, to send the question of fact to a jury, 
where any reasonable doubt is raised ; and I cannot suppose there is 
any prejudice in a tribunal appointed according to the constitution of 
the coiintry to try the fact. — Lord Eldon, O'Connor v. Cooke (1803), 
8 Ves. 576. 

See Jury, 8, 9 ; Reasonable, 1. 

15. Courts of equity have always considered it of the greatest possible 
importance that parties should not sleep on their rights.^ — Sir J. 
Bomilly, M.R., Browne v. Cross (1852), 14 Beav. 113. 

See also 33, 34, helow ; Consent, 5, n. ; Diligence, 2 ; Rights, 4. 

16. We ought not to interpose in a matter which seems peculiarly to 
belong to the jurisdiction of a Court of equity. — Ahbott, C.J., Davey v. 
Prendergrass (1821), 2 Chit. Rep. 340. 

17. We are now Courts of equity, and must decide the thing according 
to all the rights. — Lord Coleridge, Cooper v. Griffin (1892), 61 L. J. 
Rep. Q. B. 566. 

18. I have always thought that formerly there was too confined a way 
of thinking in the Judges of the common law Courts, and that Courts 

1 For illustration of this maxim, see upon it, cannot claim without giving 

Snell's "Principles of Equity "(ed. 1868), compensation: Hallett c Martin, 24 

p. 38. Also as to the meaning in Chan- C. D. 624. 

eery of this maxim, see Oxford v. Provand, " Equity in its true and genuine meaning, 

L. E. 2 P. C. Ap. Cas. 135. It is best is the soul and spirit of all law ; positive 

illustrated by the enforcing of a wife's law is construed, and rational law is 

equity to a settlement : Sturgis «. Champ- made, by it. In this, equity is synony- 

neys, 5 My. & Cr. 105 ; and the principle mous to justice ; in that, to the true 

that where a person having a title to an sense and sound interpretation of the 

estate stands by and allows another who rule. ' ' — J3lac. Comm. Bk. III., c. 17, p. 222. 
is ignorant of the facts to expend money 

D.L.Q. 6 

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Equity — continued. 

of equity have risen by the Judges not properly applying the prin- 
ciples of the common law, being too narrowly governed by old cases 
and maxims, which have too much prevented the pubMc from having 
the benefit of the common law. — Wilmot, L.C.J., Collins v. Blantem 
(1767), 2 WHs. 341. 
See 2, above, and reference ; Dictum, 5 ; Jddges, 65, 71 ; Prece- 
dents, 10. 

19. I cannot agree that the doctrines of this Court are to be changed 
with every succeeding Judge. Nothing would inflict on me greater 
pain in quitting this place, than the recollection that I had done 
anything to justify the reproach that the equity of this Court varies 
like the Chancellor's ioot}—Eldon, L.C., Gee v. Pritchard (1818), 
2 Swanston, 414. 

See Praotiob, 3 ; Pbecedeotb, 20. 

20. It must not be forgotten that the rules of Courts of equity are not, 
like the rules of the common law, supposed to have been established 
from time immemorial. It is perfectly weU known that they have 
been estabUshed from time to time — altered, improved, and refined 
from time to time. In many cases we know the names of the 
Chancellors who invented them. No doubt they were invented for 
the purpose of securing the better administration of justice, but stiU 
they were invented. Take such things as these : the separate use 
of a married woman, the restraint on alienation, the modem rule 
against perpetuities, and the rules of equitable waste. We can name 
the Chancellors who first invented them, and state the date when they 
were first introduced into Equity jurisprudence; and therefore, in 
cases of this kind, the older precedents in equity are of little value. 
The doctrines are progressive, refined, and improved ; and if we 
want to know what the rules of Equity are, we must look, of course, 
rather to the more modem than the more ancient cases. — JesseL, M.R., 
In re Hallett's Estate; Knatchbull v. Hallett (1879), L. R. 13 
C. D. 710. 

See also Married Woman. 

21. I think that common law is better than equity. — lAndley, L.J., 
Angus V. Clifford (1891), L. J. Rep. (N. S.) 60 C. D. 455. 

See Common Law, 8. 

1 " Equity is a roguish thing : for law 'Tis all one, as if they should make his 

we have a measure ; know what to trust foot the standard for the measure we call 

to. Equity is according to the con- a foot 'a Chancellor's foot' ; what an 

science of him that is Chancellor ; and, uncertain measure would this be ! One 

as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. Chancellor has a long foot, another a 

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Equity — continued. 

22. This Court should determine upon broad principles which wiU meet 
the common sense of mankind. — Kenyan, M.R., Stebbing v. Walkey 
(1786), 1 Cox, Eq. Ca. 252. 

23. A Court of equity may do great things, but cannot alter things, or 
make them to operate contrary to their essential natures and properties. 
—Povxl, B., Montague v. Lord Bath (1693), 3 Ca. in Ch. 67. 

24. Equity has not relieved against gross improvidence. — Lord 
Brougham, Duke of Beaufort v. Neeld (1845), 12 CI. & F. 260. 

See ToET, 16. 

25. A man must come into a Court of equity with clean hands.^ — 
Eyre, L.C.B., Bering v. Earl of Winchelsea (1787), 1 Cox, Eq. Ca. 319. 

26. It is a rule that those who come into a Court of justice to seek 
redress, must come with clean hands, and must disclose a transaction 
warranted by law. — Lord Kenyan, C.J., Petrie v. Hannay (1789), 
3 T. R. 422. 

See also Paeliament, 9 ; Pleadings, 6 ; Peoseodtion ; Relief, 3 ; 
ToET, 2. 

27. When any one comes into a Court of equity to ask that which 
would not be granted in a Court of law, that person must come into 
Court with clean hands. — Kay, L.J., Roberts v. Cooper (1891), 
60 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) C. D. 381. 

See Relief, 1. 

28. In this case the plaintifE does not come into Court with clean hands ; 
he alleges his own turpitude, and is indictable for his fraud. — 
Rooke, J., Farmer v. RusseU (1798), 2 Bos. & PuU. 301. 

See Relief, 3 ; Toet, 16. 

29. The strict primary decree of this Court, as a Court of equity, is in 
■persanam?—Lard Eardvneke, Penn v. Lord Baltimore (1750), 

1 Ves. 444. 

30. The paternal jurisdiction of Courts of eqmtj.*—Kay, J., Mainlands. 
Upjohn (1889), 58 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) C. D. 363. 

31. liough proceedings in equity are said to be seaundem disoretionem 

short foot, a third an indifferent foot ; equity sued for ; it must be a depravity 

'tis the same thing in the Chancellor's in a legal, as well as m a moral sense. — 

conscience."— iSeZiiera," Table Talk, "title: Id. See also iSreeZZ'* " Prin. of Equity, 

Equity, p. 37. 39 ; Story, Eq. Jur. {12th ed.) 58 

1 The reader wiU note that the English ' Equity acts in personam. For lUus- 

principle in this respect widely differs tration of this maxim, see SnelVs " Prm. 

from the Eoman law; which kept pro- of Equity," 43. .,.,., 

digals in a state of perpetual pupilage. * " He (Lord Nottingham) has been 

s " When this is said, it does not mean emphatically called ' the father ot 

a general depravity ; it must have an equity.'" — /Si?- W. BlaekstoTie (1765), 

, immediate and necessary relation to the Com. Bk. III., Gh. 4, p. 55. 


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Equity — continued. 

honi viri, yet when it is asked, " Vir bonus est quis? " the answer is, 
" Qui consulta patrum, qui leges juraque servat."' — Sir Joseph Jekyll, 
Cowper V. Cowper (1735), 2 P. WiU. 753. 
See Discretion, 4. 

32. A Court of equity interposes only according to conscience. — Lord 
St. Leonards, Birch v. Joy (1851), 3 H. L. C. 598. 

33. A Court of equity which is never active in relief against conscience, 
or public convenience, has always refused its aid to stale demands 
where the party has slept upon his right, and acquiesced for a great 
length of time. Nothing can call forth this Court into activity, but 
conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence; where these are 
wanting, the Court is passive and does nothing.'' — Lord Camden, 
Smith V. Clay (1767), 3 Bro. Ch. Ca. 639 n. 

See above, 15 ; Consent, 4, 5 ; Courts, 8 ; Diligence, 2 ; Judges, 
47 ; Limitation, 1, 2 ; Reasonable, 1 ; Relief, 3. 

34. It is the constant practice of Courts of equity to discourage stale 

' Lord Campbell makes the following 
obserTations upon the Chancellor's sup- 
posed pratorian power, or iiobile officium : 
" It is a common opinion that English 
equity consists in the Judge acting upon 
his own notions of what is right, always 
softening the rigour of the common law 
when he disapproves of it, and dispensing 
with the application to particular cases of 
common law rules allowed to be generally 
wise, — so that he may reach justice accord- 
ing to the circumstances of each particular 
case, in pursuance of the suggestion of 
Lord Bacon, — ' Haleant Curite PrcBtorim 
potestatem tam subveniendi contra rigorem 
legis quam supplendi defectum legis.' — 
De Augmentis Sclent. Iviii. ; Aphor. 85.* 

"But with us there is no scope for j udicial 
caprice in a Court of Equity more than 
elsewhere. Our equitable system has 
chiefly arisen from supplying the defects of 
the common law, by giving a remedy in 
classes of cases for which the common law 
had provided none, and from a universal 
disregard by the equity Judge of certain 
absurd rules of the common law, which 
he considers inapplicable to the whole 
category to which the individual case 
under judgment belongs. In former 

• In like manner, let the Courts of the 
Lord Chancellor have the power both of 
relieving against the rigour and supplying 
the defects of the Common Law. 

unconscientious Chancellors, talking per- 
petually of their conscience, have decided 
in a very arbitrary manner, and have 
exposed their jurisdiction to much odium 
and many sarcasms. But the preference 
of individual opinion to rules and prece- 
dents has long ceased : ' the doctrine of 
the Court ' is to be diligently found out 
and strictly followed ; andftlie Chancellor 
sitting in equity is only to be considered 
a magistrate, to whose tribunal are 
assigned certain portions of forensic busi- 
ness, to which he is to apply a well- 
defined system of jurisprudence, — ^being 
under the control of fixed maxims and 
prior authorities, as much as the Judges 
of the common law. He decides ' secun- 
dum arbitrium boni viri ' ; but when it is 
asked, ' Vir bonus est quis ? ' the answer 
is, ' Qui consulta patrum, qui leges 
juraque servat.' " — lAves of the Li. Cham. 
Vol. 1., p. 11. 

^ " Altho' the surety is not troubled 
or molested for the debt, yet at any time 
after the money becomes payable on the 
original bond, this Court will decree the 
principal to discharge the debt ; it being 
unreasonable that a man shall always 
have such a cloud hang over him. " — Lord 
Keeper North, Ranelaugh v. Hayes (1683), 
1 Vern. 189, 190. {Tliis is quoted to illus- 
trate the exclusive coercive jurisdiction of 
equity in cases where it is against con- 
science to permit a passive state of things 
to continue.) 

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Equity — continued. 

demands. — Sir Thomas Plumer, M.R., Att.-Gen. v. Mayor of Exeter 
(1822), Jacob's Rep. 448. 
See above, 15 ; Diligence, 2 ; Rights, 4. 

35. Confederacies and combinations are very proper heads of relief. — 
Lord HardioiGke, Worthington v. Foxhall (1750), Bamardiston's 
Rep. 263. 

36. H est fort eguitdble et de publigue convenience gue gens ferront 
aide en recovery de lour duties (It is very agreeable to Equity, and 
of public convenience, that people should be aided in recovering their 
duties). — Vaughan, C.J., Witherhead v. Harrison (1670), Jones's 
(Sir Thos.) Rep. 2. 

See CouETS, 7 ; Judges, 47 ; Justice, 4. 

37. It is not the function of a Court of justice to enforce or give effect 
to moral obligations which do not carry with them legal or equitable 
rights. — Lord Macnaghten, Blackburn, Low & Co. v. Vigors (1887), 
L. R. 12 Ap. Ca. 543. 

See Morals, 3, and references therefrom; Tort, 2. 

38. It would not be correct to say that every moral obligation involves 
a legal duty ; but every legal duty is founded on a moral obligation.^ 
—Lord Coleridge, C.J., The Queen v. Instan (1893), L. R. 1 Q. B. 
[18931 P- 453. 

See CosTRACT, 2 ; Fraud, 14 ; Misoellakeous, 11 ; Tort, 4 ; Truth, 8. 


1. Esquire is neither a profession nor occupation." — Martin, B., Perrins 
V. Marine, &c. Society (1860), 8 W. R. 563. 

2. When a man is asked if he is an esquire, and he answers that he is an 
esquire, the general understanding is that he is a person of no 
profession or occupation. — Goekhum, C.J., Perrins v. Marine and 
General TraveHers' Ins. Co. (1859), L. T. Rep. (N. S.) Vol. 1, p. 27. 

See also ante, Counsel, 1, n., 2. 

3. Considering the laxity with which the title of Esquire has been used, 
as is the subject of remark by Sir Thomas Smith, in his days, as to the 
title of gentleman' . . . the Court cannot take upon itself in this case 

' All laws stand on the best and (alluding to the peerage, baronetage and 

broadest basis which go to enforce moral knights), esquires and gentlemen being 

and social duties. — Lord, Kenyan, C.J., only names of worship." — 2 Inst. 667. 

Paslev v. Freeman (1789), 3 T. R. 51. Steph. Comm. (9th ed.), Vol. 2, 617. 

3 ""These, Sir Edward Coke says, are ^ Common w. of Eng. b. 1, c. 20. 

all the names of dignity in this kingdom 

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Esquire — continued. 

to define, whetlier it has been improperly assumed.^ — Sir William Scott, 
Ewing V. Wheatley (1814), 2 Hagg. Con. Rep. 183. 

4. The term esquire has no relation whatever to landed property. — 
WiUes, J., Jones v. Smart (1785), 1 T. R. 50. 

5. I know of no privileged class of society, and I do not know an esquire 
has any privileges a yeoman has not.^ — Abbott, C.J., Case of Edmonds 
and others (1821), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 889. 


An estimated value is a precarious measure of justice, compared with 
the specific thing.— Lord Mansfield, Fisher v. Prince (1762), 3 Burr. 
Part rV. 1365. 


1. There is no difference, in point of evidence, whether the case be a 
criminal or civil case ; the same rules must apply to both. — Hoiham, B., 
King V. Cator (1802), 14 Esp. 143. 
See Ckiminal Justice, 1, 5. 

' Esquires and gentlemen are con- 
founded together by Sir Edward Coke, 
who observes, that every esquire is a 
gentleman, and a gentleman is defined to 
be one qui arma gerit. ... It is indeed 
<i matter somewhat unsettled, what con- 
stitutes the distinction, or who is a real 
esquire ; for it is not an estate, however 
large, that confers this rank upon its 
owner. — Steph. Cumm. (9th ed.), Vol. 2, 
p. 618. (On this subject see also Covs- 
SEL, 1, »., ante, p. 51.) Till a recent 
period, this term was affixed to the names 
of men of birth and professional persons 
only. Men of inferior importance had 
" Mr." prefixed to their names, and thus a 
distinction between the two classes was 
kept up. Now it is quite customary to 
add "Esq." to the names of the better 
class of tradesmen when they are addressed 
as private persons. It is a trifle, yet it 
might have been better if the old rule had 
been adhered to : for, in the first place, 
the extension of the term is grammatic- 
ally wrong, seeing that it is only applic- 
able to m6n entitled to bear arms ; and 
in the second, if there is any honour in 
the appellation, it is right that the superior 
class should have it, in which case it 
would serve as one of the incentives 
which work upon the ambition of the 
mercantile classes, prompting them to the 
industry which leads to honours. It 

appears, however, that the tendency of 
honourable terms is ever, like that of 
glaciers, downward. In the seventeenth 
century, in Scotland, the term " Mr." was 
reserved for clergymen, barristers, and 
other persons of consequence, while the 
mercantile classes only had their naked 
names. " Mr." then came down to the mer- 
cantile classes, from whom it is now going 
to the better class of working men. So, 
also, " Sir," which originally signified alord 
(jihor, Gothic), has gradually descended 
till it is applied to nearly every respect- 
able person. 

2 Upon the best English authorities, 
yeoman is a title of courtesy. — Clumber- 
lain. J., Weldon's Case (1795), 26 How. 
St. Tr. 242. 

A yeoman is he that hath free land of 
forty shillings by the year ; who was 
antiently thereby qualified to serve on 
juries, vote for toights of the shire, and 
do any other act, where the law requires 
one that is probus et legalis homo. — Steph. 
Comm., Vol. 2 (9th ed.), 619. 

Yeoman or yoman [fr. gvma, Sax. ; 
gommans, Theotise], a man of a small 
estate in land ; a farmer, a gentleman 
farmer ; also, a 40«. freeholder not 
advanced to the rank of a gentleman ; 
tte highest order among the plebeians. — 
2 Inst. 668. 

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Evidence — continued. 

2. Sitting in a Court of law, I can receive no evidence but what comes 
under the sanction of an oath. — Lord Kenyan, Wright v. Barnard 
(1797), 2 Esp. 701. 

See AjFroAViT, 2 ; CRiMiNix Justice, 36. 

3. The witness swears more generally on his senses, the juror by collec- 
tion and inference, by the act and force of his understanding.— 
Vaughan, L.C.J., Bushel's Case (1670), Jones' (Sir Thos.) Rep. 16. 

See luTEaiEOGATORiES ; Jury, 3. 

4. Some instances of strength of memory are very surprising. — Buller, J., 
Coleman v. Wathen (1793), 5 T. R. 245. 

5. It is difficult to say what is or is not evidence in itself, because it all 
depends upon the chain and connection it has — if there are two or 
three links in the chain, they must go to one first and then to another, 
and see whether they amount to evidence.^ — Eyre, L.C.J., Tooke's 
Case (1794), 25 How. St. Tr. 76. 

6. To my mind the taking some expression of a Judge used in deciding 
a question of fact as to his own view of some one fact being material 
on a particular occasion, as laying down a rule of conduct for other 
Judges in considering a similar state of facts in another case, is a 
false mode of treating authority. It appears to me that the view of a 
learned Judge in a particular case as to the value of a particular piece 
of evidence is of no use to other Judges who have to determine a 
similar question of fact in other cases where there may be many 
different circumstances to be taken into consideration. — Brett, L.J., 
Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England v. Kino (1880), L. R. 14 
C. D. 225. 

See Judges, 11, 70, and references there given. 

7. I cannot go upon suspicion ; I can only look at the evidence. — 
Lord Selhome, L.C., Nobel's Explosives Co. v. Jones (1882), L. R. 8 
Ap. Cas. 9. 

8. A fair suspicion may be well worthy of further investigation, and it 
may well be worth the expense and trouble of examining witnesses to 
see whether it is well founded. — Jessel, M.R., In re Grold Co. (1879), 
L. R. 12 C. D. 84. 

See Witness, 2. 

9. Suspecting is not believing ; saying he suspects woTild not be 
well; but swearing according to his estimation is sufficient. — Lord 
Hardideke, C.J., Smith v. Boucher and others (1734), 7 Mod. Rep. 178. 

1 "... . A good corroborating chain, i fall to the ground." — Pra«, L.C.J., Wilkes 
they fail in the last link, the whole will v. Wood (1763), LofEt. 12. 

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Evidence — continued. 

10. Certainly, no evidence will be received but what is legal evidence — 
at least, none but what the Judge thinks is legal ; you may take that 
for granted.* — Holroyd, J., Eedford v. Birley and others (182^, 
1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 1174. 

See 11, 31, helow; Courts, 14; Criminal Justice, 8; Juet, 17; 
Trial for Life, 1. 

11. It is the duty of the Judge in criminal trials to take care that the 
verdict of the jury is not founded upon any evidence except that 
which the law allows. — Lord Coleridge, C.J., Eeg. v. Gibson (1887), 
18 Q. B. D. 537 ; 16 Cox, C. C. 181. 

See 10, ahove; 31, helow; Judges, 52 ; Jury, 4, 8. 

12. Circumstantial evidence only raises a probability. — Pollock, 03., 
Reg. V. Rowton (1865), 13 W. R. 437. 

See 28, below; Presumption, 1 ; Witness, 1. 

13. I wish that objections to questions as leading, might be a little 
better considered before they are made. It is necessary, to a certain 
extent, to lead the mind of the witness to the subject of inqidry. If 
questions are asked, to which the answer "Yes" or "No" would be 
conclusive, they would certainly be objectionable, but in general no 
objections are more frivolous than those which are made to questions 
as leading ones.* — Lord EUeriborough, NichoUs v. Dowding and another 
(1815), 1 Stark. 81. 

See 18, below ; Counsel, 25 ; Witness, 2. 

14. You must answer any questions that are not ensnaring questions. — 
Wright, L.C.J., Trial of the Seven Bishops (1688), 12 How. St. Tr. 310. 

See 19, below; Character, 2, 4 ; Miscellaneous, 19 ; Witness, 2. 

15. There is no fixed rule which binds the coimsel calling a witness to a 

particular mode of examining him. If a witness, by his conduct in 

the box, shows himseU decidedly adverse, it is always in the discretion 

' The wisdom and goodness of our law substantial, according to the rules of 

appear in nothing more remarkably, than natural justice and equity. — Lord Cowper, 

in the perspicuity, cerUiuty, and clear- 8 New Pari. Hist. 338 ; Proceedings 

ness of the evidence it requires to fix a. against Bishop Atterbury (1723), 16 How. 

crime upon any man, whereby his life, St. Tr. 323 ; id. Vol. 29, p. 1328. See 

his liberty, or his property may be con- also poit, Trial fob Life, 1, 2, aiid 

cerned : herein we glory and pride our- references therefrom. 

selves, and are justly the envy of all our ^ The objection in principle applies 

neighbour nations. Our law, in such only to those cases where the question 

cases, requires evidence so clear and con- propounded involves an answer immedi- 

vincing, that every by-stander, the instant ately concluding the merits of the case, 

he hears it, must be fully satisfied of the and indicating to the witness an answer 

truth of it ; it admits of no surmises, which will best accord with the interests 

innuendos, forced consequences, or harsh of the party.— iStarA. Eoid. (4th ed.), 166. 

constructions, nor anything else to be 2 Pothiei; by Evans, 265, referred to. 
oSered as evidence, but what is real and 

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Evidence — contimted. 

of the Judge to allow a cross-examination. — Best, C.J., Clarke v. 
Saffery (1824), Ry. & M. 126. 
See 16, 17, 18, helow. 

16. I mean to decide this, and no further. That in each particular case 
there must be some discretion in the presiding Judge, as to the mode 
in which the examination shall be conducted, in order best to answer 
the purposes of justice. — Abhott, L.C.J. , Bastin v. Carew (1824), 
Ry. & M. 127. 

See 15, above; 17, 20, below; Criminal Justice, 2, and references 

17. There are cases where examinations are admitted, namely, before the 
coroner, and before magistrates in cases of felony. That appears to 
me to go rather in support of the general rule than in destruction of 
it. Every exception that can be accounted for is so much a confirma- 
tion of the rule that it has become a mairiTn, Exeeptio prohat regulam. 
—Lord Kenyon, The King v. Inhabitants of Eriswell (1790), 3 T. R. 

See 23, helow. 

18. I apprehend that you may put a leading question to an imwiUing 
witness on the examination in chief at the discretion of the Judge ; 
but you may always put a leading question in cross-examination, 
whether a witness be unwilling or not. — Alderson, B., Parkin v. Moon 
(1836), 7 C. & P. 409. 

See 13, 15, above. 

19. Try if you can trap him in any question. — Dolhen, J., Rex v. Green 
and others (1679), 7 How. St. Tr. 176. 

See 14, above. 

20. A general fishing cross-examination ought not to be permitted. — 
Lord EsJier, M.R., Coulson v. Disborough (1894), L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 
[1894], p. 318. 

See 16, above, and references therefrom. 

21. It appears to us contrary to all rules of evidence, and opposed to 
natural justice, that the evidence of one party should be received as 
evidence against another party, without the latter having an oppor- 
timity of testing its truthfulness by cross-examination. — Lopes, L.J. 
Allen V. Allen (1894), L. R. P. D. (C. A.) [1894], p. 253. 

See Administration of Justice, 1, 19 ; Criminal Justice, 7 ; Propebty, 

22. There are himdreds of actions tried every year in which the evidence 
is irreconcilably conflicting, and must be on one side or other wilfully 

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Evidence — continued. 

and corraptly perjured. — James, L.J., Flower v. Lloyd (1879), L. R. 10 
C. D. 333. 
See Administiution of Jdstioe, 15, and references therefrom; Ceiminal 
Justice, 36. 

23. I think that reading parts of evidence given in a former case is not 
a legal course.— ErZe, J., Queen v. Bowling (1848), 7 St. Tr. (N. S.) 

See 17, above. 

24. I can only reconunend to you not to break in upon parts of the 
evidence.— %re, L.O.J., Tooke's Case (1794), 25 How. St. Tr. 76. 

See Administration of Justice, 14. 

25. A hostile witness is a witness who, from the manner in which he 
gives his evidence, shows that he is not desirous of telling the truth 
to the Court. — Sir J. P. Wilde, Coles v. Coles and Brown (1866), 
L. R. 1 P. & D. 71. 

See also Fraud, 27, and references therefrom. 

26. I think that the situation in which this witness stands towards 
either party, does not give the party calling the witness a right to 
cross-examine her, unless her evidence was of itself of such a nature 
as to make it appear that she was an unwilling witness. — Erskine, J., 
R. V. Ball and others (1839), 8 C. & P. 745. 

27. Artificial rules upon matters of evidence are better avoided as far 
as possible.— WiJZs, J., Hennessy v. Wright (1888), L. R. 21 Q. B. 

See Miscellaneous, 24. 

28. I think it is impossible to give credit to testimony that would prove 
infinitely more than can be brought within the bounds of probability. 
—Lord Westbury, Neilson v. Betts (1871), L. R. 5 Eng. & Ir. Ap. Ca. 

See 12, above. 

29. We are obliged to hear all that witnesses have to say ; but it is a 
canticle of Courts of justice that witnesses non numerentur sed 
■ponderentur : they are not to be numbered but weighed. It is the 
nature of the human mind, it is the perfection of the human heart, 
to serve a friend in distress ; but in doing so, a man should not 
transgress the higher calls of religion and morality, the obligations of 
an oath. We are not monks and recluses, as was said in another 
place,' but come from a class in society that I hope and beheve gives 
us opportunities of seeing as much of the world, and that has as much 

1 See Judicial Decisions, 2. 

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Evidence — eontinited. 

virtue amongst its members as any other, however elevated. — Lord 
Kenyan, Rex v. Rusby (1800), Peake's N. P. Ca. 193. 

See 30, behw ; Disoeetion, 9 ; Counsel, 13 ; Judges, 3 ; Jdey, 26 ; 
Peejury ; Politics, 3 ; Tort, 25 ; Trial foe Life, 1 ; Witness, 3. 

30. Do you imagine that the law supposed that anybody should produce 
four score witnesses ? Two witnesses are enough to prove any fact, 
if it be a good one, for by the mouth of two witnesses shall a thing 
be established ; and 200 will not prove any fact, if it be a bad one.' — 
Marlay, L.C.J. (Ir.), Trial of May Heath (1744), 18 How. St. Tr. 49. 

See 29, above ; Jury, 26. 

31. The statement of a living man is not to be disbelieved because there 
is no corroboration, although in the necessary absence through death 
of one of the parties to the transaction it is natural that, in considering 
the statement of the survivor, we should look for corroboration in 
support of it ; but, if the evidence given by the living man brings 
conviction to the tribunal which has to try the question, then there is 
no rule of law which prevents that conviction being acted upon.^ — Sir 
J. Hannen, Be Hodgson ; Beckett v. Ramsdale (1886), 54 L. T. Rep. 
(N. S.) 224 ; L. R. 31 C. D. 177. 

See also 10, 11, above. 

32. Hearsay evidence is always to be received with caution. — Graham, B., 
Berkeley Peerage Case (1811), 4 Camp. 408. 

See Witness, 1. 

33. Concessions made for the purpose of settling the business for which 
the action is brought, cannot be given, in evidence ; but facts admitted 
I have always received.* — Lord Kenyan, Turner v. Railton (1796), 2 
Esp. 475. 

See Aebitration ; Compeomise ; Criminal Justice, 41, 42 ; Damages, 6 ; 
Litigation, 3 ; Pardon, 4. 


1. Where two evils present, a wise administration, if there be room for 

1 The headnote to Blackman v. Bainton where the cause of action (if any) arose." 

(1863), 15 0. B. (N. S.) 432, is quaint: 2 Testis oculatus unus plus valet quam 

" Twenty-five witnesses and a horse on auriti decern : One eye-witness is worth 

one side against ten witnesses* on the more than ten ear-witnesses. — 4 Inst: 

other. Held, not such a preponderance 279. 

of ' inconvenience ' as to induce the Court ^ Evidence of concessions made for the 

to bring back the venue from the place purpose of settling matters in dispute, I 

shall never admit ; but facts admitted 

* Multitudinem decern faciunt : Ten before arbitrators I always shall. — Lord 

constitute a crowd. — Co. Jbitt. 257. iSee Kenyon, Gregory v. Howard (1800), 8 Esp. 

also Ceiminal Justice, 32. 113. 

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Evil — contimied. 

an option, will choose the lea,BV— Foster, J., Case of Pressing Mariners 
(1743), 18 How. St. Tr. 1330. 
See Miscellaneous, 58. 

2. I think the old, sound, and honest maxim that " you shall not do evil 
that good may come," is applicable in law as well as in morals.' — 
GoeUum, C.J., Reg. v. HicMin and another (1868), 11 Cox, C. C. 27 ; 
S. G. 3 L. R. Q. B. 372. 

3. Let us never forget the christian maxim " that wo shotdd not do evil 
that good may come of it."— Crampton, J., R. v. O'ConneU (1843), 5 
St. Tr. (N. S.) 703. 


The privilege of executors is too great already. They ought to be 
properly informed when they bring actions. — Lord Mansfield, Hawes 
V. Saunders (1764), 3 Burr. Part IV., p. 1585. 


The family consists of those who live under the same roof with the pater 
familias ; those who form (if I may use the expression) his fire-side. — 
Lord Kenyan, C.J., R. v. Inhabitants of Darlington (1792), 4 T. R. 800. 
See Compromise ; Husband and Wife, 7 ; Paeent and Child, 2, n. 


We take notice of aU feasts, and the almanack is part of the common 
law, the calendar being established by Act of Parliament, and it is 
published before the Common-prayer Book. — E.oU, C.J., Brough v. 
Parkings (1703), 2 Raym. 994. 


1. A fiction of law shall never be contradicted so as to defeat the end 
for which it was invented, but for every other purpose it may be 
contradicted.' — Lord Mansfield, Mostyn v. Fabrigas (1775), Cowp. 161. 

' Of two evils, the less is always to be we say,) Let us do evil, that good may 

chosen. — Thomas a Xempis, " Imitation of eome ? " — Romans, iii., 8. 

Christ," Book III., Ch. 12. ' No fiction shaU extend to work an 

Of two evils I have chose the least. — injury, its proper operation being to 

JViwr, "Imitation of Horace." E duobus prevent a mischief or remedy an incon- 

malis, minimum eligendum. — Cicero, De venience which might result from the 

Officiis. general rule of law. — 3 Bla. Com. (21 ed.) 

2 "And not rather, (as we be slander- 43. See also post. Judges, 13, amd 

ously reported, and as some affirm that references therefrom. 

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Fiction — continued. 

2. Fictions of law must be consistent with justice.* — Maule, J., Whitaker 
V. Wisbey (1852), 6 Cox, C. C. 111. 

3. Actions are allowed against all the King's subjects for the furtherance, 
but never for the hindrance, of justice. — Lord Mansfield, Lane v. 
Wheat (1780), 1 Doug. 314. 

4. When Courts adopt a fiction they must necessarily support it. — Lord 
Alvanley, C.J., Gray v. SidnefE (1803), 3 Bos. & Pull. 399. 

Foreign Law. 

1. The sentences of foreign Courts have always some degree of regard 
paid to them by the Courts of justice here : and it is very right that 
an attention shoxdd be paid to them, as far as they ought to have 
weight in the case depending. — Wilmot, J., Robinson v. Bland (1760), 
2 Burr. Part IV., p. 1084. 

2. The Judge has not organs to know and to deal with the text of the 
foreign law, and therefore requires the assistance of a foreign lawyer 
who knows how to interpret it." — Lord Brougham, Sussex Peerage Case, 
(1844), 11 CI. & F. 115. 

3. To learn what the laws of a country are, is not the work of a day even 
in pacific times, and to persons accustomed to legal enquiries. — Lord 
StoweU, Ending v. Smith (1821), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 1062. 

See Law, 1 ; Practice, 1. 

4. It is every day's practice with us to decide cases which turn upon the 
laws of foreign countries, or the laws administered in Courts of peculiar 
jurisdiction in this country. Of this we have no judicial knowledge ; 
but we acquire the necessary knowledge by evidence.' — Coleridge, J., 
Stockdale v. Hansard (1837), 3 St. Tr. (N. S.) 932. 

See also Contract, 3 ; JraxjES, 64 ; Practice, 1, 26 ; Tort, 1. 

5. Unless Parliament has conferred upon the Court that power in 
language which is immistakable, the Court is not to assume that 
Parliament intended to do that which so seriously affect foreigners 
who are not resident here, and might give offence to foreign Govern- 
ments. Unless Parliament has used such plain terms as show that 
they reaUy intended us to do that, we ought not to do it. — lAndley, M.R., 
In re A. B. & Co. (1900), L. R. 1 Q. B. D. [1900], C. A. p. 544. See 

1 In fictione juris semper cequitas own art is to be believed. — Co. Litt. 125. 
existit : A legal fiction is always consistent Auctoritates pJdlosophorum, medicormm, 

with Equity. — 11 Rep. 51. et ptetarum, smd in ctmsis allegandce et 

* See also Coucha v. Murrieta ; De Mora tencmdce : The opinions of philosophers, 

■t'. Coucha, L. B. 40 Ch. Div. 543. physicians, and poets are to be alleged 

' Ouilibet in arte sua perito est creden- and received in causes. — Co. Litt. 264. 
Every one who is skilled in his 

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Foreign Law — continued. 

also Ex parte Blain, 12 Ch. D. 522 ; In re Pearson (1892), 2 Q. B. 263. 
See also Consteuotion, 8 ; Law, 22, 44, 49 ; Parliament, 13, 14, 17 ; 
Statutes, 15. 

The King has no interest in this money : he is only Royal trustee for the 
party.— Lord Mansfield, Rex v. Eyres (1766), 4 Bnrr. Part IV. 2119. 
See Costs, 4, 5 ; Soveeeigntt, 2. 

1. "Fraud in point of law" is, to my mind, the oddest expression. 
—BramweU, B., HoUand v. RusseU (1863), 11 W. R. 758. 

2. It is fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to 
be false, and injury ensues, although the motives from which the 
representations proceeded may not have been bad. — Tindal, C.J., 
Foster v. Charles (1830), 7 Bing. 105. 

See 8, 12, 13, 16, 27, below; Law, 41 ; Motives, 1, 8 11 ; Tort, 16. 

3. I do not understand legal fraud. To my mind it has no more 
meaning than legal heat or legal cold, legal light or legal shade. 
There never can be a well-founded complaint of legal fraud, or of 
anything else, except where some duty is shown and correlative right, 
and some violation of that duty and right.' — Lord BramweU, Weir v. 
BeH (1878), 3 Ex. D. 243. 

See 22, 23, 24, helow; MiscasLLANEOus, 31. 

4. No man is bound to presume a fraud.^ — Ghitty, J., In re Denham and 
Co., L. R. 25 Ch. 766. 

See Relief, 1. 

5. It is impossible in a Court of justice to call a particidar act a bond fide 
act simply because a man says that he did not intend to commit a 
fraud. — Jessel, M.R., In re National Funds Assurance Co. (1878), 
L. R. 10 Ch. 128. 

See 31, helow. 

6. Fraud and deceit abound in these days more than in former times. — 
Lord Coke, Twyne's Case (1602), 3 Co. 80. 

7. The Statute of Frauds is a weapon of defence not offence. — Lord 
SeTborne, Jervis v. Berridge (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 360. 

' But see Derry ■;;. Peek, L. R. 14 Ap. stances or conditions of the parties 

Ca. 337 ; Peek v. Derry, L. R. 37 Ch. contracting : weakness on one side, usury 

541. on the other, or extortion or advantage 

a Mm decipitur qui scit se decipi : He taken of that weakness." — Earl of Clhester- 

is not deceived who knows himself to be field v. Janssen (1750), 2 Ves. Sen. 156. 

deceived.— 5 Co. 60. Says Lord Hard- On this point, see also Feaud, 9, 10, 16,' 

wicke, L.C. : "There is always fraud ahme ; Misoblianeods, 10, 19, 47,58; 

presumed or inferred from the ciroum- Usury, 2, supra. 

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Fraud — eontimced. 

8. I must confess to such an abhorrence of fraud in business that I am 
always most unwilling to come to a conclusion that a fraud has been 
committed, and I have very strong views with regard to what is the 
legal definition of fraud. It seems to me that no recklessness of 
spectdation, however great, and that no extortion, however enormous, 
is fraud. It seems to me that no man ought to be foimd guilty of 
fraud unless you can say he had a fraudulent mind and an intention 
to deceive.— Brett, L.J., Wilson v. Church (1879), L. R. 13 Ch. 51. 

See 2, 4, n., above; 14, 22, 23, 24:, 34:, below; Misoellaneods, 31; 
Motives, 8. 

9. Collusion is not necessary to constitute fraud. — BvUer, J., Pasley v. 
Freeman (1789), 3 T. R. 51. 

See also 4, n., above ; 17, below. 

10. The strongest mind cannot always contend with deceit and falsehood. 
—Lord Wynford, Blackford v. Christian (1829), 1 Knapp, 77. 

See MiscFJT.A-MEOus, 10, 31 ; Relief, 1 ; Title, 4. 

11. I know of no case where by imphcation of law the duty of clearing 
himself from an imputed fraud rests on the defendant. — Lord Watson, 
Cavendish Bentincki;. Fenn (1887), L. R. 12 App. Ca. 666. 

12. The manner of the transaction was to gild over and conceal the 
truth ; and whenever Courts of law see such attempts made to conceal 
such wicked deeds they wiU brush away the cobweb varnish and show 
the transactions in their true light. — Wilmot, C.J., Collins v. Blantern 
(1767), 2 Wils. 349. 

See 2, above ; 19, below. 

13. I think that it must in every case .depend upon the nature of the 
transaction, whether the fact not disclosed is such, that it is impliedly 
represented not to exist ; and that must generally be a question of 
fact proper for a jury. — Blackburn, J., Lee v. Jones (1864), 17 C. B. 
(N. S.) 506. 

See 2, above. 

14. The Court exercises its jurisdiction for the enforcement of the truth, 
and makes a man's acts square with his words, by compelling him to 
perform what he has undertaken.' — Sir J. Bomilly, M.R., Laver v. 
Fielder (1862), 32 Beav. 13. 

See CoNSTEUOTiON, 4 ; Contract, 2 ; Equity, 38 ; MisoELLAiiEOUS, 11 ; 
Tort, 16 ; Teuth, 8. 

1 Courts of justice are to regard the Per LorA SarduncUe, L.G., Earl of 

substance of things on a contract, and not Chesterfield v. Janssen (1750), 2 Ves. Sen. 

mere words, which might be inaccurately 153. 
used by the parties in private dealing. — 

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Praud — continued. 

15. The Court never loses the power of unravelling cases of fraud. — 
Bacon, C.J., Ex parte McHattie ; In re Wood (1878), L. R. 
10 C. D. 402. 

16. An action cannot be supported for telling a bare naked lie : but that 
I define to be, saying a thing that is false, knowing or not knowing it 
to be so, and without any design to injure, cheat, or deceive another 
person. Every deceit comprehends a lie ; but a deceit is more than 
a lie, on account of the view with which it is practised, its being 
coupled with some dealing, and the injury which it is calculated to 
occasion, and does occasion, to another person. ^—Buller, J., Pasley v. 
Freeman (1789), 3 T. R. 56. 

See 2, ahove ; Teuih, 8. 

17. Collusion between two persons, to the prejudice and loss of a third, 
is, in the eye of the Court, the same as a fraud.' — Hardvoieke, L.C., 
Garth v. Cotton (1750), 1 Ves. 524. 

See 9, ahove ; 19, helow. 

18. If every untrue statement which produces damage to another woidd 
found an action at law, a man might sue his neighbour for any mode 
of communicating erroneous information, such (for example) as having 
a conspicuous clock too slow, since plaintiff might thereby be prevented 
from attending to some duty or acquiring some benefit. — Lord Den- 
man, C.J., Barley v. Walford (1837), 9 Q. B. 208. 

See 27, helow. 

19. It woTild be an absurdity in law to hold that if a man draws another 
into a snare, the party suffering shoidd have no remedy by action. — 
Heath, J., Tapp v. Lee (1803), 3 Bos. & PuU. 371. 

See 5, 8, 12, ahove ; Misqellaheous, 10, 19 ; Motives, 13 ; Protection, 
2 ; Title, 4 ; Tort, 16. 

20. I do not see any sound distraction between the case of money paid 
in a concern which is malum in se and money paid in a concern which 
is malum ■prohibitum. The latter as well as the former tends to 
encourage a breach of the law.* — Reaih, J., Aubert v. Maze (1801) 
1 Bos. & Pull. 374. 

See Money, 3. 

1 See also per Lord Kenyan, id. p. 65. 3 I perfectly agree with my Brother 

2 Wherever one of two innocent persona Heath in reprobating any distinction 
must suffer by the acts of a third, he who between malum prohibitwni and malum in 
has enabled such third person to occasion se, and consider it as pregnant with 
the loss must sustain it. — Aslihurst, J., mischief. Every moral man is as much 
Lickbarrow v. Mason (1786), 6 Bast, 21. bound to obey the civil law of the land as 
See also 2 T. E. 63 ; 1 H. Bl. 357 ; Colling- the law of nature.— i'er RooTie J id 
wood ?). Berkeley, 16 C. B. (N. S.) 145. p. 375. See aUo post, Mo^Al.s,i. ' " 

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Fraud — continued. 

21. Whatever may be the case in a Court of morals, there is no legal 
obligation on the vendor to inform the purchaser that he is under a 
mistake, not induced by the act of the vendor. — Blackburn, J., Smith 
V. Hughes (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 607. 

See MoBAis, 3. 

22. As no Court has ever attempted to define fraud, so no Court has 
ever attempted to define undue influence, which includes one of its 
many varieties. — lAndley, L.J., AUcard v. Skinner (1887), L. R. 
36 Ch. 183. 

See 3, above ; Sovereignty, 10. 

23. Fraud is an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates the most solemn 
proceedings of Courts of justice. LordCofee says it avoids aU judicial 
acts, ecclesiastical or temporal. — De Grey, C.J., Duchess of Kingston's 
Case (1776), 2 Sm. L. C. 687. 

24. " Fraud," in my opinion, is a term that should be reserved for 
something dishonest and morally wrong, and much mischief is, I 
think, done, as weU as much unnecessary pain inflicted, by its use 
where " illegality " and "illegal "are the really appropriate expres- 
sions. — Wills, J., In re Companies Acts ; Ex parte Watson (1888), 
L. R. 21 Q. B. 309. 

See 3, 22, above. 

25. Secrecy is a mark of Fraud.^ — Lord Coke, Twyne's Case (1602), 

3 Co. 80. 

26. Fraud is infinite in variety ; sometimes it is audacious and 
unblushing ; sometimes it pays a sort of homage to virtue, and then 
it is modest and retiring ; it would be honesty itseU if it could only 
afford it. — Lord Macnaghten, Reddaway v. Banham (1896), L. R. 
App. Ca. [1896], p. 221. 

See Law, 23. 

27. Fraud may consist as well in the suppression of what is true as in 
the representation of what is false. If a man professing to answer a 
question, select those facts only which are likely to give a credit to the 
person of whom he speaks, and keep back the rest, he is a more artful 
knave lian he who teUs a direct falsehood. — Heath, J., Tapp v. Lee 
(1803), 3 Bos. & Pull, 371; Park, J., Foster v. Charles (1830), 

4 M. & P. 70. 

See 2, 18, above ; Inteeeogatoeies ; Judges, 48, n. ; Misoella- 
NEons, 19 ; Teuth, 6, 7 ; Witness, 4. 

I Id. per Beath, J., Kidd v. Bawliason fraudem : It is fraud to conceal fraud. — 
(1800),'l Bos. & Pull. 61. Praus est colore lVern.27Q. 

D.L.Q. 7 

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Fraud — contirmed. 

28. Fraud is sometimes mere matter of fact, and sometimes tlie 
conclusion of law from facts. — Lord Mansfield, Foxcroft v. Devon- 
shire (1759), 2 Burr. Part IV. 937. 

29. There cannot be a greater Paradox, than that a man should be guilty 
of a fraud in lending his money with no other prospect but the chance 
of being repaid it. — Lord Mansfield, Foxcroft v. Devonshire (1759), 
2 Burr. Part IV. 941. 

See Money, 2 ; Propeutt, 12. 

30. No man shall set up his own iniquity as a defence any more than as 
a cause of action.' — Lord Mansfield, Montefiori v. Montefiori (1762), 
1 Wm. Bl. 363. 

31. A man shaU not avail himself of an iniquity or blunder of his own. 
Allegans turpitudinem suam shall not be heard. — Lord Mansfield, The 
King and Borough of Portsmouth (1774), LofEt. 553. 

See 5, above ; 33 helow ; Criminal Justice, 51 ; Miscellaneous, 33. 

32. You shall not stipulate for iniquity. All writers upon our law agree 
in this, no polluted hand shaU touch the pure foimtains of justice. — 
Wilmot, L.C.J., CoUins v. Blantem (1767), 2 Wils. 341. 

33. No man can avail himself of his own fraud to avoid the law. We 
have instances even in the criminal law where a man shall not be 
permitted to avoid the law by fraud. — Grove, J., Doe v. Carter (1799), 
8 T. R. 302. 

See 31, above ; Criminal Justice, 51 ; Public Policy, 7. 

34. As to relief against fraud, no invariable rules can be established, 
Fraud is infinite ; and were a Court of equity once to lay down rules, 
how far they would go, and no farther, in extending their relief against 
it, or to define strictly the species or evidence of it, the jurisdiction 
would be cramped and perpetually eluded by new schemes, which the 
fertility of man's invention would contrive. — Lord Hardicicke in a 
letter to Lord Kaims, quoted by Mr. Justice Story, 1 Story Eq. 
§ 186 n. 

See above, 8 ; Motives, 8 ; Relief, 3. 

35. You cannot imply an authority to do an illegal act. — Jessd, M.R., In re 
Parker (1882), L. R. 21 C. D. 417. 

See Law, 75 ; Relief, 2. 

36. You may discuss the question of legality on legal grounds, bu.t not 
by an argumentum ad Jiominem.—Bayley, J., Trial of Hunt and 
others (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 282. 

» See also Doe d. Roberts v. Roberts, 2 B. & Aid. 367 ; Wetherell v. Jones, SB.* Aid. 225. 

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Freedom of Speech. 

The power of conmninication of thoughts and opinions is the gift of 
God, and the freedom of it is the source of all science, the first fruits 
and the ultimate happiness of society ; and therefore it seems to 
foUow, that human laws ought not to interpose, nay, cannot interpose, 
to prevent the communication of sentiments and opinions in volimtary 
assemblies of men. — Eyre, L.C.J. , Hardy's Case (1794), 24 How. 
St. Tr. 206. 
See Law, 70 ; Liberts of the Press, 9 ; Liberty of the Subject, 5 ; 
Minorities, 2 ; Paeuament, 6 ; Politics, 8 ; Voting. 


" None shall be disseised of his freehold " (Magna Oharta). — Quoted 
by Denison, J., Rex. v. Inhabitants of Aythrop Rooding (1756), 
Burrow (Settlement CasesJ, 414. 
See Laud. 


Graming in aU its forts is too big an evil for the regulation of positive 
law. Subject it to that, and the event is, you restrain it not at aU. ; 
but the honest party suffers doubly ; and the knave escapes and 
trixmiphs. The former loses, he pays ; it is a debt of honour : The 
latter happens to lose, then the condition is changed : I would have 
taken, if I had won ; but now, I'L. pay you in law. This is gaming 
very high indeed ; tends to a monopoly ; enhances the price of one of 
the necessaries of life ; and therefore merits all the discouragement we 
can give it. — Lord Mansfield, Coote v. Thackeray (1773), Lofft. 153. 
See also Cock-Fighting ; Commerce, 10, 32 ; Misceiianeous, 36. 


The game laws are already sufficiently oppressive, and therefore ought 
not to be extended by implication. — Willes, J., Jones v. Smart (1785), 
1 T. R. 49. 
See Construction, 9. 


Many people there are in this kingdom who never see a Gazette to the 
day of their deaths, and very mischievous would be the consequences 
if they were bound by a notice inserted in it. — Lord Kenyan, Graham 
V. Hope (1794), 1 Peake, N. P. Ca. 155. 


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We know well that the Primitive Church in her greatest purity were 
but voluntary congregations of believers, submitting themselves to 
the Apostles, and after to other Pastors, to whom they did minister of 
their Temporals, as Grod did move them. So as Eedesiasticus, cap. 17, 
says, God appointed a Rider over every people, when he divided 
nations of the whole Earth. And therefore if a people will refuse all 
government, it were against the law of God ; and yet if a popular 
State wiU receive a Monarchy it stands well with the Law of God. — 
HobaH, C.J., Bruton v. Morris (1614), Lord Hobart's Rep. 149. 
See Law, 68 ; Libel, 4. 


No man can make a stable-yard of the King's highway. — Lord EUen^ 
borough, Rex v. Cross (1812), 3 Camp. 227. 


1. An honest blunder in the use of the language is not dishonest. — 
Bowen, L.J., Angus v. CHfPord (1891), 60 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) C. D. 456. 

See Mistakes, 3. 

2. What is honest is not dishonest.* — Bowen, L.J., Angus v. Clifford 
(1891), 60 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) C. D. 456. 


Honours ought to come from merit, and from merit alone. — Lord St. 
Leonards, Brownlow v. Egerton (1853), 23 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) 415. 
See Peeeaqe, 1 ; Public Seevakt, 4. 


Acts of hostility shall be intended matters of force. — Tioisden, J., 
Errington v. Hirst (1665), Ray. (Sir Thos.) Rep. 125. 
See Law, 7. 

Husband and Wife. 

1. In the eye of the law no doubt, man and wife are for many purposes 
one : but that is a strong figurative expression, and cannot be so 
dealt with as that all the consequences must follow which would result 

' See per Lori BlaoKburn in Smith v. L. E. 41 C. D. 348 ; per Our. Derry v 

Chadwick, 51 L. J. Eep. Ch. 597 ; 53 iJiti. Peek, 58 L. J. Eep. Oh. 864 -'l E 14 

873 ; L. E. 20 C. D. 27 ; 9 Ap. Ca. 187 ; App. Oa. 337. 
per Lord Chwnoellor in Amison v. Smith, 

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Husband and Wife — continued. -'--u..,^-^ 

from its being literally true. — Maule, J., Wenman v. Ash (1853), 
C. B. 844. 
See lelow, 7 ; Matrimohy, 2 ; Miscjellaueous, 25. 

2. When a woman marries, her husband, is the head of the family. — 
Parker, C.J., Inhabitants of St. Katherine v. St. Greorge (1714), 
Fortesc. 218. 

3. A woman is to comfort her husband. — HoU, C.J., BusseU v. Come 
(1703), 2 Raym. 1032. 

See 6, helow ; Judges, 2, n. 

4. If such cruelty shall be sanctioned, and wives shall not be allowed 
necessaries, England will lose the happy reputation in aU foreign 
kingdoms, which her inhabitants have achieved by their respect for 
this sex, the most excelling in beauty, which, as in this climate it far 
transcends that of the women in all other lands, so has this Kingdom 
surpassed all other countries in its tenderness and consideration for 
their welfare. — Per Gur} Manby v. Scott (1672), 1 Levinz, 4 ; 
2 Sm. L. C. (8th ed.) 458. 

5. Dissentions existing between man and wife are in all events very 
unfortunate : when they become the subject of consideration to third 
persons, they are very unpleasant, and if the case requires that the 
conduct of each party should be commented upon in public, it is a 
most painful task to those to whose lot it falls to judge on them. The 
subject therefore is always to be handled with as much dehcacy as it 
will admit of ; but the infirmities of human nature have given rise to 
cruelties and other iU-treatment on the part of husbands, and to cases 
in which this Court has thought it indispensably necessary to inter- 
pose.— BwZZer, J., Fletcher v. Fletcher (1788), 2 Cox, Eq. Cas. 102. 

See 8, helcM ; Contempt of Court, 3, 9 ; Judicial Proceedings, 2, 6 ; 
MiscEiiANEOUS, 53 ; Peoteotion, 2. 

6. By the laws of England, by the laws of Christianity, and by the con- 
stitution of society, when there is a difEerence of opinion between 
husband and wife, it is the duty of the wife to submit to the husband. 
—Malins, V.-C, In re Agar-EUis ; Agar-EUis v. LasceUes (1878), 
L. R. 10 C. D. 55. 

See 3, above. 

7. " The naturalest and first conjunction of two towai-ds the making a 
further society of continuance, is of the husband and wife, each having 
care of the family : the man to get, to travel abroad, to defend ; the 
wife to save, to stay at home, and distribute that which is gotten for 

1 Mallet, Twisden, and Terrill, JJ.i 

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Husband and Wife — continued. 

the nurture of the children and family ; is the first and most natural 
but primate apparence of one of the best kind of coromonwealths, 
where not one always, but sometime, and in some things, another 
bears a rule ; which to maintain, God hath given the man greater wit, 
better strength, better courage to compel the woman to obey, by 
reason or force; and to the woman, beauty, fair countenance, and 
sweet words to make the man obey her again for love. Thus each 
obeyeth and commandeth the other, and the two together rule the 
house, so long as they remain together in one." I wish, with all my 
heart, that the women of this age would learn thus to obey, and thus 
to command their husbands : so wiU they want for nothing that ia 
fit, and these kind of flesh-flies shall not suck up or devour their 
husbands' estates by illegal tricks.' — Hyde, J., Manby v. Scott (1600), 
1 Mod. 140. 
See above, 1. See also Family ; Peopeety, 6 ; Pdblio Poliot, 5. 

8. There may by possibility be cases where cruelty may lead up 
directly to the wife's adultery. — Dr. Lushington, Dillon v. Dillon 
(1841), 3 Curt. 94. 

See 5, above. 

9. A woman commits adultery in order to gratify her own imlawful 
passion : she does not think about the annoyance to her husband 
when she abandons herself to her lover. — Brett, M.R., Fearon v. Earl 
of Aylesford (1884), L. R. 14 Q. B. D. 797. 

10. If I might be permitted to borrow an illustration from poetry, the 
distinction between forgiveness and reconciliation is nowhere more 
strikingly shown than by a poet who, more than most other men, has 
sounded the depths of human feeling, and who supposes the question 
put to the husband of an adulteress : 

" Then did you freely, from your heart forgive ? " 
to which he replies : 

" Sure, as I hope before my Judge to live ; 
Sure, as the Saviour died upon the tree 
For aU who sin — for that dear wretch and me. 
Whom never more, on earth, wiU I forsake or see." 

Crabhe's " Tales of the HaU," b. 12. 

— Lord Chelmsford, L.C., Keats v. Keats and another (1859), 7 W. R. 
378 ; 5 Jur. (N. S.) Part 1 (1859), p. 178. 

• This quotation by the learned Judge wealth of England," Bk. I., c. U, f. 23. 
is from Sir Thomas Smith's "Common- 

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Hasband and Wife — continued. 

11. When people understand that they must live together, except for a 
very few reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual 
accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; 
they become good husbands, and good wives, from the necessity of 
remaining husbands and wives ; for necessity is a powerful master in 
teaching the duties which it imposes.* If it were once understood, 
that upon mutual disgust married persons might be legally separated, 
many couples, who now pass through the world with mutual comfort, 
with attention to their common offspring and to the moral order of 
civil society, might have been at this moment living in a state of 
mutual imkindness — in a stage of estrangement from their common 
offspring — and in a state of the most licentious and imreserved 
immorality. — Sir Wm. Scott, Evans v. Evans (1790), 1 Hagg. Con. 
Rep. 36, 37. 

12. The cock swan is an emblem or representation of an affectionate and 
true husband to his wife above all other fowls ; for the cock swan 
holdeth himself to one female only, and for this cause nature hath 
conferred on him a gift beyond aU others ; that is, to die so joyfully, 
that he sings sweetly when he dies ; upon which the poet saith : 

" Dulcia defecta modulatur carmina lingua, 
Cantator, cygnus, funeris ipse sui, &c." 

—Coke, The Case of Swans (1600), 4 Rep. 85. 

13. There is not one of us who caimot recall to memory the experience 
of some case in which a woman submitted to the worst of treatment, 
treatment degrading and humiliating, and allowed it to continue 
rather than permit her name to become the subject of a public 
scandal.— Lord Fitzgerald, G. v. M. (1885), L. R. 10 Ap. Ca. 208. 

14. The reason why the law will not suffer a wife to be a witness against 
her husband is to preserve the peace of families.'' — Lord Eardvncke, 
Barker v. Dixie (1735), Ca. temp. Lord Hardwicke, 265. 

See Married Woman. 

15. The husband is not liable for the crimiaal conduct of his wife.* — 
Wilmot, J., Lockwood v. Coysgame (1764), 3 Burr. Part IV. 1681. 


Illegality is not to be presimied ; it is to be alleged and proved when it 

1 See post, Necessity. as a witness in certain cases (s. 4 (1)). 

2 Under the Criminal Evidence Act, ' All offences are personal. — Tates, J., 
1898 (61 & 62 Vict. o. 36), the wife or id. 1682. 

husband of a person charged may be called 

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Illegality — covtimied. 

does not appear on. the face of the instrument itself. — Tindal, C.J., 
Lord Howden v. Simpson (1839), 10 A. & E. 821. 
See Law, 41 ; Peesumption, 3. 


1. Minority is to give total impunity. — Sir Wm. Scott, Beauraine v. 
Beauraine (1808), 1 Hagg. Con. Rep. 499. 

2. If an infant commit an assault, or utter slander, God forbid that he 
should not be answerable for it in a Court of justice. — Lord Kenyan, 
C.J., Jennings v. RtmdaU (1799), 8 T. R. 337. 

3. Infants have no privilege to cheat men. — King, L.C., Evroy v. 
Nicholas (1733), 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 489. 

See also Paeknt iun Child, 8. 

Inns of Court. 

1. The Inns of Court are "voluntary societies, which for ages have 
submitted to government analogous to that of other seminaries of 
learning." — Lord Mansfield, The Bang v. Benchers of Gray's Inn, 
(1780), Doug. 354. 

2. The Templers have no Court of justice within themselves. — Holt, C.J., 
Brown v. Burlace (1697), 3 Salk. 45. 

3. I hope that the system which has prevailed satisfactorily may long 
continue ; but if ever the Inns of Court should make arbitrary rules 
for the government of their members, and should enter into a contest 
for students, by abridging the period of study and relaxing the regu- 
lations for the exclusion of improper candidates, it wUl be necessary 
for the legislature to interpose, and to establish a xmiform and efficient 
disciphne by way of preparation for a profession of such importance 
to the community. — Lord Mansfield, The King v. Benchers of Gray's 
Inn (1780), Doug. 353. 

See also Universities, n. 


1. Hamlet, being charged with " coinage of the brain " answers : 

" It is not madness 
That I have uttered ; bring me to the test. 
And I the matter wiU re-word ; which madness 
Would gambol from." 

Madness, then, varies and fluctuates : it cannot " re-word " — if the 
poet's observation be well founded ; and though the Court would not 

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Insanity — continued. 

at all rely upon it as an authority, yet it knows from the information 
of a most eminent physician that this test of madness, suggested by 
this passage, was found, by experiment in a recent case, to be strictly 
applicable, and discovered the lurking disease.^ — Sir John Nicholl, 
Groom v. Thomas (1829), 2 Hagg. Ecc. Rep. 452, 453. 
2. A himian creature deprived of reason, and disordered in his senses, 
is stUl an animal, or instrument possessing strength and ability to 
commit violence ; but he is no more so than a mere mechanical 
machine, which, when put in motion, performs its powerful operations 
on all that comes in its way, without consciousness of its own efEects, 
or responsibility for them. In like manner, the man under the 
influence of real madness, has properly no will, but does what he is 
not conscious orfeensible he is doing, and therefore cannot be made 
answerable for any consequences. — Lord EsJtgrove, Kinloch's Case 
(1795), 55 How. St. Tr. 1000. 


International Law. 

1. Writers on international law . . . cannot make the law ... it must 
have received the assent of the nations who are to be bound by it. 
This assent may be express ... or may be implied from established 
usage. — Gockhum, C.J., The Queen v. Keyn ; " The Franconia " 
(1876), 2 L. R. Ex. D. 202. 

2. International law is part of the common law. — Pigott, B., Attorney- 
General V. SiUem and others, " The Alexandra " (1864), 12 W. R. 258. 

3. International law, Kke the moral law, is part of the law of England, 
but only to the extent that the Courts wiU not help those that break 
it. — Pollock, C.B., Attorney-General v. SiUem and others, " The 
Alexandra " (1864), 12 W. R. 258. 

4. In questions of international law we should not depart from any 
settled decisions, nor lay down any doctrine inconsistent with them. — 
Lord Hatherley, L.C., Udny v. Udny (1869), L. R. 1 Sc. & Div. Ap. 
Ca. 454. 

5. A great part of the law of nations stands upon the usage and practice 

' The Court was understood to allude are should be discontinued ; if they are 

to the case referred to in a note to p. 242, matters of fact, the Judge should no longer 

of the 10th number of the new series of testify without being sworn as a witness 

the Qudrterly Jimrnal of Science/ and and showing himself qualified to testify as 

the Arts, London, 1829. " If the tests of an expert." — Doe, J., State v. Pike, 49 New 

insanity are matters of law, the practice Hamp. Eep. 399 ; 6 Amer. Hep. 584. 
of allowing experts to testify what they 

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International Law — continued. 

of nations.' It is introduced, indeed, by general principles : but it 
travels with, those general principles only to a certain extent : and, if 
it stops there, you are not at liberty to go further, and to say, that 
mere general speculations would bear you out in a further progress — 
thus, for instance, on mere general principles it is lawful to destroy 
your enemy ; and mere general principles make no great difference as 
to the manner by which this is to be effected ; but the conventional 
law of mankind, which is evidenced in their practice, does make a 
distinction, and allows some, and prohibits other, modes of destruction. 
—Sir W. Scott, "The Mad Oyen" (1799), 1 C. Rob. 140. 


Where a man speaks upon a subject of his own accord, he naturally tells 
the whole of what he knows ; but where he is exanmned on interro- 
gatories formally administered to him, his answers are naturally 
confined to the particulars to which he is so interrogated ; and as the 
examining party generally knows beforehand the scope of tbe wit- 
ness's evidence, he has an opportunity of so shaping his questions as 
that they may elicit everything in his favour with which the witness 
is acquainted, and keep back everything of a contrary tendency. — 
Bayley, J., Berkeley Peerage Case (1811), 4 Camp. 405. 
See Evidence, 3 ; Feadd, 27 ; Truth, 8. 


1 . Men intoxicated are sometimes stunned into sobriety.'' — Lord Mansfield, 
Rex V. Wilkes (1769), 4 Burr. Part IV. 2563. 

2. Qui peccat ebrius ; luat sobrius : Let him who sins when drunk, be 
punished when sober.' — Quoted in Kendrick v. Hopkins (1580), Gary's 
Rep. 133. 

See Miscellaneous, 41. 

1 The voluntary law of nations derives surprise or shock wiU put a person in full 
its force from the presumed consent of possession of his senses. This seems the 
nations, the conventional from their most correct interpretation of the dictmn. 
express consent ; the consuetudinary from Says Coke : " Scmw potest esse JmUHs et 
their tacit consent. — Woljius, "Jus inhabilis diversis temporibzis" : A man 
Gentium " {Prolegomena), § 25. may be capable and incapable afdifiEerent 

2 This dictum of Lord Mansfield times. — 5 Co. 98. 

probably means that if a person is ^ "(According to our commune pro- 
intoxicated by drink or by success or by verbe), ' He that kyllyth a man drunk, 
anything which practically takes away sobur schal bel hangyd.'" — T. Starhey, 
sober reasoning, that anything which "England in Beign of Henry VIII.," 
startles him will bring it back again. We Bk. I., Ch. II. (S. Pole). 
sec the same in ordinary life : any sudden 

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The invention of an author is a species of property unknown to the 
common law of England. Its usages are immemorial ; and the views 
of it tend to the benefit and advantage of the public with respect to 
the necessaries of life, and not to the improvement and graces of miad. 
—Y<Aes, J., Millar v. Taylor (1769), 5 Burr. Part IV., p. 2387. 


1. A very old author discoursing upon Irishmen, says, " Where Irishmen 
are good, it is impossible to find better, where they are bad, it is 
impossible to find worse." I am afraid we have got to this alter- 
native. Treachery was never the character of Irishmen. Courage 
and intrepidity were their characteristics. Every creature is taught 
to fight, but boldly and fairly. — 'Earl of Glonwell, L.C.J. (Ir.), Case of 
Glennan and others (1796), 26 How. St. Tr. 462. 

2. Grod and nature have joined England and Ireland together. It is 
impossible to separate them. — Barl of GlomveU, L.O.J. (Ir.), Case of 
Glennan and others (1796), 26 How. St. Tr. 460. 

3. The common law of England is the common law of Ireland, where 
the latter is not altered by statute. — Perrin, J., Queen v. O'Connell 
(1843), 5 St. Tr. (N. S.) 63. 

4. Decisions of the Irish Courts, though entitled to the highest respect, 
are not binding on English Judges. — Kay, J., In re Parsons, 
Stockley v. Parsons (1890), L. R. 45 C. D. 62. See also earlier decision 
of Lord Esher in The Queen v. Commissioners of Income Tax (1888), 
L. R. 22 Q. B. D. 306 ; 58 L. J. Q. B. 199. 


Every irregularity is not erroneous. — Lord Kenyon, C.J., Jackson v. 
Hunter (1794), 6 T. R. 74. 

See Consent, 4 ; Criminal Justice, 52 ; Mistakeh ; Stathteh, 27. 


1. Judges are philologists of the highest order.^ — Pollock, C.B., Ex parte 
Davis (1857), 5 W. R. 523. 

See 64, lelow ; Construction, 2, 4, 8, 16, 19 ; Judicial Peooeebings, 
10; Words, 6. 

2. Judges, like Caesar's wife, should be above suspicion." — Bowen, L.J., 

1 " The Judge does much better herein, « PlutardA, " Life of Csesar," Ch. 10 : " I 

than what a bare grave grammarian, or would have the chastity of my wife clear 

logician, or other prudent man could do." even of suspicion," replied Caesar, as his 

— Male's " Common Law," Vol. I., (5th ed.) reason for divorcing his wife. See 

143. Husband and Wife, 3. 

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Judges — continued. 

Leeson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration 
(1889), L. R. 43 C. D. 385. 

3. What is the obligation upon which we proceed ? Upon the solemn 
sanction of an oath. Take away the reverence for religion, and there 
is an end at once of that obligation. — Best, J., King v. Carlile (1821), 

1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 1046. 

See 76, helow ; EviDEajcE 29 ; Politics, 3. 

4. I am willing to put the case into any shape you choose. — Lord 
Ellenborough, Richmond v. Heapy and another (1854), 1 Starkie, 204. 

See CororsEL, 7, 14, 16, 18, 25 ; Law, 40. 

5. Common sense still lingers in Westminster HalU — Maule, J., 
Crosse v. Seaman (1851), 11 C. B. 525. 

6. To vindicate the pohcy of the law is no necessary part of the office of 
a Judge.— Sir Wm. ScoU, Evans v. Evans (1790), 1 Hagg. Con. 
Rep. 36. 

7. Little respect wiU be paid to our judgments if we overthrow that one 
day, which we resolved the day before. — Lord Kenyan, L.C.J. , Rex v. 
Inhabitantes de Haughton (1718), 1 Str. 83. 

See Cases, 10 ; Law, 29. 

8. I can't look to contingencies. — Lord Kenyan, Sikes v. Marshal (1799), 

2 Esp. 707. 

9. Our business is to determine of meum and tuum, where the heats 
do not run so high, as in things belonging to the legislature. — 
Poivys, J., Ashby v. White (1703), 2 Raym. 946. 

See Courts, 2 ; Statutes, 13. 

10. We must go upon general principles. — Lord Mansfield, Rex v. 
Cowle (1759), 2 Burr. Part IV. 863. 

See helow, 11 ; Cases, 21 ; Law, 46. 

11. The expressions of every Judge must be taken with reference to the 
case on which he decides, otherwise the law will get into extreme 
confusion. That is what we are to look at in all cases. The manner 
in which he is arguing it, is not the thing ; it is the principle he is 
deciding.— Best, C.J., Richardson v. Hellish (1824), 2 Bing. 248. 

See above, 10 ; below, 70 ; Administration of Justice, 8 ; Evidence, 6 ; 
Practice, 4. 

12. Aueupia verborum sunt judice indigna : Catching at words is 

' For the Judges of the Court I feel the to perform in a satisfactory manner the 

most sincere respect, esteem and affection. duties of their high office. — Lord Camp- 

Never haye there presided in Westminster hell's Speeches, 406. 
Hall magistrates more devotedly anxious 

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Judges — continued. 

unworthy of a Judge. — Lord Hohart, C.J., Sheffield v. RatclifPe (1616), 
Hob. 343. 
See ahofoe, 11 ; Law, 25 ; Statutes, 10 ; Words, 5. 

13. Judges, in their judgments, ought to have a great regard to the 
generality of the cases of the King's subjects, and to the inconveniences 
which may ensue thereon, by the one way or the other. Judges, in 
giving their resolutions in cases depending before them, are to judge 
of inconveniences as things illegal ; and an argument ah inconvenienti 
is very strong to prove that it is against law. — Hyde, J., Manby v. 
Scott (1672), 1 Mod. 127. 

See also Constrdction, 23, n. ; 28, 31 ; Fiction, 1, n. ; Judicial 
Peoceedings, 2, 6 ; Law, 36 ; Mischief, 1, n. ; Statutes, 4 ; 
Tort, 23 ; Usage, 13. 

14. If my Lord Chief Justice do commit any person, and set his name 
to the warrant, he does not use to add to his name " Lord Chief 
Justice," but he is known to be so, without that addition. The lords 
do not use to write themselves privy counsellors ; they are known to 
be so, as well as a Judge, who only writes his name and does not use 
to make the addition of his office.' — Allybone, J., Trial of the Seven 
Bishops (1688), 12 How. St. Tr. 210. 

15. I am always afraid of quoting my own decisions ; I do not think it 
is the right thing for a judge to do, but I often do refer to them when 
I can thereby avoid repeating in different words what I have said 
before. — Kekewich, J., Bolton Partners v. Lambert (1889), L. R. 41 
C. D. 300. 

16. Every Judge ought to exercise care, and it is not more needed in 
one case than in another.^ — Sir G. Jessel, M.R., Smith v. Smith (1875), 
L. R. 20 Eq. Ca. 504. 

See helovj, 17, 60, 67 ; Administration of Justice, 2, 15 ; Delay, 1 ; 
Pleadings, 2 ; Punishment, 3, n. ; Time, 3, n. 

17. In the hurry of business, the most able Judges are liable to err. — 
Lord Kenyan, C.J., Cotton v. Thurland (1793), 5 T. R. 409. 

See above, 16 ; Administration of Justice, 15 ; CRonNAL Justice, 29, 
and references therefrom ; Statutes, 10. 

18. For myself I wDl say that the Judges invite discussion of their acts 

1 The Chief Justice of England is called Feitmatio justitite est noverca ■mfortmdi : 
inoldBistoTiesCapitalisJustieiaet prima Hasty justice is the stepmother of mis- 
poit Begem in Anglia Jiigticia. — Lamib fortune. — Hob. 97. See also Sir Matthew 
Mvrena/rcha, p. 4, Precedence, &c., of the Hale's precepts : " Things necessary to be 
Judges. Fortetcvs, 395. continually had in remembrance." — Hale's 

2 Ahvmdans cavtela mm nooet : Extreme " Common Law," Vol. I. (ed. 1794), p. xix. 
care does no mischief. — 11 Co. 6. 

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Judges — continued. 

in the administration of the kw, and it is a relief to them to see error 
pointed out, if it is committed.' — Fitzgerald, J., Reg v. Sullivan (1868), 
11 Cox, C. C. 57. 
See 60, hehw; Contempt of Couet, 1, 9 ; Jodioial Peoceedings, 7. 

19. Vastly inferior as this Court is to the House of Commons, considered 
as a body in the State, and amenable as its members may be for ill- 
conduct in their office to its animadversions and certainly are to its 
impeachment before the Lords, yet, as a Court of law, we know no 
superior but those Courts which may revise our judgments for error ; 
and in this respect there is no common term of comparison between 
this Court and the House." — Coleridge, J., Stockdale v. Hansard (1837), 
3 St. Tr. (N. S.) 931. 

iSee lelow, 37 ; Administration of JDSTibE, 20 ; Politics, 4 ; Peopebtt, 
7 ; ToET, 8. 

20. The Judges are totally independent of the ministers that may 
happen to be, and of the King himself.' — Lord Mansfield, Proceedings 
against the Dean of St. Asaph (1783), 21 How. St. Tr. 1040. 

See helow, 26, n. ; Administeation of Jdstioe, 21 ; Politics, 4, 6 ; 
Punishment, 6. 

> In The Protector t\ Geering (1656), 
Atkins, arguendo, says : " Errors are like 
Felons and Traytors ; any person may 
discover them, they do caput gerere 
Inpinum." — Hardres, 85. It is for the 
honour of a Court of justice to avoid error 
in their judgments. — Dyer, 201. See also 

mi. 5. 

2 I have yet to learn that this Court is 
to be restrained by the dignity or the 
power of anybody, however exalted, from 
fearlessly, though respectfully, examining 
their reasonableness and justice, where the 
rights of third parties, in litigation before 
us, depend upon their validity. — Coleridge, 
J., id. See alto ante. Administration 
OF Justice, 21, n. 

3 Blackstone says (1 Comm. 267) : " In 
order to maintain both the dignity and 
independence of the Judges in the superior 
Courts, it is enacted by the statute 13 
Will. III., c. 2,* that their commissions 
shall be made not, as formerly, f durante 
bene placito, but quamdiu bene se 
gesserint, and their salaries ascertained 
and established ; but that it may be 

• 12 & 13 Will. III. c.2, s. 3. 
t See Whitelock, 16 May, 17 ; 

lawful to remove them on the address of 
both Houses of Parliament. And now, by 
the noble improvements of that law, in the 
statute of 1 Geo. III. c. 23, enacted at 
the earnest recommendation of the King 
himself from the throne, the Judges are 
continued in their offices during their 
good behaviour, notwithstanding any 
demise of the Crown, (which was formerly 
held immediately to vacate their seats,) 
and their full salaries are absolutely 
secured to them during the continuance 
of their commissions ; His Majesty having 
been pleased to declar.e, that ' he looked 
upon the independence and uprightness 
of the Judges, as essential to the impartial 
administration of justice ; as one of the 
best securities of the rights and liberties 
of his subjects ; and as most conducive to 
the honour of the Crown.' "% 

Blackstone here appears to treat the 
latter alteration as if it had been a 
sacrifice on the part of George III. of some 

Hutt. i 

X See notes of Lord Hardwicke, pre- 
pared on moving an address upon His 
Majesty's Speech, in the 1 5th vol. of " Pari. 
Hist." 1011. Also the author's treatise 
upon the Attorney and Solicitor-General 
of England (ed. 1897), p. 70. 

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Judges — contimied. 

21. The act of a single Judge, unless adopted by the Court to which he 
belongs, is of no validity. As the Courts do not sit in vacation, many 
things are done by the Judges individually ; but their acts, when 
recognised, become the acts of the Court. — Lord Alvanley, Turner v. 
Eyles (1803), 3 Bos. & PuU. 460, 461. 

See Peaotice, 1, 3, 7, 30. 

22. I cannot properly give advice to anybody. It is very often supposed 
Judges can give advice, and I therefore take this public opportunity 
of saying that a Judge cannot do it. — Bayley, J., Trial of Dewhurst 
and others (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 607. 

See also helow, 81. 

23. If we give an opinion, we can't give a judgment : you can't come 
here for an opinion to us.- — Lord Mansfield, The King v. Inhabitants 
of the West Riding of Yorkshire (1773), LofEt. 238. 

See also Paedon, 3. 

24. Many judges have avoided giving extra judicial opinions.' — Heath, J., 
Aubert v. Maze (1801), 1 Bos. & Pull. 375. 

portion of his prerogative in favour of the 
independence of the Judges ; but it is 
evident that the whole concession was 
made by the statute of Will. III., and 
that the provisions of 1 Geo. III. c. 23, in 
no way interfered with any power of 
appointment to be exercised by that 
prince, but that on the contrary the latter 
statute gave him the power of making 
Judges of his successors.* 

The accession of George III. is con- 
tinually referred to as the period when 
the dignity and independence of the 
Judges of the Superior Courts was legally 
secured : and the orthodox Blackstone, as 
we have seen, so lays it down ; but the 
change in the law then made was really 
to carry out the more important reform 
eflfected in the time of William III. The 
ancient position of the Judges was very 
precarious. They were subject to removal 
at any moment if the King thought proper 

* It should not be forgotten that the 
learned writer of the Commentaries on the 
Laws of England, who takes so courtly a 
view of this act of royalty, was Solicitor- 
General to the Queen, and that he after- 
wards, from his Commentaries rather than 
from his conduct on the bench, acquired 
the name of "the Orthodox Judge." — 
Oiblm's " Decl. and FaU," chap. 41, Vol. 
VIIL 145 n. 

to dismiss them. At the end of the reign 
of William III. this arbitrary power of 
the Crown was restrained, and the Judges' 
commission was described as lasting 
g[uamdm se hene gesserit, 12 & 13 WiU. III. 
c. 2, s. 3, but on the accession of Queen 
Anne the next year, it was found that 
every one of the Judges' patents required 
renewal, being voidable by the new 
Queen : and two of the Judges, Mr. 
Justice Turton and Mr. Baron HatseU, 
with five of the King's Serjeants and 
three of the King's Counsel, were actually 
superseded. See Lord Eaym. Kep. 769 ; 
Thos. Jones' Rep. 43. And on the two 
next occasions of the demise of the Crown 
the evil of the system appears to have 
been felt, every judicial appointment then 
legally expiring, and its renewal left to 
depend merely on Court favour. The Act 
of 1760 (] Geo. III. c. 23), therefore, 
which provided that all such commissions 
should continue notwithstanding the 
demise of the Crown, was not only in form, 
but in substance, very important, and 
George III. seems to have personally taken 
an interest in the matter, as before it 
became law His Majesty gave orders for 
renewing aU the patents of the Judges, 
King's Serjeants, and King's Counsel, 
without any alteration. See Wynne's 
" Serjeant-at-Law," p. 348. 
' This is an attempt to get the opinion 

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Judges — continued. 

25. Certainly the opinion of all the Judges of later times, must have 
more weight than the extra-judicial opinion of a single Judge at any 
former time.— Pmtt, L.C.J., Layer's Case (1722), 16 How. St. Tr. 112. 

26. I honour the King ; and respect the people^ : but, many things 
acquired by the favour of either, are, in my account, objects not worth 
ambition. I wish popularity, but it is that popularity which foUows ; 
not that which is run after. It is that popularity which, sooner or 

expectantes,' looking for nothing, neither 
praise nor profit." The Justices he roundly 
threatened with dismissal if they did not 
effectually repress faction, "of which 
ensue infinite inconveniences and per- 
turbations of all good order, and crossing 
of all good service in Court and country." 
And he told them he should follow a fine 
remedy devised by Cicero when consul, a, 
mild one but an apt one : Eos qui otium 
perturbant reddam otiosos. Speech in the 
Star Chamber before the Summer Circmtt 
QieiT).— Bacon's Works, Vol. VI., 141, 
194, 244. In swearing in new Judges, he 
delivered most excellent advice to them, 
which should be kept in remembrance by 
all their successors. Thus he counsels 
Justice Hutton, when called to be a Judge 
of the Common Pleas : 
" Draw your learning out of your books, 

not out of your brain. 
Mix ■well the freedom of your opinion with 
the reverence of the opinion of your 
Continue the studying of your books, and 

do not spend on upon the old stock. 
Fear no man's face, yet turn not stoutness 

into bravery. 
Be a light to Jurors to open their eyes, 
not a guide to lead them by the 
Affect not the opinion of pregnancy and 
expedition by an impatient and 
catching hearing of the counsellors 
at the bar. 
Let your speech be with gravity, as one 
of the sages of the law, and not 
talkative, nor with impertinent flying 
out to show learning.* 
Contain the jurisdiction of your Court 
within the ancient mere-stones, with- 
out removing the maTk."t 
—Bacon's Worhs, Vol. IV., 497. 

of the Court extra judicially. — Denison, 
J., Ballard v. Bennett (1758), 2 Burr. 
Part IV., p. 779. 

• " Fear God, Honour the King." — 1 
Peter ii., 17. See also supra, Miscel- 
laneous, 20. 

» " My lords, I have heard of those who 
have expressed more wishes for popularity 
than ever I felt. 1 have heard it said, and 
I think it was in this Court, that they 
' would have popularity : but it should be 
that popularity which follows, not that 
which is sought after.' My lords, I am 
proud enough to despise them both. If 
popuhirity should offer itself to me, I 
would speedily take care to kick it away." 
This was in reference to Lord Mansfield's 
judgment quoted above. See Home's 
address in the Court of King's Bench, 
20 How. St. Tr. 785. In 1770, Lord 
Mansfield supported the BiU for prevent- 
ing delays of justice by reason of privilege 
of Parliament, upon which he spoke at 
considerable length. In the course of his 
speech, he took occasion again to express 
a sentiment, which formed a remarkable 
feature of his character — his contempt of 
popularity. See his speech reported at 
length in "Pari. Hist.," Vol. XVI.. 977. 
While Bacon was Chancellor he regularly 
twice a year before the commencement of 
each of the two circuits, assembled all the 
Judges and all the Justices of the Peace 
that happened to be in London, in the 
Exchequer Chamber, and lectured them 
upon their duties, above all admonishing 
them to uphold the prerogative — " the 
twelve Judges of the realm, being the 
twelve lions under Solomon's throne, 
stoutly to bear it up, and Judges going 
circuit, being like planets, revolving round 
the Sovereign as their sun." He warned 
them against hunting for popularity, 
saying, "A popular Judge is a deformed 
thing : and plaudites are fitter for players 
than for magistrates. Do good to the 
people ; love them, and give them justice ; 
but let it be as the psalm says, ' nihil inde 

* See ante. Counsel, 13, w. 

t Quoted by Sir E. Atkyns in Rex. v. 
Williams (1695), 13 How. St. Tr. 1430. 
See also Jurisdiction, 5, supra. 

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Judges — continued. 

later, never fails to do justice to the pursuit of noble ends, by noble 
means. I wiU not do that which my conscience teUs me is wrong, 
upon this occasion, to gain the huzzas of thousands, or the daily praise 
of all the papers which come from the press : I wiU not avoid doing what 
I think is right, though it should draw on me the whole artillery of 
libels ; all that falsehood and malice can invent, or the credulity of a 
deluded populace can swallow.^ I can say, with a great magistrate, 
upon an occasion and under circimastances not unlike, " Ego hoc 
animo semper fui, ut invidiam virtute partam, gloriam, hand infamiam, 
putarem."2 — Lord Mansfield, Case of John Wilkes (1763), 19 How. 
St. Tr. 1112, 1113 -,8.0.4: Burr. Part IV. 2562. 

See also helow, 45, n. ; 76 ; Administration of Justice, 20 ; Jury, 15. 

27. Sachez le vous qe nous ne froms nul tort a nul, pur vous ne pur 

altre : Know you this, that we wUl do no wrong to any one, neither 

for you nor for any one else. — Berrevnk, J., Henry Le Moys v. A. 

(1302), Y.B. 30 & 31 Ed. I, p. 158. 

See above, 20 ; Administration of Justice, 34, 35 ; Law, 19 ; 
Politics, 3 ; Protection, 2 ; Punishment, 6 ; Tort, 6. 

1 JealouBy of leaving the law to the 
Court, as in other cases, so in the case of 
libels, is now, in the present state of 
things, puerile rant and declamation. 
The Judges are totally independent of the 
ministers that may happen to be, and of 
the King himself. (_8ee Lord Mansfield's 
judgment in Proceedings against the Dean 
of St. Asaph, quoted above, anth. Judges, 
20.) Their temptation is rather to the 
popularity of the day. But I agree with 
the observation cited by Mr. Cowper from 
Mr. Justice Forster "that a popula/r 
Judge is an odious and a pernicious 
character." — Lord Mansfield, King v. 
Shipley (1784), 3 Dong. 170. 

2 It is to be observed that to the 
quotation from Cicero, " Ego hoc animo," 
&c., Mr. Serjeant Hill in his copy of 
Burrow had written as a note the follow- 
ing passage of Swift : " The world will 
never allow any man that character which 
he gives to himself by openly professing 
it to those vrith whom he converseth. (See 
ante, Ohaeactek, 6.) Wit, learning, 
valour, acquaintance, the esteem of good 
men, will be known although we should 
endeavour to conceal them, however they 
may pass unrewarded : but I doubt our 
own bare assertions upon any of these 
points, will be of very little avail, except 


Digitized by 

in tempting the hearers to judge directly 
contrary to what we advance." — i 
Smrow, 2562— 25G3. Taken with Bacon's 
address to Mr. Justice Hutton, the 
following advice to the Judges by Coke 
will prove appropriate (see 4 Inst., 
Epilogue) : 

"Fear not to do right to all, and to 
deliver your verdicts justly according to 
the laws ; for feare is nothing but a 
betraying of the succours that reason 
should afford : and if you shall sincerely 
execute justice, be assured of three 
things : 

1. Though some may maligne you, yet 
God will gi^e you his blessing. 

2. That though thereby you may offend 
great men, and favourites, yet you 
shall have the favourable kindness of 
the Almighty, and be his favourites. 

3. And lastly, that in so doing, against 
aU scandalous complaints, and 
pregmatical devices against you, 
God will defend you as with a 
shield : ' For thou, Lord, wilt give 
a blessing unto the righteous, and 
with thy favourable kindnesse wilt 
thou defend him, as with a shield.' " 
(see Psalm v., 12). See also 3vJ>QrT!S, 
82, M., supra, and Sir Matthew Hale's 
precepts : " Things necessary to be 




Judges — continiied. 

28. As long as we liave to administer the law we must do so according 
to the law as it is. We are not here to make the law. — Lord 
Coleridge, C.J., Eeg v. Solomons (1890), 17 Cox, C. C. 93. 

See 31, helow; Law, 22; Paelument, 13 ; Statutes, 9. 

29. We are sitting in a Court of law, and are bound to give a legal 
decision.— Oose, J., Doe v. Staple (1788), 2 T. R. 700. 

See Administration of Justice, 18, and references therefrom; 
Chanceet, 9 ; Peoperty, 7. 

30. For God's sake, do not put us on making law. — Keating, L.C.J., 
Case of John Price and others (1689), 12 How. St. Tr. 625. 

31. We cannot make laws.— HoZt, C.J., Reg. v. Nash (1703), 2 Raym. 
990 ; Powll, J., Queen v. Read (1706), Fortesc. 99. 

See Statutes, 13. 

32. We caimot make a law, we must go according to the law. That 
must be our rule and direction. — HoU, C.J., Parkyns' Case (1696), 
13 How. St. Tr. 72. 

See 28, above. 

33. Our duty is simply to administer the law as we find it. — Grove, J., 
Scaltock V. Hartson (1875), L. R. 1 Com. PI. 109. 

See Law, 49 ; Pardon, 2 ; Parliament, 12, 13, 14. 

34. A Judge has nothing to do but to administer the law as he finds 
it.2>_JesseZ, M.R., Bunting v. Sargent (1879), L. R. 13 C. D. 

See 28, 33, ahove ; Construction, 28 ; Counsel, 20 ; Law, 40, 71. 

35. The Judges do not make the law ; they administer it, and that 
however much they may disapprove or dislike it.' — Lopes, L.J., The 
Queen v. Bishop of London (1889), L. R. 24 Q. B. 246. 

See Law, 29 ; Statutes, 17, 18, 19. 

36. A Judge cannot set himseK above the law which he has to 
administer, or make or mould it to suit the exigencies of a particular 

continually held in remembrance." p. .522 ; do., pei' Sir F. H. Jeune, In the 

—Hale's •'Common Law," Vol. I. goodsof Huber (1896),L.B. Pro.D. [1896], 

(ed. 1794), p. xix. p. 211. 
1 Judiois est jns dicere non dare : It is Though in many other countries every- 

for the Judge to administer, not to make thing is left in the breast of the Judge to 

laws. — Iiofft. 42. determine, yet with us he is only to 

* It is the duty of the Judge to decide declare and pronmtnce, not to nialie or rww- 

according to law. — Jessel, M.E., Smith v. model, the law. — Sir Wm. Blachstone 

Day (1882), L. E. 21 C. D. 431. See also (1765), Com. Bk. III., Ch. 25, p. 335. 
per Vaughan Williams, J., In re Mac- ^ We have to administer the law 

donald, Sons & Co. (1893), L. B. 1 Ap. Ca. whether we like it or no. — Lord Coleridge, 

{\%9i'\,V.'^0i: do., per Stirling,!., In re Reg. v. Ramsey (1886), 1 Cab. Jc Ellis' 

Horlock (1895), L. R. 1 C. D. [1895], Q. B. D. Rep. 148. 

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Judges — continued. 

occasion. — Cockbwn, C.J., Martin v. Mackonochie (1878), L. R. 3 
Q. B. 775. 
See 44, 62, 66, 69, helow ; Administration of Justiok, 20 ; Law, 40 ; 
Statutes, 7. 

37. The cause is before us ; we are sworn to decide it according to our 
notions of the law ; we do not bring it here ; and, beiag here, a 
necessity is laid upon us to dehver judgment ; that judgment we can 
receive at the dictation of no power : we may decide the case 
erroneously ; but we cannot be guilty of any contempt in deciding it 
according to our consciences. — Goleridge, J., Stockdale v. Hansard 
(1837), 3 St. Tr (N. S.) 945. 

See 16, 17, 19, 20, above; 41, 60, helow; Law, 29, 30, 59; 
Pardon, 2 ; Politics, 3 ; Pbopeett, 7 ; Punishment, 6 ; Rights, 4 ; 
TOET, 8. 

38. If I am to pronounce a judgment at all in this or in any other case, it 
must and shall be the judgment of my own mind, applying the law 
of the land as I understand it according to the best of my abilities, 
and with regard to the oath which I have taken to administer justice 
truly and impartially. — Littledale, J., Stockdale v. Hansard (1837), 
3 St. Tr. (N. S.) 911. 

See helow, 61 ; Administration of Justice, 10, 28 ; Justice, 3 ; 
Law, 30 ; Statutes, 13. 

39. I commend the Judge that seems fine and ingenious, so it tend to 
right and equity. And I condemn them, that either out of pleasure 
to shew a subtil wit will destroy, or out of incuriousness or negligence 
will not labour to support the act of the party by the art or act of the 
law.— Lord EohaH, Pits v. James (1614), Hob. Rep. 125. 

40. We do not conceive the law, but we know the law. — Popham, C.J., 
Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh (1603), 2 How. St. Tr. 18. 

41. I must lay down the law as I understand it, and as I read it in 
books of authority.' — L<yrd Coleridge, Reg. v. Ramsey (1883), 1 Cab. & 
Ellis' Q. B. D. Rep. 136. 

See ahme, 37; helow, 43, 66 ; Law, 1, 43. 

42. I am bound by my oath to abide by the law, and I cannot suffer 
anybody to derogate from it. — Booke, J., Redhead alias Yorke's Case 
(1795), 25 How. St. Tr. 1083. 

See Justice, 2 ; Statutes, 19. 

1 "I will consider it upon the Pre- —Lord Mamfield, nex v. Corporation of 
eedents ; upon the circumstances of thu Wigan (1758), 2 Burr. Part. IV., p. 784. 
case ; and upon the Reason of the thing." 


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Judges — continued. 

43. We cannot alter the law, we are bound by our oaths to proceed 
according to the law as it is at present.— HoZt, C.J., Parkyns' Case 
(1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 73. 

See above, 41. 

44. We must not be guilty of taking the law into our own hands, and 
converting it from what it reaUy is to what we think it ought to be. — 
Lord Coleridge, Reg. v. Ramsey (1883), 1 Cab. & Ellis' Q. B. D. Rep. 136. 

See 36, above; 64, 69, helmjo; Disoebtion, 12; Law, 10, 40; Mis- 
CBLiANEOus, 23 ; Statutes, 13. 

45. Give your judgments, but give no reasons.^ — Lord Mansfield. 

See 48, lelow; Judges, 26, n. ; Parliament, 5, n. 

46. If no reason had been given, the authority might have had more 
weight : but, to be sure, the reason is a false one. — Lord Mans fide, 
Ingle V. Wordsworth (1761), 3 Burr. Part IV. 1286. 

See Miscellaneous, 24 ; Statutes, 8, 11. 

47. Reasons of public benefit and convenience weigh greatly with me. — 
Lord Eardwieke, Lawton v. Lawton (1743), 3 Atk. 16. 

See Counsel, 13 ; Equity, 33, 36 ; Limitation, 1 ; Statutes, 13. 

48. As a rule. Judges give reasons, though in many of the old cases the 

' This is a well-known anecdote of Lord 
Mansfield : "A person who had been 
appointed to a Judgeship in some distant 
part of the Empire, applied to his lordship 
for advice how to act, as he was totally 
ignorant of the law. Give your judg- 
ments, said Lord Mansfield, but give no 
reasons. As you are a man of integrity, 
Bound sense, and information, it is more 
than an even chance that your judgments 
will be right ; but as you are ignorant of 
the law, it is ten to one that your reasons 
wiU be wrong." — See Case of Benjamin 
Flower (1799), 27 How. St. Tr. 1060. 
According to Lord Campbell, " Chancellor 
Michael fie La Pole did not at first resort 
to the expedient of handing over the seal 
to a legal keeper to act as his judicial 
deputy ; and as he Us said to have per- 
formed well in the Court of Chancery, he 
must have been like some of the military 
Chancellors in our West India Islands, 
who by discretion, natural good sense, 
taking hints from the clerks in Court, 
and giving no reasons for their decrees 
(according to the advice of Lord Mansfield 
to a military man going to Jamaica to 
sit as Chancellor) have very creditably 
performed the duties of their office." — 
Lives of Ld. Chanc, Vol. I. , 3rd ed. 28. 

See also ^^er CbTte^jL.GJ. 

" Wise and learned men do before they 
judge, labour to reach to the depth of all 
the reasons of the case in question, but in 
their judgments express not any : and 
in troth if Judges should set down the 
reasons and causes of their judgments 
within every record, that immense labour 
should withdraw them from the necessary 
services of the commonwealth, and their 
records should grow to be like Elephantini 
liiri of infinite length, and in mine 
opinion lose somewhat of theii- present 
authority and reverence ; and this is also 
worthy for learned and grave men to 
imitate. But mine advice is, that when- 
soever a man is enforced to yield a reason 
of his opinion or judgment, that then he 
set down all authorities, precedents, 
reasons, arguments and inferences what- 
soever that may be probably applied to 
the case in question ; for some will be 
persuaded or drawn by one, and some by 
another, according as the capacity or 
understanding of the hearer or reader is." 
—2 Bjip. vi. 

Judiees non tenentur emprimere causam 
seiitentice sum : Judges are not bound to 
explain the reason of their sentence. — 
Jenh. Cent. 75. 

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Judges — continited. 

Judges gave no reasons^ ; but where no reasons are given for a par- 
ticular decision, it becomes extremely difficult for a Judge to follow 
it, because he does not know the principle on which the decision 
' proceeded.— Jessel, M.R., In re Merceron (1877), L. R. 7 C. D. 187. 
See 45, above; 52, 54, 56, n., helow; Appeam, 6; Cases, 9, 21; 
Motives, 9. 

1 That this is so, is undeniable. Lord 
Chief Justice Holt was no less a staunch 
upholder of the opinion that Judges should 
give no reasons — except in " unusual " 
cases — than was that great Judge, Lord 
Mansfield, after him. (iSee note 1 under 
Parliament, No. 5, poit), and as 
exemplied in the following case : " The 
subject being unusual, I fear that I shall 
not make myself intelligible, but I will 
do my endeavour, that the reasons of our 
judgment may be apprehended." — SoU, 
C.J., K. V. Knight and Burton (1699), 1 
Baym. 527. As to Lord Mansfield, 
nothing could induce him to depart fi-om 
what seems to have been his well- 
established custom. ^2t2Ze7-, J., speaking 
of him in the case of Bell v. Gilson (1798), 
(2 Bos. & Pull. 354), says : " I never could 
get him (i.e., Lord Mansfield) to reason." 

The b^t safeguard of the justice and 
accuracy of judicial decisions consists in 
the rule that decisions and the reasons of 
them ought to te delivered publicly. In 
all judgments of importance, the Judges 
declare the reasons on which their con- 
clusions are founded ; and where the 
Judges of a Court are not unanimous in a 
particular judgment, it is usual for them 
to deliver their reasons seriatim. This 
course is adopted in the House of Lords, 
and the Courts of law and equity ; but a 
different rule is adopted in the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, where, if 
any difference of opinion arise among the 
members, the sentiments of the minority 
are not divulged ; but the reasons of the 
decision are invariably stated at length 
by one of the members of the Committee, 
and are usually embodied in a written 
judgment. (See Macqueen, "Appellate 
Jurisdiction," 717.) Similarly the Courts 
of civil law allow debates among the 
Judges to be private among themselves. 
(8 St. Tr. 434.) Adverting to the import- 
ance of public judgments it criminal 
cases, Lord Mansjield has observed (Case 
of John Wilkes, 19 St. Tr. 1098) : "It is 
not only a justice due to the Crown and 

the party, in every criminal cause where 
doubts arise, to weigh weU the grounds 
and reasons of the judgment ; but it is of 
great consequence to explain them with 
accuracy and precision in open Court, 
especially if the questions be of a general 
tendency, and upon topics never before 
fully considered and settled, that the 
criminal law of the land may be certain 
and known." (See belov), 52 ; Pbb- 
OEDENTS, 20.) Of old time, before 
Edward III., the reasons for judgments at 
law used to be entered on the record in 
cases of difficulty, but ever afterwards 
were constantly pronounced by the Court, 
that they might be entered in the books 
of Cases and Beports. If the practice 
were otherwise, it has been well observed : 
" No man could have known what the law 
of England is, for the Year-books and 
reports are nothing but a relation of what 
is said by the counsel and Judges in giving 
judgment, and contain the reasons of the 
judgment, which are rarely expressed in 
the record of the judgment ; and it is as 
much the duty of a Judge to give the 
reasons why he doubts, as it is of him who 
is satisfied in the judgment. Men some- 
times wiU be ashamed to offer those reasons 
in public, which they may pretend, satisfy 
them, if concealed ; besides, we have a 
maxim in law undeniable, and of great 
use, that any person whatever may rectify 
or inform a Court or Judge publicly or 
privately, as Amicus Curia, a friend to 
the Court, or a friend to justice : but can 
that be done, if the standers-by know not 
the reason u pen which the Court pronounce 
their judgment ? ... If a man swears 
what is true, not knowing it to be true, 
though it be logically a truth as it is 
distinguished, yet it is morally a lye ; and 
if a Judge give judgment according to law, 
not knowing it to be so, as if he did not 
knOiT the reason of it at that time, but 
bethought himself of a reason for it after- 
wards, though the judgment must be legal, 
yet the pronouncing of it is unjust. 
Judges ought not to be bound up by the 

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Judges — continued. 

49. One does not like to differ from a man without knowing the reasons 
which influenced him. — lAndley, L.J., Ex parte Strawbridge ; In re 
Hickman (1883), L. E. 25 C. D. 276. 

See 54, below; Appeals, 2; Minorities, 2. 

50. Let us consider the reason of the case. For nothing is law that is 
not reason. — Powell, J., Coggs v. Barnard (1703), 2 Ray. 911. 

See Cases, 10. 

51. I beHeve that an experienced lawyer may be, as it were, instinctively 
right without at the moment being able to give a good reason for his 
opinion. — Lord Bramwell, Mills v. Armstrong (1888), 57 L. J. P. C. 
Cas. 70. 

See also Counsel, 12, 13. 

52. I never give a judicial opinion upon any point, until I think I am 
master of every material argument and authority relative to it. It is 
not only a justice due to the Crown and the party, in every criminal 
cause where doubts arise, to weigh well the grounds and reasons of 
the judgment ; but it is of great consequence, to explain them with 
accuracy and precision, in open Court ; especially if the questions be 
of a general tendency, and upon topics never before fuUy considered 
and settled ; that the criminal law of the land may be certain and 
known.^— Lord Mansfield, Wilkes' Case (1769), 4 Burr. Part IV., 
2549 ; 19 How. St. Tr. 1098. 

See above, 48, n. ; Administration of Justice, 10 ; Criminal Justice, 
37 ; Evidence, 11 ; Politics, 3. 

53. My brothers ^ differ from me in opinion, and they aU differ from one 
another in the reasons of their opinion ; but notwithstanding their 

reasons given in public, and not satisfy or but that had been laid aside ever since 

make good their judgment by after- Hale's time." — SUt. of Ids own Tinms, 

thought of reasons." — Memarks on the (A.D. 1682). See further on this subject, 

Tried of Pitzharris, in 33 Car. II. (1681), note to LAW Eepoets, 3, supra; see also 

by Sir John Hawkes, Solicitor- General to ante, Counsel, 15. 

William III. (8 St. Tr. 434), referring to i The Court will not keep back their 
the atrocious trials for high treason in the opinion without having sufficient ground 
latter part of the reign of Charles II., and for doubting, and a necessity of taking 
the practice which the corrupt Judges time to satisfy their doubts : on the other 
who were concerned in those trials intro- hand, they will not give their opinions 
duced of delivering their judgments with- over-hastily and prematurely, merely to 
out stating their reasons. (On this subject gratify the humours or passions of man- 
age further ante, Fbaud, 27 ; Jury, 25.) kind. — Aston, J., id. p. 1097. 
Burnet, referring to the great Quo a The Judges formerly were always 
Warranto case in this reign, says : " The chosen from the order of Serjeants-at-Law 
Judges were wont formerly, in delivering (Fort. J)e Laud. c. 1, p. 116 ; Coke's i 
their opinions, to make long arguments, Inst. 75, 100 ; Preface to 10 Co. Rep. 24 ; 
in which they set forth the grounds of 2 Kot. Pari. 331 b.), and where no special 
lair on which they went, which were great character of brotherhood existed, as in 
instructions to the students and barristers; their case, "brother" would naturally be 

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Judges — continued. 

opinion, I think the plaintifE ought to recover, and that this action is 
well maintainable and ought to lie. I will consider their reasonB.*— 
EoU, C.J., Ashby v. White (1703), 2 Raym. 950. 
See also 26, n. ; 48, n. ; 52, n., above ; Politics, 3. 

considered a term of condescension used 
by a superior to an inferior. The second 
chapter of Oughton's Prolegumeiia con- 
cludes as follows : " XLI. Bright therefore 
be its glory, and may succeeding ages be 
illumined, far and wide, with the beams 
of this fostering, this renowned, this most 
worshipful — ^Arches Court of Canterbury." 
In the controversy between the Serjeants 
and doctors of civil law for precedence at 
the coronation of James I., the latter urged 
their right of sitting with the Judge, 
as evidencing their superiority to Ser- 
jeants, who plead standing. "Et doctores 
sedendi cum judice potestatem habent, 
nisi hiis horis quibus merita causarum 
pandantur." They also said that in their 
Courts a Judge is punishable who addresses 
a doctor as frater, and not as domlnus. 
Ough. Ordo Judiciorum, in Foro Ecclesi- 
astico-civili. Prolegomena, cap. 2, tit. 
Advocates in Ecclesiastical Courts. See 
also Spelman, Gloss, voce "Serjeant." 
The Serjeants derived their title from the 
old Knights Templars, amongst whom 
there existed a peculiar class under the 
denomination of "frferes sergens," or 
fratres servieivtes ; wherefore amongst all 
the Serjeants the practice was and still is 
to address each other by the familiar 
epithet of "brother." — Coiwel, Addison's 
Knight Templars, 318. 

' In 1 Bl. Com. 18, Professor Christian 
has the following note : " Here it may 
not be improper to observe that there is no 
casting vote in Courts of justice ; but in 
the superior Courts, if the Judges are 
equally divided, there is no decision, and 
the cause is continued in Court till a 
majority concur. At the sessions the 
justices, in case of equality, ought to 
respite the matter till the next sessions ; 
but if they are equal one day, and the 
matter is duly brought before them another 
day in the same sessions, and if there is 
then an inequality, it will amount to a 
judgment ; for all the time of the sessions 
is considered but as one day. A casting 
vote sometimes signifies the single vote of 
a person, who never votes but in the case 
of an equality ; sometimes the double vote 
of a person who first votes with the rest, 

and then upon an equality creates a 
majority by giving a second vote." A 
casting vote neither exists in corporations 
nor elsewhere, unless it is expressly given 
by statute or charter, or, what is equiva- 
lent, exists by immemorial usage ; and in 
such cases it cannot be created by a bye- 
law. (R. V. Ginever, 6 T. E. 732.) And 
see R. ». Bumstead, 2 B. & Ad. 704. 

If the Judges are equally divided in the 
superior Courts, and the question in dispute 
has received a decision at Nisi Prius, that 
decision will stand, as in Laugher v. 
Pointer (5 B. & C. 547) there was a non- 
suit, and the Court above being equally 
divided after argument on showing cause 
against a rule for a new trial, the rule was 
discharge.!. So in Strother v. Barr (5 Bing. 
136), which was an action upon the case 
for an injury to the reversion, the question 
was, whether there was sufficient evidence 
of the plaintifE's having a reversionary 
interest ; and leave was reserved to set 
aside the verdict : and in the recent case 
of Boe d. Mudd v. Suckermore (5 A. & E. 
703), in which a rule nisi for a new trial 
had been obtained on the ground of au 
improper rejection of evidence : in each 
case the Court being equally divided after 
cause shown, the rule was discharged. So, 
in the case of an appeal from an order of 
two magistrates to the quarter sessions, if 
the magistrates there assembled are equally 
divided upon the subject-matter of the 
appeal, it would seem that the order of 
the two justices would stand. In election 
committees of the House of Commons, as 
constituted by the Grenville Act, 10 
Geo. III. c. 16, the chairman by sect. 27 
had a casting voice, if the voices were 
equal ; and the number of members on the 
committee being not more than fifteen 
nor less than thirteen, it might be 
necessary, in order to create a majority, 
that the chairman should give a double 
vote in some cases, and a single vote in 
others ; so that he would have a casting 
voice in both of the significations above 
mentioned. By sect. 77 of the 2 & 3 
Vict. c. 38, for amending the jurisdiction 
for the trial of election petitions, it is 
specifically enacted, that " whenever the 

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Judges — continued. 

54. As I find that my brothers ' are of a different opinion from me, I 
submit to their authority.^ — Eyre, L.C.J., Brandon v. Pate (1794), 
2 H. B. 311. 

See also 48, 49, 53, above, and 55, below. 

55. I am so imfortunate as to differ a second time from my brethren, 
but I am bound by my opinion, and it is my duty to deliver it.* — 
Eyre, L.C.J., Bencough v. Rossiter (1795), 2 H. B. 426. 

See note to 54, above. 

56. You shall have my judgment presently ; but my brothers ^ are to 
speak first.* — Wright, L.C.J., Case of the Seven Bishops (1688), 
12 How. St. Tr. 274. 

See also note to 53, above. 

voices shall be equal, the chairman shaU 
have a second, or casting vote." 

' See anti, Judges, 53, n., for meaning 
of the term " brother." 

See also to the same efEect per Holt, 
C.J. : " My judgment ought to be given 
for the plaintifi : but my brothers are all 
of another opinion, and so I submit to it. 
The defendant must have his judgment." 
Philips V. Bury (1788), 2 T. &. 358 ; per 
Grose, J. : " For the sake of general con- 
venience, I am not sorry that the rest of 
the Court are of a contrary opinion." 
Read r. Brookman (1789), 3 T. R. 162, 
and per llooke, J. . " Whatever doubts 1 
had, I submit to the authority of the 
other Judges." Mitchell v. Cookbume 
(179i), 2 H. B. 382. (Eyre, L.C.J., how- 
ever, subsequently delivered a difierent 
dictmn , see 55 abore). See also per Lord 
Fitzgerald in Cairil v. Sime (1887), L. R. 12 
App. Ca. 359 : " In the course vrhich the 
case is now about to take my opinion 
becomes worthless. I am bound to 
assume that I am wrong in point of law. 
Your lordships' judgment settles the law 
finally, and in yielding a willing obedi- 
ence I have, at least, the palliation for 
mistake in law that I have erred in com- 
pany with the Lord President, the Lord 
Justice Clerk, and four other able and 
eminent Scotch Judges." 

^ Tlie term " brethren " is explained 
atitii, Judges, 53, n. 

■* "This is the first instance of a final 
difference of opinion in this Court since I 
sat here. Every Order, Rule, Judgment, 
and Opinion has hitherto been nmanimous. 
That unanimity never could have hap- 
pened if we did not among ourselves 
communicate our sentiments with great 

freedom ; if we did not form our judg- 
ments without any prepossession to first 
thoughts ; if we were not always open to 
conviction, and ready to yield to each 
other's reasons. We have all equally 
endeavoured at that unanimity, upon this 
occasion : we have talked the matter over 
several times. I have communicated my 
thoughts at large in writing : and I have 
read the three arguments which have 
been now delivered. In short, we have 
equally tried to convince or be con- 
vinced : but, in vain. We continue to 
differ. And whoever is right, each is 
bound to abide by and deliver f/iai opinion 
which he has formed upon the fullest 
examination.* — Lord Mansfield, Millar 
I'. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. Part IV. 2395. 

* See the term " brother " explained 
ante, Judges, 53, n. 

^ The Judges proceed to give their 
opinions seriatim, beginning from the 

* Says Sir James Burrow : Except in this 
and one other case now depending (by writ 
of error) in the House of Lords, where Mr. 
Justice Yates differed from the other three, 
every rule, order, judgment, and opinion 
has, to this day, been (as far as I can recol- 
lect) unanimous. This gives weight and 
dispatch to the decisions, certainty to the 
law, and infinite satisfaction to the 
suitors : and the effect is seen by that 
immense business which flows from all 
parts into this channel ; and which we 
who have long known Westminster HaU, 
behold with astonishment ; the rather, as 
during this period, all the other Courts 
have been filled with Judges of unques- 
tionable integrity, eminent talents, and 
distinguished abilities. Ed. note, id. 2395. 

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Judges — continued. 

57. To be sure, it is a very important case, though very imperfectly 
reported in the printed cases, which make an impossibility, by making 
the senior Judge speak first. — Lard Mansfield, Morgan v. Jones (1773), 
LofEt. 167. 

58. Whenever there is a real likelihood that the Judge would, from 
kindred or any other cause, have a bias in favour of one of the parties, 
it would be very wrong in him to act, and we are not to be understood 
to say that where there is a real bias of this sort this Court would not 
interfere.— 5Zacfc6M?-w, J., Reg. v. Rand (1867), L. R. 1 Q. B. 230. 

See helow, 61, 82 ; Administeation of Justice, 28, 29 ; Jury, 25. 

59. Pur dishonest Judgm't Judges povent estre punv. Mirror de Justices 
report que 44 fueront pendus pur cest cause : For dishonest judgment 
Judges may be punished. Mirror of Justices reports that 44 were 
hanged for this cause. — Vaughqn, J., Bushel's Case (1670), Jones's 
(Sir Thos.) Rep. 15. 

60. If I was wrong, I should think it more honourable to acknowledge 
and rectify any error that I should have committed, than to justify and 
defend it.— Lord Mansfield, Rex v. Wilkes (1770), 4 Burr. Part IV. 2532. 

See 18, above, and references therefrom; helow, 67 ; Practice, 21. 

61. I think that it is a matter of public pohcy that, so far as is possible, 
judicial proceedings shall not only be free fi'om actual bias or prejudice 
of the Judges, but that they shall be free from the suspicion of bias 
or prejudice. — Fry, L.J., Leeson v. Greneral Council of Medical 
Education, &c. (1889), L. R. 43 C. D. 390. 

See above, 38, 58; Administration of Justice, 28, 29; Judicial 

PEOCEEDINGfl, 6, 7. 

62. It is impossible for us English lawyers, dealing with the English 
language, to express our views except in the technical language of our 
h.w.—Kekewich, J., Lauri v. Renad (1892), L. R. 3 C. D. [1892], p. 413. 

See above, 36 ; Administration of Justice, 11 ; Cases, 15 ; Law, 65 ; 
Statutes, 6 ; Will, 8 ; Words, 6. 

junior. — The Grand Opinion, S^o., con- doctrine that falls from him, in the 

eerning the Royal Family (17n'),'WorteBC. course of that opinion." — Douglas on 

410. Again, " The Judges delivered their Uleetions (ed. 1775), Introd. p. 39. 

opinions separately, and at large ; the An Ordinance of the Privy Council of 

junior Judge beginning, and so proceeding 1627, forbade Privy Councillors divulging 

upvs'aid to the Lord Chief Justice." — See " how the particular voices and opinions 

Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2309. " I went." Lord Cairns in February, 1878, 

believe it is understood that though, passed a fresh Ordinance applying the 

when the Judges are unanimous, the Order of 1627 expressly to judicial busi- 

Chief Justice delivers the opinion of the ness. See also 48, aiove, and references 

Court, yet the other justices are not pre- there giren. 
sumed to adopt and concur with every 

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Jvdges — continued. 

63. Judges are not bound to travel beyond the facts stated in cases, 
and, as a general rule, such a practice would be inconvenient. — 
Day, J.j Dui-ham County Council v. Chester-le-Street Union (1890), 
60 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Mag. Cas. 12. 

See Statutes, 13. 

64. Judges are more to be trusted as interpreters of the law than as 
expounders of what is called public policy. — Cave, J., In re Mirans ; 
Ex 'parte Official Receiver (1891), 60 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. 399. 

See 1, 44, ahme ; Foreign Law, 4 ; Public Poliot, 8 ; Statutes, 14. 

65. In former years, and down to times within my recollection, Judges 
of what used to be the common law Courts of this realm delighted in 
applying, rigidly and strictly, a series of rules and maxims which 
their predecessors had delighted themselves in devising, although 
they did not always commend themselves to the apprehension of the 
million.— James, L.J., Ashworth v. Outram (1877), 5 L. R. Ch. D. 941. 

See 71, helow; Common Law, 4; Dictum, 3, 5; Disceetion, 12; 
Equity, 18 ; Law, 58 ; Practice, 4 ; Statutes, 24. 

66. I think we ought to adhere to those ancient forms which have been 
perfected by the wisdom of ages and confirmed in their utility by the 
experience of many centuries. — Best, J., Orton v. Butler (1822), 2 Chit. 
Rep. 350. 

See 33, 36, 41, ahove; Judicial Decisions, 4, 16; Law, 46, 49; 
MiBCELi^NEOus, 6, 7 ; Praotioe, 17 ; Usage, 13. 

67. If I must either attribute to some Judges a reverence more for the 
letter than the spirit, caution carried too far, an over-anxiousness to 
keep themselves within the most clearly - defined limits of their 
authority, or ascribe to others an arbitrary and imwarrantable 
assumption of legislative power, I elect the former. — Knight-Bruee, 
L.J., Boyse v. Rossborough (1854), 23 L. J. Rep. Part 5 (N. S.) Ch., 
p. 331. 

See Law, 50 ; Pari^lament, 14 ; Statutes, 13. 

68. I am not now going, and I do not suppose that any Judge will ever 
do so, to lay down a rule which, so to say, wiU tie the hands of the 
Court.— Pearson, J., Holland v. Worley (1884), L. R. 26 C. D. 584. 

See 44, ahove ; Discretion, 12 ; Judges, 12 ; Miscellaneous, 23. 

69. I am far from being such a Judge as shall lay any intolerable yoke 
upon any one's neck.— Holt, C.J., Philips v. Bury (1788), 2 T. R. 358. 

See above, 36, 44, 68 ; Commerce, 32 ; DisoEBnoN, 12. 

70. In the judgments which Judges pronounce, this is inevitable, that, 
having their minds fuU, not only of the cases before them, but of the 

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Judges — continued. 

principles involved in the cases which, have been referred to, it very 
often happens that a Judge, in stating as much as is necessary to 
decide the case before him, does not express aU that may be said 
upon the subject. That leaves the judgment open sometimes to mis- 
construction, and enables ingenious advocates, by taking out certain 
passages, to draw conclusions which the Judge never meant to be 
drawn from the words he used.' — Sir James Bacon, V.-C, Green's 
Case (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. Ca. 433. 

See 11, above, and references ; AuMmiSTEUTiON of Justice, 7,8,9; 

C!ouNSEL, 22 ; Equity, 18 ; Evidence, 6 ; Judicial Decisions, 9 ; 

Law, 2 ; Law Reports, 2 ; Peaci'ioe, 6. 

71. It certainly is very hard upon a Judge, if a rule which he generally 
lays down, is to be taken up and carried to its fuU extent. This is 
sometimes done by counsel, who have nothing else to rely on ; but 
great caution ought to be used by the Court in extending such 
maxims to cases which the Judge who uttered them never had in 
contemplation. If such is the use to be made of them, I ought to be 
very cautious how I lay down general maxims from this bench. — 
— Mansfield, C.J., Brisbane v. Dacres (1813), 5 Taunt. 162. 

See 65, 70, ahc/oe ; 72, lelow ; Dictum, 3, 5. 

72. In my opinion it is very important that one Judge should not 
attempt to draw fine distinctions between cases before him and similar 
cases decided by another Judge. Practitioners are much embarrassed 
by minute differences between the decisions of different Judges, and 
it is very important to follow a hne of procedure which has been 
already laid down. — Fry, J., In re Symons ; Luke v. Tonkin (1882), 
L. R. 21 C. D. 761. 

See 3, 71, above; Cases, 14 ; Peacticse, 14. 

73. If once our Courts of Justice come to be awed or swayed by vulgar 
noise, and if judges and juries should manage themselves so as 
woidd best comply with the humour of the times, it is falsely said 
that men are tried for their lives or fortunes ; they live by chance, 
and enjoy what they have as the wind blows, and with the same 
certainty. Let us pursue the plot a God's name, and not baulk any- 
thing where there is danger or suspicion upon reasonable grounds ; 
but not so overdo it, as to show our zeal, we wiU pretend to find what 
is not; nor stretch one thing beyond what it will bear, to reach 

1 It is not fair to criticise every line imperfect record of it. — Lord Hatherley, 

and letter of a, summing-up which has Prudential Assurance Co. v. Edmonds 

been delivered by a Judge in trying a (1877), L. R. 2 App. Ca. 494. 
case, especially when there is a somewhat 

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Judges — aontinued. 

another. — Soroggs, L.C.J., Speech, on the first day of Michaebnas Term 
(1679), 16 How. St. Tr. 242. 
See 36, above; 82, helow; Adminibtration of Justice, 20. 

74. I will not be influenced by any judgment that is founded either on fear 
or favour.— WiZles, L.C.J., WeUesi;. Trahem (1740), WiUes' Eep. 240. 

See Ceiminal Justice, 26, 30 ; Justice, 3 ; Law, 19 ; Punishment, 6. 

75. The character of the Judges is public property, and if they have 
done anything amiss, they ought to be censured. But if not, their 
characters ought to be respected ; otherwise the most mischievous 
consequences will arise to the public. — Lord Kenyan, Holt's Case 
(1793), 22 How. St. Tr. 1234. 

See 26, above; 76, below; Administration of Justice, 20; Chaeaotee, 
7 ; Contempt of Couet, 1 ; Judicial Peooeedings, 11. 

76. We that do sit here, do move in a sphere, and should be like the 
primum mobile, according to whom all others are to steer their course ; 
and Judges themselves must move steadily upon their right poles, as 
I hope this Court will. What Judge soever he be that is elevated by 
popular applause,' or animated by the contrary, to accumulate honour, 
is fitter to live " in fcece Eomuli guam in politia Angliee." Nor will 
I lose time in remembering the first oath of a Judge, who should 
expel aU by-respects, and speak his conscience. I hope none of us 
forget the duty we owe to God, to the King, and to the commonwealth, 
and to ourselves. I shaU endeavour to satisfy my conscience in all 
that I can say. And they forget their duty to the first, and humanity 
towards us, that say or think the contrary of any one of us. Some of 
us have fortunes and posterities, and therein have given hostages to 
the commonwealth. . . . Those that want those blessings, want those 
temptations that make dream of, or hunt for honour or riches, to 
perpetuate their names and families ; to them nothing can be more 
precious than the bahn of integrity, which will preserve their names 
and memories. It cannot be presumed, but we will speak our con- 
sciences, since we well know shortly, as the psalmist says, " Corruption 
shall say, I am thy father, and the worm, I am thy mather." — Finch, 
L.C.J., Hampden's Case (1637), 3 How. St. Tr. 1217. 

See 3, 26, above ; Disoeetion, 9 ; Evidence, 29 ; Jury, 8 ; Poutics, 3 ; 
Trial foe Life, 1. 

77. I wiU. teU you we are bound to be of counsel with you, in point of 
law ; that is, the Court, my brethren and myself, are to see that you 

1 See Sir Matthew Hale's precepts : remembrance." — Hale's " Common Law " 
" Things necessary to be continually had in (ed. 1794), p. xx, referred to antb, p. 113, n. 

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Judges — continued. 

suffer nothing for your want of knowledge in matter of law. — Hyde, C.J., 
Twyn's Case (1663), 6 How. St, Tr. 516. 
See 79, Idow ; Law, 14 ; Presumption, 12. 

78. I am obliged to watch as he has no counsel. — Bayley, J., King v. 
Knowles (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 505. 

See 80, helow. 

79. I have been reminded that I sit here as counsel for the defendant. 
I certainly do so, so far as to interpose between him and the counsel 
for the prosecution, and to see that no improper use of the law is 
made against him, and that no improper evidence is given to the 
jury '- : but the Judge has another task to perform, which is that of 
assisting the jury in the administration of justice. — Lord Kenyan, 
Wakefield's Case (1799), 27 How. St. Tr. 736. 

See 77, above; Evidknce, 3; Judge, 1. 

80. It is sometimes said —erroneously, as I think — that the Judge should 
be counsel for the prisoner'' ; but at least he must take care that the 
prisoner is not convicted on any but legal evidence. — Wills, J., Reg. 
V. Gibson (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 537 ; 16 Cox, C. C. 181. 

See 78, abme ; Ceiminal Justice, 31. 

81. By our rules we cannot receive a letter from a friend.' — Bayley, J., 
King V. Knowles (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 515. 

1 The Court ought to be in stead of would then, at least, have justice done 

counceU for the prisoner, to see that to him, and the spectacle of poverty 

nothing be urged against him contrary to baited by wealth would no longer ofEend 

law and right. — Coke, 3 Inst. 29. the eye of the unaccustomed spectator. 

* As to the doctrine of the Judge being Surely humanity could not propose to 

considered in the light of counsel for the itself a nobler object than protecting 

prisoner, see 1 CAitty's " Grim. Law," 407 : innocence, and securing even to the guilty 

It has often been urged that a Judge ought a, fair and fuU investigation of all the 

not to be put to prosecute: similarly applies circumstances that mitigate the crime, 

the objection that a Judge ought not to Since this note was written much of the 

play the part of counsel for the prisoner. evil pointed out has been remedied by the 

The miserable economy that violates the Poor Prisoners Defence Act, 1903 (3 Bdw. 

fii-st principles of justice for the sake of a 7, c. 381). 

trifling saving to a county is disgraceful ^ The prisoner had asked for leave to 
to our jurisprudence, and discreditable to read a letter he had received in the course 
those by whom those local tribunals are of the trial. By the statute 20 Ed. III. 
regulated. It is not in human nature to c. 1, the Judges are to take no fee but 
advocate both sides of a question with from the King to do equal right and 
equal zeal. It is impossible at once to do justice, without regard to letters or corn- 
justice to the prosecutor and the criminal, mandment from the King or any other ; 
If it were not so, why in all civilized and if any letters come, the justices are 
countries is the intervention of advocates to proceed as if there were none 
deemed essential to the administration of such, {^brtesc. 363.) The main object 
justice. Of the unemployed barristers of the statutes of 2 Ed. II. c. 8 ; 18 
who sit round the table, why might not Ed. III. stat. 4 ; 20 Ed. HI. c. 1, and 
the prisoner be permitted to nominate 11 Kich. II. c. 10, prohibiting the Crown 
one to defend him. The poor prisoner from sending letters signed by the Privy 

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Judges — continued. 

82. Gentlemen, I speak for myself as well as^for you : I never read any- 
thing about what may come before me in a Court of Justice ; I keep 
my mind free from everything of the kind. There is often a necessity 
for me to look into the law : but I never suffer my mind to be biassed 
by reports, or such papers or pamphlets as are written with a view to 
pervert justice.i— Pmtt, C.J., WUkes' Case (1763), 19 How. St. Tr. 1410. 
See above, 58, 73 ; Administration of Jdstioe, 20 ; Contempt of 
Court, 10 ; Judicial Proc5EEDings, 11 ; Jury, 25. 

Signet or Privy Seal to the Courts of 
justice, was to prevent the undue inter- 
ference of the Crown in the litigation of 
private suits ; but the language of those 
statutes, and the mischief, apply, as dis- 
tinctly, to the case of the Crown sending 
a missive to any of the Courts for any 
purpose (see the firm conduct of the 
Judges in resisting an undue exercise of 
the prerogative by Queen Elizabeth, in 
Cari'iulish's Case, 1 Anderson, 152 ; id. 
Pettyfs Jus Parliamentarium, 68, 205 — 
210). The statute 18 Ed. III. stat. 4, 
prescribes the oath to be taken by a Judge, 
and then enacts that, in case he be found 
in default in any of the points contained 
in such oath, he shall be at the King's 
will of body, lands, and goods, thereof to 
be done as shall please him. The follow- 
ing is the translation of the oath, which is 
given in KufEhead's edition of the statutes, 
the original of which Is in Norman 
French : — 

" You shall swear, that well and law- 
fully ye shall serve our soveraigne lord the 
King, and his people, in the oflBce of 
Justice, — and that lawfully' ye shall 
couusaile the King in his businesses, — and 
that you shall not counsaile, nor assent to, 
anything, which may turn him to damage 
or disheriso, by any maner, way, or colour ; 
— and that ye shall not know the damage 
or disherison of him, whereof ye shall not 
do him to be warned by yourself or by 
other, — and that ye shall do even law and 
execution of right to all his subjects, rich 
and poore, without having regard to any 
person, — and that ye take not by yourself, 
or by other, privily nor apiertly, gift nor 
reward of gold nor silver, nor of any other 
thing which may tume to your profit, 
unless it be meat or drinke, and that of 
small value, of any man that shall have any 
plea or process hanging before you, as long 

* Loyalment, honestly. 

as the same process shall so be hanging, 
nor after for the same cause ; and that ye 
take no fee, as long as ye shall be Justice, 
nor robes of any man great or small, but 
of the Kinge himselfe. And that ye give 
none advice nor counsaile, to no man, 
great nor small, in no case where the King 
is party, — and in case that any, of what 
estate or conditio they be, come before 
you in your sessions, with force and 
armes, or otherwise against the peace, or 
against the forme of the statute thereof 
made, to disturbe execution of the common 
law, or to menace the people, that they 
may not pursue the law, that you shal do 
their bodies to be arrested and put in 
prison, and in case they be such that ye 
may not arrest them, that ye certifie the 
King of their names, and of their mis- 
prison hastily, so that he may thereof 
ordaine a covenable remedy, — and that ye, 
by your selfe nor by other, privily nor 
apertly, maintalne any plea or quarreU 
hanging in the King's court or elsewhere 
in the country, — and that you deny to no 
man common right, by the King's letters, 
nor none other man's, nor for none other 
cause, and in ease any letters eome to you 
contrary to the law, that ye do nothing by 
such letters, lut certijie tlie King tliereof, 
and go forth to do the law, notwithstanding 
the same letters. And that ye shall doe 
and procure the profit of the King, and of 
his crowne, with all things where ye may 
reasonably do the same. And in case ye 
be from henceforth found in default in 
any of the points aforesaid, ye shall be at 
the King's will of body, lands and goods, 
thereof to bee done as shall please him ; as 
God you helpe." See also 22, above; 
Politics, 3, and references therefrom. 

' I pass over many anonymous letter's I 
have received. Those in print are public : 
and some of them have been brought 
judicially before the Court. Whoever the 
writers are, they take the wrong way. I 

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A judgment for too little, is as bad as a judgment for too much. — Per 
Cur., King v. Salomons (1786), 1 T. R. 252. 
See also Judicial Decisions, 8 ; Practice, 29, 30. 

Judicial Decisions. 

1. Year-books, books written of the law of England, and judgments in 
Parliament, are three of the authorities, and they are thesauri aperti. 
Judicial records and precedents are the fourth, and they are thesauri 
absaonditi. — Lord Goke, Case of the Marshalsea (1612), 10 Rep. 75. 

2. I cannot help observing, that many of those who have written in 
support of our ancient system of jurisprudence, the growth of the 
wisdom of man for so many ages, are not as they are alleged by some 
to be men writing from their closets without any knowledge of the 
affairs of life, but persons mixing with the mass of society, and 
capable of receiving practical experience of the soundness of the 
maxims they inculcate. — Lord Kenyan, C.J., King v. Waddington 
(1800), 1 East, 157. 

See Evidence, 29 ; Statutes, 14. 

3. It is certainly true that from the reign of Edward VI. to the end of 
the reign of James I., many decisions wiU be found turning on many 
nice points, and many now apparently frivolous objections have been 
entertained, but it was not because the Judges who graced the bench 
in those days were inferior, either in intellect or in learning, to those 
who now sit on it ; in the last, I fear, they would be found our 
masters ; but it is because a greater liberality of sentiment now 
prevails in the decisions of Courts of justice. — Gibhs, C.J., Croydon 
Hospital V. Farley (1816), 6 Taunt. 479. 

See Precedents, 1. 

4. To be sure the Court regularly adheres to regular judgments, if in 
the support of the merits and justice ; but if against the merits and 

will do my duty, unawed. What am I to judice, as it may influence those who have 

fear ? That mendan infamia from the to decide it, and who should be influenced 

press, which daily coins false facts and by the evidence alone. But when the 

false motives 1 The lies of calumny carry decision is once given, the tongue of public 

no terror to me. I trust, that my temper criticism becomes unfettered, 

of mind, and the colour and conduct of Contempt op Court, 9, and references 

my life, have given me a suit of armour tliere given. 

against these arrows. — Lord Mansfield, ' "Lord Chief Justice ^iW« used to say 

Wilkes' Case (1763), 19 How. St. Tr. that he could get authorities in the Year- 

1112. See also CoMs Admeetothe Judges, Books for any side in any thing," said 

aiitb, p. 113, Judges, 26, n. Lord Lyndhurst, Lord Chancellor, in the 

Note. — For long past it has been, as is course of the argument of a celebrated 

well known, a contempt of Court for a case in the House of Lords : Gray v. The 

publication to comment on a case suh Queen (1844), 11 Clark & Finnelly, 441. 

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Judicial Decisions — continued. 

justice they always get rid of the mere formality of them ; but they 
do it upon terms. — Lord Mansfield, Lord Mexhorough v. Sir John 
Delaval (1773), Lofft. 310. 
See also Judges, 66. 

5. This Court is hound to adhere loyally to former decisions unless 
clearly satisfied that they are wrong. But, if we are satisfied that a 
former decision is clearly wrong, and not warranted by law, we ought 
not blindly to foUow it : and I am satisfied that the Court has acted 
upon that principle on more than one occasion. ... I agree also that the 
Court should use the utmost circumspection in overruling a case which 
has been acted upon for several years, and especially after subsequent 
legislation upon the subject, which has left the decision untouched. — 
Brett, J., Hadfield's Case (1873), L. R. 8 Com. PI. Ca. 318, 320. 

See also 6, 20, 24, helow; Common Law, 12; Construction, 6, 28; 
Law, 73 ; Law REa>0RTS, 3 ; Practice, 12, 13 ; Precedents, 2, 17, 
20 ; Statutes, 3. 

6. It is my misfortune to differ in opinion from some decisions of this 
Court, not from captious motives, but from a conscientious conviction, 
that those decisions are not foimded upon the true principles of law 
and justice ; and therefore I feel it my duty to endeavour to efEect a 
restoration of the law to its true constitutional and legitimate standard ' : 
when I shall be told by the highest Court of Judicature in this 
kingdom, assisted by the other Judges of Westminster Hall (as I 
suppose that assistance would be called in), that the decisions I 
oppose are right ; I shall then acquiesce and conform to them. — 
Wood, B., Bennett v. Beale and others (1811), Wightw. 330. 

See Cases, 21 ; Law Reports, 3 ; Precedents, 2, 18. 

7. It is the duty of the Court not to alter a decision brought in review 
before it, merely because another view, perhaps as good, may be 
presented. In matters involving discretion it is often very difficult 
to say with certainty which decision is right. — Sir John Stuart, V.-C, 
Wilcox V. MarshaU (1867), L. R. 3 Eq. Ca. 272. 

See Appeal, 7 ; Precedents, 11. 

8. Judgments are in their nature equal tiU they are reversed, in what 
Court soever they are obtained ; a judgment in a Court of record by 
grant, is equal to a judgment in a Coiu-t of record by prescription ; 
and a judgment in a Court piepoudre is equal to a judgment in any 

^ Judicia posterior a stmt in lege posterioribus fides est ad!iihenda : CxeditiB 
fortiora: The later decisions are the to be taken to the later decisions. — 13 
stronger in law. — 8 Co. 97. Judiciis Co. 14. 

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Judicial Decisions — continued. 

of the superior Courts. — Eldon, L.C, Mo rice v. Bank of England 
(1736), 3 Swanston, 575. 
See also ante, Judgment. 

9. I have often said, and I repeat it, that the only tiling in a Judge's 
decision binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the 
principle upon which the case was decided : but it is not sufficient 
that the case should have been decided on a principle if that principle 
is not itself a right principle, or one not applicable to the case ; and 
it is for a subsequent Judge to say whether or not it is a right principle, 
and, if not, he may himself lay down the true principle. In that case 
the prior decision ceases to be a binding authority or guide for any 
subsequent Judge, for the second Judge who lays down the principle 
in effect reverses the decision. — Jessel, M.R., Osborne to Rowlett 
(1880), L. R. 13 C. D. 785. 

See 12, 18, Mow; Cases, 9, 21; Judges, 70, 72; Law, 2; Peeoe- 
DENTS, 18. 

10. Decisions are to be followed as precedents. — Leach, M.R., Walsh v. 
WaUinger (1829), Tamlyn's Rep. 429. 

See PEEOEDBaiTS, 3, 19. 

11. Judicial opinion has varied a great deal, and must vary a great deal, 
when you consider the ground upon which that judicial opinion or 
those judicial opinions have been founded. — Jessel, M.R., Besant v. 
Wood (1879), L. R. 12 C. D. 620. 

See Precedents, 1. 

12. It is the principle of the decision by which we are bound, not a 
mere rule that in exactly the same circumstances we are to arrive at 
the same conclusions. Therefore to say that the decisions are wrong 
in point of principle, if that principle was clearly laid down, does 
not relieve us from the obligation of following the principle of the 
decision, because the whole theory of our system is, that the decision 
of a superior Court is binding on an inferior Court and on a Court of 
co-ordinate jurisdiction, in so far as it is a statement of the law which 
the Court is bound to accept. — Sir W. M. James, L.J., Merry v. 
NickaUs (1872), L. R. 7 Ch. Ap. Ca. 750. 

See 9, above ; Jueisdiotion, 20 ; Law, 53 ; Peecsedents, 20. 

13. Judicial decisions in Courts of justice are ranked by Lord Hale as one 
of the grounds or constituents of the common law.* — Tindal, L.C.J., 
Balme v. Hutton (1833), Moore & Scott's Rep. 61. 

See Peecedents, 10. 

1 Hale's "History of the Common Law,'' c. 4. 

D.L.Q. 9 

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Judicial Decisions — continued. 

14. A considerable part of the law of England consists of judicial 
decisions, and in the very nature of things this must be so. Every 
decision upon a debated point adds a little to the law by roaking that 
point certain for the future. — Stephen, J., Reg. v. Coney and others 
(1882), 15 Cox, C. C. 58. 

See Precedents, 20, and references therefrom. 

15. It is very dangerous for a Judge who does not agree with particular 
decisions, to deal in distinctions from those decisions. — Jessel, M.R., 
In re International Pulp and Paper Co. ; Knowles' Mortgage (1877), 
L. R. 6 C. D. 559. 

See 17, helow. 

16. I think that the proper and safe course is to follow a decision of a 
Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, unless some cogent reason is given 
to the contrary. — Kekewich, J., Evans v. Manchester, &c. Rail. Co. 
(1887), L. J. (N. S.) 57 C. D. 157. 

See CoNBTEUCTioN, 13 ; Judges, 66 ; Jueisdiction, 4 ; Law, 53. 

17. It is a matter of great difficulty to a Judge who disapproves of a 
decision to be quite siure that he is honestly distinguishing the case 
in which it was given from the case before him. Of course, the 
inchnation of his mind is to find every distinction sufficient, and 
therefore he must be particularly on his guard to see that he does not 
unfairly distinguish with a view to getting rid of the original decision. 
I have tried in every instance before me to be thus on my guard, but 
whether I have succeeded or not will be for others to say. — Jessel, M.R., 
Smith's Case (1879), L. R. 11 C. D. 587. 

See 9, 15, cAove ; Peecedents, 7, 13. 

18. I wiU. have it done, that it may remain a decision in perpetv/im ret 
memoriam.—HoU, C.J., Tutchin's Case (1704), 14 How. St. Tr. 1101. 

19. A great deal of difficidty has been caused in the administration of 
the law, and particularly of the common law, by decisions in which 
technical rules have been formulated which were not true— that is, 
were not in accordance with the facts of the case. — Lord Esher, M.R., 
In re North, Ex parte Hasluck (1895), L. R. 2N3. B. D. [1895], p. 269. 

See Law, 72 ; Law Repoets, 3. 

20. When we find a series of decisions running down ^om the time of Sir 
William Grant, we should be very cautious, and very slow to overrule 
them.^—Lindley, L.J., In re Pickard (1894), L. R. 3 C. D. [1894], p. 710. 

See ahcme, 5 ; Conbtedotion, 6 ; Law, 73. 

21. A series of decisions based upon grounds of public policy, however 
■ This was in reference to the case of Finch r. Squire (1804), 10 Ves. 41. 

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Judicial Decisions — continued. 

emiaent the Judges by whom they were delivered, cannot possess the 
same blading authority as decisions which deal with and formtdate 
principles which are purely legal. — Lord Watson, Nordenfelt v. 
Maxim Nordenfelt Gxms and Anmnmition Company (1894), L. R. 
App. Ca. Part 5, p. 553. 

See above, 5, 6 ; Pubuc Policy, 8, 

22. A collection of records may be the result of professional knowledge, 
research, and skill, just as a collection of curiosities is the result of 
the skill and knowledge of the antiquarian or virtuoso. — Bowen, L.J., 
LyeU V. Kennedy (1884), L. R. 27 C. D. 31. 

23. I must look at the decision with reference to all the circumstances 
which led to it.— Kekemch, J., In re England (1895), L. R. 2 C. D. 
[1895], p. 109. 

See above, 5, 6 ; Cases, 16. 

24. Where there is a decision precisely in point, it is better to foUow it. 
—Lord Eldon, Townley v. Bedwell (1808), 14 Ves. 596. 

See above, 23 ; Pkeoedekts, 14, 19, 20. 

25. The headnote is the fair epitome of the decision. — Kekeimch, J., 
Ashworth v. Roberts (1890), L. J. Rep. (K S.) 60 C. D. 28. 

26. Mankind naturally give evidence to the constituted Courts, and 
reputation is iucurably damaged by their decisions, whether erroneous 
or not. — Lord Penzance, Borough v. CoUins (1890), L. R. 15 P. D. 85. 

See Administration of Justice, 3 ; Codets, 13, 14. 

Judicial Proceedings. 

1. It is upon the ground that Courts of justice are open to the public, 
that what passes there is pubhc at the time, and that it is impor- 
tant that all persons should be able to scrutinise what is there done, that 
the publication of everything which there passes has been thought 
tobelawful.— LittJedoIe, J.,Stockdale v. Hansard (1840), 3 St. Tr. 923. 

See Contempt of Couet, 9. 

2. It is of great consequence that the public should know what takes 
place in Court ; and the proceedings are under the control of the 
Judges. The inconvenience, therefore, arising from the chance of 
injury to private character is infinitesimally small as compared to the 
convenience of publicity.^ — Lord Camphell, Davison v. Duncan (1857), 
7 E. & B. 231 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 106. 

See 3, 6, below; Judges, 13. 

1 The superior benefit of the publicity times may be great. — Wightman, J., Jiavi- 
of judicial proceedings counterbalances son v. Duncan, rupra. Private interest 
the injury to individuals, though that at must give place to a common good ; the 


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Judicial Proceedings — continued. 

3. Public policy requires that some hardship should be suffered by- 
individuals rather than that judicial proceedings shoidd be held in 
secret. — Lord Esher, M.R., Kimber v. The Press Association (1892), 
L. R. 1 Q. B. [1893], p. 69. 
See 2, above ; 7, helow. 

i. The general rule is an excellent one, that legal proceedings should be 
in public— Nort?i, J., In re Martindale (1894), L. R. C. D. [1894], 
p. 200. 

5. It is one of the essential qualities of a Court of justice, that its pro- 
ceedings should be public, and that aU parties who may be desirous 
of hearing what is going on, if there be room in the place for that 
piirpose, — provided they do not interrupt the proceedings, and pro- 
vided there is no specific reason why they should be removed, — have a 
right to be present for the purpose of hearing what is going on.i — 
Bayley, J., Daubney v. Cooper (1829), 10 B. & C. 240. , 

private prejudice that any man hath, is 
very well repaired by the public utility 
that comes to the kingdom. — Sir Ed. 
Littleton, Hampden's Case (1637), 3 How. 
St. Tr. 927. 

Jam tua res agitur paries cum proximus 
ardet: The private must suffer for the 
public cause.— 22 Ed. IV. f. 2 b. ; 26 
Ed. I. f . 45. 

' In connection with this ruling it may 
be appropriate to reproduce here the 
following correspondence which appeared 
in The limes of June 8, 1891, relative to 
the admission of the public to the Law 
Courts : — 

To the Editor of Tlie Times. 

Sir, — I shall be much obliged if you 
can find room for these letters in your 
Monday paper. 

Your obedient servant, 


1, Sussex Square, Hyde Park, W., June 6. 

37, Temple, E.C., 

June .5, 1891. 
My Loed, — Since it appears there is 
little or no chance of gaining admittance 
into your Court without a ticket, I now 
formally apply for one. I base my appli- 
cation on the ground that although a 
Judge is indeed absolute emperor over his 
Court, yet his power does not extend to 
the selection of what body of people shall 
represent the " public " in cases which 
are not heard in oamera. Although a 
Judge has the undoubted right to take 

such measures as to insure the conveni- 
ence of those having business in the 
Court, even to the exclusive issuing of 
tickets of admission, yet such tickets 
should be distributed impartially to all 
applicants. I have no personal know- 
ledge that such has not been actually the 
case. This I know, that I have been told 
that Lady Coleridge has distributed most 
of the tickets among her friends. I say 
this, not because I in any way wish to be 
insulting or disrespectful to a lady, but 
simply as a statement of fact as to what I 
heard a Templar say. I also say it in 
order to call attention to a fact I am sure 
your lordship will admit to be true, and 
that is your lordship's personal friends 
have no more right to represent the public 
than the friends of John Smith. It 
would seem that this ticket-issuing, or 
rather its distribution, has practically 
resulted in the above-mentioned undesir- 
able outcome. I also maintain that if 
there is room in the well of the Court, any 
member of one of the Inns of Court lias a 
prior right to a seat therein over an 
ordinary member of the public — ^whether 
provided with tickets from the Judge or 
not. This system of admittance by 
tickets only, it tolerated, will practically 
confer on the Judge the power of selecting 
his audience — a right which up to now, I 
labour under the impression, has not been 
conferred on them either by statute or 
any other law. It is not within my pro- 
vince to find fault with your lordship for 

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Judicial Proceedings — continued. 

6. It is of vast importance to the public that the proceedings of Coxirts of 
justice should be universally known. The general advantage to the 

taking the best means in your opinion to 
insure the comfort of those who are bound 
to be in your Court, any more than to do 
so with reference to the degrading of the 
Bench to the level of a grand stand ; but 
I consider that no one, by virtue of hold- 
ing a ticket of admission, has the right to 
take precedence of those who are standing 
much nearer to the door than he is — in 
other words, no member of the public 
having no lociis statidl in your Court has 
the right to have the seat kept reserved 
for him, the first 72 members of the 
public who present themselves at the 
public gallery have the right to be 
admitted. I say 72, because I believe 
that is the number which can be accom- 
modated in the public gallery of your 
lordship's Court. I believe I am not 
wi-ong in saying that there is no denying 
my assertion. The Court, so far as I 
know, takes no notice of the difference 
between peer and pauper in the question 
of admittance therein. If John Smith, 
labourer, is in front of Lord Knows Who, 
and there is only one seat vacant in the 
public gallery, the peer has no prior right 
to occupy that seat. Your lordship pro- 
bably knows all this better than I do, yet 
in the face of recent events, it is well to 
mention all that I have. 1 respectfully 
propose to your lordship that orders be 
given to the official at the door to admit 
members of the Inns of Court (on presen- 
tation of their cards of membership, or 
on their otherwise satisfying them of the 
person being such), giving them pre- 
cedence over members of the public pos- 
sessing a ticket which, strictly speaking, 
gives them no more right to be admitted 
than a piece of waste-paper. If the 
tickets only admit by " courtesy " and 
not by "right," then I claim, my Lord, 
that such courtesy should be extended 
first to members of the Inns of Court. 

Be that as it may, but since admission 
to the Court has been by ticket, I think I 
may safely conclude that as many tickets 
as there are seats have been already dis- 
tributed. If that is so, in order to show 
such distribution did not practically 
amount to a selection of the " public " 
among your lordship's friends and 
acquaintances, one or other of my alter- 
natives should be acted upon. Either 

the members of the Inns of Court should 
be admitted by virtue of their member- 
ship, or a ticket should be sent to one who 
has not the honour of being a friend or 
acquaintance of your lordship's — to wit, 
to me. As I have said before, I deny the 
right of anyone to "reserved" seats in a 
Court of justice. A member of my Inn, 
in palliation, said that the tickets were 
not sold, but granted gratis to aU appli- 
cants. I hope that is so. Armed with a 
ticket of admittance I hope to be able to 
gain an entry, taking my chance with 
others similarly armed. Supposing the 
possessor of a ticket issued before the 
trial commenced is absent, his seat should 
be kept vacant. If he is late, an earlier 
ticketholder should occupy the space 
allotted to him when present. On these 
grounds I respectfully ask your lordship 
to issue tickets over and above those 
already issued, so that there should be no 
appearance of the Court being reserved 
for a few personal friends. 

Your obedient servant, 

L. Tallibn a. M'Vane.* 
To the Eight Hon. J. D. Lord Coleridge. 

I, Sussex Square, W., 

June 6, 1891. 
SiK, — I have hesitated whether to take 
any notice of your letter ; but it has 
become the custom to assume that anyone 
has a right to accuse any other person of 
anything, and that if that other is not at 
the trouble o£ replying to the accusation 
he must be taken to admit its truth. It 

• The writer at the time of his writing 
was apparently only a student, being 
called to the Bar by the Inner Temple on 
May 11, 1892. It will be a matter of 
surprise to many to know that the 
abominable and un-English practice of 
exacting money for admission to a Court 
of justice, i.e. to the galleries of the 
Central Criminal Court, existed until so 
late as in 1860, when it was abolished and 
a condition precedent to admission, in the 
shape of a ticket from the sheriff, sub- 
stituted. A full account in connection 
with the subject will be found in The 
Times of December 10, 1860. See also 
Jur. (N. S.), Vol. 5 and 6, Part 3. 
(1839—60), p. 458. 

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Judicial Proceedings — continued. 

country in having these proceediags made public more than counter- 
balances the inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may 
be the subject of such proceedings. The same reasons also apply to 
the proceedings in Parliament : it is of advantage to the public, and 
even to the legislative bodies, that true accounts of their proceedings 
should be generally circulated.' — Lawrence, J., The King v. Wright 
(1799), 8 T. R. 298. 
See 2, alme ; Husband and Wife, 5 ; Judges, 61 ; Justice, 6. 

is very inconvenient just now to spend 
valuable time in replying to you ; but in 
such a matter as the public administra- 
tion of justice it is perhaps better to 
submit to the inconvenience. 

No one except the Sovereign and the 
Judges has any right upon the Bench ; 
but it has been the immemorial custom 
for the Judges to extend the courtesy of a 
seat there to peers, Privy Councillors, 
and any other persons whom they may 
choose to invite. 1 speak from a personal 
recollection of more than 50 years. It is 
a discretion I shall exercise as my iEus- 
trious predecessors have exercised it, 
when and as I think fit, and with which, 
except by Parliament, I shall permit no 

The statement as to my wife, which you 
profess to have heard from " a Templar," 
is absolutely untrue. It seems that some 
Templars can be like other men — inaccu- 
rate — and that other Templars can forget 
what is usually considered due to a lady. 
It is equally untrue that the Bench has 
been filled by my personal friends. My 
wife has had at her disposal three seats, 
and three seats only, including her own. 
The majority of persons on the Bench 
have been unknown to me, even by sight, 
but they have been persons to whom, for 
one reason or another, it seemed proper to 
grant the privilege. Exactly the same 
observations apply to my own small 
gallery and to a portion of the gallery 
opposite the Bench. The rest of that 
gallery and the whole of the body of the 
Court has been absolutely free, but I have 
given strict orders to prevent overcrowd- 
ing, so that the quiet and orderly trial of 
the cause shall be secured ; with the 
further direction that the utmost avail- 
able space shall be given to members of 
the Bar in costume ; and that the re- 
porters for the Press, who keep the public 
informed of the proceedings in Court, 

shall be able to perform their important 
duty, as far as possible, in ease and 

I believe that my orders have not been 
wholly ineffectual, and they will certainly 
be continued. When the Court is fuU my 
orders are to exclude everyone. There 
are thousands, I daresay, who would like 
to hear the trial of an interesting cause ; 
but it is, in my opinion, far more impor- 
tant that those who do hear it should be 
comfortable (so far as comfort is possible 
in the Koyal Courts of Justice), and 
therefore quiet and orderly, than that a 
few more persons — it may be 100 — should 
hear it at the expense of the comfort, the 
quiet, and the order of the whole audience. 
I have acted before now on these views ; 
and shall certainly act on them now and 
whenever it may be my fate to preside at 
the trial of a case which excites public 
interest. I can make no alteration in 
your favour. 

As the person you refer to as "a 

Templar " and yourself may perhaps 

repeat your mistakes, I shall send your 

letter and my answer to the newspapers. 

I am, Sir, 

your obedient, humble servant, 


. T. A. M'Vane, Esq. 
' Publicity is the very soul of justice. 
It is the keenest spur to exertion, and 
the surest of all guards against improbity. 
It keeps the Judge himself while trying 
under trial. Under the auspices of pub- 
licity, the cause in the Court of law, and 
the appeal to the court of public opinion, 
are going on at the same time. So many 
bystanders as an unrighteous Judge, or 
rather a Judge who would otherwise be 
unrighteous, beholds attending in his 
Court, BO many witnesses he sees of his 
unrighteousness, so many condemning 
Judges, so many ready executioners, and 
so many proclaimers of his sentence. By 


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Judicial Proceedings — continued. 

7. The privilege which attaches to the publication of the proceedings of 
the Courts of justice rests on the foundation that the law of this land 
is administered publicly and openly, and its administration is at once 
subjected to, and protected by, the full and searching light of public 
opinion and public criticism. The openness and publicity of our 
Ciourts forms one of the excellences of our practice of the law, and 
admits of exception only in rare cases of such a character that public 
morality requires that the proceedings should be in camerd wholly or 
in part. This openness and publicity was at one time peculiar to the 
law of England. Harrington, in his observations on the statutes, and 
speaking of our open Courts, says : " I do not recollect to have met in 
any of the European laws with an injunction that all causes should be 
heard ' ostiis apertis,' except in those of the republic of Lucca. In 
Scotland, by a statute of William and Mary, all causes must be tried 
with open doors, rape and the like being excepted." And Mr. Emlyn, 
in his preface to his edition of State Trials, says : " In other countries 
the Courts of justice are held in secret ; with us pubhckly and in open 
view ; there the witnesses are examined in private, and in the 
prisoner's absence ; with us face to face, and in the prisoner's 
presence." — Lord FitsGerald, MacdougaU v. Knight (1889), L. R. 14 
Ap. Ca. 206. 

See 3, above ; 11, heloic; Adhinisteation of Justice, 20; Coktehipt 
OF Court, 9 ; Ceiminal Justice, 14, 15 ; Judges, 18, 61, 75, 82 ; 
Morals, 1. 

8. As to proceedings in Courts of justice, it is for the interest of all the 
public to hear what takes place in Court. — Lord Esher, M.R., Pittard 
V. Oliver (1891), L. J. 60 Q. B. D. 221. 

See above, 7, and references therefrom. 

publicity, the Court of law, to which his rise up in opposition to it from a thousand 

judgment is appealed from, is secured mouths. Many a known face, and every 

against any want of evidence of his guilt. unknown countenance, presents to him a 

It is through publicity alone that justice possible source of detection, from whence 

becomes the mother of security. By the truth he is struggling to impress may, 

publicity, the t€inple of Justice is con- through some unsuspected connection, 

verted into a school of the first order, burst forth to his confusion, 

where the most important branches of "Without publicity, all other checks 

morality are enforced by the most impres- are fruitless : in comparison with pub- 

sive means : into a theatre, where the licity, all other checks are of small 

sports of the imagination give place to the account. It is to publicity, more than to 

more interesting exhibitions of real life. everything else put together, that the 

" Nor is publicity less auspicious to the English system of procedure owes its 

veracity of the witness than to the probity being the least bad system as yet extant , 

of the Judge. Environed as he sees himseU instead of being the worst." — Bentham- 

by a thousand eyes, contradiction, should iatia ; or, Select Extracts from the Works 

he hazard a false tale, will seem ready to of Jeremy Benthwm, 1843, p. 419. 

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Judicial Proceedings — continued. 

9. The proceedings in our Courts are founded upon the law of England, 
and that law is again founded upon the law of nature and the revealed 
law of God.— JBest, J., Forbes v. Cochrane and another (1824), 2 St. 
Tr. ^. 8.) 167. 

See Cheistianity, 5 ; Law, 68 ; Public Policy, 7. 

10. It is the excellence of our law that its Judges are illuminated and 
fortified by the concurrent justice and support of all other arts and 
sciences, and its honour that these great Courts where it is adminis- 
tered are public, and interfere not with immodesty or indecent subjects, 
as divorces and other evils of matrimony, which are more easily 
allayed by private conference, than healed by public discussion. — 
Per Cttr-.,' Manby v. Scott (1672), 1 Levinz, 4 ; 2 Sm. L. C. (8th ed.) 

See above, 7 ; Husband and Wife, 5 ; Judges, 1, 57. 

11. Nothing can be of greater importance to the welfare of the public 
than to put a stop to the animadversions and censures which are so 
frequently made on Courts of justice in this country. They can be of 
no service, and may be attended with the most mischievous conse- 
quences. Cases may happen in which the Judge and the jury may be 
mistaken : when they are, the law has afEorded a remedy ; and the 
party injured is entitled to pursue every method which the law allows 
to correct the mistake. But when a person has recourse either by a 
writing like the present, by publications in print, or by any other 
means, to calumniate the proceedings of a Court of justice, the obvious 
tendency of it is to weaken the administration of justice, and in conse- 
quence to sap the very foundation of the Constitution itself.' — 
Buller, J., King v. Watson and others (1788), 1 T. R. 205. 

See above, 7 ; Admenisteation of Justice, 20 ; Appeais, 1 ; Contempt 
OF Court, 9 ; Judges, 75, 82, 

12. Public notoriety is nothing here ; we can only be informed of the 
facts relevant to the matter before us. — Abbott, C.J., R. v. Edmonds 
and others (1821), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 925. 

See Rights 3. 

13. Words used in the course of legal or judicial proceedings, however 
hard they might bear on the party of whom they were used, were not 

' Mallet, Twisden and Terrill, JJ. ought to arise from good and grave men, 

* Fa/ma, qua mspicionem inducit, oriri who indeed from malevolent and malicious 

dehet apud bonos et graves, non quidem men, but from cautious and credible per- 

malevolos et maledicos, sed proeidas et fide sous, not only once, but frequently ; for 

dignas persanas, non semel sed stepius, clamour diminishes and defamation mani- 

quia clamor minuit et defamatio mani- fests. — 2 Inst. 52. 
festat : Report, which induces suspicion, 

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Judicial Proceedings — continued. 

such as would support an action for slander. — Lord Eldon, C.J., 
Johnson v. Evans (1800), 3 Esp. Rep. 33. 
See CocirsEL, 13. 


1. God forbid that Judges upon their oath should make resolutions to 
enlarge jurisdiction. — Gowper, L.C., Reeves v. Buttler (1715), Gilbert, 
Eq. Ca. 196. 

See helow, 2, 6 ; Dictum, 4. 

2. I agree we ought not to incroach or inlarge our jurisdiction ; by so 
doing we usurp both on the right of the Queen and the people. — 
EoU, C.J., Ashby v. White (1703), Lord Raym. 938. 

See above, 1 ; Common Law, 11 ; Magistrates, 3, n. 

3. The rule for jurisdiction is, that nothing shall be intended to be out 
of the jurisdiction of the superior Court, but that which specially 
appears to be so; and on the contrary, nothing shall be intended 
to be within the jurisdiction of an inferior Court but that which 
is so expressly alleged. — Per Cur.,^ Peacock v. BeU and Kendall 
(1667), 1 Saund. 74 a.^ 

See Magistrates, 3. 

4. The Court ought never to come to the conclusion that two cases in 
the same Court, or in Courts of co-ordiaate jurisdiction, are in conflict, 
unless it is obliged to. I agree that if two cases are in conflict the 
Court must say with which of them it agrees. — Lord Esher, Duke of 
Devonshire v. O'Connor (1890), L. R. 24 Q. B. D. 473. 

See Construction, 13 ; Judicial Decisions, 16 ; Law, 53. 

5. Although our powers are great, they are not unlimited — they are 
bounded by some liaes of demarcation.^ — Abbott, C.J., The King v. 
Justices of Devon (1819), 1 Chit. Rep. 37. 

See Judges, 26, n. 

6. The Court is not hungry after jurisdiction. — Sir W. Scott, "The Two 
Friends " (1799), 1 C. Rob. Ad. Rep. 280. 

See above, 1. 

7. It is part of my duty to expound the jurisdiction of the Court. It is 
no part of my duty to expand it. — Keketoich, J., In re Montagu (1897), 
L. R. 1 C. D. [1897], p. 693. 

See Statutes, 22. 

1 Kelynge, Twysden, Wyndham and ^ Quoted by Parlte, B., in Howard v. 

Moreton, JJ. Gosset (1844), 6 St. Tr. (N. S.) 397 

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Jurisdiction — continued. 

8. A total want of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the assent of the 
parties.!— Potteson, J., Jones v. Owen (1848), 5 D. & L. 674. 

See 9, 10, 11, helow ; Consent, 2. 

9. If the Court does not possess an inherent jurisdiction over the subject- 
matter, it is not possible that the consent of an individual could confer 
any such jurisdiction.— Z>r .Lushington, "The Golubchick" (1840), 
1 Wm. Rob. Ad. Rep. 147. 

See above, 8 ; Statutes, 22. 

10. Consent does not give jurisdiction.'— Wilde, B., Reg. v. Thompson 
(1861), 9 Cox, C. C. 85 ; 9 W. R. 208. 

See 8, 9, above. 

11. I am extremely unwilling that we should take upon ourselves to 
exercise a jurisdiction which the law does not vest in us. — Abbott, C.J., 
Rex V. Middleton (1819), 1 Chit. Rep. 656. 

See below, 12 ; Statutes, 22. 

12. We ought not to overstep our jurisdictionb ecause we think it might 
be advantageous so to do. — Bigby, L.J., In re Watkins (1896), L. R. 2 
C. D. [1896], p. 339. 

See above, 11 ; Admission ; CoNSTEacTiON, 13. 

13. In case of private jurisdictions, the Court has inclined not to inter- 
meddle.— I>emsow, J., The King v. Bishop of Ely (1750), 1 Black. 
Rep. 58. 

See Statutes, 19. 

14. If it be a matter within our jurisdiction, we are bound by our oaths 
to judge of it.— ffoZt, C.J., Ashby v. White (1703), 2 Raym. Rep. 956. 

See 16, 17, below. 

15. The title or description of a Court does not often point out the extent 
of its jurisdiction. — Lawrence, J., Lothian v. Henderson (1803), 3 Bos. 
and PuU. 525. 

IG. Those who act under a jurisdiction given by Act of Parliament, 
must shew their jurisdiction. — Probyn, J., Rex v. Inhabitants of 
Stepney (1735), Burrow (Settlement Cases), 25. 
See 14, above ; Statutes, 19. 

1 Also to same efEect, Farquharson r. (8th ed.), p. 371, and authorities there 
Morgan, L. E. C. A. Q. B. D. (189i), collected. Nor except by express words 
Vol. 1, p. 552. See also Lawrence v. or necessary implication : King v. Abbot 
Wilcock (1840), 11 A. & £. 941 ; Lismore (1783), 2 Dou?. 552; Gates «. Knight 
V. Beadle (1842), 1 Dowl. (N. S.) 566 ; (1789), 3 T. E. 442 ; Shipman v. Henbest 
Jackson r. Beaumont (1855), 11 Ex. 300; (1790), 4 T. E. 116 ; Crisp v. Bunbury 
^iK jwarie Eobertson (1875), 20 Eq. 733. (1832), 8 Bing. 399; Jacobs r. Brett 

2 Nor can jurisdiction be ousted by (1875), L. E. 20 Eq. 6 ; Oram v. Brearey 
agreement : Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. Ca. (1877), 2 Ex. D. 346, overruled by Chad- 
811 ; see also Cumber r. Wane, 1 Sm.L. Ca. wick f. Ball (1885), 14 Q. B. 855. 

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Jurisdiction — continued. 

17. It is of little importance how the jurisdiction originated, if it be 
found to exist. — Turner, L.J., Boyse v. Rossborough (1854), 23 L. J. 
Rep. Part 5 (N. S.) Ch. 535. 

18. I shall not be afraid to exercise a jurisdiction I find established, and 
shall adhere to precedents. — LordH.ardvncke,'L.G., Earl of Chesterfield 
V. Janssen (1750), 2 Ves. Sen. 158. 

19. The rule is this : that wherever there is a decision of a Court of 
concurrent jurisdiction, the other Courts will adopt that as the basis 
of their decision, provided it can be appealed from. If it cannot be 
appealed from, then they will exercise their own judgment. — Pollock, 
C.B., Leech v. North Staffordshire Railway Co. (1860), 29 L. J. M. C. 

See helow, 20 ; Judicial Decisions, 12, and references there given. 

20. A Court of law is well justified, according to the comity of our 
Courts, in overruling the decision of another Court of co-ordinate 
jurisdiction.— Brett, M.R., Pahner v. Johnson (1884), L. R. 13 Q. B. D. 

See above, 19 ; Law, 53. 


1. take it to be the bounden duty of the Judge to lay down the law as it 
strikes him, and that of the jury to accede to it, unless they have 
superior knowledge on the subject.' — Bayley, J., Trial of Sir Francis 
Burdett (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 130. 

See JnDGES, 79. 

2. Though a definition, or maxim in law, without an exception, it is 
said, is hardly to be found, yet this I take to be a maxim, without an 
exception : ad guoestionem juris non respondent juratores ; ad quces- 
tionem faeti non respondent judices? — Lord Mansfield, King v. Shipley 
(1784), 3 Doug. 169. 

3. It is of the greatest consequence to the law of England and to the 
Subject, that the powers of the Judge and Jury are kept distinct : that 
the Judge determines the law, and the Jury the fact : and if ever they 
come to be confounded it will prove the confusion and destruction of 

1 Blackstone considers trial by jury 8th ed., Bk. 5, c. 11, p. 532. 

as having been universally established 2 j^^ gueition^s facti non respondent 

amongst all the northern nations, and so judices; ad qvestiones legis non respon- 

interwoven in their very Constitution, that dent jtiratores : Judges do not answer 

the earliest accounts of the one gives us questions of fact ; juries do not answer 

also some traces of the other. — £1. questions of law. — Co.Mtt.295. 
Vol. III., p. 349 ; St. Com. Vol. III., 

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Jury — continued. 

the law of England}— Lord Hardwicke, Rex v. Poole (1737), K. B. 
Cas. temp. Hardw. 28.^ 

See above, 1 ; below 8 ; Evidence, 3. 

4. The jury cannot find evidence : they must find facts. — Lord Mans field, 
Rex V. Royce (1766), 4 Burr. Part IV., p. 2077. 

See below, 14 ; Evidence 11. 

5. It is certainly a rule that the jury must find facts, and not merely 
evidence of facts. — Buller, J., Newling v. Francis (1789), 3 T. R. 198. 

See 14, below. 

6. It is the Court, not the jury, v^ho are to determine the law. — Aston, J., 
PiUans v. Van Mierop (1764), 3 Burr. Part IV. 1675. 

See 2, above. 

7. I am as jealous of the rights of juries as of those of the Court. — Lord 
Mlenborough, Rex v. Hucks (1816), 1 Starkie, 522. 

See 12, behw. 

8. The constitution trusts, that, under the direction of a Judge, they wiU 
not usurp a jurisdiction which is not in their province. They do not 
know, and are not presumed to know the law ; they are not sworn to 
decide the law ; they are not required to decide the law. If it appears 
upon the record, they ought to leave it there, or they may find the 
facts subject to the opinion of the Court upon the law. But further, 
upon the reason of the thing, and the eternal principles of justice, the 
jury ought not to assume the jurisdiction of the law. As I said 
before, they do not know, and are not presumed to know anything 
of the matter ; they do not understand the language in which it is 
conceived, or the meaning of the terms.* They have no rule to go by 
but their affections and wishes. It is said, if a man gives a right 
sentence upon hearing one side only, he is a wicked Judge, because 
he is right by chance only, and has neglected taking the proper 
method to be informed ; so the jury who usurp the judicature of 
law, though they happen to be right, are themselves wrong, because 
they are right by chance only, and have not taken the constitutional 

' " The man, who laugh'd but once to Slattery, id. 1155. Also remarks of 

see an ass Daniel, J., in Mitchel v. Harmony, 13 

Mumbling to make the cross-grain'd Howard (U.S.)R. Ii2 — 145. 

thistles pass, ' See Law, 1. It was chiefly in con- 
Might laugh again to see a jury chaw sequence of the discussion occasioned by 
The prickles of unpalatable law." this case (77t« King v. Shipley'), that the 
Dnjden, " The Medal." legislature passed the statute 23 Geo. III. 
a See also Prudential Assurance Co. v. c. 60, entitled " An Act to remove Doubts 
Edmonds, L. E. 2 App. Ca. 487 ; Metro- respecting the Functions of Juries in 
politan Railway Co. v. Jackson, L. R. 3 Cases of Libel." 
App. Ca. 193 ; Dublin, &c. Railway Co. t". 

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Jury — continued. 

way of deciding the question.' It is the duty of the Judge, in all 
cases of general justice, to tell the jury how to do right, though they 
have it in their power to do wrong, which is a matter entirely between 
God and their own consciences. — Lord Mansfield, King v. Shipley 
(1784), 3 Doug. 170. 
See also 3, above ; helow, 9, 10, 19, 25 ; Evidence, 11 ; Judges, 
52, n. ; 76 ; Politics, 3 ; Property, 12 ; Public Policy, 9. 

9. I am sure from my experience of juries that, in a criminal case 
especially, they will obey the law as declared by the Judge ; they 
will take the law from the Judge, whether they like it or do not like 
it, and apply it honestly to the facts before them. — Lord Coleridge, 
Reg. V. Ramsey (1883), 1 Cab. & EU. Q. B. Rep. 133. 

See above, 8 ; Equity, 14. 

10. It is a strange, wild jurisdiction, where the jurors are judges both of 
law and fact, and ignorant country fellows^ are to determine the 
nicest points of law. — Wilmx)t, J., Doev. Roe3(1760), 2 Burr. Part IV. 

iSee above, 8. 

11. The moment juries or judges go beyond their functions, and take 
upon themselves to lay down the law or find the facts, not according 
to the law as it is, but according to the law as they think it ought to 
be, then the certainty of the law is at an end ; there is nothing to rely 
upon ; we are left to the infinite variety and xmcertainty of human 

1 See Administration of Justice, be whether A. had a right to demise on 

1 ; Judges, .S6, 73. the day in question ; in fact A. had to 

* See post, note to Money, 3. prove his title. — See Steph. Comm. 

' The action, which was to recover Vol. III., Bk. 5, c. viii. 405. See also the 
land, began by " a declaration " at the following : " My brother Shepherd states 
suit of a fictitious plaintiff (John Doe) it to be the practice to put any names 
against a fictitious defendant (Richard into the writ, as John Doe ; which is very 
Eoe), that a lease for a term of years intelligible; the writ here is only the 
having been made to Doe by A. (the real process by which this defendant was 
claimant of the land) and Doe having brought into Court, and the notice of 
entered thereon, Roe ousted him, and Doe declaration given afterwards is right. If 
claimed damages. A notice to appear Jolm, Doe be ever joined in the writ with 
was at the same time given to B. the real the real defendant, it follows that pro- 
tenant in possession, who on receipt of ceedings are not to be stayed because two 
this would appear and defend : otherwise names appear in the writ, and one only in 
judgment would be given against the the declaration ; for John Doe is never 
casual ejector (Hoe) who would make no inserted in the declaration." — Eyre, C.J., 
defence. On the tenant (B.) appearing, Spencer ■«. Scott (1797), 2 Bos. & Pull. 19. 
he signed a " consent rule " by which he Again, "We will not distinguish between 
confessed that he was in possession and Jolvn Doe and a real defendant, in order 
that he had ejected the plaintiff. Then ' to raise an objection." — Per Cur. in 
the issue was sent to trial, as an action at Stables and another v. Ashley and others 
the suit of Doe on the demise of A. (1797), 2 Bos. & Pull. 50. 
against B., and the point at issue would 

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Jury — continued. 

opinion ; to caprice which may at any moment influence the best of us, 
to feelings and prejudices, perhaps excellent in themselves, but which 
may distort or disturb our judgment, and distract our minds from the 
single simple operation of ascertaining whether the facts proved bring 
the case within the law as we are bound to take it. — Lord Coleridge, 
Reg. V. Ramsey (1883), 1 Cab. & EU. Q. B. Rep. 134. 
See hehw, 25 ; Discretion, 4 ; Equity, 31, w. ; Motives, 11. 

12. You all very well know what deference I always pay, and ever will, 
to that part of the office of a jury which properly belongs to them. In 
regard to the law, I have always been as tenacious of the proper 
function of a Judge, as I have been of that of the jury. I never wiU, 
while I have the honour of executing the office of a Judge, attempt to 
controul or influence their minds in respect of damages ; but only 
submit to them such observations as occur to me upon the evidence. 
—Wilmot, L.C.J., Wilkes v. Lord HaUfax (1763), 19 How. St. Tr. 

See 7, above. 

13. It wiU be your verdict, and not the verdict of the Court ; we are 
responsible for the law, it is our duty to state the law, and I have laid 
down principles from great authority. — Earl of Glonwell, L.C.J., 
Jackson's Case (1795), 25 How. St. Tr. 871. 

14. The best way in which a jury can execute their duty is to give their 
verdict according to the evidence before them. — Rooke, J., Trial of 
Redhead alias Yorke (1795), 25 How. St. Tr. 1149. 

See 4, 5, above. 

15. If I were master of eloquence I would not make the decision of this 
cause a stage upon which I would display that eloquence. Those 
things which are very proper for advocates to do,^ become very 
improper for the Judge,'who has nothing to do, but to state to the juiy 
the short grounds upon which the cause ought to proceed. — Lord 
Kenyan, Eaton's Case (1793), 22 How. St. Tr. 820. 

See CorarsEL, 13, n. 

16. Our trials by juries are of such consideration in our law that we 
allow their determination to be best and most advantageous to the 
subject ; and therefore less evidence is required than by the civil law. 

So said Fortescue in his commendation of the laws of England. 

Bolt, L.C.J., Vaughan's Case (1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 535. 

See Teial foe Life, 1. 

1 On the subject of forensic eloquence. Privileges relating to Colonial Attorneys- 
see the Author's treatise on the Law and General, p. 53. 

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Juty — eontirmed. 

17. Upon trials, the jury ouglit not to have any evidence laid before 
them but what is proper. — Prohyn, J., Rex v. Inhabitants of Preston 
upon the HiU (1736), Burrow (Settlement Cases), 85. 

See Evidence, 10, 11. 

18. Le direction del Judge in civil pleas doit estre hypothetic, si le fait 
soit trove tiel, dengue pur le plaintiff ou defendant, mes ne ungues 
positive ou coercive, ne le jury finable : The direction of the Judge in 
civil pleas ought to be hypothetick, if the fact be found such, then for 
the plaintifE or defendant, but never positive or coercive, nor is the 
jury finable. — Vaughan, L.C.J., Bushel's Case (1670), Jones's (Sir 
Thos.) Eep. 16. 

19. Le jury est perjure si le verdict soit contra lour proper judgment, 
coment per direction del Court, car lour serement oblige eux al lour 
judgrnent proper : The jury is perjured if the verdict be against their 
own judgment, tho' by direction of the Court, for their oath obliges 
them to their own judgment.'' — Vaughan, L.C.J., Bushel's Case (1670), 
Jones's (Sir Thos.) Rep. 17. 

See above, 8 ; Contempt of Court, 10. 

20. Est le duty dun Judge de examiner le Jury, et de Juror al responder, 
et si ne voet respondre, ou rendra verdict eontr' lour response, en lun 
et lauier case, il est finable : It is the duty of a Judge to examine 
the Jury, and of a Juror to answer, and if he will not answer, or 
shall give a verdict contrary to their answer, in either case he is 
&iahle.^— Vaughan, L.C.J., Bushel's Case (1670), Jones's (Sir Thos.) 
Rep. 15. 

See Contempt of Court, 2, 4. 

21. We do not desire that the unanimity of a jury should be the result 
of anything but the unanimity of conviction. It is true that a 
single juryman, or two or three constituting a small minority, may, 
if their own convictions are not strong and deeply rooted, think 
themselves justified in giving way to the majority. If is very true, 
if jurymen have only doubts or weak convictions, they may yield 
to the stronger and more determined view of their fellows ; but I 
hold it to be of the essence of a juryman's duty, if he has a fimn 
and deeply rooted conviction, either in the affirmative or the negative 
of the issue he has to try, not to give up that conviction, although the 
majority may be against him, from any desire to purchase his freedom 
from confinement or constraint, or the various other inconveniences to 

' Hob. 227 ; Cro. Eliz. 416 ; 26 ^ Bract. 289. 

Hen. VIII. cap. i. 

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Jury — continued. 

which jurors are subject. — Gockhum, J., Winsor v. The Queen (loDo), 
L. R. 1 Q. B. Ca. 305. 
See also 23, 29, 30, helow. 

22. In my mind, he was guilty of no error, he was chargeable with no 
exaggeration, he was betrayed by his fancy into no metaphor, who 
once said, that all we see about us. Kings, Lords, and Commons, the 
whole machinery of the State, all the apparatus of the system, and its 
varied workings,' end in simply bringing twelve good men into a box.' 
—Lord Brougham (1828), Present State of the Law (Feb. 7). 

See Liberty of the Peess, 8 ; Teial foe Life, 1. 

23. There is no distinction between a good jury and a common jury. — 
Buller, J., King v. Perry (1793), 5 T. R. 460. 

See 21, above. 

24. It is infinitely better that a cause should be tried upon a view had 
by any twelve than by six of the first twelve ; or by any six ; or by 
fewer than six ; or even without any view at all, than that the trial 
should be delayed from year to year, perhaps for ever : it can never 
be proper or necessary to grant a view which is asked and used for 
so unjust a purpose." — Lord Mansfield (1765), 1 Burr. Part IV. 254. 

25. It is and must be admitted, that publications which are calculated 
with a view to prejudice the minds of men who ought to come to 
compose a jury, without any pre-conceived opinions to decide upon 
the subject — I say it must be admitted that any publications of 
that kind, whether made by the party interested in the question, 
or by strangers, is sufi&cient reason to put ofi the trial of the cause, in 
order that the minds of those who are to decide may return to a proper 
tone, and that they may not be put into a situation which no man 
sitting in judgment ought to be in, namely, having formed a prior 
opinion upon the point; for that juryman would be extremely dis- 
graced who should put himself into that box, having made up his 
mind upon that subject before he heard it discussed ; non sum doctus 
rere instruetus is the language a juryman ought to hold ; he ought to 
have no wishes in the matter.' — Kenyan, L.C.J., Proceedings against 
the Dean of St. Asaph (1783), 21 How. St. Tr. 869. 

See above, 8, 11 ; Judges, 48, n. ; 58, 82. 

1 In all criminal causes, the most rega- sworn men. — Hale, " Pleas of the Crown " 

lar and safe way, and most consonant to Vol. II. 151. ' 

the statutes of Magna Cliarta, cap. 29 ; 2 Upon the granting of rules for views 

5 Ed. III. cap. 9 ; 25 Ed. III. cap. 4 : in Civil Causes. 

28 Ed. III. cap. 3 ; ei 42 Ed. III. cap. 3, is ^ ]j.,.att. L.G.J. : And there is, too, an 

by presentment or indictment of twelve examination in print ; that ought not to 

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Jury — continued. 

26. I have always told a jury that if a fact is fuUy proved by two 
witnesses it is as good as if proved by a hundred. — Buller, J., Calliand 
V. Vaughan (1798), 2 Bos. & PuU. 212. 

See also Affidavit, 2; EviDEaiOE, 29, 30; Tkial foe Life, 1; 
Witness, 3. 

27. The jury can't find a negative, unless such an one as is proved by 
an affirmative. — Lord Mansfield, Harwood v. Groodright (1774), Lofft. 

28. Challenges being for the sake of justice, they are greatly favoured in 
the law.* — Per Gur., Kynaston v. Mayor of Shrewsbury (1737), Andrews' 
Rep. 87. 

29. I have had the honour of being a considerable time on the bench ; 
I cannot now pretend to bear fatigue as well as formerly, but I hope I 
shall take care that the jurors or myself shall not be in danger of 
being destroyed.' — Ward, J., Trial of Mary Heath (1744), 18 How. 
St. Tr. 23. 

See 21, above. 

30. We are all desirous to sit as long as we can, but necessity justifies 
that which it compels ; the strength of man is not adequate to .this. 
Lord Mansfield, as little inclined to give way as any man, did give 
way at a certain hour in the case of Lord Pomfret. — Lord Kenyan, 
Stone's Case (1796), 25 How. St. Tr. 1290. 

See Ceoonal Justice, 43 ; Neoessitt, 2 ; Misoellaneods, 56 ; 
Time, 3, n. 

31. We have a duty to discharge to the individual as well as to the 
public. We cannot make a man serve at the hazard of his life.' 
— Pennef other, L.C.J. (1843), Queen offoinst O'ConneU, 5 St. Tr. 
(N. S.) 86. 

be, and the person that did it ought to be — LutterelVs Case (1722), 16 How. 

censured ; are juries to be prepossessed ; St. Tr. 33. 

here is a printed pamphlet, whereof the ' Co. Litt. 158 a. ; 3 Keb. 740. 

title is "Mr. Lutterell's Cry for Justice." ' Thehungryjudgessoonthesentenoesign, 

Mr. HvMgerford': I never saw it, but And wretches hang, that jurymen may 

am told it is most in favour of the dine, 

prisoner at the bar. —Pope, " The Rape of the Look." 

Pratt, L.C.J. : If the examination is Canto III. L. 21. 

true, it ought to be produced, and the ' " Mr. Plumer, if you seek for a resting 

prisoners ought to come fairly to their place in a course so cbmplicated and 

trial, and, if guilty, God forbid that they extensive as this, you may freely choose it 

should suffer, but not by passionate in- for yourself." — Thomas, Lord JErsMne, 

sinuations in print ; and it is am, vnprece- L.C. (addressing counsel for the defen- 

dented thing, and if it comes out who did dant). Trial of Lord Viscount Melville 

it, I shall take a course vrith them : it is a (1806), 29 How. St. Tr. 1249. 
way of preventing all manner of justice. 

D.L.Q. 10 

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1. Justice must not give way to policy. — Hotham, L.C., Prideaux v. 
Prideaui (178i), 1 Cox, Eq. Ca. 36. 

See also Politics, 2 ; Public Policy, 9. 

2. Uncertain justice by a verdict is much better than certain injustice.^ 
—Lord Mansfield, Cases in the King's Bench (1773), EEilary Term, 
13 Geo. in., LofEt. 147. 

See also Judges, 42. 

3. There is not in this country one rule by which the rich are governed, 
and another for the poor. No man has justice meted out to him by a 
different measure on account of his rank or fortune, from what would 
be done if he were destitute of both. Every invasion of property is 
judged of by the same rule ; every injury is compensated in the same 
way ; and every crime is restrained by the same pimishment, be the 
condition of the offender what it may. It is in this alone that true 
equality can exist in society." — Buller, J., Trial of O'Coigly and 
others (1798), 26 How. St. Tr. 1193. 

See also Judges, 38, 74, 81 ; Justice, 3 ; Law, 19, 31 ; Pooe, 3 ; 
Pboteotion, 2 ; Punishment, 6 ; Rights, 4 ; Tort, 6 ; Trespass, 2. 

4. It is the right of her Majesty's subjects to make claims and to have 
them tried in the constitutional way. — Kekewich, J., Birmingham and 
District Land Co. v. London and North-Western Railway Co. (1888), 
57 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) C. D. 123. 

See Equity, 36 ; Law, 66 ; PARLiAMEajT, 9 ; Relief, 3 ; Tort, 8. 

5. The humanity of the Court has been loudly and repeatedly invoked. 
Hitmanity is the second virtue of Courts, but undoubtedly the 
first is Justice. — Sir Wm. Scott, Evans v. Evans (1790), 1 TTagg 
Con. Rep. 36. 

See Law, 33 ; Pardon, 1, n. 

6. When the Court see reason to suspect that justice has not been done 
to any particular defendant, they will in their discretion direct a 
farther enquiry into the merits of the cause. — AsJihurst, J., The King v. 
Holt (1793), 5 T. R. 444. 

See Appeals, 1 ; Contempt of Court, 5, 10 ; Judicial Proceedings, 6, n. ; 
New Trial, 2, 3. 


1. There are a thousand things might have been a justification. — Lord 

Mansfidd, The King v. Williams (1774), Lofft. 762. 

1 Lexvultpotiiisprivatwiiincommodum same for all ranks and degrees. Sir 

quant puUioum malvm. Wm. Blachstone (1765), Com. Bk. III., 

' The law is well known, and is the ch. 25, p. 379. 

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Justification — continued. 

2. Is ill-language a justification for blows ? — PraU, C.J., Case of Hugh 
Reason and another (1722), 16 How. St. Tr. 44. 
See WoEDs, 4. 


Generally speaking, no young tree is allowed to stand on copyhold land.* 
— Coke, 3rd Rep. 15. 
See Freehold. 


1. It is my province to lay down the law. Every lawyer knows that 
the law is the result of a great deal of learning.* — Erie, J., Queen v. 
Dowling (1848), 7 St. Tr. (N. S.) 438. 

iSee CoussEL, 15 ; Foeeign Law, 3 ; Jury, 8. 

2. The law does not consist in particular instances, though it is explained 
by particular instances and rules, but the law consists of principles, 
which govern specific and individual cases, as they happen to arise.* 
—Lm-d Mansfield, R. v. Bembridge (1783), 22 How. St. Tr. 155. 

See alio 3, 53, helmo ; Cases, 9, 21 ; Common Law, 12 ; Judges, 70 ; 
Judicial Decisions, 9. 

3. Law grows, and though the principles of law remaia unchanged, yet 
(and it is one of the advantages of the common law) their application 
is to be changed with i the changing circumstances of the times.* 

1 Hence the maxim, that " the oak has convinced me that he spoke truly. — 

scorns to grow except on free land." Warren, " Study of the Law." 

^ We may appeal to the experience of I cannot say the law was ever a hard 

every sensible lawyer, whether anything mistress to me ; and she did not allow me 

can be more hazardous or discouraging long to languish in idleness, nor ever 

than the usual entrance on the study of suffer me to be without hope. But, of 

the law. — iSSr Wm. BlaokUone, Com. course, X had many idle days, and I was 

Bk. I., sec. 1, p. 16. rather fond of note-taking as a very 

Beading, mafceth a full man, conference instructive practice, whenever the case 

a ready man, and writing an exact man ; — was an interesting one, and I found great 

and, therefore, if a man write little, he benefit from it when the facility of taking 

had need have a great memory ; if he an accurate and full note rapidly became 

confer little, he had need have a present of the greatest importance in the course 

wit ; and if he read little, he had need of my after life at the Bar and on the 

have much cunning to seem to know that Bench. — Right Hon. Sir John T. Coleridge, 

he doth not. — Lord Bacon. " Circuit Beminiscences." TheJur.(B.^.) 

" I had heard much of ," said an Vol. V. and VI., Part 2 (1859—1860), 

eminent person to the author, alluding to p. 377. See also post, Law Repokts, 

a yoimg man who had recently entered 3, n. 

pubUo life, "and was disposed to think <* See this quoted in Lord Melville's 

well of him, tiU I heard him say that for Case (1806), 29 How. St. Tr. 1383. 

the last four years he had sead fourteen * Leges posteriores priores, contr arias 

hours a day ! I have never thought any- abrogant : Subsequent laws repeal prior 

thing of him since." From that time, contrary laws. — 11 Co. 626. 

whatever I have seen or known of him, 


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Law — continued. 

Some pereonB may call this retrogression, I call it progression of 
human opinion. — Lord Coleridge, Reg. v. Ramsey (1883), 1 Cabab6 
and Ellis' Q. B. D. Rep. 135. 
See 2, above ; Cocet Leet ; Paeliament„ 3 n. 

4. The truth is . . . the old feudal law existing in England ... is 
only being broken down slowly by legislation and decisions of the 
Court, and . . . still exists to a very great extent. — Kay, J., Whitby 
V. MitcheU (1889), L. R. 42 C. D. 500. 

5. There is no positive law : Many things are bad by that, which 
otherwise were not. — Lord Mansfield, Jones v. Randall (1774) LoSt. 

6. No man can come into a British Court of justice to seek the assistance 
of the law who founds his claim upon a contravention of the British 
laws.— Lord Alvanley, C.J., Morck v. Abel (1802), 3 Bos. and PuU. 38. 

See 24, helow; Criminal Justice, 51. 

7. That whom he could not by the sword destroy, he might supplant by 
the law.— Hobart, C.J., Sheffeild v. Ratcliffe (1614), Lord Hobart's 
Rep. 335. 

See Hostility. 

8. Contemporaria expositio legis est optima, a contemporary exposition of 
a law, if there be any question about it, as our books teU us, is always 
the best, because the temper of the law-makers is then best known. — 
HoU, C.J., Harcourt v. Fox (1693), Shower's Rep. 326. 

9. I am sorry to think, that Englishmen should seem to excuse them- 
selves by ignorance of the law, which all subjects are bound to know, 
and are born to have the benefit of. — Popham, C.J., Trial of Sir 
Christopher Blunt and others (1600), 1 How. St. Tr. 1450. 

See helow, 69. 

10. He had no right to take the law into his own hands. — Lord Kenyan, 
Tarleton v. McGawley (1795), 2 Peake, N. P. Ca. 208. 

See Judges, 44. 

11. Every one must be supposed to be cognizant of a public law. — 
Lord Ellenboroiigh, Smith v. Beadnell (1807), 1 Camp. 33. 

12. Every man (who is of sufficient understanding to be responsible for 
his actions) is supposed to be cognizant of the law, as it is the rule by 
which every subject of the kingdom is to be governed, and therefore 
it is his business to know it. — Wilhs, J., King v. Shipley (1784), 
3 Doug. 177. 

13. Every man must be taken to be cognizant of the law, otherwise 
there is no saying to what extent the excuse of ignorance may not be 

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Law — contimied. 

carried. It would be urged in almost every case. — Lord EUenhorough, 
Bilbie v. Lumley (1802), 2 East, 469. 
See lelow, 14. 

14. Ignorantia juris non excusat} The true meaniiig of that maxim is 
that parties cannot excuse themselves from liability from aU civil or 
criminal consequences of their acts by alleging ignorance of the law, 
but there is no presumption that parties must be taken to know all 
the legal consequences of their acts, and especially where difficult 
questions of law, or of the practice of the Court are involved." — Lord 
FitzGerald, Seaton v. Seaton (1888), L. R. 13 Ap. Ca. 78. 

See above, 13 ; Judges, 77 ; Peaotioe, 1 ; Presumption, 12. 

15. A mere evasion, colour, disguise and device to evade the law. — Lord 
Mansfield, SuKton v. Norton (1761), 3 Burr. Part IV., p. 1237. 

16. It has been said that ignorance of law is no excuse, but when the 
Court has a discretion the petitioner's ignorance of the law may be 
properly excused. — Barnes, J., Whitworth v. Whitworth and Thomas- 
son (1893), 62 L. J. Rep. P.C.C. (1893), p. 73. 

17. Very happily, the more the law is looked into, the more it appears 
founded in equity, reason, and good sense.' — Lord Mansfield, James v. 
Price (1773), Lofft. 221. 

See 52, below; Peeoedents, 4. 

18. It being a maxim that three things are always favoured in law, life, 
liberty and dower. — Per. Cur., Dumsday v. Hughes (1803), 3 Bos. and 
Pull. 456. 

See LiBEETT OF THE SuBjEOT, 1 ; Tbial foe Life, 1. 

' 1 Co. 177. See also per Lord Weit- sed contraria omnia legitima atque 

bury as to this maxim, Cooper r. Phibbs, honesta. 

L. R. 2 H. L. 170 ; a.Uo per Stirling, J., "The common lawe itself e is nothing 

Allcard v. Walker, L. E. 2 C. D. [1896], else but reason ; which is to be under- 

p. 381. stood of an artificial! perfection of reason, 

2 Zord Wetthwy in Spread v. Morgan gotten by long study, observation, and 
(11 H. L. C. 602), dealing with a question experience, and not of every man's natural 
of election thus puts it : " It is true as a reason ; ioi nemo nascitur artifex. This 
general proposition that knowledge of the legall reason est summa ratio. And there- 
law must be imputed to every person, but fore if all the reason that is dispersed into 
it would be too much to impute know- so many severall heads, were united into 
ledge of this rule of equity " (the rule one, yet could he not make such a law as 
which applies to election) ; " election as the law of England is, because by many 
a question of intention of course implies successions of ages it hath been fined and 
knowledge." — Id. refined by an infinite number of grave 

3 Lex est sanctio jnsta juheiis honesta et and learned men, and by long experience 
froMiens eontraria. growne to such a perfection, for the 

Leie est summa ratio. gouvernment of this realme, as the old 

Batio est anima legis. rule may be justly verified of it, nemmem 

Nulla vetita aut turpia pmswnmntur, oportet esse sapientiorem legibus : no man, 

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Law — continued. 

19. The laws alone are they that always speak with all persons, high or 
low, in one and the same impartial voice. The law knows no 
favourites. — Sir Bohert Atkyns, L.C.B., Trial of Sir Edw. Hales 
(1686), 11 How. St. Tr. 1206 n. 

See also lelow, 31, 32 ; Jcdges, 27, 74 ; Justiqe, 3, n. ; Poor, 3 ; 
PmnsHMEajT, 6 ; Rights, 4 ; Tort, 6. 

20. The law woidd be a strange science if it rested solely upon Cases ; 
and if after so large an increase of Commerce, Arts and Circum- 
stances accruing, we must go to the time of Bich. I. to find a Case 
and see what is law.* — Lord Mansfield, Jones v. Randall (1774) 
Lofft. 386. 

See Presumption, 7 ; Usage, 1, 8. 

21. It is far more important the law should be administered with 
absolute integrity, than that in this case or in that the law should 
be a good law or a bad one. — Lord Coleridge, Reg. v. Ramsey (1883), 
Cabab6 and Ellis' Q. B. D. Rep. 134. 

See Statutes, 7. 

22. Every object and purpose of justice is effectually answered, and 
every supposed inconvenience is effectually rebutted by the law as it 
stands.— jBai/Zei/, J., King v. Woolf (1819), 1 Chit. 423. 

See Construction, 28 ; Equity, 10 ; Judges, 28 ; Statutes, 3, 9. 

23. Sometimes rhetorical phrases are applied even by eminent Judges 
to propositions of law. In Lord Dungannon v. Smith ^ Lord Brougham 
in eloquent language declared it as " one of the comer stories of the 
law" and I understand the Lord Chancellor in the same case to have 
considered the decision in Jee v. Audley 'to be " one of the land- 
marks." — Chitty, J., In re Dawson ; Johnston v. Hill (1888), L. R. 39 
C. D. 152. 

iSee 15, ahove; 26, 28, 43, 50, 54, 75, helow; Courts, 1 ; Fraud, 26 ; 
Judges, 26, n. 

24. I cannot help thinking that where a person appeals to the Law of 
England, he must take his remedy according to the Law of England 
to which he has appealed. — Wilmat, J., Robinson v. Bland (1760), 
2 Burr. Part IV. 1084. 

See 6, ahove ; Contract, 4 ; Foerign Law, 5; Tort, 1. 

out of his own private reason, ought to be ' The sparks of all the sciences in the 

wiser than the law, which is the perfec- world are raked up in the ashes of the 

tion of reason." — Lord Coke's Praise of law. — Miiclie, L. b. 1, c. 3. 

the Law of England. See also post, ' 12 CI. & F. 631. 

MlSOELLANBOTJS, 6. ' 1 Cox, 824. 

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Law — continued. 

25. The kw is not apt to catch at actions. — Powys, J., Ashby v. White 
(1703), 2 Ld. Raym. 944. 

See also JtroGES, 12 ; "Woeds, 3. 

26. It was nobly said in another place (I heard it with pleasure, and 
thought it becoming the dignity of the person who pronounced it, and 
the place in which it was pronounced) " that the law is best applied, 
when it is svhservient to the honesty of the case." — Buller, J., Master v. 
Miller (1791), 4 T. R. 335. 

See also, 23 above ; Administration of Justice, 17 ; Judges, 13 ; 
Usage, 13. 

27. It is of very httle consequence to the public to lay down definite 
rules of law, if you have indefinite rules of evidence. — Thurlow, L.C., 
Fox. V. Macfcreth (1788), 2 Cox, 320. 

28. It has been sometimes said, communis error facib jus ; but I say 
communis opinio is evidence of what the law is ; not where it is an 
opinion merely floating and theoretical floating in the miadB of persons 
but where it has been made the ground-work and substratum of 
practice.' — Lord Ellenlorough, Isherwood v. Oldknow (1815), 3M. &S. 
(K. B. Rep.) 396, 397. 

See 23, cAove. 

29. Judges could by their resolution altei- the practice, but never the 
law.— Blaekhum, J., Reg. v. Charlesworth (1861), 9 Cox, C. C. 67. 

See lelow, 71 ; Judges, 7, 13, 35, 36, 37 ; Parliament, 12 ; Statutes, 
15, 18. 

30. Law and conscience are one and the same. — Bacon, J., Watson v. 
Watson (1670), Style's Rep. 56. 

31. The law is for the protection of the weak more than the strong. — 
ErU, J., Reg v. WooUey (1850), 4 Cox, C. C. 196. 

See 19, above; 32, lelow; Justice, 3 ; Protection, 2. 

32. The law protects nothing in that very respect, in which it is, at the 
same time, in the eye of the law, a crime. — Lord MansfAd, Evans v. 
The Chamberlain of London (1720), (App. to Fumeaux's Letters), 
2 Bum's Ecd. Law, 207; Harrison v. Evans (in Error) 6 Bro. 
P. C. 181. 

See 31, above ; Tort, 6 ; Trespass, 2. 

33. The law of England will not sanction what is inconsistent with 
humanity.— Best, J., Rott v. Wilkes (1820), 4 B. & A. 319. 

See Justice, 5. 

I The law rarely hesitates in declaring quently puzzled to find out the meaning 
its own meaning; but the Judges are fre- of others.— Sir Wm. Slachstone (,1765) 

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Law — continued. 

34. The law does not act vindictively. — Bacon, V.-C, Barrett v. Ham- 
mond (1879), L. E. 10 C. D. 289. 

35. The law has respect to human infirmity. — Best, C.J., Robertson v, 
McDougaH (1828), 4 Bing. 679. 

See Cheistianitt, 12, n. ; Miscellaneous, 53 ; Reasonable, 3. 

36. We cannot judge of the fact, but the law upon the fact. — PrcM, J., 
Rex V. Inhabitantes de Haughton (1718), 1 Str. Rep. 84. 

37. As a lawyer I am before and above all things for the supremacy of 
law. — Lord Coleridge, C.J., The Queen -!;. Bishop of London (1889), 
L. R. 23 Q. B. 452. 

See 54, helow ; Couets, 14 ; Ceiminal Justice, 40 ; Judges, 29. 

38. A Court has no right to strain the law because it causes hardship. 
—Lcyrd Coleridge, C.J., Body v. Hake (1891) L. R. 1 Q. B. [1892], 
p. 207. 

iSee 40, below. 

39. Your lordships must look hardships in the face rather than break 
down the rules of law. — LordEldon, C, Berkeley Peerage Case (1811), 
4 Camp. 419. 

See Peecedents, 7. 

40. I would wish to do as much as possible for you ; but I cannot strain 
the law.' — Earl of Clonwell, L.C.J., Jackson's Case (1795), 25 How. 
St. Tr. 879. 

See 38, above ; Judges, 4, 37, 40, 44. 

41. It is a principle of law, that a person intends to do that which is the 
natural effect of what he does. — Lord EUenborough, Beckwith v. Wood 
and another (1817), 2 Starkie, 266. 

See Fraud, 2 ; Jllegalitt ; Peesumption, 2 ; Pleadings, 4 ; Toet, 16. 

42. Hard cases, it is said, make bad law." — Lord CampbeU, C.J., Ex parte 
Long (1854), 3 W. R. 19. 

See MiscfflEF, 1, n. 

43. All arguments on the hardship of a case, either on one side or the 
other, must be rejected, when we are pronouncing what the law is ; 
for such arguments are only quicksands in the law, and, if indulged, 

Com. Bk. III., ch. 25, p. 336. See also 605. There is no worse torture than the 

ante, Construction. 3 ; Will, 2, 6 ; torture of laws. — Zord Bacon, to. edit. 

Words, 5, 6. Vol. I. HO, 441. 

1 What I desire to point out is that I a Hard cases, it has been frequently 

wish the law was not so, but that being observed, are apt to introduce bad law. — 

the law, I must follow it. — Bomer, J., TroZ/e,B.,Winterbottomii. Wright (1842), 

Davies v. Parry (1899), I L. K. C. D. 10 Meeson U Welsby, 116. 

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Law — continued, i 

will soon swallow up every principle of iV^Buller, J., Yates v. Hall, 
(1785), 1 T. R. 80. 

See 23, above; Consteuotion, 28. 

44. General laws cannot give way to particular cases. — Ashhurst, J., 
King V. The College of Physicians (1797), 7 T. R. 290. 

See Cases, 20 ; Foeeign Law, 5. 

45. We must not, by any whimsical conceits supposed to be adapted to 
the altering fashions of the times, overturn the estabhshed law of the 
land : it descended to us as a sacred charge, and it is our duty to 
preserve it. — Lord Kenyon, C.J., Claytons. Adams (1796), 6 T. R. 605. 

See Judges, 36, 41 ; Usage, 13. 

46. We must proceed according to evidence, and forms and methods of 
law ; they may think what they will of me, but I wiU always declare 
my mind according to my conscience.* — Wright, L.C.J. , Trial of the 
Seven Bishops (1688), 12 How. St. Tr. 344. 

See Judges, 10, 37, 66 ; Politics, 3. 

47. The law of England is a law of liberty.' — Lord Mlenhorough, Wm. 
Cobbett's Case (1804), 24 How. St. Tr. 49. 

See Liberty of the Press, 7. 

48. The law of England is a law of mercy. — Goke, 2 Inst. 315.* 

See Administration of Justice, 32 ; Criminal Justice, 4, 25 ; Pardon, 
3 ; Punishment, 5 ; Trial for Life, 1. 

49. If the law be thought to be improper or inconvenient, application to 
correct it must be made elsewhere, and not to those who are bound by 
the repeated and solenm judgments of their predecessors. — Buller, J., 
Bishop of London v. Ffytche (1800), 1 East, 495. 

See helow, 62 ; Foreign Law, 5 ; Judges, 33, 66 ; Parliament, 12, 14 ; 
Statutes 13. 

50. No person is less disposed than I am to accommodate the law to the 
particular convenience of the case : but I am always glad when I find 
the strict law and the justice of the case going hand in hand together. — 
Lcyri Kenyon, C.J., Peaceable v. Read and others (1801), 1 East. 573. 

See 23, 49, above ; Equity, 8 ; Liberty of the Subject, 3. 

^ 1 agree that is the law, though I Powell, J. : No, by no means, we must 

think it is a hard law ; but we have not go by presumptions, but proofs, 
nothing to do with the question of hard- Lord Mllenborough, L.C.J. -. We must 

ghip. — Lord Eslier, M.E., In re Perkins proceed according to evidence and forms, 

(1890), L. E. 24 Q. B. D. 618. and methods of law." 

2 See also JohnsorCs Case (1805), 29 ' Angli<s jura in omni casu libertatit 

How. St. Tr. 451, 453 : — dant favarem: The laws of England in 

"Lord Mlenhorough, L.O.J. : No; we every case of liberty are favourable. — 

ought not to do anything by presumption Forteso. c. 42. 
here. ■* Lex Anglice est lex misericordia. 

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Law — covtirmed. 

51. What is ridiculous and absurd never is, to my mind, to be adopted 
either in law or in equity. — Brett, M.R., In re Garnett ; Gandy v. 
Macaulay (1885), L. E. 31 C. D. 9. 

52. I think the law is generally reasonable. — Cotton, L.J., Bidder v. 
Bridges (1887), L. J. 57 C. D. 304. 

See 17, above; Reasonable, 1. 

53. Now when a rule of law which is against principle is alleged to be 
estabhshed, there are two points to be considered ; first of all, was any 
such rule of law ever laid down by any Judge ? That is the first 
point to be decided; and secondly, if it was so laid down, has it 
passed into a binding rule of law ? — that is, has it been so recognised 
and dealt with by subsequent Judges as to prevent a Judge of a 
tribunal of co-ordinate jurisdiction from sayiag that the decision is 
contrary to the course of law, and is not binding upon him. — Jessel, 
M.R., Henty v. Wrey (1882), L. R. 21 C. D. 340. 

See 2, above; 63, below; Cases, 9, 21; Construction, 13; Judicial 
Decisions, 12, 16, 17 ; Jurisdiction, 4, 20 ; Precedents, 18. 

54. The picture of law triumphant and justice prostrate, is not, I am 
aware, without admirers. To me it is a sorry spectacle. The spirit of 
justice does not reside in formalities, or words, nor is the triumph of 
its administration to be found in successfully picking a way between 
the pitfalls of technicality. After all, the law is, or ought to be, but 
the handmaid of justice, and inflexibility, which is the most becoming 
robe of the latter, often serves to render the former grotesque. But 
any real inroad upon the rights and opportunities for defence of a 
person charged with a breach of the law, whereby the certainty of 
justice might be imperilled, I conceive to be a matter of the highest 
moment.— Lord Penzance, Combe v. Edwards (1878), L. R. 3 P. D. 142. 

See 23, 37, above ; Criminal Justice, 3, 37 ; Precedents, 20, and 
references therefrom. 

55. Whatever disadvantages attach to a system of unwritten law, and of 
these we are fuUy sensible, it has at least this advantage, that its 
elasticity enables those who administer it to adapt it to the varying 
conditions of society, and to the requirements and habits of the age in 
which we live, so as to avoid the inconsistencies and injustice which 
arise when the law is no longer in harmony with the wants and usages 
and interests of the generation to which it is immediately apphed. — 
Gockbum, C.J., Wason v. Walter (1868), L. R. 4 Q. B. 93. 

See 62, below; Administration of Justice, 15; Chancery, 1, n., 10; 
Common Law, 4 ; Consibuotion, 28 ; Parliament, 3, n. ; Statutes, 13. 

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Law — continued. 

56. YoTi say well : the law of God is the law of England ; and you have 
heard no law else, but what is consonant to the law of reason, which 
is the test law of God ; and here is none else urged against you. — 
Keble, C.J., Lilburne's Case (1649), 4 How. St. Tr. 1307. 

See 57, helow ; CHKisTiANnr, 5, 8 ; Religion, 1. 

57. God made man, and gave him a law to live by ; and the laws of 
England are grounded on the laws of God : and in the laws of 
England every man is concerned. — Garmond, J., Streater's Case 
(1653), 5 How. St. Tr. 387. 

See 56, above, and references. 

58. Personally, I detest any attempt to bring the law into maxims. 
Maxima are invariably wrong, that is, they are so general and large 
that they always include something which is not intended to be 
included. — Lirrd Esher, M.R., Yarmouth v. France (1887), L. J. 57 
Q. B. 9. 

See DiCTDM, 5 ; Judges, 65. See also Relief, 3. 

59. There is no other power in England, but a legal power to punish 
according to law. — Holt, C.J., Duncombe's Case (1699), 13 How. 
St. Tr. 1077. 

See ADMiNiSTRiTioN OF Justice, 3, 4 ; Courts, 10, 14 ; Judges, 19, 37 ; 
Pkopeett, 7 ; Punishment, 8. 
,60. Retrospective laws are, ■primd facie of questionable poHcy, and con- 
trary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of 
mankind is to be regulated ought, when introduced for the first time, 
to deal with future acts, and ought not to change the character of past 
transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law. Leges 
et constituiiones futuris eertum est dare formam negotiis non ad facta 
prcBterita revocari ; nisi nominatim et de prceterito tempore et adhue 
pendentibus negotiis cautum sit.' — WiUes, J., PhiUips v. Eyre (1870), 
L. R. 6 Q. B. 23. 

61. Whatever place becomes the habitation of civiHzed men, there the 
laws of decency must be inforced. — McDonald, C.B., Rex v. Crunden 
(1809), 2 Camp. 89. 

See below, 67 ; Morals, 1 ; Relief, 2. 

62. There is no law whatsoever but may be dispensed with by the Supreme 
Law-giver ; as the laws of God maybe dispensed with by God himself ; 

1 Jfova comtitutio futuris formam im- forward, not backward. — Jenh. Cent. 284. 
ponere debet non prceteritis : A new state Omnis nova constitutio futims tempori- 

of the law ought to affect the future, not ius formam imponere debet, nonprceteritis : 

the past. — 2 Tmt. 292. Every new enactment should affect future, 

LexprospioitnonreipioU: The law looks not past times. — 2 last. 95. 

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Law — continued. 

as it appears by God's command to Abraham, to offer up his son Isaac : 
so Hkewise the law of man may be dispensed with by the legislator, 
for a law may either be too wide or too narrow, and there may be 
many cases which may be out of the conveniences which did induce 
the law to be made ; for it is impossible for the wisest lawmaker to 
foresee all the cases that may be, or are to be remedied, and therefore 
there must be a power somewhere, able to dispense with these laws. — 
Herbert, C.J., Hale's Case (1686), 11 How. St. Tr. 1196. 
See 49, 55, above ; Administeation of Justice, 15 ; Chancery, 10 ; 
Criminal Justice, 29 ; NEOESsiir, 1 ; Statutes, 2. 

63. If the law be so, there must be some just and honest reason for it, or 
else some universal settled rule of law upon which it is grounded. — 
HoU, C.J., Coggs V. Bernard (1704), Raym. 909. 

See 53, ahcme ; 64, below; Parliament, 5. 

64. If it is law, it wiU be found in our books. If it is not to be found 
there, it is not law.^ — Camden, L.C.J., Case of Seizure of Papers 
(1765), 19 How. St. Tr. 1066. 

See above, 63 ; Miscellaneous, 57, n. ; Precedents, 15. 

65. You were speaking of the laws being in other tongues ; those that 
we try you by are in English ; and we proceed in English against you ; 
and therefore you have no cause to complain. — Michel, J., LiLbume's 
Case (1649), 4 How. St. Tr. 1311. 

See Administration op Justice, 11 ; Judges, 62 ; Will, 8. 

66. The laws of England wiU protect the rights of British subjects, and 
give a remedy for a grievance committed by one British subject upon 
another, in whatever country that may be done. — Bayley, J., Forbes v. 
Cochrane and Cockburn (1824), 2 St. Tr. (N. S.) 159. 

See Justice, 4 ; Parliament, 9 ; Relief, 3 ; Tort, 2, 8, 9. 

67. A residence in a new country often introduces a change of legal con- 
dition, which imposes rights and obUgations totally inconsistent with 
the former rights and obligations of the same persons. — Lord StoweU, 
The Slave Grace (1,827), 2 St. Tr. (N. S.) 289 ; 2 Hagg. 94. 

See above, 61. 

68. The law of nature is that which God at the time of creation of the 
nature of man infused into his heart, for his preservation and direc- 
tion ; and this is lex ceterna, the moral law, called also the law of 

1 De non apparentiius, et non existen- me any law for that if you can, Mr. 

tiivt, eadem est ratio : Things which do Williams, I know you are a lawyer." — 

not appear are to be treated as the same Jefferiet, L.C.J., Trial of John Hampden 

as those which do not exist.— Co. " Shew (1684), 9 How. St. Tr. 1057. 

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Law — continued. 

nature.' And by this law, written with the finger of God in the heart 
of man, were the people of Grod a long time governed, before the law 
was written by Moses, who was the first reporter or writer of law in 
the world.— Lord C6ke, Calvin's Case (1608), 4 Co. 21. 
See Government ; Judicial Proceedings, 9. 

69. Every moral man is as much bound to obey the civil law of the land as 
the law of nature."— Eoofee, J., Aubert v. Maze (1801), 1 Bos. & Pull. 375. 

See ahme, 9 ; Litigation, 1 ; Morals, 1, 3 ; Relief, 2. 

70. If a man endeavours to obtain a repeal of those laws, which are 
conceived to be obnoxious, or the introduction of any laws which he 
believes to be salutary, if he does that legally, there is no objection to 
it.— BayUy, J., R. v. Hunt and others (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 484. 

See Freedom of Speech ; Liberty of the Press, 9 ; Minorities, 2. 

71. The law has prescribed a particular method, and we cannot alter the 
law, nor prevent the inconveniences. — Holt, C.J., Tawney's Case (1703), 
2 Raym. 1013. 

See above, 29 ; Construction, 28 ; Judges, 34, n. ; 35 ; Parliament, 12 
Statutes, 4. 

72. Sans fact conus, est impossible de scier la ley sur cest fact : Without 
a known fact, it is impossible to know the law on that fact. — 
Vaughan, J., Bushel's Case (1670), Jones's (Sir Thos.) Rep. 16. 

See Construction, 28 ; Judicial Decisions, 19. 

73. It would be of ill-consequence, to authenticate a body of laws, that 
have lain dormant for two hundred years.' — Foster, J., The King v. 
Bishop of Ely (1750), 1 Black. Rep. 59. 

See Construction, 6 ; Doctrine, 1 ; Judicial Decisions, 5, 20 ; 
Practice, 5 ; Precedents, 1. 

74. It is a public scandal when the law is forced to uphold a dishonest 
act. — Lm-d Macnaghten, Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt &C. Co. (1894), 
L. R. App. Ca. Part 5, p. 573. 

See Precedents, 15 ; Public Poliot, 7 ; Relief, 2. 

75. Legality and oppression are not unknown to run hand in hand. — 
Hawkins, J., Roberts v. Jones; WiUey v. Great Northern Railway 
Co. (1891), L. R. 2 Q. B. [1891], p. 203. 

See 23, above; Fraud, 35 ; PKOOEsa, 2 ; Relief, 2. 

' Wing. Max. 1; Co. Litt. 11 b. Prudenter agit gm preeoepto legis oMem- 

" Laws of Nature, are God's thoughts perat : He acts prudently, who obeys 

thinking themselves out in the orbs and the command of the law. — 5 Co. 49. 

the tides." — C. S. ParTihurst. ' DarmivM aliqwando leges, nimjuam 

3 Ohedientia est legis essentia : Obedi- moriuntur : The laws sometimes sleep, 

ence is the essence of law. — 11 Co. 100. never die.— 2 Inst. 161. 

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Law Reports. 

1. Do you think that a reporter has a right to supply or suppress any 
part of a judgment?' — L(yrd Brougham,, Cadell v. Palmer (1833), 
1 CI. & F. 372. 

See also Text Books, 2. 

2. 'Tis pity that reporters sometimes catch at quaint expressions that 
may happen to be dropped at the Bar or Bench ; and mistake their 
meaning. — Lord Mansfield, Miller v. Race (1758), 1 Burr. Part IV. 457. 

See Judges, 70, and references there given. 

3. Imperfect reports of facts and circumstances, especially in cases where 
every circumstance weigh something in the scale of justice, are the 
bane of aU science that dependeth upon the precedents and examples 
of former times." — Foster,^., " Crown Ijaw Discourse" (ed. 1762), p. 292. 

See Judicial Decisions, 5, 6, 7, 19 ; Precedents, 1, 4, 11, 12, n., 
13, 15. 

Legal Profession. 

1. The interests of justice cannot be upholden, the administration of 
justice cannot go on without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, 
in the practice of the Courts, and in those matters afEecting rights and 
obligations which form the subject of aU proceedings. — Brougham, L.C., 
Greenough v. GaskeU (1833), 1 Myl. & K. 98. 

See also Attorneys. 

2. There is nothing which has so great a tendency to secure the due 
administration of justice, as having the Courts of the country 
frequented by gentlemen so eminently qualified by their education 
and principles of honour, as at this time appear to discharge the 

' This was in answer to Counsel who the point : " There wants nothing to 

had remarked that the reporter in a case answer the objection, but to state the 

he quoted, ought not to have taken notice case : which I will do for the sake of the 

of a certain dictum. students." — Wilson v. Mackreth (1765), 3 

2 " And now Lord Mansfield delivered Burr. Part IV., p. 1826. See also on this 

the opinion of the Court, having first subject, ante, Counsel, 15 ; Burnet, 

desired Mr. Hussey to state the case for " Hist, of my own Times," aUuded to 

the sake of the students : for he took this ante, JtrDGES, 48 »,p. 118. On the question 

opportunity of observing and declaring of imperfect reports the following will not 

that nothing misleads so much as report- be considered inappropriate, per Lord, 

ing the determination of Courts of justice, Kenyan, C.J., in King v. Harris (1797), 7 

without having a suflBcient and correct T. E. 239 : " That case (R. v. Ashton, 8 

state of the case, which he said was only Mod. 175) is reported in 'Modern Cases 

an ignis fatuus, leading people into an in Law and Equity ' : but it is totally 

error and mistake." — See Rex v. Peters mistaken there, as indeed are nine cases 

(1758), 1 Burr. Part IV. 571. Lord out of ten in that book." To same effect 

Mansfield was always at great pains to see 1 Burr. 386 (marginal note) ; 3 Burr. 

" state cases" for the benefit of students. 1826 (marg. n.) ; and per Buller, J., King 

This is frequently seen in the books, the v. Lyme Regis (1779), 1 Doug. 82. 
following being another illustration on 

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Legal Profession. — continued. 

duties which they are called upon to fulfil. — Best, J., Morris v. Hunt 
(1819), 1 Chit. Rep. 555. 
3. Professional ad"vice in England ia confined to legal advice. — Jessel, 
M.R., Slade v. Tucker (1880), L. R. 14 C. D. 827. 
See also Counsel. 


1. Everything printed or written, which reflects on the character of 
another, and is published without lawful justification or excuse, is a 
hbel, whatever the intention may have been. — Parke, B., O'Brien v. 
Clement (1846), 15 M. & W. 437. 

2. It is not the truth or falsehood that makes a libel, but the temper 
with which it is published.— Best, J., King v. Burdett (1820), 1 St. Tr. 
(N. S.) 49. 

3. It was the rule of Holt, Chief Justice, to make words actionable 
whenever they sound to the disreputation of the person of whom they 
were spoken ; and this was also Hale's and Twisden's rule ; and I 
think it a very good rule.' — Fortescue, J., Button v. Heyward (1722), 
8 Mod. 24. 

4. Libelling against a private man is a moral offence ; but when it 
is against a government, it tends to the destruction of it.' — Molt, C.J., 
Rex V. Beare (1 698), 1 Raym. 418. 

See Government. 

5. Why are libels against individuals prosecuted ? Because they have a 
tendency to provoke the party to whom they are sent to a breach of 
the peace.— Best, J., King v. Burdett (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 117. 

6. His reputation is his property, and, if possible, more valuable than 
other property.' — Malins, V.-C, Dixon v. Holden (1869), L. R. 7 
Eq. 492. 

See Ckiminal Justice, 49. 

Liberty of the Press. 

1. My opinion of the liberty of the press is, that every man ought to be 
permitted to instruct his feUow subjects ; that every man may fear- 
lessly advance any new doctrines, provided he does so with proper 
respect to the religion and government of the country ; that he may 

1 This is in reference perhaps to Baker ointment." — Uocles. vii., 1. 

r. Pearce, 6 Mod. 23. " He that filches from me my good name, 

2 For the antiquity of this notion, see Bobs me of that which not enriches him, 
Vvrmius, 741, by the law of the twelve And makes me poor indeed." 

tables. —Shakes., "Othello" (lago), 

' " A good name is better than precious Act III., Sc. iii. 

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Liberty of the Press — continued. 

point out errors in the measures of public men ; but he must not 
impute criminal conduct to them. — Best, J., King v. Burdett (1820), 
1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 120. 
See LiBEEiT OF the Subject, 3 ; Mistakes, 1 ; Sovereigntt, 10 ; Teuth, 13. 

2. The liberty of the press has always been, and has justly been, a 
favourite topic with Enghshmen. They have looked at it with jealousy 
whenever it has been invaded ; and though a Hcenser was put over 
the press, and was suffered to exist for some years after the coming of 
William, and after the revolution, yet the reluctant spirit of English 
liberty called for a repeal of that law ; and from that time to this it 
has not been shackled and limited more than it ought to be. — Lord 
Kenyan, Case of John Lambert and others (1793), 22 How. St. Tr. 1016. 

3. To be free, is to live under a government by law. The liberty of the 
press consists in printing without any previous licence, subject to the 
consequences of law. The licentiousness of the press is Pandora's box, 
the source of every evU. Miserable is the condition of individuak, 
dangerous is the condition of the State, if there is no certain law, or, 
which is the same thing, no certain administration of law, to protect 
individuals or to guard the State. — Lord Mansfield, King v. Shipley 
(1784), 3 Douglas's Rep. 170. 

See Precedents, 20, and references therefrom ; Protection, 2. 

4. Where vituperation begins, the liberty of the press ends. — Best, J., 
King V. Burdett (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 120. 

5. The liberty of the press is dear to England ; the licentiousness of the 
press is odious to England : the liberty of it can never be so well 
protected as by beating down the licentiousness. — Lord Kenyon, 
CutheU's Case (1799), 27 How. St. Tr. 674. 

See Commerce, 3. 

6. When licentiousness is tolerated, liberty is in the utmost danger; 
because tyranny, bad as it is, is better than anarchy ; and the worst 
of governments is more tolerable than no government at all. — Camden, 
L.C.J., Case of Seizure of Papers (1765), 19 How. St. Tr. 1074. 

See also Gtoveenment. 

7. The law of England is a law of liberty, and, consistently with this 
liberty, we have not what is called an imprimatur (let it be printed) ; 
there is no such preliminary licence necessary. But if a man publish 
a paper, he is exposed to the penal consequences, as he is in every 
other act, i£ it be illegal. — Lord Ellenhorou^h, R. v. Cobbett (1804), 
29 How. St. Tr. 49. 

See Law, 47. 

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Liberty of the Press — continued. 

8. A man may publish anything which twelve of his countrymen think 
not blamable. — Lord Kenyan, Cuthell's Case (1799), 27 How. St. Tr. 

See Jury, 22. 

9. The power of free discussion is the right of every subject of this 
country. It is a right to the fair exercise of which we are indebted 
more than to any other that was ever claimed by Englishmen. All 
the blessings we at present enjoy might be ascribed to it. — Lord 
Kenyan, King v. Eeeves (1796), Peake's Nisi Prius Cases, 85. 

See Peeedom of Speech ; Law, 70 ; Mwoeities, 2 ; Politics, 8 ; Voting. 

10. The liberty of the press is a very great advantage and security to 
our public liberty. — Lord Mansfield, The King v. Williams (1774), 
Lofft. 763. 

11. The liberty of the press is no greater and no less than the liberty 
, of every subject of the Queen. — Lord Russell of Killawen, Reg. v. Gray 

(1900), L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 40. 

Liberty of the Subject. 

1. The Judge is intrusted with the liberties of the people, and his saying 
is the Law. — Tmsden, J., King v. Wagstaffe (1665), Sir Thos. Ray. 
Rep. 138. 

See Counsel, 8 ; Law, 18. 

2. I should be as unwilling as any man to concur in anything injurious 
to the rights of the subject. The Habeas Corpus is a very wise and 
beneficial statute : and the Judges have always been disposed to put 
such a construction upon it as will favour the real liberty of the 
subject. But we must be careful that those Acts which have been 
made for the benefit of the subject are not turned into engines of 
oppression : nor must we, under the idea of promoting general liberty, 
withhold that degree of favour from Individ aals which is consistent 
with the security of the public. — Bodke, J., Huntley v. Luscombe 
(1801), 1 Bos. and PuU. Rep. 538. 

See AjDMiNisTEATioN OF JUSTICE, 35 ; Construction, 7 ; Parliament, 13. 

3. The last end that can happen to any man, never comes too soon, if he 
faUs in support of the law and liberty of his country : for liberty is 
synonymous to law and government. — Lord Mansfield, Rex v. Wilkes 
(1769), 4 Burr. Part IV., p. 2563. 

See Law, 50 ; Libeety of the Peess, 1 ; Minoeities, 2 ; Tort, 6. 

4. Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the 
party, can be of no benefit to either, it can only be oppressive ; and if 

D.L.Q. 11 

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Liberty of the SvLhjeot— continued. 

oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law unreasonable. — Tindal, C.J., 
Horner v. Graves (1831), 7 Bing. 743. 

See Pbooess, 2 ; Pboteotion, 1. 
5. It does not seem to admit of doubt that the general policy of the law 
is opposed to aU restraints upon liberty of individual action which are 
injurious to the interests of the State or community.* — Lord Watson, 
Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt, &c. Co. (1894), L. R. App. Ca. 
[1894], p. 552; also per Lord Maenaghten, id., p. 565. See also 
E. Underwood & Son, Ltd. v; Barker, L. R. 1 C. D. [1899], p. 311 
et seq. 

See Freedom of Speech ; Minorities, 2 ; Politics, 8 ; Voting. 


1. The limitation of suits is founded in public convenience ; and attended 
with so much utility, that Courts of Equity adopt this Statute as a 
positive rule, and apply it, by parity of reason, to cases not within it.' 
—Lwd Mansfield, Johnson v. Smith (1759), 2 Burr. Part IV., p. 961. 

See Equity, 33, 34 ; Judges, 47. 

2. This very cause between parties who (on both sides) are strangers 
to the whole transaction, shews the wisdom of some limitation. — 
Lord Mansfield, Johnson v. Hargreaves (1760), 2 Burr. Part IV., p. 962. 


1. A writer's fame will not be the. less, that he has bread, without 
being under the necessity of prostituting his pen to flattery or party, 
to get it.— Willes, J., Millar v. Taylor (1768), 4 Burr. Part IV., p. 2335. 

1 In the Year-iook, 2 Hen. V. pi. 26, modem times that, in the construction of 
there is a maxim in common law founded the Statute of Limitations, the decisions 
upon public policy, that it was not good had not proceeded upon principles better 
for the realm that men should be prevented adapted to carry into efiect the real objects 
from exercising their trades. It was an of the Statute ; that instead of being 
obligation, with a condition that if a man viewed in an unfavourable light as an 
did not exercise his craft, say of a dyer, unjust and discreditable defence, it had 
within a certain town — that is, where he not received such support as would have 
carried on his business — in six months, made it what it was intended to be, 
then the obligation was to be void ; upon emphatically a Statute of repose. It is a 
which SiiH, J., being uncommonly angry wise and beneficial law, not designed 
at such a violation of all law, said accord- merely to raise a presumption of payment 
ing to the book, " Par Dieu I if he were of a just debt from lapse of time, but to 
here, to prison he should go, just as if he afford security against stale demands after 
had committed an offence against the the true state of the transaction may be 
King," because he had dared to restrain forgotten, or be incapable of explanation 
the liberty of the subject. See per Lord by reason of the death or removal of 
Si!. Xeo?iar(i«, Brownlowu. Bgerton(1853), witnesses.— Jlfr. Justice Story, 1 Peters, 
23 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) 416. Sup. C. Rep. (U. S.) 360. 

2 It has often been matter of regret in 

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Literature — eontinued. 

2. He who engages in a laborious work (such, for instance, as Johnson's 
Dictionary) which may employ his whole life, wiU do it with more 
spirit if, besides his own Glory, he thinks it may be a provision for 
his family.— WiZZes, J., Millar v. Taylor (1768), 4 Burr. Part IV., 
p. 2335. 
See Adthoe, 2. 


1. Englishmen may have been law-abiding, bnt they have not been 
TinlitigiouB. — Brett, L.J., Martin v. Mackonochie (1879), 4 L. R. Q. B. 

See Law, 9, 69. 

2. Though every attempt to shorten litigation is entitled to the favour 
of the Court,' yet before we stop a party in a regular course of pro- 
ceeding, we ought to be certain that we shall not deprive him of 
that justice which the law authorizes him to seek. — Lord Eldon, C.J., 
Martin v. Kennedy (1800), 1 Bos. & PuU. 70. 

See Chancsert, 4 ; Peaotice, 10 ; Rights, 3 ; Transfer of Right of 

3. The law is too tenacious of private peace, to suffer htigations to be 
negotiable.— rotes, J., Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. Part TV., p. 2385. 

See Compromise ; Criminal Justice, 39, 40 ; Evidence, 33 ; Pardon, 4 ; 
Transfer of Right of Action. 

4. Proceedings at law are sufficiently expensive. — Lord Kenyon, Marriott 
V. Hampton (1797), 2 Esp. 548. 


There is no magic in parchment or in wax. — Ashhurst, J., Master v. 
Miner (1763), 4 T. R. 320. 
See Words, 1. 


1. It is impossible to overrate the importance of keeping the administra^ 
tion of justice by magistrates clear from all suspicion of unfairness. 
—Wills, J., Queen v. Huggias (1895), L. R. 1 Q. B. D. [1895], p. 565. 

2. It is necessary for Courts of Justice to hold a strict hand over simimary 
proceedings before magistrates, and I never wiU agree to relax any 

1 JEacpeAit reipublicce ut Ht finis lUvwm, : esse finis litivm : There ought to be an end 
It is for the public good that there be of law suits. — Jenk. Cent. 61. 
an end of litigation. — Co. Litt. 303. Debet 

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Magistrates — continued. 

of the rules by which they have been bound. Their jurisdiction is 
of a limited nature, and they must shew that the party was brought 
within it. — Lord Kenyan, C. J., King v. Stone (1800), 1 East, 650. 

3. It is perfectly plain that either the Crown or any subject may inter- 
vene and inform a superior Court that an inferior Court is exceeding 
its jurisdiction; and it is the duty of the superior Court, when it 
is so informed, to confine the inferior Court within the limits of its 
jurisdiction.'— Sir G. Jessel, M.R., Jacobs v. Brett (1875), L. R. 20 
Eq. Ca. 5. 

See Jurisdiction, 3. 

4. I do not see to what purpose we exercise a superintendency over aU 
inferior jurisdictions, unless it be to inspect their proceedings, and 
see whether they are regular or not. I have often heard it said that 
nothing shall be presumed one way or the other in an inferior 
juristiiction.— Pratt, L.C.J., Rex v. Cleg (1722), 1 Stra. 476. 

See below, 5 ; Courts, 1. 

5. We presume a magistrate does right until the contrary appears. — 
Laurence, J., King v. Despard (1798), 7 T. R. 744. 

See above, 4 ; Administration of Justice, 35. 

6. It is of infinite importance to the public that the acts of magistrates 
should not only be substantially good, but also that they should be 
decorous. — Lord Kenyan, C.J., The King v. Sainsbury (1791), 4 T. R. 

See Appeals, 3 ; Courts, 3. 

7. It is the more fit for the Supreme Court to give some certain rule 
in it that may regulate and guide the judgment of inferior Courts. — 
Sir Robert Atkyns, L.C.B., Trial of Sir Ed. Hales (1686), 11 How. St. Tr. 

Karried Woman. 

If the policy of the law has withheld from married women certain 
powers and faculties, the Courts of law must continue to treat them 
as deprived of those powers and faculties, until the legislature directs 
those Courts to do otherwise. — Lord Eldon, C.J., Beard ti. Webb (1800), 
1 Bos. and PuU. 109. 
See Equity, 20 ; Husband and Wife, 14. 

Blaster and Servant. 

1. The power of arbitrarily dismissing those in one's employ, is a power 

' Excess of jurisdiction is ground for prohibition. — Brett, L. J., Martin v. Mackonoohie 
(1879), L. R. i Q. B. D. 755. 

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Master and Servant — continued. 

exercised in a great degree over a vast number of persons in ttis 
country, without their having any redress at law. Put the case of 
a day labourer or ordinary servant. Yon may refuse to give him a 
character, and he has no redress. If you give him a false character, 
he has the means of redress, but that is of a very different kind. 
And this is the law of the land. — Shadwell, V.-C, Ranger v. Great 
Western Eail. Co. (1838), 2 Jur. (0. S.) 789. 

2. The possession of the servant is the possession of the master. — Side, 
C.J., King V. Burgess (1663), Ray. (Sir Thos.) Rep. 85. 

3. Apprentices and servants are characters perfectly distinct : the one 
receives instruction, the other a stipulated price for his labour. — 
Lord Kenyon, C.J., The King v. Inhabitants of St. Paul's, Bedford 
(1797), 6 T. R. 454. 

See also SovEEEiGNTy, 11, 12. 


1. Nothing is more natural than to marry. — Hobart, C.J., Sheffeild v. 
Ratchffe (1617), Lord Hobart's Rep. 342. 

2. The holy state of matrimony was ordained by Almighty God in 
Paradise, before the Fall of Man, signifying to us that mystical union 
which is between Christ and His Church ; and so it is the first relation : 
and when two persons are joined in that holy state, they twain 
become one flesh^ ; and so it is the nearest relation. — Hyde, J., 
Manby v. Scott (1659), 1 Mod. Rep. 125. 

See HosBiND and Wife, 1. 

3. Marriage in the contemplation of every Christian conununity is the 
union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others. — 
Lush, L.J., Harvey v. Farnie (1880), L. R. 6 Pro. D. 53. 

4. Matrimony is a sacrament.' — Ahney, J., Richards v. Dovey (1746), 
Willes' Rep. 623. 

5. In the Christian Church marriage was elevated in a later age to the 
dignity of a sacrament.' — Sir Wm. Scott, Daliymple v. Dalrymple 
(1811), 2 Hagg. Con. Rep. 64. 

1 Gen. iii., 16. the Eeformation, this country disclaimed, 

2 See also 1 Giis. 431. The words of amongst other opinions of the Romish 
the canon are "Firmiter inhibemus ne Church, the doctrine of a sacrament in 
cuiquam pro aliqua pecuniS, denegetur marriage, though still retaining the idea 
sepultura, vel baptismus, vel aliquod of its being of divine institution in its 
sacramentam ecclesiasticum, vel etiam general origin ; and on that account, 
matrimonium contrahendum impediatur." as well of the religious forms that were 

3 Sanchez, lib. 2, disp. 6, s. 2, et lib. 2, prescribed for its regular celebration, an 
disp. 10, 8. 2. Father Paul, p. 737 ; holy estate, h^ly matrimony, but it like- 
Pallavicini, lib. 23, ch. 8 ; Pothier, tit. 3, wise retained those rules of the Canon 
p. 290. — 27 qu. 2, c. 10, omne. " At Law which had their foundation not in 

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Matrimony — continued. 

6. Marriage, in its origin, is a contract of natural kw' ; it may exist 
between two individuals of different sexes, although no third person 
existed in the world, as happened in the case of the common ancestors 
of mankind : It is the parent, not the child of civil society. 
" Principium urhis et quasi seminarium reipuhliecB." * — Sir William 
Scott, Dabymple v. Dal^ple (1811), 2 Hagg. Con. Rep. 63. 

7. It wiU appear, no doubt, that at various periods of our history there 
have been decisions as to the nature and description of the religioua 
solemnities necessary for the completion of a perfect marriage, which 
cannot be reconciled together ; but there will be found no authority 
to contravene the general position, that at all times, by the common 
law of England, it was essential to the constitution of a full and 
complete marriage, that there must be some religious solemnity ; that 
both modes of obligation should exist together, the civil and the 
religious.'— rindol, C.J., R. v. Millis (1844), 10 01. & Fin. 655. 


1. Experience tells us that sometimes, when minorities insist on their 
rights, they ultimately prevail. — Kekeioich, J., Young v. South 
African, &c. Syndicate (1896), L. R. 2 C. D. [1896], p. 278. 

2. It is impossible that bodies of men should always be brought 
to think ahke : there is often a degree of coercion, and the majority 
is governed by the minority, and vice versd, according to the strength 

the sacrament, or in any religious view of foreign to the case quoted above, the case 

the subject, but in the natural and civil of McAdam v. Walker (1 Dow. App. Gas. 

contract of marriage." — Sir Wm.. Scott, 148), 14 Eev. Eep. 36, 48, was referred to 

Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (1811), 2 Hagg. in the argument. In the report of this 

Con. Eep. 67. case is appended a note of some verses 

* A contract executed without any part summarising the law governing a Scotch 

performance. — Lord Broughavi, E. ■». marriage, entitled " The Tourist's Matri- 

Millis (1844), 16 01. & Fin. 719. monial Guide through Scotland," composed 

Consensus, non concubitis, facit matri- by an eminent Scotch Judge, the late Lord 

monium. — Co.Litt.i%. Neaves. "The metrical form," adds the 

Our law considers marriage in the light reporter, " is a post-prandial accident, 

of a contract, and applies to it with some which does not detract from Its soundness 

exceptions, the ordinary principles which in point of law." The verse quoted by 

apply to other contracts. — Steph. Com., Mr. Justice Barnes was the following : — 

Yol. II. (8th ed.), Bk. 3, c. 2, p. 238. " If people are drunk or delirious, 

2 OS.. 1, 17. See also Hyde i'. The marriage of course would be bad ; 
Hyde and Woodmansee, L. E. 1 Pr. & Div. Or if they're not sober and serious, 

133 ; Warrender v. Warrender, 2 01. & But acting a play or charade. 

Fin. 531 ; Turner v. Meyers, 1 Hagg. Con. It's bad if it's only a cover 
414. For cloaking a scandal or sin, 

3 In a case before Mr. Justice Barnes in And talking a landlady over, 
July, 1899, involving an examination into To let the folks lodge in her inn." 
the Scotch law of marriage, a subject not 

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Iffiuorities — continued. 

of opinions, tempers, prejudices, and even interests. — Eyre, O.J., 
Grindley v. Barker (1798), 2 Bos. & Pnll. 238. 
See also Freedom of Speech ; Judges, 48, n. ; 49 ; Law, 70 ; Liberty 
OF THE Pbess, 9 ; Liberty of the Subject, 5 ; Politics, 1, 7, 8 ; 


1. Human affairs are wonderfully like a kaleidoscope, with, its 
combuiationB of colours constantly changing. — Kay, J., CJoventry's 
Case (1890), L. R. 1 C. D. [1891], p. 207. 

2. The truth is, we live in an age where men are apt to bring those 
things in question, of which our ancestors never doubted.' — PoioeU, J., 
Britton v. Standish (1704), 6 Mod. 190. 

See lelow, 40 ; Cases, 14 ; Teuth, 7. 

3. Great men ruminating back to the origin of things, lose sight of the 
present state of the world; and end their enquiries at that point 
■where they should begin our improvements. — Willea, J., Millar v. 
Taylor (1768), 4 Burr. Part IV. 2339. 

See Politics, 8 ; Tort, 12. 

4. I shall not enter into the crude and uncertain opinions of early times. 
—Blaekstone, J., Goodright v. Harwood (1773), LofEt. 221. 

See Religion, 3. 

5. Improvement in learning was no part of the thoughts or attention of 
our ancestors.— Yotes, J., Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. Part IV. 2387. 

See Universities, 2. 

6. People must not be wiser than the experience of mankind. — Bowen, L. J., 
Filbum V. People's Palace and Aquarium Co. (1890), L. R. 25 
Q. B. 261. 

See Judges, 66 ; Protection, 2. 

7. I wish as sincerely as any man, that learned men may have all the 
encouragements, and all the advantages that are consistent with the 
general right and good of mankind. — Yates, J., Millar u. Taylor (1769), 
4 Burr. Part IV. 2394. 

See 6, above ; Conibact, 16. 

8. Those regulations that are adapted to the common race of men are 

1 Nam genus et proavos, et qiUB non of this world are in their generation 

feeimus ijpsi, vix ea nostra vuoo : For those wiser than the children of light." — 

things which were done either by our St. Lake xvi., 8. 

fathers, or ancestors, and in which we MuUi multa, nemo ommia novit : Many 

ourselves had no share, we can scarcely know many things, no one everything. — 

call our own. — Ovid. " The children Co. 

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King V. The College of Physicians 

MisceUaneous — continued. 

the best. — Lord Kenyon, C.J 
(1797), 7 T. R. 288. 

9. A duty of imperfect obligation attaches on every one to do what is for 
the good of society.— Gotten, L.J., Waller v. Loch (1881), L. R. 7 
Q. B. 622. 

See Fraud, 4, n. ; Pock, 3 ; Peoteotion, 2 ; Tort, 16. 

10. Every man is bound not wilfully to deceive others or to do any act 
which may place them in danger. — Willes, J., Gautret v. Egerton 
(1867), L. R. 2 C. P. Ca. 375. 

See 33, below; Fraud, 10, 19 ; Title, 4 ; Tort, 16 ; Usury, 2. 

11. A man cannot be allowed to neglect a duty which he has undertaken. 
—Lord Langdale, M.R., Booth v. Booth (1838), 1 Beav. 129. 

See CoKTRAOT, 2 ; Equitt, 38 ; Fraud, 14 ; Tort, 3 ; Teuth, 7. 

12. Infection is God's arrow.'— Lord Eale, 1 Hale, P. C, Vol. L 
(ed. 1778), p. 432. 

See Tort, 11. 

13. Modus in rebus — there must be an 
Proceedings against the Dean of 
St. Tr. 875. 

end of things.^ — Lord Kenyan, 
St. Asaph (1783), 21 How. 

' Lord Hale doubted whether volun- 
tarily and maliciously infecting a person 
of the plague, and so causing his death, 
would be murder. It is hard to see why, 
but he thought as quoted above. " Now 
what is the act of God 1 " asks Lord 
Mansfield, " I consider it to mean," he 
says, " something in opposition to the act 
of man : for everything ia the act of God 
that happens by his permission ; every- 
thing, by his knowledge." — Forward v. 
Pittard (1785), 1 T. K. 33. See also Coggs 
V. Bernard, 2 Ld. Eaym. 909 ; Nugent v. 
Smith, L. B. 1 Com. PI. Div. 423. " The 
act of God shall prejudice no man ; as, 
where the law prescribeth means to perfect 
or settle any right or estate, if by the act 
of God the means, in some circumstances, 
become impossible, no party shall receive 
any damage thereby." — Co. lAt. 123 ; 1 
Rep. 97. Actus Dei nemini facit 
injwiam : The act of God is so treated by 
the law as to affect no one injuriously. — 
2 Bla. Com. 122. 

2 The famous Sir William Jones, the 
most accomplished man of his age, had 
written a very harmless little tract, 
illustrating the general principles of 
government, and recommending parlia- 
mentary reform, entitled "A Dialogue 
between a Gentleman and a Farmer." 

His brother-in-law. Dr. Shipley, approv- 
ing of it, recommended it to a society of 
reformers in Wales, and caused it to be 
reprinted. Thereupon, the Honourable 
Mr. Fitzmaurioe, brother to the first 
Marquis of Lansdowne, preferred an 
indictment against the Dean at the 
Great Sessions for Denbighshire, for a 
seditious libel ; and in the autumn of 1783 
it stood for trial at Wrexham, before Lord 
Kenyon, then Chief Justice of Chester, and 
his brother Judge, Mr. Justice Barrington. 
Erskine attended, and thousands flocked 
to this dirty Welsh village in the hope of 
hearing him. There was a general feeling 
in favour of the defendant, so that his 
acquittal was anticipated, for not only had 
the pamphlet been generally read and 
approved of, but it was well known that 
the Attorney and Solicitor General, being 
applied to, had refused on the part of the 
Government to prosecute the author. At 
the sitting of the Court, however, a motion 
was made by the prosecutor's counsel to 
postpone the trial, on the ground that a 
paper had been printed and extensively 
circulated in the neighbourhood, which, 
without mentioning or alluding to the 
pending prosecution, argued that in all 
cases of libel, the jury are judges of the 
law as well as of the fact, and contained 

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Kiscellaneous — continued. 

14. " He that is greatest among you, let him be your servant " 
(Matt, xxiii., 11). — Quoted by Hdbart, C.J., Pitts v. James (1614), 
Ld. Hob. Rep. 125. 

15. Nothing is so easy as to be wise after the event. — Quoted by 
Bramwdl, B., Cornman v. The Eastern Counties Rail. Co. (1859), 
5 Jur. (N. S.), 658. 

See 6, above; Law, 17, n. ; Railway Company, 1. 

16. Experience hath shewn, that between the prisons and the graves of 
princes, the distance is very small. — Sir M. Foster, J., Foster's 
Crown Cas. (1762), Discourse I. c. 1, s. 3. 

17. 'Tis like leaping before one come to the stile.' — Hale, C.J., also 
TtDisden, J., Sir R. Bovy's Case (1672), 1 Vent. 217. 

18. A man is not born a knave ; there must be time to make him so, nor 
is he presently discovered after he becomes one. — Lord Holt, Reg, v. 
Swendsen (1702), 14 How. St. Tr. 596. 

See Character, 5 ; Criminal Justice, 4, 49 ; Fraud, 27 ; Reputation. 

19. Nothing is so silly as cunning. — Lord Mansfield, AnonymouB (1772), 
LofEt. 54. 

See EviDENOE, 14; Fraud, 4, n., 19, 27; Miscellaneous, 40; 
Pleadings, 5, 10 ; Truth, 6 ; Usury, 2. 

20. You know very well the old counsel, and it is a good one, " Fear 
Grod, and honour the King, and meddle not with them that are given 

various extracts from legal writers to as Lord Mansfield should hardly have had 
establish this position. There was no the rudiments of a classical education. — 
allegation that this was done by the Zives of the Ld. Chan., Vol. VIII. (-Ith 
defendant, and he made an affidavit, ed.) 272. With regard to Lord Mansfield 
positively denying aU knowledge of it. and the reference to his accomplishments 
Notwithstanding an animated address by Lord Campbell, it may be added that 
from Erskine upon the unmeasurableness his knowledge of Latin was undoubted ; 
of the motion and the extreme hardship the following quotation on the subject 
which delay would cause to his client, the from one of his judgments shews it : " The 
Judges, without hearing the reply, ordered Latin is somewhat worse, I think, in this 
the trial to be postponed ; and upon a Charter, than in that of Edward the 
suggestion by Erskine that a letter of the Third : Worse, indeed, I think never 
prosecutor could be proved, showing that existed. The more a man understands 
he was acting vindictively, the speech Latin the less he wiU be able to under- 
quoted above is said to have been made by stand this." — Lord Mansfield, Mayor, &c. 
the presiding Judge. Says Lord Camp- of Berwick-upon-Tweed r. Johnson (1773), 
bell : There were several Latin quotations LofEt. 338. 

which this distinguished lawyer had ' "For he that leaps, before he look, 

picked up, and which he generally mis- good son, 

applied, insomuch that George III. gave May leap in the mire, and miss what 

him the friendly advice, " Stick to your he hath done." 

good law, and leave ofE your bad Latin." — Ihe Marriage of True Wit 

He was very acute, very deeply learned in and Science (Wit), Act IV. Sc. i. 

his profession, and a very honest man; " And look before you ere you leap." — 

but it was rather humiliating that the Butler, "Hudibras," Pt. II., Canto 2, 

successor of such an accomplished scholar 1. 601. 

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Miscellaneous — continued. 

to change."' Meddling with them that are given to change has 
brought too much mischief already to this nation ; and if you wiU. 
commit the same sin, you must receive the same punishment : for 
happy is he that by other men's harms take heed.^Sir Robert Forster, 
C.J., Trial of Thomas Tonge and others (1662), 6 How. St. Tr. 265. 
See also Judges, 26 ; Religion, 4. 

21. No doubt there are plenty of people in this world whom it is difficult 
to drive, but whom anybody can lead. It is weE known that people 
who are generally most difficult to drive, are usually the most easily 
to be led by others who understand them. — Lord Eaikerley, L.C., 
Turner v. Collins (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. Ap. Ca. 340. 

See 30, helow ; Paeeot and Child, 4 ; Peoteotion, 2 ; Punishment, 
10, n. 

22. There are no means at my disposal for cutting this Gordian knot.' — 
Ghitty, J., Cunnack v. Edwards (1895), L. R. 1 C. D. [1895], p. 498. 

See Chancseey, 8 ; "Will, 18, n. 

23. We must take the thing in the grip of our hands.' — Bowen, L.J., 
The Queen v. Justices of County of London, &c. (1893), L. R. 
2 Q. B. 494. 

See Delay, 1 ; Judges, 44, 72, 73. 

24. Metaphysical reasoning is too subtile. — WiUes, J., Millar v. Taylor 
(1768), 4 Burr. Part IV. 2334. 

See Evidence, 27 ; Judges, 46 ; Reasonable, 3 ; Tort, 12. 

25. If bitter waters are flowing, it is not necessary to inquire from what 
source they spring. — Sir Wm. Scott, Holden v. Holden (1810), 2 Hagg. 
Con. Rep. 458. 

See Husband and Wife, 1. 

26. You must have a very good opinion of the ladies, Mr. Attorney ; for 

" In amore hace omnia insunt vitia, injuriae, 
Suspiciones, inimicitise, inducise, 
BeUum, pax rursimi." ■* 
Eardwicke, L.C., Moore v. Moore (1737), West, Ch. R. 44. 

1 " Fear thou the Lord and the King : Shelley's Case (1 Eep. 104a.), wherein his 
and meddle not with them that are given lordship expresses himself in almost the 
to change." — Prov. xxiv., 21. same terms as above : " That was putting 

2 "0 Time, thou must untangle this, the case in a nutshell. But it is one thing 

not I ; to put a case lilie Shelley's in a nutshell 

It is too hard a knot for me t' untie." and another thing to keep it there." See 

— Shahs. Van Grutten v. Foxwell (1897), 66 L. J. 

' The point lies in a nutsheU.— ior^f Eep. (N. S.) Q. B. D. 752. 

3fansfield, Bulbrook r. Goodere (1765), 3 * This was a suit for an injunction to 

Burr. Ft. IV. 1770. See also per Lord restrain proceedings in an action of eject- 

Macnaghten on the subject of the rule in ment upon the ground that Lady Moore, 

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Miscellaneous — eontimied. 

27. It was a wise saying, that the farthest way about was often the 
nearest way home.^ — Quoted by Lord Eedesdale, Corporation of 
Ludlow V. Greenhouse (1827), 1 Bligh, New Rep. 49. 

28. The only case in which I can conceive a person having breakfast 
over night is that he is not likely to have it next morning.— Bowen, L. J., 
Borthwick v. The Evening Post, Ltd. (1888), 58 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 258. 

29. " Qui s'excuse s'accuse." — Quoted by Wood, V.-C, Tichborne v. 
Tichbome (1867), 15 W. R. 1074 ; by Lord Bramwell, Deriy v. Peek 
(1889). L. R. 14 Ap. Ca. 347. 

30. Tis more than reason that goes to "persuasion? — Quoted by 
Tivisden, J., Manby v. Scott (1672), 1 Levinz. 4; 2 Sm. L. C. 
(8th Ed.) 462. 

See 21, above. 

31. An active imagination may find a bad tendency arising out of every 
transaction between imperfect morals. — Alderson, B., Brownlow v. 
Egerton (1854), 23 L. J. Rep. Part 5 (N. S.) Ch. 365. 

See Fbadd, 3, 8 ; Motives, 8 ; Public Policy, 7. 

32. " Tout exemple cloche." ' — Quoted by Knight Bruce, L.J., Boyse v. 
Rossborough (1854), 23 L. J. Rep. Part 5 (N. S.), Ch. 332. 

33. It is every man's own fault if he does not take such advice as will 
be sxixe to lead him right. — Ashhurst, J., Goodtitle v. Otway (1797), 7 
T. R. 420. 

See 10, above ; Fraud, 31 ; Pleadqigs, 5 ; Peoeeety, 12 ; Protection, 
2 ; Relief, 1 ; Solicitor and Client, 2 ; Title, 4. 

34. Zeal and indignation are fervent passions. — Hobart, C.J., ShefEeild v. 
RatcMe (1614), Lord Hobart's Rep. 335. 

35. Masterly inactivity may be prudence to one man, desperate rashness 
to another. — Kekewich, J., In re Liverpool Household Stores Assoc. 
(1890), 59 L. J. Rep. C. D. 618. 

See Commerce, 30 ; Motives, 11. 

the defendant, by her elopement, had " The furthest way about, t' o'ercome, 

forfeited her title to an annuity and that In the end does prove the nearest 

her husband was willing to receive her home." 

again. After decree had been pronounced, — ^wWer, " Hudibras," Pt. II. 

the Attorney-General for plaintiff said this Canto 1 , 1. 227. 

was so uncommon a case that probably it Seepe matorem nova, nun vetus, orbita 

would not happen again, which called fallit : A new road, not an old one, often 

forth the above reply from the Lord deceives the traveller. — 4 Iiist. 34. 
Chancellor. ^ " Tioiiden, J., said, that he was now 

1 " The next way home's the farthest strongly impressed with the truth of the 

way about." — Quarlet, "Emblems," Bk. opinion, stated by a, reverend divine 

IV., Pt. II., Bp. 2. (hard as the saying may appear)." — Id. 

3 Nullum simile quatuor pedihus ourrit. 

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Miscellaneous — continued. 

36. A wager! '—%re, L.C.J., Tooke's Case (1794), 25 How. St. Tr. 418. 

See Gambling. 

37. "As the crow flies" — ^a popular and picturesque ezpression to 
denote a straight lipe. — Maule, J., Stokes v. GrisseU (1854), 23 L. J. 
Eep. Part 7 (N. S.), Com. PL 144. 

See Delay, 2, n. 

38. Comparative necessairement suppose un positive, et que riens est un 
mere privative : A comparative necessarily supposes a positive, and 
nothing is a meer privative. — Vaughan, J., Tustian v. Roper (1670), 
Jones's (Sir Thos.) Rep. 37. 

39. " Touch not a cat, but (without) a glove." ^ — Quoted by Lord 
Brougham, Abbott v. Middleton (1858), 7 H. of L. Ca. 76. 

40. What is clear to one man may be doubtful to another. — Lord 
Kenyan, Godfrey v. Hudson (1788), 2 Esp. 500. 

See above, 2, 19 ; below, 44 ; Cases, 14 ; Motives, 10 ; Politics, 8 ; 
Reputation ; Tiiij;, 4 ; Words, 7. 

41. He who sows ought to reap.' — Lord Mansfield, Wigglesworth v. 
DaUison (1779), Doug. 201. 

See Intoxication, 2 ; Toet, 5. 

42. Thou shalt not feethe a kid in his mother's milk.* — Quoted by 
Lord Mansfield, Archbishop of Canterbury v. House (1774), LofEt. 622. 

43. It is sometimes difficult to get rid of first impressions. — Lord 
Kenyon, C.J., WithneH v. Gartham (1795), 6 T. R. 396. 

iSee Motives, 9. 

44. What may be good circumstances in one man, cannot be deemed so 
in another. — Lord Ellevborou^h, Rex v. Locker (1803), 5 Esp. 106. 

See above, 40 ; Reputation. 

^ Prisonerstatedto the Courthe" would — Samuel .BatZer, " Hudibras," Part. II., 

venture a wager " that a witness in the Canto 2. 

case had made a statement which he could " He which soweth sparingly shall reap 

not on his oath deny, which drew forth also sparingly ; and he which soweth 

the above exclamation from the Judge, to bountifully shall reap also bountifully." — 

which prisoner replied, " I am wrong. I 2 CoHritMans ii., 7. 
forgot myself." "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall 

^ This motto of the Macpliersons was he also reap." — Oalatians vi., 7. 
quoted by Lord Brougham in an argument * Mr. Waller, in his defence before the 

upon the construction to be put upon the House of Commons, thus explained this 

word " but " ; that the word is not neces- precept of the Bible : " You shall not turn 

sarily in opposition to what precedes it. It what was designed to support and benefit 

is a conjunction as well as a preposition. mankind into their destruction."* — Id. 

In one case it is derived from " be out," 622. 
and is equivalent to " except," or " with- 

ut," as in the case above pointed out by 

lOrd Brougham. 

' " For as you sow, y' are like to reap." hominum converti. 

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out," as in the case above pointed out by * Leges in honwn ^ salutem hominum 

Lord Brougham. tiata petsimum est in ffatidetn et perniciem 


Miscellaneous — continued. 

45. The tree must lie where it has iaRen.^—North, J., In re Bridgewater 
Navigation Co., Ltd. (1890), 60 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) C. D. 422. 

46. Let no cobler go beyond his kst.— Quoted by Bayley, J., Trial of 
Hunt and others (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 282.' 

47. A man who has done one contemptible thing to benefit himself will 
do another, if necessary, in order to carry out and complete the object 
he has in view.^ — Lord Esher, M.R., Exchange Telegraph Company 
V. Gregory & Co., (1896) L. R. 1 Q. B. D. [1896], p. 151. 

iSee Fradd, 4, n. ; Reputation ; Usury, 2. 

48. It certainly is of 'consequence to prevent men hanging out false 
colours. — Laurence, J., Jordaine v. Lashbrooke (1798), 7 T. R. 611. 

See below 58 ; Pleadings, 6. 

49. When thieves fall out, honest men get their own. — Sir M. Hale.* 

50. They that once begin first to trouble the water, seldom catch the 
fish. — Jefferies, L.C.J., Trial of Wm. SachevereU and others (1684), 

10 How. St. Tr. 92. 

51. No dog is entitled to have one worry with impunity.— -Lord Goekhum, 
Orr V. Fleming (1853), 1 W.R. 339. 

52. This was laying the axe to the root of the tree.^ — Quoted by Parker, 
C.J., Reg. V. Ballivos, &c. de Bewdley (1712), 1 P.Wms. 226. 

53. Human nature is imperfect. — Alderson, B., Howard v. Grosset (1844), 
6 St. Tr. (N. S.) 365. 

See Administeation of Justice, 35 ; Discretion, 9 ; Husband and 
Wife, 5 ; Judges, 76 ; Law, 35 ; Mistakes, 2 ; Peesumption, 8 ; 


54. The best men are but men, and are sometimes transported with 
passion.— Sir RoleH Atkyns, L.C.B., Trial of Sir Edw. Hales (1686), 

11 How. St. Tr. 1206. 

See Criminal Justice, 23 ; Motives, 11 ; Politics, 8 ; Sovereignity, 10 ; 
Truth, 13. 

1 "In the place where the tree falleth, acquis ne prospfere jamaie." — Fr. Prov. 
there it shall be." — Eeclesiastes xi., 3. * In a case before Sir Matthew Hale, 

2 " Let the cobler stick to his last." — the two litigants unwittingly set out that 

at a former period they had in conjunction 

3 iBes profectb ituUa est nequitiee leased a ferry to the injury of the pro- 
modus : There is no mean in wickedness. prietor, on which Sir M. Hale made the 
\\ Co_ 8 b. above remark. This will be found 

Mmliilt'U/rpe,cui nihil satii: To vthom recorded in " Familiar Words," p. 277. 

nothing is sufficient, to him nothing is Another similar saying is, " When thieves 

^ase. 4 Inst. 53. ^^11 0"*i ^^^^ mea come to their goods." — 

Quce mala simt inchoata in principio Pt-owj-S* (J.Heywood), Bk. II., Ch.ix. 
vix bono peraguntur enitu : Things bad * Said on an argument respecting the 

in principle at the commencement seldom payment of costs to the Crown. See 

achieve a good end.— 4 Co. 2. " Bien mal Matt, iii., 10 ; Luke iii., 9. 

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Miscellaneous — continued. 

55. The lecturer should remember that 

" Beneath this starry arch 
Nought resteth or is stiU ; " 
and that his duty is to watch over and criticise new modes of thought, 
new works, the march of intellect, and those discoveries which 
"Make old knowledge 
Pale before the new." 
Even in pure mathematics there may be alterations and additions, and 
ethical science is not free from the inexorable law of mutability. — Lord 
Fitzgerald, Caird v. Sime (1887), 57 L. J. Rep. P. 0. Cas. 13 ; L. R. 
12 App. Cas. 354. 
See Author, 1. 

56. The end directs and sanctifies the means} — Wilmot, L.J.C., CoUins 
V. Blantern (1767), 2 Wils. Rep. 351. 

See Criminal Justice, 43 ; Jury, 30 ; Necessity, 2. 

57. " As sure as Grod is in Gloucester ! " — Exclamation by Lord Alvardey, 

' " The end must justify the means." — 
Matthew Prior, " Hans Carvel," line 67. 

Fallacy that " the end justifies 
the means." " The end justifies the 
means. Yes : but on three conditions, 
any of which failing, no such justification 
has place : — 

1. One is, that the end be good. 

2. That the means chosen be either 
purely good — or, if evil, having less 
evil in them than on a balance 
there is of real good in the end. 

3. That they have more of good in 
them, or less of evil as the case may 
be, than any others, by the employ- 
ment of which the end might have 
been attained. 

Laying out of the case these restrictions, 
note the absurdities that would follow. 

Acquisition of a penny loaf is the end I 
aim at. The goodness of it is indisputable. 
If, by the goodness of the end, any means 
employed in the attainment of it are 
justified, instead of a penny, I may give 
a pound for it : thus stands the justification 
on the ground of prudence. Or, instead 
of giving a penny for it, I may cut the 
baker's throat, and thus get it for nothing : 
and thus stands the justification on the 
ground of benevolence and beneficence, 
II. 470." — Benthamiana ; or. Select 
JSxtracts from the Works of Jeremy 
Bentham, 1843, p. 419. 

^ Swift, in one of his verses upon 
Whiston writes : 

" Who prov'd, as sure as God's in 
That Moses was a great impostor." 

It is said of Lord Alvanley that he 
would now and then talk in a slip-shod 
manner, as if sitting in an arm-chair and 
presiding over a free-and-easy club. Of 
this deportment a singular instance was 
mentioned by the late Mr. Whitbread, 
when arraigning Lord MelviUe at the bar 
of the House of Lords (see Trial of Lord 
Viscount Melville (1806), 29 How. St. Tr. 

" It was not long since Lord Alvanley 
was trying a cause in this hall, and an 
Act of Parliament was in question. A 
learned Serjeant quoted a particular 
section of the Act ; Lord Alvanley said 
there was no such clause in the Act. 

" ' Why but, my lord, here it is,' said 
the Serjeant ; 

" ' Never mind, I tell you I know it is 
not there,' retorted the Judge. 

" ' I beg your lordship's pardon, but here 
it is in the book ; read it.' 

" The learned Judge at length took the 
book, and having read it, exclaimed — 

" ' Oh true, here it is sure enough, as 
sure as God is in Gloucester. ' " 
— Toionseiid, " Lives of Twelve Eminent 
Judges," Vol. I., p. 158. This incident 

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Miscellaneous — continued. 

58. Wickedness and weakness generally go tand-in-hand together ; and 
upon the repeated observation of their doiag so, is founded that well- 
known saying, " Quos Deus vult perdere prius dementat." — Mounteney 
B., Annesley v. Lord Anglesea (1743), 17 How. St. Tr. 1431. 

See ahme, 48 ; Evil, 1 ; Fraud, 4, n. ; Words, 8. 

59. "Yoil may not sell the cow and sup the milk."^ — Pr. Quoted by 
Lord Maenaghten, Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammu- 
nition Co., (1894), L. R. App. Cas. [1894], p. 572. 

60. " How happy could I be with either 

Were t'other dear charmer away ; 
But now you both tease me together, 
To neither a word will I say." 

Gay, " The Beggar's Opera " {Maaheath sings), 
Act n., sc. ii. 
— Quoted by Yaughan Williams, L.J., (in reference to the meaning of 
the word " either "), In re Pickworth ; Snaith v. Parkinson (1899), L.R. 
1 C. D. C. A. 655. 

61. Aiit CcBsar out nullus.* — Quoted by Lord Maenaghten in Van Grutten 
V. FoxweU (1897), 66 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. D. 752. 


1. Certainty is the mother of quiet, which is the end of the law, and 
tho' it falls out that some particular cases may light very hard, 

in reference to Lord Alvanley brings case now adverted to might, perhaps, be 
to recollection a somewhat similar called "An anonymous case," and Mr. 
anecdote related by Mr. Baron Huddle- Reid might answer it by saying, "It 
stone some few years back, and to has been overruled in the House of 
be found recorded in the following para- Lords." — The [London] Standard, 4th 
graph : — Jiilyi 1885 ; Cases Heard and Determined 
An Anonymmis Case. — Mr. Finlay, Q.C., in the Suprerne Court of the Straits Settle- 
in. arguing some matters of law, referred merits, by the Author, Vol. I. cviii. See 
to a case which, he said, had been decided also, ante, LAW, 64. 
lately, but had not been reported ; so that i Said in reference to a solicitor in 
he could not quote it in the usual way. large practice who sold his business 
Mr. Baron Huddlestone said that he covenanting not to practise on his own 
recalled to his mind that years ago Mr. account in England or Scotland, but who 
Wakefield, in one of the Chancery Courts, afterwards set up in the immediate neigh- 
referred to what he described as an bourhood and thus tried to steal the busi- 
anonymous case ; and the matter for the ness he had sold. A similar proverb to 
time passed ofE. When Mr. Bethell, how- the above may be found in the following : 
ever, came to reply, he said, " I have to " Would yee both eat your cake and have 
iiiform your lordship that that case has your cake ? " — See Proverhs (Heywood), 
been overruled in the House of Lords." Bk. II., Oh. ix. 

Thereupon Mr. Wakefield, somewhat 2 " Either Caesar or nobody : '■ I will 

losing his temper, retorted, " There never attain supreme eminence, or perish in the 

was such a case." In a similar way the attempt. — A saying of Julius Ccesa/r. 

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Mischief — continued. 

yet better that mischief than an inconvenience.^ — Pollexfen, C.J., 
Bolton V. Canham (1672), PoUejden's Rep. 131. 
See helow, 2 ; Administration of Justice, 35 ; Common Law, 5 ; 
Doctrine, 4 ; Law, 43, 44 ; Precedents, 20. 

2. The policy of the law of England, and indeed the true principles of 
aU government, wUl rather suffer many private inconveniences, than 
introduce one public mischief. — Wright, J., Sir John Wedderburn's 
Case (1746), Foster's Cr. Cas. 29. 

See above, 1 ; Justice, 1 ; Navy, 7 ; Toet, 3. 

3. It is a general rule of Judgment, that a mischief should rather be 
admitted than an inconvenience." — Goieper, L.C., Devit v. College of 
DubUn (1720), Gilbert Eq. Ca. 249. 


1. There have been errors in the administration of the most enlightened 
men. — Lord Ellenborough, Rex v. Lambert and Perry (1810), 2 Camp. 

See Evil, 1 ; Judges, 17 ; Liberty of the Press, 1 ; Precedents, 6, n. ; 
Sovereignty, 10 ; Tort, 25. 

2. Mistakes are the inevitable lot of mankind. — Jessel, M.R., In re 
Taylor's Estate ; Tomlin v. Underhay (1882), L. R. 22 C. D. (1883), 
p. 503. 

See Amendment, 15 ; Criminal Justice, 29 ; Miscellaneous, 53. 

3. A mistake, as it seems to me, is none the less a mistake because it is 
made deliberately in the pursuance of a mistaken intention. — Lord 
Bussell of Killowen, C.J., Linforth v. Butler (1898), L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 

See Honesty, 1 ; Irregularity. 

4. I know but of one Being to whom error may not be imputed. — lard 
Ellenborough, Rex v. Lambert and Perry (1810), 2 Camp. 402. 

See Sovereignty, 10. 

1 " Certainty is the mother of repose. Trial of Sir Edw. Hales (1686), H How. 

and therefore the common law aims at St. Tr. 1208. See also ante, jTJDGBi, 13, 

certainty." — Lwd Sardivicke, L.C., and references t/wre given. 

Walton V. Tryon (1753), 1 Dick. 245. 2 As the sun arising in the horizon 

" And the law says, better is a mischief shews not the figure so clear, as when it 

than an inconTenience. By a mischief is is beholden in the meridian ; so by mixing 

meant, when one man or some few men many impertinences with the case in 

suffer by the hardship of a law, which judgment, it hath been apprehended to be 

law is yet useful for the public. But an of a far tenderer consequence than indeed 

inconvenience is to have a public law dis- it is : yet tender and weighty it is. — 

obeyed or broken, or an ofience to go Much, L.C.J., Hampden's Case (1637), 

unpunished."— /Sir Boiert Atliyns, L.O.B., 3 How. St. Tr. 1217. 

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1. One cannot help regretting that where money is concerned, it is so 
much the rule to overlook moral obligations. — Malins, V.-C, Ellis v. 
Houston (1878), L. R. 10 C. D. 240. 

See Ceiminal Justice, 41 ; Pahdon, 4. 

2. The greediness of gain is the only principle on which a stranger can 
be induced to furnish a stranger.' — Burnett, J., Earl of Chesterfield 
V. Janssen (1750), 2 Ves. 125. 

See Commerce, 12, 18 ; Feaud, 29 ; Property, 12. 

3. Common people do not make such distinction between money and 
land, as persons conversant in Law Matters do.' — Lm-d Mansfield, 
Hope V. Taylor (1756), 1 Burr. Part IV. 272. 

See Fraud, 20. 

4. It has been quaintly said " that the reason why money cannot be 
followed is, because it has no ear-mark " : But this is not true. The 
true reason is, upon account of the currency of it : it cannot be 
recovered after it has passed in currency. — Lord Mansfield, Miller 
V. Race (1785), 1 Burr. Part IV. 457. 

5. I am a great friend to the action for money had and received : it is 
a very beneficial action, and founded on principles of eternal justice. — 
Lord Mansfield, C.J., Towers v. Barrett (1786), 1 T. R. 134. 

6. Any man who spends his income, whether large or small, benefits the 
community by putting money in circulation. — Kekewich, J., In re 
Nottage (1895), L. R. 2 C. D. [1895], p. 653. 


1. Whatever is contrary, bonos mores est decorum, the principles of 
our law prohibit, and the King's Court, as the general censor and 
guardian of the public manners, is boxmd to restrain and punish. — 
Lm-d ManafiAd, Jones v. RandaU (1774), LofEt. 386. 

See also Contempt of Court, 1 ; Law, 61 ; Relief, 2. 

2. The reason why no mention is made in our ancient books of uses, is, 
because men were then of better Consciences than now they are, so as 
the feoffees did not give occasion to their feoffors to bring subpoenas 
to compell them to perform the trusts reposed in them. — Manwood, J., 
Brett's Case (1583), 2 Leonard's Rep. 15. 

1 " We, as lawyers, as men of business, — lA/ndley, L.J., In re Marquis of Ailes- 

as men of experience, know perfectly well bury's Settled Estates (1891), L. J. Kep. 

what evils necessarily result from hand- 61 0. D. 123. 

ing over a great family estate to a mort- a " Common people ' ' may here be 

gagee in possession, whose only chance of taken in the same sense as " ignorant 

getting his money is to sacrifice the country fellows " in Juby, 10, «tp>'4. 
interests of everybody to money-getting." 

D.L.Q. 12 

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Morals — aontinued. 

3. This Court does not sit as a Court of morality, to inflict punislnnent 
against those who offend against the social law. — Sir F. H. Jeune, 
Evans v. Evans (1899), L. R. Prob. Div. [1899], p. 202. 
See Courts, 11 ; Feaci^ ^, n. ; Judicial Pboceedings, 7 ; Public 
PoLior, 7. 


1. Motives do not concern me ; they are a dangerous subject with which 
to deal.—KekeiDieh, J., Whelan v. Palmer (1888), L. J. Rep. (N. S.) 57 
C. D. 788. 

See Fraud, 2. 

2. What passes in the mind of man is not scrutable by any human 
tribunal ' ; it is only to be collected from his acts. — Willes, J., King 
V. Shipley (1784), 3 Doug. 177. 

See Words, 8. 

3. We must judge of a man's motives from his overt acts. — Lord 
Kenyon, C.J., King v. Waddington (1800), 1 East, 158. 

4. There is no entering into the secret thoughts of a man's heart. — Lord 

Mansfield, The King v. WoodfaU (1774), Lofft. 782. 

5. It is impossible to dive into the secret recesses of a man's heart.' — 
Sir Wm. Grant, M.R., Burrowes v. Lock (1805), 10 Ves. Jr. 476. 

6. To enter into the hearts of men belongs to him who can explore the 
human heart. — Lord Kenyon, C.J., Eaton's Case (1793), 22 How. 
St. Tr. 821. 

7. It is not for himian judgment to dive into the heart of man, to know 
whether his intentions are good or evil. — Lord Kenyon, C.J., Case of 
Lambert and others (1793), 22 How. St. Tr. 1018. 

See SovEREiGNTT, 10 ; Truth, 13. 

8. . . . The fallacious use of the principle that you cannot look into a 
man's mind. It is said you cannot do that : therefore what follows ? 
It is said that you are to have fixed rules to tell you that he must 
have meant something, one way or the other, when certain exterior 
phenomena arise. The answer is that there is no such thing as an 
absolute criterion which gives you certain index to a man's mind. 
There is nothing outside his mind which is an absolute indication of 

1 "He revealeth the deep and secret 2 Seealso^er LordEomilly, M.E.,iuBe 

things, he knoweth what is in the dark- Ward (1862) : " The plaintifE cannot dive 

ness, and the light dwelleth with him." — into the secret recesses of his (the defen- 

Quoted by Xegge, B., Trial of Mary dant's) heart."— 31 JBeav. 7. 
Blandy (1752), 18 How. St. Tr. 1188. 

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motives — continued. 

what is going on inside. So far from saying that you cannot look 
into a man's mind, yoa must look into it, if you are going to find 
fraud against him : and unless you think you see what must have 
been in his mind, you cannot find him guilty of fraud. — Bowen, L.J., 
Angus V. CMord (1891), L. R. 2 C. D. [1891], p. 471. 
See Fraud, 2, 8, 34 ; Misoellanbous, 31. 

9. Every man has a right to keep his own sentiments if he pleases. — 
Yates, J., Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. Part IV. 2379. 

See Author, 1 ; Judges, 48, n. ; Miscellaneous, 43. 

10. Men's feelings are as different as their faces. — Qrose, J., Grood v. 
Elliott (1790), 3 T. R. 701. 

See Miscellaneous, 40 ; Words, 7. 

11. A man acting for himseK may indulge his own caprices, and 
consider what is convenient or agreeable to himself, as well as what 
is strictly prudent, and his prudential motives cannot afterwards be 
separated from the others which may have governed him. — Lord 
Langdale, M.R., Att.-Gen. v. Kerr (1840), 2 Beav. 428. 

See Commerce, 30 ; Fraud, 2 ; Jury, 11 ; Miscellaneous, 35, 54. 

12. Motives are very often immaterial with reference to the manner of 
disposing of a suit. It has been said by an eminent Judge, that if 
you were to look into motives of suitors, Courts of justice woidd not 
sit above a month in the year, and would have little to do. Of course 
there are, in numerous instances, motives for litigation which, if they 
could be looked into, would prevent a Court of justice from interfer- 
ing. But generally I agree that it is not the rule so to regard them. 
— Knight Bruce, L.J., Att.-Gen. v. Sheffield Gas Consimiers Co. (1853), 
3 D. M. & G. 311. 

See Administration of Justice, 9, 15 ; Pleadings, 4 ; Tort, 2. 

13. The rule of our law is that the immediate cause, the causa proxima, 
and not the remote cause, is to be looked at : for, as Lord Bacon says : 
" It were inficnite for the law to judge the causes of causes and their 
impulsions one of another ; therefore it contenteth itself with the 
immediate cause, and judgeth of acts by that, without looking to any 
further degree."' — Blackburn, J., Sneesby v. Lancashire and Yorkshire 
Rail. Co. (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. Ca. 267. 

See Administration or Justice, 7 ; Fraud, 19 ; Law, 41. 

1 Causa proxima, non remota spectatur. losses were included there would be 

Bac. Max. Meg. 1. This Is why in the nowhere to stop and they might result 

awarding of damage, only the proximate from other causes. For illustration, see 

loss which can be directly traced to the Sharp v. Powell, 7 C. P. 253 ; Cattle v. 

injury is considered. If consequently Stockton Waterworks Co., 10 Q. B. 463. 

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Motives — continued. 

14. I think the motives of the legislature in passing an Act of Parliar 
ment are to be taken to be proper motives. — Bayley, J., King v. Hunt 
(1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 312. 

See Parliament, 8, 13, 17. 

15. It was by no means uncommon, where the legislature had a 
particular object in view in making a particular statute, to extend the 
enactments beyond the immediate and original object, and apply it to 
other matter suggested by it. — Ahhott, C.J., Clarke v. Burdett and 
another (1819), 2 Stark. 505. 

See CoNSTEDOTiON, 8, 9, 10 ; Statotes, 7. 


Where a man calls himself by a name which is not his name, he is 
telling a falsehood.' — Lord Usher, M.R., Reddaway v. Banham (1895), 
L. R. 2 Q. B. D. [1895], p. 293. 


What does naturalization give ? AH that belongs to the character of a 
British Subject. What does it take away ? All that does not apper- 
tain to that character. It makes the party ip«o facto a British Subject, 
to aU iatents and purposes. — Wilde, C.J., Reg. v. Manning (1849), 4 
Cox, C. C. 37. 


1. The legislature have anxiously provided for those most useful and 
deserving body of men, the seamen and marines of this country. — 
Ixn-d Kenyan, C.J., Turtle v. HartweU (1795), 6 T. R. 429. 

2. Surely the navy must be the navy royal.' — Holt, C.J., Tutchin's 
Case (1704), 14 How. St. Tr. 1122. 

3. The royal navy of England has ever been its greatest defence and 

1 Ifihil facit error noviinis oum, de course, otherwise. — Franhlaiid v. Nichol- 

corpore constat : An error as to a name is son (1805), 3 M. & S. 260. The statement 

nothing when there is certainty as to the of the law in Barlow v. Bateman might be 

person. — 11 Co. 21. See also Janea ». Whit- understood to mean that a man might 

bread and others (1851), 11 C. B. 406, 411. only change his name definitely, and not 

Nothing is more certain than that given use two at once, but given bona fides as 

hona fides, a man may call himself what above laid down a man may use two 

he pleases. " Any one," said Sir Joseph names at once, as for instance one for his 

JekyU, M.E., in 1730, "may take upon private and one for his business use. 
him what surname, and as many surnames -^ » This was on an argument that the 

as he pleases without an Act of Parlia- ^word " navy ' ' " signified no more than a 

ment." — Barlow v. Bateman, 3 P. Wms. number of ships got together, and there- 

66. But where a fraud is practised by fore there may be a navy of merchant 

means of the change of name, it is, of ships as well as a navy of men-of-war." 

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Kavy — continued. 

omanient ; it is its ancient and natural strength ; the floating bul- 
wark of the island.' — Sir Wm. Blaekstone (1765), Com. Bk. I., ch. xiii., 

4. The condition of the British Navy is, no doubt, a matter of national 
importance and public interest. — Grove, J., Henwood v. Harrison 
(1872), L. R. 7 C. P. Cas. 613. 

5. The salvation of this country depends upon the discipline of the 
fleet ; without discipline they would be a rabble, dangerous only to 
their friends, and harmless to the enemy. — Per Gur.,' Johnstone v. 
Sutton (1786), 1 T. R. 549. 

6. The navy is the most important defence of the country, in which 
every subject of the Queen has an interest of the deepest character. — 
Willes, J., Henwood v. Harrison (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. Cas. 627. 

7. War itself is a great evil, but it is chosen to avoid a greater. The 
practice of pressing is one of the mischiefs war bringeth with it. But 
it is a maxim in law, and good policy too, that all private mischiefs 
must be borne with patience for preventing a national calamity. And 
as no greater calamity can befall us than to be weak and defenceless 
at sea in a time of war, so I do not know that the wisdom of the 
nation hath hitherto found out any method of manning our navy, less 
inconvenient than pressing ; and at the same time, equally sure and 
efEectual.' — Foster, J., Case of Pressing Mariners (1743), 18 How. St. 
Tr. 1330. 

See MisoHiEF, 2 ; Shipping, 7. 

8. It may not be fit, in point of discipline, that a subordinate officer 
should dispute the commands of his superior, if he were ordered to 
go to the mast head : but if the superior were to order him thither, 
knowing that, for some bodily infirmity, it was impossible he should 
execute the order, and that he must infallibly break his neck in the 
attempt, and it were so to happen, the discipline of the navy would 
not protect that superior from being guilty of the crime of murder. — 
Eyre, B., Sutton v. Johnstone (1786), 1 T. R. 503. 

I The naval dominion of England is of bono pensatur." Pressing is still legal, 

great consequence and use ; for it is though nowadays it is unnecessary to 

called dotem regni. If therefore the resort to it, as the principle is unchanged 

kingdom of England consists of land and that the Sovereign can call upon all his 

sea, I hope we shall not stand at half subjects for their services in the event of 

defence, to defend the land and leave the necessity. These maxims still find illus- 

sea. — Rat. Pari., 2 Rich. II., M. 2.5. tration in the compulsory taking of land 

Lord* liOugKborough and Mamfield. for railways and other public under- 

' The maxims on this head are " Salus takings, service of jurymen, incidence of 

populi supremalez." (Boo. Max. Reg. taxation, &c. 
12), and " Privatum incommodam publico 

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1. The law of necessity dispenses with things which otherwise are not 
lawful to be done. — Per Ciw./ Manby v. Scott (1672), 1 Levinz, 4 ; 2 
Sm. L. C. (8th ed.) 446. 

See Law, 62. 

2. Necessity creates the law, — it supersedes rules ; and whatever is reason- 
able and just in such cases is Ukewise legal. — Sir W. Scott, "The 
Gratitudine " (1801), 3 Rob. Adm. Rep. 240. 

See Criminal Justice, 43 ; Husband and Wife, 11 ; Jury, 30 ; 
Miscellaneous, 56. 

New Trial. 

1. There is no doubt now, that now-a-days, on proper ground, we would 
grant a new trial." — Lord Mansfield, Rex v. Curril (1773), Lofft. 156. 

2. Motions for new trials have been very much encouraged of late years, 
and I shall never discourage them ; for nothing tends more to the due 
administration of justice, or even to the satisfaction of the parties 
themselves, than applications of this kind. — BuUer, J., Vernon v. 
Hankey (1787), 2 T. R. 120. 

See 3, helow ; Justice, 6. 

3. Though this motion for a new trial is an apphcation to the discretion 
of the Court, it must be remembered that the discretion to be exercised 
on such an occasion is not a wild but a soimd discretion, and to be 
confined within those limits within which an honest man, competent 
to discharge the duties of his office, ought to confine himself. And 
that discretion will be best exercised by not deviating from the rules 
laid down by our predecessors ; for the practice of the Court forms 

1 Twisden and Mallet, 31. whether I am right or not. — Lord Mans- 

Necessitas non liabet legem ; Necessity jield, Bright v. Eynou (1757), 1 Burr, 

has no law. — Plow. 18. Part IV. 396. The expression " brothers " 

Necessity is the law of the time and will be found explained under JUDGES, 

action, and things are lawful by necessity, .53, n., ante, p. 118. 

which otherwise are not ; " Quicquid One was ordered by the Judge of assize 

necessitas cogit, defendit" ; and the law of to be hanged in chains ; the officers hung 

the time must regulate the law of the in private solo: the owner brought tres- 

place in such public things. — Sir Ed. pass ; and upon not guilty, the jury found 

Littleton (Sol.-Gen.), Hampden's Case for the defendant, and the Court would 

(1637), 3 How. St. Tr. 927. not grant a new trial, it being done for 

Neceasitas est lex temporis et loci : convenience of place, and not to affront 

Necessity is the law of time and place.— the owner (Sparks r. Spicer (1698), 2 Salk. 

Sale's V.C.5i. 648). "Mich. 10 W. S, pei- Solt, Ghiet 

Necessity, the tyrant's plea. — Milton, Justice: If a man be hung in chains upon 

" Par. Lost," Bk. IV., line 393. my land, after the body is consumed, I 

a I am clearly of opinion that there shall have gibbet and chain — said upon a 

ought to be a new trial. These are my motion for a new trial." — 1 Ld. ~ 

sentiments : my brothers will judge 738. 

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New Trial— continued. 

the law of the Court.^ — Lord Kenyan, C.J., Wilaon v. Rastall (1792), 
4 T. E. 757. 

See 2, above; Praotioe, 2, 11. 


It is a great satisfaction to a Judge, that a nonsuit is not conclusive.^ — 
Lord Mansfield, Brookshaw v. Hopkins (1773), Lofft. 244. 
See Appeaus, 1 ; Counsel, 12, 13, n. 

Notice to Quit. 

It seems to me that each case must be taken by itself, and that one 
decision on the meaning of a notice to qidt does not afford much 
guidance for the interpretation of a notice in different words. . . . 
We must remember that we are dealing with sensible people, and we 
must try to interpret the notice as if it were given by a man of sense. 
—Ridley, J., Wridev. Dyer (1899), L. R. 1 Q. B. D. [1900], p. 25. 
See Administration of Justice, 11. 

' See also per Parher, C.J., and Eyre 
and Powell, JJ., in Beg, v. BalliTOS, &c. 
de Bewdley (1712), 1 P. Wms. at p. 211 
et teq., more particularly in reference to 
the " history ' ' of new trials. 

3 It has been often laid down, that if a, 
Judge gives it as his opinion that the 
plaintiff should be non-suited, and counsel 
submit to the direction, it is not to be 
imputed as a fault of the counsel. — Lord 
Mamfield, Harris v. Bntterley (1775), 
1 Cowp. 484. Judges ought to lean 
against every attempt to nonsuit a plain- 
tifE upon objections which have no relation 
to the real merits : much more, when the 
plaintiff is clearly entitled to recover upon 
the merits, and must recover in another 
action. — Lord Mansjwld, Morris 'P.'Pugh 
(1761), 3 Burr. Part IV. 1243. A non- 
suit is the same as discontinuance by 
leave of the Court. This dictum of Lord 
Mansfield is very clear. Formerly when 
the Judge considered that a plaintiff had 
not made out his case, he intimated the 
fact to him, and the plaintiff, if he was 
wise, absented himself and did not follow 
up his action ; hence it was " non prose- 
quUw " and he could bring it again. It 
was so unusual to disregard the suggestion 
of the Judge, who after the view he had 
expressed, if the case went on, would be 
sure to decide for the defendant (and then 
the plaintiff could not sue again), that 
Judges got into the habit of nonsuiting 

without consulting the plaintiff at all. 
But still the plaintiff could object, though 
it would be very foolish. Hence for 
counsel to submit to the Judge's direction 
and not to go on in his teeth, cannot iu 
any case be considered as a fault in 
counsel, for he sees what ruling the Judge 
will give if the case goes on, and by 
taking a nonsuit, presel'ves for his client 
the right to bring a fresh action. The 
law upon nonsuit at the present day is 
briefly this. The Judicature Rules of 
1875 (0. 41, r. 6) provided that a judg- 
ment for nonsuit should be final. The 
Rules of 1883, repealing the Rules of 1875, 
made no provision as to nonsuit. In the 
latest case, Fox v. The Star Newspaper 
Co., Ltd. (1898), L. R. 1 Q. B. 63B, 
affirmed L. R. A. 0. (1900), p. 19, it was 
decided that " nonsuit ' ' is covered by 
0. 26, r. 1, which provides (inter alia') 
that the Court may allow a plaintiff to 
discontinue at any time. When the 
parties are face to face in Court it is only 
at the discretion of the Judge that the 
plaintiff may withdraw, reserving to him- 
self the privilege of bringing another 
action. It is only before the hearing that 
the plaintiff can discontinue without leave 
of Court. This discontinuing practically 
covers nonsuit. It is the same thing. 
Therefore nonsuit by right is a thing of 
the past. 

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Obiter Dicta. 

1. I believe that obiter dieta, like the proverbial chickens of destiny, 
come home to roost^ sooner or later in a very uncomfortable way to 

1 Thus the Zaw Times : " We are very 
glad to hear it, and trust that Her 
Majesty's Judges will note and remember 
this piece of forensic natural history."— 
X.r.JoMr.,1888, p. 272. 

" Obiter Dicta," said John A. Finch at 
the recent banquet of the Indiana State 
Bar Association, "is not statutory Latin, 
and we have no information as to how 
the words would have been translated 
by the Commissioners who prepared our 
first Code, had they been required to 
make such an attempt. The law dic- 
tionaries and the Courts translate these 
words as a phrase, and give us rather 
an exegesis than a translation. ' Dieta,' 
says a Judge of the New York Court of 
Appeals, ' are opinions of a Judge which do 
not embody the resolution or determination 
of the Court, and made without argument 
or full consideration of the point ; they are 
not the professed, deliberate determina- 
tions of the Judge himself. ' Obiter dicta,' 
he says, ' are such opinions, uttered by the 
way, not upon the point or question 
pending, as if drawn aside for the time 
from the main topic of the case to 
collateral subjects.' 

" An old Judge is quoted as saying, ' An 
obiter dictvm, in the language of the law, 
is a gratuitous opinion, an individual 

" I am not much of a dictionary maker, 
but I believe I could improve upon either 
and say, ' An obiter dictimi is the passing 
opinion of a Judge expressed when it is 
not called for.' 

" A great Judge was asked, ' What is 
the difference between law and equity ? ' 
'Very little in the end,' responded his 
lordship ; ' at common law you are done 
for at once ; in equity you are not so 
easily disposed of. The former is a bullet 
which is instantaneously and charmingly 
effective ; the latter, the angler's hook, 
which plays with the victim before it kills 
him. Common law is prussic acid, equity 
is laudanum,' 

" Whether a man goes dovvm with a law 
bullet in a vital part or is wearied out as 
is the fish before being landed, where he 
may gasp his life out ; whether he dies 
with one convulsion after a. swallow of 
prussic acid or dreamily passes away in 
the solace of an opium overdraught, is 

perhaps no matter in the end. In the 
processes there is a vast difference, but 
the tombstones — the reports of that Court 
which has the last say — read very much 
alike. The figure is, perhaps, not a bad one. 

" There is a deal of difference in what 
should be on the monument and what is 
on it, and there is equal difference in what 
should be in the opinions of the Courts of 
last resort and what the Judges speaking 
for the Court find time to inject. The 
elegies and eulogies on the plain memorial 
slab and the massive monument are often 
obiter — ^not meant seriously — and super- 
fluous. The Judges of the law Courts in 
bank and the Chancellors in their medita- 
tive chambers are as much given to 
superfluous utterances as are the post- 
mortem inscription in marble. Obiter 
dicta is a vice common to both. 

" A child wandering in a cemetery, after 
reading the effusive inscriptions, all too 
superfluous after the statement that a 
dead man is below, asks where the bad 
people are buried. A reader of reports, 
searching for authority, sighs that so 
much is said when so much less would 
amply suffice. 

" We are taught that we may disregard 
all obiter dicta, but, as we are never sure 
what the law in a given case is until some 
Court has given an opinion in the reports, 
equally are we never sure what is 
unnecessary law, the obiter dicta of an 
opinion, until some later Court so informs 
us. That which we have for years quoted 
as authority is, in later expressions, 
stripped of its conclusiveness and made 
simply an impertinence. Not only does 
the superfluous expression which has been 
cited or acted upon as decisive become 
indecisive, it becomes a reproach to the 
Judge who wrote it. 

"This sort of thing reminds one of 
what Artemus Ward said in his lecture on 
the Mormons : ' One of the principal 
features of my entertainment is that it 
contains so many things that don't have 
anything to do with it.' We have been 
succeeding or failing because of something 
in an opinion which turns out to have no 
right to a place in the judicial utterance. 
A man who has carefully wound up his 
clock every night for twenty years and 
then learns that it is an eight-day clock 

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Obiter Dicta — continued. 

the Judges who have uttered them, and are a great source of 
embarrassment in future cases. — Bowen, L.J., Cooke v. New River 
Co. (1888), L. R. 38 C. D. 70. 
See DiCTOM ; Practice, 4. 

has less reason for feeling bad than a 
lawyer who has lost a case or been guided 
in advice given by something that turns 
out to be obiter. 

"After haying bowed to the supposed 
law, as found in an opinion of a High 
Court for years, we are suddenly told that 
the Judge who wrote the opinion was 
'ofi his base,' so to speak, and what he 
said was not the law at all, or, at least, he 
had no business to have then said it was 
the law. 

" Take the case of the Some Insurance 
Company v. Morte, in which the Supreme 
Court of the United States held that a 
statute of Wisconsin requiring an insurance 
company of another State to agree that it 
would not remove a case against it to the 
United States Cfrcuit Court was ' illegal 
and void ' and therefore not binding on 
the company. Then read, and rub your 
^es as you read, the same Court in Boyle 
T. The Cmttinental Insurance Company, 
in which it was held that the State may 
prescribe any condition that it may deem 
proper, whether constitutional or not, 
upon which corporations of other States 
may enter its borders, using language 
which was long held as a sword over 
companies that contemplated taking a, 
case to the United States Circuit Court in 
that State, or in other States having a like 
statute. Years afterwards we have from 
the same Court Barron v. Burnside, in 
which it was held that the ominous part 
of Boyle v. The Continental Insurance 
Company was obiter dictum; holding 
further that no conditions can be imposed 
by a State upon corporations foreign to it 
which are repugnant to the Constitution 
and laws of the United States. Such an 
episode reminds one of the trick on 
Falstaff that was ' argument for a week, 
laughter for a month, and a jest for ever.' 

"Borne says, 'Nothing is permanent 
but change." And so we have to say of 
the law. We can never rest secure upon 
any opinion until we have searched later 
reports for an opinion modifying or 
reversing it or declaring some of its vital 
parts obiter dicta. 

" Polonius asked Hamlet what he was 
reading. 'Words, words, words,' said 

Hamlet, and called the writer a ' satirical 
rogue." Ben Butler was seen in a railroad 
train reading what appeared to be a law 
book, and was asked, ' Are you reading 
law, general 1 ' ' No, " taid he ; ' only a 
volume of Massachusetts reports, " 

" There are 166 volumes of Massachusetts 
reports, 16o volumes of United States 
Supreme Court reports, and hundreds and 
thousands of reports of other States. 
Every year adds to the reports of the 
Courts of this country about 250 volumes 
and about sixty volumes of text-books. 
' Words, words, words.' Ben Butler to 
the contrary notwithstanding, all of these 
words are law unless they have been 
pronounced obiter dicta. 

" Does anybody believe we can allow 
our presses to go on for ever belching out 
books that are of such value that every 
lawyer must know what is or what is not 
in the motley throng before he can feel 
safe 1 Nay, verily. There must, in some 
way, from somewhere, come relief. 

"The supposed great library at Alex- 
andria was destroyed by the men of 
Mohammed for the, to them, satisfactory 
reason that if the books in it agreed with 
the Koran they were unnecessary, and if 
they did not agree with it they were 
unsound. Will ever some devoted advocate 
or some legions of such devotees of the 
real law — the red-eyed kind, if you please 
— arise and settle this question by a 
conflagration ? 

" Oliver WendellHolmes said he doubted 
not that if all the medicines in the world 
were dumped into the sea it would be a 
great deal better for the human family, 
though a great deal worse for the fishes. 
Some such remark could be made about our 
voluminous libraries. If something violent 
should happen to all the law reports now 
crowding our shelves, and all, or nearly 
all, of the books of alleged authors on 
particular branches of the law — such 
books being in the main a product of 
scissors, paste-pot, and a 10-dollars-a- 
week drudge — would anybody suffer ? 

" A long time ago an old man wished 
that his adversary would write a book. 
It needs no argument to prove that no 
lawyer ever said that ; our enemies have 

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Obiter Sicta — continued. 

2. This mere ohiter opinion ought not to weigh against the settled 
direct authority of the cases which have been deliberately and upon 
argument determined the other way. — Lord Mansfield, Saunderson v. 
Rowles (1766), 4 Burr. Part IV. 2069. 
See also Dictum, 4. 

Opening Speech. 

1. Do not open that which is not evidence. — Bayley, J., Trial of EJiowles 
(1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 505. 

2. This case not having been opened has thrown a difficulty upon the 
Court — without presuming to say it ought not to have been the course, 
considering the state of the matter ; I am thinking of the inconvenient 
situation in which the Court is placed. Parties, I think, should act 
upon the law as it stands. The usual course is for the counsel for the 
prosecution to state the facts without reasoning upon them, and such, 
facts as may lead one's attention to that which may be the real question 
of law in the case. But if a contrary course is to be adopted, and an 
opening is to be done without, we shall be ia great difficulty at the 
end of the cause.— GfflseZee, J., Fursey's Case (1833), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 558.' 

See 4, below ; Practice, 22. 

written books, lots of them ; too many of 
them such as they are ; and the spoiling of 
paper goes merrily on. ' Much study is a 
weariness of the flesh,' it is true, but 
winnowing chaff for an occasional grain 
of wheat is more weariness still. Are we 
for ever to roll at the ever increasing stone 
of Sisyphus, or shall we make some effort 
to relieve ourselves and our successors 1 

' ' I am myself a lecturer on a branch of 
the law in a reputable law college. At 
the beginning of my course, or at the end, 
or, mayhap, many times ad interim, I tell 
my classes there is no logical, coherent, 
justifiable law on the subject ; that there 
are decisions galore, and that those 
decisions will control in the trial Courts, 
not because they are right, but because 
they are decisions bound in calf, or sheep, 
or hide of some other animal. I advise 
them to search well these volumes in 
animal skin, and say that the lawyer who 
finds most opinions leaning his way will 
succeed the best. It is not a question of 
logic or elementary law of the sort that is 
the ' perfection of reason.' It is simply a 
question of numerical strength. 'The 
Lord is on the side of the heaviest 
battalions,' said Napoleon. 

" Indiana has more Courts and more 
Judges and annually issues more reports 
than all England. Our reports seem to 
get more voluminous and contain less law. 
The first volume of Blackford has 432 
pages and contains 504 cases. The last 
volume of Indiana reports has 700 pages 
and 179 cases. Comparison of the first 
and ilast volume of reports of any other 
State will show like numerical results. 
Does this signify? Yes, verily, it does 
signify. It signifies all too much. Do 
lawyers at the bar or Judges on the bench 
carefully reason or copiously remember 1 
Is the law a matter of reasoning, or is it a 
matter of searching for cases in point ? 

" outer dicta might be applied to many 
a volume in its entirety, to many a page 
of opinion for its mere prolixity. 

" Men and brethren, what shall we dO' 
to be saved." * 

* Albany Law Journal. — See Law 
Times, Nov. 6, 1897, p. 16. 

' That is the great diflSculty in not 
having an opening speech. If there is a 
speech without any observations, I think 
it beneficial. — Parke, J., id. 

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Opening Speech. — continued. 

3. It is manifestly faUacions to make the opening of counsel the test 
on the question of what is " the act or transaction which the Crown 
prosecutes." It is plain that the Court is not at aU bound by the 
statements made by the counsel in his address.' — Williams, J., Reg. v. 
Bird et uxor (1851), 5 Cox, C. C. 65. 

iSee CoDuaEL, 13 ; Judicial Pkoceedings, 13. 

4. What is introductory goes for nothing, but it is in order to explain 
the evidence.— Pmtt, C.J., Layer's Case (1722), 16 How. St. Tr. 181. 

See 2, above. 


1. If you will apply yourself to the King, you may, and there, perhaps, 
you may find mercy ; we must, according to the duty of our places 
and oaths, give such judgment as the law requires." — Jefferies, L.C.J., 
Hampden's Case (1684), 9 How. St. Tr. 1126. 

See Justice, 5 ; Punishment, 4. 

2. We cannot pardon. We are to say what we take the law to be: 
if we do not speak our real opinions, we prevaricate with God and 
our own consciences. — Lord Mansfield, Case of John Wilkes (1763), 
4 Burr. Part IV. 2562. 

See Judges, 37 ; Politics, 3, 4 ; Punishment, 3. 

3. Mercy is in the King's breast, but is no part of our province : and 
therefore your application on that head must be elsewhere. — Lord 
Mansfield, Rex v. Florence Hensey (1758), 1 Burr. Part IV. 650. 

See Administration of Justice, 32 ; Cebbinal Justice, 25 ; Judges, 
23, 37 ; Law, 48 ; PoLmca, 4. 

4. Where a person interposes his interest and good offices to procure a 
pardon, it ought to be done gratuitously and not for money. — Lord 
Eldon, C.J., Norman r. Cole (1801), 3 Esp. 253. 

See Criminal Justice, 41, 42 ; Evidence, 28 ; Litigation, 3 ; Money, 1 ; 
PuBUC Servant, 6. 

' " If Mr. Attorney in opening does say 2 Raleigh : Oh my lord, you may use 

anything that he ought not to say, I will equity. 

correct him, as I would do anybody that Vopham, C.J. . That is from the King ; 

does not open things right as they are you are to have justice from us. — Trial 

proved ; but pray don't you that are at of Sir Walter Raleigh (1603), 2 How. 

the bar interrupt one another, it is St. Tr. 16. 

unbecoming men of your profession to be Sequi debet pvtentia justitiam non 

chopping in and snapping at one another. p9-acedere : Power should follow justice, 

Go on, Mr. Attorney." — Wright, L.C.J., not precede it. — 2 /nsf. 454. 

Trial of the Seven Bishops (1688), 12 " May one be pardoned and retain the 

How. St. Tr. 341. offence? "Shaki., "Hamlet." 

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Parent and CMld. 

1. Human society was so constituted, for human nature was so con- 
stituted, that the honour and dignity of a father were connected 
with that of a son ; and there was no son who must not be disturbed 
and disquieted by impatations on his father. — Abbott, C.J., King v. 
Hunt (1824), 2 St. Tr. (N. S.) 100. 

2. The authority of a father to guide and govern the education of his 
child is a very sacred thing, bestowed by the Almighty, and to be 
sustained to the uttermost by human law. It is not to be abrogated 
or abridged, without the most coercive reason. For the parent and 
the child alike, its maintenance is essential, that their reciprocal 
relations may be fruitful of happiness and virtue ; and no disturbing 
intervention should be allowed between them whilst those relations 
are pure and wholesome and conducive to their mutual benefit.^ — 
Lord O'Hagan, In re Meades (1870), 5 Ir. L. R. Eq. 103. 

See Family. 

3. As a man of the world, and speaking as a father, I am satisfied 
that solitary children are not so happy, and not so likely to make 
good men and women, as children brought up in the society of 
brothers and sisters in early life. — Jessel, M.R., In re Besant (1879), 
L. R. 11 C. D. 512. 

4. When we talk of parental influence we do not think of terror in 
connection with it — that is not the primary idea — it is not terror and 
coercion, but kindness and affection, which may bias the child's mind, 
and induce the child to do that which may be highly imprudent, and 
which, if the child were properly protected, he would never do. — Lord 
Hatherley, L.C., Turner v. Collins (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. Ap. Ca. 340. 

See Miscellaneous, 21. 

5. The welfare of a child is not to be measured by money only, nor 
by physical comfort only. — Lindley, L.J., In re McGrath (Infants), 
L. R. 1 C. D. (1893), p. 148. 

6. A father, by the law of Grod and nature, is bound to support his 
son, and e contra, in case the father is empoverished. — Wyndham, J., 
Manby v. Scott (1672), 1 Levinz, 4 ; 2 Sm. L. C. (8th ed.) 472. 

7. It is as unnatural to force a child from the mother as from the 
father. — Parker, C.J., Inhabitants of St. Katherine v. St. George (1714), 
Fortescue, 218. 

' See In re Agar-BUia, Agar-Ellis e. 329. 

Lasoelles, L. R. 10 0. D. 49. " The Court must never forget, and 

" The rights of a father are aaored rights will never forget, j&rs t of all, the rights of 

because his duties are sacred duties. " — family life which are sacred." — Boioeii, 

JBrett, M.R. (1883), id., L. B. 24 C. D. L.J. (1883), id., L. R. 24 0. D. 337. 

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Parent and Child — eontirmed. 
8. In one sense all British Subjects who are infants are wards of Court, 
because they are subject to that sort of parental jurisdiction which 
is entrusted to the Court in this country, and which has been adminis- 
tered continually by the Courts of the Chancery Division.* — Kay, L.J., 
Brown v. Collins (1884), L. R. 25 C. D. 60. 
See also Infant, 3. 


1. This Court is a standing Court, and the law doth adjourn it from 
time to time : but a Parliament is a new Court, they appear, and are 
always summoned by new writs. — Bolle, C.J., Case of Captain Streater 
on an Habeas Corpus (1653), 5 How. St. Tr. 400. 

2. The Crown used to call a Parliament annually, but there was not 
an annual election. These words, annuo parliamento, relate to the 
time of their meeting, and not their election. — Eodke, J., Trial of 
Redhead alias Yorke (1795), 25 How. St. Tr. 1081. 

3. To one who marvelled what should be the reason that Acts and 
Statutes are continually made at every Parliament, without inter- 
mission, and without end, a wise man made a good and short answer, 
both which are well composed in verse : 

" QusBritur, ut crescunt tot magna volumina legis ? 
In promptu causa est, crescit in orbe dolus." ' 

—Lord Gdke, Twyne's Case (1602), 3 Rep. 80. 
See also Administration of Justick, 15; Criminal Justice, 29; 
Chancery, 10 ; Law, 3 ; Statutes, 2. 

1 But it must be remembered that this subject, to repeal all the existing statutes 

parental authority is only exercised when on the subject, and Insert the clause 

the infant has property, because the verbatim in the new bill, with any new 

Court deems that it has nothing to clauses that may be thought necessary : 

exercise its jurisdiction upon. " There is no providence or wisdom of 

a If the wise man had given his answer man, nor of any council of men," says Sir 
in these days, it must have been at some- Eobert Atkyns, L.C.B., " that can foresee 
what greater length. If some member and provide for all events and variety of 
were to move for a return of the compara- cases, that will or may arise upon the 
tive increase in different years of the making of a new law." — Trial of Sir Edw. 
volumes of the statutes, of the wise man's Hales (1686), 11 How. St. Tr. 1208. 
supposition, what an appalling picture The causes of the multiplicity of the 
must be dravTn of the increase of viUany English laws are, the extent of the country 
in the world. It is some small satisfac- which they govern ; the commerce and 
tion to know that the wickedness of man- refinement of its inhabitants ; but above 
kind is not the principal cause of the aU, the liberty and property of the sub- 
great accimiulation of statutes, but that ject. — Sir Wm. Blaohstone (1765), Com. 
it is principally due to a combination of Bk. III., ch. 25, p. 234. 
ienoranoe and laziness in the legislature. The multiplicity of our laws is a price 

It is now found to be the most con- we pay for our freedom.- 

venient course, before legislating on any They who exclaim against the multi- 

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Faxliament — continued. 

4. Lex Parliamenti is to be regarded as the law of the reabn; but, 
supposing it to -be a particular law, yet if a question arise determin- 
able in the King's Bench, the King's Bench ought to determine it. — 
Bridgman, C.J., Binion v. Evelin (1662), Dyer, 60 ; Garth. 137 ; 
1 Show. 99. 

See Ceown. 

5. If a man be committed by Parliament, and the Parliament is pro- 
rogued, the King's Bench will grant a habeas corpus. The common 
law then does not take notice of any such law of Parliament to deter- 
mine inheritance originally. If there is any such, it ought either 
to be by act of Parhament, and there is no such act ; or it ought to 
be by custom, and no more is there any such custom. ^ — Lord HoU, 
Rex et Reg. v. KnoHys (1694), 1 Ld. Raym. 11. 

See Law, 64. 

plicity of our laws, are fond of quoting the 
passage in Tacitus, where he says, " Corrup- 
tissima Respuhlica, plurimee Leges " ; but 
they should consider that the historian 
does not throw this out as a general 
reflection, but as applicable to the par- 
ticular circumstances of Rortie during the 
licentious authority of the Tribunes ; 
when, in contravention to the laws of the 
Twelve Tables, particular and partial 
laws were made by the influence otprirate 
men : The Twelve Tables provided that 
no laws should be made by private 
persons, and that no capital punishments 
should be adjudged, bat at tlie Comitia 
Centuriata. The frequent revolutions, 
however, among the Romans, rendered 
these provisions ineffectual ; for when- 
ever the lawless attempts of an ambitious 
leader prevailed, the Usurper instantly 
commenced Legislator : And consequently 
in this corrupt State of the Common- 
wealth, the laws, as Tacitus observeth, 
were very numerous. — See Cicero pro 
Seactio — and id. pro Domo Sim ; RufflieaA, 
" Statutes at Large " (ed. 1786), xxi. 

The multiplication and growth of the 
laws are urged by Hale as inducing a 
necessity for their revision and reduc- 
tion : " By length of time and continu- 
ance, laws are so multiplied and grown to 
that excessive variety, that, there is a 
necessity of a reduction of them, or other- 
wise it is not manageable. . . And the 
reason is, because this age, for the pur- 
ipose, received from the last a body of 
laws, and they add more, and transmit 

the whole to the next age ; and they add 
to what they had received, and transmit 
the whole stock to the next age. Thus, 
as the rolling of a snowball, it increaseth 
in bulk in every age till it becomes utterly 
unmanageable. And hence it is that, 
even in the laws of England, we have so 
many varieties of forms of conveyances, 
feoffments, fines, release, confirmation, 
grant, attornment, common recovery 
deeds enrolled, &c., because the use 
coming in at several times, every age did 
retain somewhat of what was past, and 
added somewhat of its own, and so carried 
over the whole product to the quotient. 
And this produceth mistakes : a man, 
perchance, useth one sort of conveyance 
where he should have used another. It 
breeds uncertainty and contradiction of 
opinion, and that begets suits and expense. 
It must necessarily cause ignorance in 
the professors and profession itself, 
because the volumes of the law are not 
easily to be mastered." 

1 This was a case in which an indict- 
ment was found against the defendant, by 
the name of Charles KnoUys, Esq., for 
murder, the defendant pleaded a mis- 
nomer in abatement, viz. that William 
KnoUys, Viscount Wallingford, by letters 
patent under the great seal of England, 
bearing date the 18th August, 2 Car. I., 
was created Earl of Banbury ; that 
William had issue Nicholas, who suc- 
ceeded William in his dignity, from whom 
it descended upon the defendant, as son 
and heir to Nicholas. The replication to 

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Parliament — continued. 

6. This Court (Lords House of Parliament), wHch ought to be an 
example to aU other Courts, wiU ever hold in the highest reverence 
the indulgent character of British justice. — Lord Erskine, L.C., Trial 
of Lord Viscount MelviUe (1806), 29 How. St. Tr. 1249. 

See Criminal Justice, 26. 

7. We cannot hear the integrity and wisdom of Parliament questioned 
in this Court.— ilbfeott, C.J., King v. Edmonds and others (1821), 
1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 927. 

8. The House of Commons are a great branch of the Constitution, and 
are chose by ourselves, and are our trustees ; and it cannot be 
supposed, nor ought to be presunaed, that they wiU exceed their 
bounds, or do anything amiss . . . this is a very foreign supposition, 
and what ought not to be said by any Englishman. — Poioys, J., Reg. v. 
Paty (1704), 2 Raym. 1109. 

See helxm, 11, 13 ; Motives, 14 ; Public Servant, 1. 

9. Every facility ought undoubtedly to be given to all persons applying 
to either House of Parliament or to any Court of Justice for the redress 

this plea was, that the defendant upon 
the 13th December, 4 Will. & M., pre- 
ferred a petition to the House of Peers, 
then in parliament assembled, that he 
might be tried by his peers, and that 
after long considerations and debates, the 
House dismissed his petition, secundum 
Legem Parliamenti, and disallowed his 
peerage, and made an order that the 
defendant should be tried by the course 
of the common law, &;c. To this replica- 
tion there was a demurrer, and after 
several arguments at the bar by Sir Ed. 
Ward, Attorney-General, Sir Thos. Trevor, 
Solicitor-General, and Sir Wm. Williams, 
for the Crown, and by Serjt. Pemberton, 
Serjt. Levinz, and Sir Bartholomew 
Shower for the defendant, the Court 
unanimously gave judgment for the 
defendant. It appears, that in that case, 
the Judges, though concurring in opinion, 
delivered their judgments senatwn. 
Though the report of Lord Holt's judg- 
ment in Lord Raymond is rather meagre, 
quite sufficient appears to show that it 
was marked by the usual abikty of that 
learned and independent Judge ; and he 
distinctly laid down the position that 
Lex Parliamenti, if a question concerning 
it arise in the common law OQUits, ought 
to be determined there, and that the 
Houses of Parliament can have no privi- 
leges but such as a statute or custom have 

entitled them to. The case of Rex r. 
Knollys presents a similarity in another 
respect to that of Stockdale i'. Hansard 
(2 Per. & D. 1 ; 9 Ad. & E. 1 ; 3 Jur. 
(0. S.) 905). The House of Lords waited 
until judgment had been given upon the 
demurrer, before they attempted to con- 
form their pretensions to an exclusive 
privilege which they did not think it 
expedient to persevere in. The reporter 
adds the following note to the case : — 

" Note, that this judgment was very 
distasteful to some lords ; and, therefore, 
Hilary Term, 1697, 9 Will. III., the Lord 
Chief Justice Holt was summoned to give 
his reasons of this judgment to the House 
of Peers, and a committee was appointed 
to hear and report them to the House, of 
which the Earl of Rochester was chair- 
man. But the Chief Justice Holt refused 
to give them in so extrajudicial a manner. 
But he said, that if the record was 
removed before the Peers by error, so that 
it came judicially before them, he would 
give his reasons very willingly, but, if he 
gave them in this case, it would be of very 
ill consequence to all judges hereafter, in 
all cases. At which answer some lords 
were so offended, that they would have 
committed the Chief Justice to the Tower. 
But, notvrithstanding, all their endea- 
vours vanished in smoak." — See also 
Judges, 45, infra; anti, p. 116. 

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Farliament — continued. 

of any alleged grievance. — Litdedale, J., Stockdale v. Hansard (1837), 
3 St. Tr. (N. S.) 922. 
See DooTEiNE, 3 ; Equity, 26 ; Freedom of Speech ; Justice, 4 ; Law, 
66 ; Belief, 3 ; Toet, 2, 8. 

10. The House of Commons are the representatives of the people. — 
Gould, J., Reg. V. Paty (1704), 2 Eaym. 1107. 

11. It would look very strange, when the Commons of England are so 
fond of their right of sending representatives to Parliament, that it 
should be in the power of a sheriff, or other officer, to deprive them 
of that right, and yet that they should have no remedy ; it is a thing 
to be admired at by aU mankind. — Holt, C.J., Ashby v. White (1703), 
2 Raym. 954. 

See 8, (Acme ; Public Sehvamt, 1, 10. 

12. I disclaim the power of legislation which is asserted to exist in 
this Court, and I say that, if such a right is to be created, it must 
be created by the LegislatTire properly so called. — Jessel, M.R., Day v. 
Brownrigg (1878), L. R. 10 C. D. 302. 

See Judges, 33 ; Law, 29, 49, 71. 

13. It is the province of the statesman and not the lawyer to discuss, 
and of the legislature to determine, what is the best for the pubUc 
good, and to provide for it by proper enactments. It is the province 
of the Judge to expound the law only — the written from the statute, 
the unwritten or common law from the decisions of our predecessora 
and of our existing Courts — from the text-writers of acknowledged 
authority, and upon the principles to be clearly deduced from them 
by sound reason and just inference — not to speculate upon what 
is the best, in his opinion, for the advantage of the community. — 
Coleridge, J., Brownlow v. Egerton (1854), 23 L. J. Rep. Part 5 (N. S.), 
Ch. 370. 

See dbaoe, 8 ; helow, 14 ; Construction, 19, 28 ; Ceown ; Dootbine, 3 ; 
Foreign Law, 5 ; Judges, 28, 30 ; Law, 44 ; LmEETr of the 
Subject, 2 ; Statutes, 4, 13, 15 ; Text Books, 4. 

14. If the legislature have not gone far enough, it is for them, not for 
us, to remedy the defect. — Ghamhre, J., Grigby v. Oakes (1801), 1 Bos. 
& PuU. 529. 

See above, 13 ; Law, 49. 

15. It is for the legislature to alter the law if Parliament in its wisdom 
thinks an alteration desirable. — Lord Macnaghten, Hamilton v. Baker, 
"The Sara" (1889), L. R. 14 Ap. Ca. 227. 

See hehw, 16 ; Judges, 33 ; Statutes, 3. 

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Parliament — continued. 

16. To abolish a well-established rule of law because it is a bad rule, is 
the business of the legislature. — Stephen, J., Reg. v. Coney and others 
(1882), 15 Cox, G. C. 59. 

iSee above, 15. 

17. What the legislature has not expressly enacted, the Judges ought 
not to presume that it intended. — Lord Chelmsford, Mordaunt v. 
Moncreiffe (1874), L. R. 2 Sc. & D. 387. 

See Equity, 10 ; Foreign Law, 5 ; Judges, 33 ; Law, 44 ; Motives, 
14 ; Statutes, 15, 19. 

18. The decisions of the House of Lords are binding on me and upon 
all the Courts except itself.— Sir John Bomilly, M.R., Att.-Gren. v. The 
Dean and Canons of Windsor (1858), 24 Beav. 715., 

See helow, 19 ; Appeals, 6 ; Peivt Council. ' 

19. By the Constitution of this United Kingdom, the House of Lords is 
the Court of Appeal in the last resort, and its decisions are authori- 
tative and conclusive declarations of the existing state of the law, and 
are binding upon itself when sitting judicially, as much as upon all 
inferior tribunals. The observations made by members of the House, 
whether law members or lay members, beyond the ratio decidendi 
which is propounded and acted upon in giving judgment, although 
they may be entitled to respect, are only to be followed in as far 
as they may be considered agreeable to sound reason and to prior 
authorities. But the doctrine on which the judgment of the House 
is founded must be universally taken for law, and can only be altered 
by Act of Parliament.' So it is, even where the House gives judg- 
ment in conformity to its rule of procedure, that where there is an 
equality of votes, semper presumitur pro negante." — Lord Campbell, 
L.C., Att.-Gen. v. Dean and Canons of Windsor (1860), 8 H. L. Cas. 
391 ; 30 L. J. Ch. 531. 

See above, 18, and references therefrom. 

Payment into Conrt. 

I have looked into the books in order to discover the origin of the 

1 See also to similar efiect per Lord Hurd (I88I), 20 C. D. 14 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 

JVwro, L.C., Tommey T. White and others ,118; Zord Usher, M.R., Guardians of 

(1850), 3 H. L. C. 69 ; Lord Oranworth, Poor of West Derby Union v. Guardians 

L.C, Ex parte White and others v. of Poor of Atoham Union (1889), 24 

Tommey (1853), 4 H. L. C. 333 ; Lord St. Q. B. D. 120 ; 59 L. J. M. C. 17 ; and 

Leojiards, Wilson v. Wilson and others Lord Coleridge, Overseers of Manchester 

(1854), 5 H. L. C. 63 ; Lord Campbell, v. Guardians of Ormskirlj; Union (1890), 

Beamish v. Beamish (1861), 9 H. L. C. 338. 24 Q. B. D. 682 ; 59 L. J. M. C. 104. 
See per Jessel, M.E., Eedgrave v. 

D.L.Q. 18 

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Payment into Court — continued. 

proceeding of paying money into Court, but without being able to fix 
the period of its commencement, though I think it highly probable 
that it took its rise early in the present century. — Heath, J., Gutteridge 
V. Smith (1794), 2 H. B. 376.' 


1. It is, if I may so express myself without disrespect, the duty of the 
Sovereign to confer the peerage as the reward of merit, or the 
iacitement to great and good actions, or for the public benefit, as a 
mode of placing the individual in a better position to render public 
service. To suppose, then, that the Sovereign wiU be at aU influenced 
by any other motives in the exercise of this most important prero- 
gative is indecent, and, in a legal sense, unreasonable. — Coleridge, J., 
Brownlow v. Egerton (1854), 23 L. J. Rep. Part 5 (N. S.), Ch. 367. 

See also Honours. 

2. The creation of a peer is an exercise of one of the prerogatives of the 
Crown, which the Crown possesses, like all other prerogatives, for the 
good of the country, and which ought to be exercised solely with 
reference to the public welfare and the merits of the individual to 
be promoted, and the cause or occasion of his promotion. — Parke, B., 
Egerton v. Earl Brownlow and others (1853), 8 St. Tr. (N. S.) 251. 

See PoBUO Servant, 4. 


I think it is a canon, which any one who is familiar with Courts of 
justice will recognise as a just one, that instead of assuming that 
people are perjuring themselves, you should, if there is a view by 
which you can reconcile all the testimony, prefer that to the view 
which places people in the position of contradicting each other, so 
that they must necessarily be swearing what is false. . . . The point 
as to having seen the witnesses and having had an opportunity of 
judging whether they were speaking the truth or not is generally a 
very powerful one.^ — Earl of Salsbury, L.C., Owners of Steamship 
" Gannet " v. Owners of Steamship " Algoa " (1900), L. R. App. Cas. 
[1900], p. 238. 
See EviDENOE, 29. 

' Payment of money into Court is an Court ' without prejudice,' " p. 312. 
admission of a legal demand only. See a We can judge only from appearances, 

Eibbans i>. Crickett and another (1798), 2 and from the evidence produced to us. — 

Bos. & Pull. 264 ; Wrights. Laing (1824), Legge, B., Trial of Mary Blandy (1762), 

3 B. & C. 166. See also L. T., Vol. CII. 18 How. St. Tr. 1188. 
(February 6th, 1897) : " Payment into 

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1. Let us stand by the rules of pleading, whioh if we infringia here, we 
may destroy altogether.' — Eyre, C.J., Jones v. Kitchin (1797), 2 Bos. 
& PuU. 81. 

2. Pleading is an exact setting forth of the truth. — Sir Robert Aikyns, 
L.C.B., Trial of Sir Edw. Hales (1686), 11 How. St. Tr. 1243. 

3. I hate and detest all frivolous pleas ; but I never will make too much 
haste, in determining matters which may be of consequence to the 
subject. — Lee, C.J., The King v. Mayor of Heydon and others (1748), 
1 Black. 35. 

See Administration of Justice, 2 ; Judges, 16, 17 ; Rights, 3 ; 
Statutes, 10. 

4. De puys fee vous ne volet respondre a leu verement fee ye vous 
tendevt . . . nous le tenum agrante : Since you wUl not answer to 
the averment which they offer to you ... we take it for granted. — 
Beresford, J., Roger de Montgomery v. Simon de C. (1292), Year-book, 
20 & 21 Ed. I., p. 276. 

See 5, lelow; Consent, 5 ; Law, 41 ; Motives, 12 ; Precedents, 20. 

5. Wherever a man neglects to take advantage of any defence which he 
has at the time, he waives it. — Buller, J., Buxton v. Mardin (1785). 
1 T. R. 81. 

See 4, above ; MisoEiiANEOUs, 19, 33 ; Propertt, 12. 

6. A plaintiff who comes into a Court of justice must show that he is in 
a condition to maintain his action. — Lord Kenyan, C.J., Morton v. 
Lamb (1797), 7 T. R. 129. 

See Equity, 26 ; Miscellaneous, 48 ; Process, 1 ; Peobecution ; 
Relief, 3 ; Tort, 2. 

7. The difficulty which I feel as a Judge, and always felt at the Bar, is 
this : a defendant is entitled to put his back against the wall ajid to 
fight from every available point of advantage.^ — Kekeioieh, J., Blank v. 
Footman & Co. (1888), 57 L. J. (N. S.) C. D. 914. 

See Propeett, 14 ; Will, 2, n. 

8. Each plea must stand or fall by itself. — Buller, 3 ., Kirk v. Nowill 
(1786), 1 T. R. 125. 

9. n serroit mervaUlouse chose que vous avendrez a dedire et contrepleder 
ceo qe vous avez avant grants en Court de reeorde : It would be a 
strange thing if you could be admitted to deny and counterplead 

1 The following is a terse statement of may be lost." — Co. Litt. 303 a. 

an vmiversal rule of civil and criminal a This can be illustrated by the aUow- 

pleadings : — " Good matter must be ing of alternative pleadings in statements 

pleaded in good form, in apt time, and in of defence, which may be contradictory 

due order, or otherwise great advantage and at variance with one another. 

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Pleadings — continued. 

that which you have previouBly allowed, in a Court of record. — 
Schardelowe, J., Writ of Entry sur disseisin against C. (1340), Year- 
book, 14 Ed. in., p. 40. 

See Counsel, 23 ; Peocess, 1 ; Usage, 15. 

10. The substantial rules of pleading are founded in strong sense, and in. 
the soundest and closest logic ; and so appear, when well understood 
and explained : Though, by being misunderstood and misapplied, they 
are often made use of as instruments of chicane.' — Lord Mansfield, 
Robinson v. Raley (1756), 1 Burr. 319. 

See Costs, 2 ; Miscellaneods, 19. 

11. In these days if there is a question to be decided on the evidence 
before the Court, we Eire not inclined to restrict the suitor very closely 
to the pleadings. — Gotton, L.J., White v. City of London Brewery Co. 
(1889), L. R. 42 C. D. 246. 

See Administration of Justice, 5, 8, 14 ; Affidavit, 2. 

12. I am sorry when any man is tripped by a formal objection. — Park, J., 
Aked V. Stocks (1828), 4 Bing. 509. 

See Ceiminal Justice, 3, 6 ; Counsel, 22 ; Evidence, 14, 16 ; Witness, 2. 


1. It cannot but occur to every person's observation, that as long as 

parties exist in the country (and perhaps it is for the good of the 

country that parties should exist to a certain degree, because they keep 

ministers on their guard in their conduct), they will have their friends 

and adherents. A great political character, who held a high situation 

in this country some years ago, but who is now dead, used to say that 

ministers were the better for being now and then a little peppered and 

salted. And while these parties exist, they will have their friendships 

and attainments, which wUl sometimes dispose them to wander from 

1 See also Sale's "Common Law," able plea but, in truth, false ; and hath 

Vol. I. (ed. 179i), p. 302, n. Speaking this end, to draw the trial of the cause 

of Sir Matthew Hale, Bishop Bumet from the jury to the Judges." He gives 

says : " His father was a man of that the following instance : " in an action of 

strictness of conscience, that he gave trespass for taking away the plaintiff's 

over the practice of the law, because he beasts, the defendant saith, that before 

could not understand the reason of giving the plaintifE had anything in them he 

colour in pleadings, which, as he thought, himself was possessed of them as of his 

was to tell a lye. And that, with some proper goods, and delivered them to A. to 

other things commobly practised, seemed deliver to him again when he and A. gave 

tohimcontrary to that exactness of truth them to the plaintiff; and the plaintiff 

and justice, which became a Christian, so supposing the property to be in A. at the 

that he withdrew himself from the Inns time of the gift, took them from the 

of Court to live on his estate in the plaintifE, whereupon the plaintiff brings 

country." "Colour," says Dr. Cowell, an action : that," adds Dr. Cowell, "is a 

"signifies, in legal acceptation, a profit- good colour and a good plea. " 

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Politics — continued. 

argument to declamation. — Lord Kenyan, Holt's Case (1793), 22 How. 
St. Tr. 1234. 

See 7, helow; Minorities, 2. 

2. The learned coimsel has very properly avoided aU political dis- 
cussions unconnected with the subject, and I shall follow his example. 
Courts of justice have nothing to do with them. — Kenyan, L.C.J., 
Trial of John Vint and others (1799), 27 How. St. Tr. 640. 

See 5, helow; Justice, 1. 

3. There may be cases in which there is so much of difficulty in knowing 
where the law stands that we take time to consider, and sometimea 
doubt much and sometimes differ among ourselves. But I believe every 
one of the Judges acts upon the principle that he is before man and 
God ia the discharge of his duty, and acts upon his solemn oath, 
and declares the law not according to any political fancy, or for. the 
purposes of serving one party or serving another, but according to the 
pure conviction of his own mind without looking to any party. — 
Bayley, J., Case of Edmonds and others (1821), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 899. 

See 6, helow; Evidence, 29;. Judges, 3, 26, 27, 37, 52, n., 53, 76, 
81, n. ; Jury, 8 ; Law, 46 ; Pardon, 2 ; Tort, 6. 

4. The Constitution does not allow reasons of State to influence our 
judgments : God forbid it should ! We must not regard poUtical 
consequences, how formidable soever they might be : if rebellion was 
the certain consequence, we are bound to say, " Fiat justitia mat 
caelum." The Constitution trusts the King with reasons of State and 
policy ; he may stop prosecutions,' he may pardon offences* ; it is his, to 
judgewhetherthelaworthecriminalshouldyield. We have no election.^ 
—Lord Mansfield, Case of John Wilkes (1770), 19 How. St. Tr. 1112. 

See also Administration of Justice, 20; Judges, 19, 20; Pardon, 
1, 2, 3 ; Public Seevants, 5 ; Soveheigntt, 10 ; Tort, 8. 

1 See ante, Attobney-Genesal, 1 ; seoute not, and the King's name is not 
also per Serjea/nt Ellis in Proceedings so much as mentioned, and only by the 
against Thomas Earl of Danby for high Commons of England, which the Courts 
treason (1678—1685) : " The regular way of Westminster cannot punish ; it is you 
of pardons is by the Attorney-General that have the interest in the suit, and all 
and the Solicitor-General, &o. They are the Commons of England.— /Sir- Franeu 
men of the law, and might stop it in Wilmington, Proceedings against Thomas 
their oflSce, and the rest of the offices. Earl of Danby, Grey's "Debates," 
&c. . . . To pardon before trial, when the Vol. VII. 167. See also 11 How. St. Tr. 
King knows not what fact he is to pardon, 786. It is the duty of the Lord Chan- 
is a dangerous precedent. . . . The King cellor's place, if he thought it not a good 
cannot pardon a man, an impeachment pardon, to inform the King of it.— Per 
depending." (11 How. St. Tr. 773, 774.) Serjeant Mlis, 11 Bow. St. Tr. 17$. 

2 Where the King has no share, and the ' See also per Lord Kenyon, Reeve's 
King's Serjeant or Attorney-General pro- Case (1754), 26 How. St. Tr. 591. 

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Politics — continued. 

5. Political arguments, in the fullest sense of the word, as they concern 
the government of a nation, miist be, and always have been, of great 
weight in the consideration of the Court. — Lord Hardwicke, The 
Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen (1750), 1 Atk. 352 ; id. 2 Ves. 
Sen. 153. 

See 2, above. 

6. I am in too high a situation to fear any man or class of men. I thank 
God I am in a position which puts me above politics. — Earl of 
Glonwell, Case of Glennan and others (1796), 26 How. St. Tr. 459. 

See 3, above ; Judges, 20, n. 

7. One cannot look too closely at and weigh in too golden scales the acts 
of men hot in their political excitement. — Hawkins, J., Bx ■parte 
Castioni (1890), 60 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Mag. Cas. 33. 

See 1, above ; Minoeities, 2 ; Voting. 

8. Men argue differently, from natural phenomena and political appear- 
ances : they have different capacities, different degrees of knowledge, 
and different intelligence. But the means of information and judging 
are open^|to both: each professes to act from his own skill and 
sagacity ; and, therefore, neither needs to communicate to the other. 
—Lcyrd Mansfield, Carter v. Boehm (1765), 3 Burr. 1905. 

See Freedom of Speech ; LmEUTY of the Press ; Liberty of the 
Subject, 5 ; Minorities, 2 ; Miscellaneous, 3, 40, 54 ; Truth, 13. 


1. Who sees not, that whosoever ministers to the poor, ministers to 
God ? as it appears in that solemn sentence of the last day. Inasmuch 
as you did feed, clothe, lodge the poor, you did it unto me. — Rohart, 
C.J., Pits V. James (1614), Lord Hobart's Rep. 125. 

2. It is not true (what some people imagine) "that the common law of 
England made no provision for the poor " : the Mirror shews the 
contrary. How, indeed, it was done does not appear. — Foster, J., 
Rex V. Loxdale (1758), 1 Burr. Part IV. 450. 

See Common Law, 12. 

3. Though in a state of society some must have greater luxuries and 
comforts than others, yet aU. should have the necessaries of life ; and 
if the poor cannot exist, in vain may the rich look for happiness or 
prosperity. The legislature is never so well employed as when they 
look to the interests of those who are at a distance from them in the 
ranks of society. It is their duty to do so : religion calls for it ; 
humanity calls for it ; and if there are hearts who are not awake to 

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Poor — eontimted. 

either of those feehngs, their own interests would dictate it. — Lord 
Kenyon, Rex v. Rusby (1800), Peake's N. P. Cases 192. 
See Judges, 27, 81, n. ; Justice, 3 ; Law, 19, 31 ; Miscellaneous, 9 ; 
Protection, 2 ; Religion, 1 ; Toet, 6. 


1. A man has not possession of that of the existence of which he is 
unaware.— Gaue, J., The Queen v. Ashwell (1885), L. R. 16 Q. B. 201. 

See Peopeett, 5. 

2. Possession is very strong; rather more than nine points of the 
law. — Lord Mansfield, Corporation of Kingston-upon-HuU v. Homer 
(1774), LofEt. 591. 

See Pbesumption, 8. 

3. Nothing but what has visible substance, is capable of actual posses- 
sion.— Fates, J., Millar V. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. Part IV. 2384. 


1. Matters of Practice are not to be known from books. What passes 
at a Judge's chambers is matter of tradition : It rests in memory. In 
cases of this kind, Judges must inquire of their officers. This is done 
in Court, every day, when the practice is disputed or doubted. It is 
in its nature, official. The officers.' are better acquainted with it, than 
the Judges. For my own part, neither my education, nor my walk in 
life before I came into this Court, ever led me into any knowledge 
of the practice of orders made by Judges in the vacation. — Lord 
Mansfidd, Rex v. Wilkes (1769), 4 Burr. Part IV. 2366 ; id. 19 How. 
St. Tr. 1117. 

See 3, 7, 9, 33, helaw ; Foeeign Law, 3, 4 ; Judges, 21 ; Law, 14, 29. 

2. We have here our own experience, and the report of our officer, a 
person of considerable experience, to guide us to the practice ' ; and 
the practice of the Court is the law of the Court."' — Grampton, J., Queen 
V. O'ConneU and others (1843), 1 Cox, C. C. 392 ; 5 St. Tr. (N. S.) 61. 

See 11, helow; Couets, 13 ; New Trial, 3 ; Peeoedents, 10. 

1 " Upon the motion I doubted, but my '■' " The practice of the Court forms the 

clerk has since reminded me that upon law of the Court." — Per Lord Kenyon, 

application I have made twenty such C.J., Wilson v. RastaU (1792), 4 T. E. 

orders." — Lord Manifield, Workman v. 757. Oursus Oarice est lem Curiis : The 

Leake (1774), 1 Cowp. 22. "We have practice of the Court is the law of the 

consulted the officers of the Crown Office, Court. — 3 BuUt. 53. It was a common 

and we find that the practice is per- expression of the late Chief Justice Tindal, 

fectly settled." — Wright, J., AsplnaU v. that the course of the Court is the 

Sutton (1894), L. E. 2 Q. B. D. [1894], practice of the Court.— See per Oreswell, 

p 860. J., Freemani).Tranah(1852),12C.B.414. 

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Practice — continued. 

3. A Judge in chambers exercises an equity — not a capricious equity, 
but all the equities which might be exercised either at law or in equity 
in the days when the two were distinct. But he has much more 
machinery for exercising his discretion than either a Court of Chancery 
or a Court in banc would have had ; and consequently it has always^ — 
at least for some years past — ^been considered that a great many things 
could be worked out in chambers, which probably no Court would 
have done, or which, if the Court of Chancery had done, it would have 
done at an enormous expense by affidavits and otherwise. — Lord 
Blaekhum, Wallingford v. Mutiial Society (1880), L. E. 5 App. Ca. 

See 1, above ; 7, helow; Discretion, 7 ; Equity, 7, 19 ; Jddgeb, 21. 

4. I do not think that a Judge would wish any statement which he may 
have made in the course of a case, merely obiter and casually, to be 
treated as necessarily being an authority on the subject in question ; 
but when a Judge has thought it necessary for the purpose of a case 
to make a deliberate examination of the practice of his Court, and to 
state such practice, I do not think the authority of such statement can 
be got rid of merely by arguing that it was not really necessary for 
the actual decision of the case. I think that such a statement if cited 
as an authority is entitled to great weight, though of course not 
binding on us as a decision. — Lord Esher, M.R., Ex parte Rev. James 
Bell Cox (1887), L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 19. 

See Common Law, 4 ; Dictum, 1, 4 ; Evidenoe, 6 ; Judges, 11, 69 ; 
Phecedents, 8. 

5. I yield to authority. I think the practice of the Court of Chancery 
for more than one himdred years, and the authority of Judges of very 
great eminence, establish such a course of practice and sach a chain 
of authority, that I do not think I am at liberty to assume that either 
the Court or those very learned Judges were in error as to their 
powers and jurisdiction. — Lord Halshury, L.C., Attomey-Gteneral v. 
Marquess of AHesbury (1887), L. J. (N. S.) 57 Q. B. 89. 

See 12, 19, behw ; Cases, 21 ; Chancery, 13 ; Dooerine, 1 ; Law, 73 ; 
Precedents, 16. 

6. To my mind when a great Judge, a master of the whole subject, 
thinking it necessary for the decision of the case to carefully examine 
into and to state the practice, it is nothing to say as against that, that 
it was not necessary for the decision. — Lord Esher, M.R., Ex parte 
BeU Cox (1887), 57 L. J. (N. S.) Q. B. 103. 

See Administration of Justice, 7, 9 ; Judges, 70. 

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Practice — continued. 

7. The business done at chambers is the most irksome part of the office 
of a Judge : but it is greatly for the benefit of the subject, and tends 
to the advancement and expedition of justice. It arises from the 
overflowing of the business of the Court, which cannot be all trans- 
acted in Court. The order of a Judge is subject to an appeal to the 
Court : but if acquiesced under, it is as valid as any act of the Court. 
—Lord Mansfield, Case of John Wilkes (1763), 19 How. St, Tr. 

See 1, 3, above ; 30, helow ; Judges, 21 ; Rights, 3. 

8. Every Court has the power to vary its own orders which are drawn 
up mechanically in the registry or in the office of the Court — ^to vary 
them in such a way as to carry out its own meaning, and where language 
has been used which is doubtful, to make it plain. I think that 
power is inherent in every Court. Speaking of the Courts with which 
I have been more familiar all my life, the Conomon Law Courts, I have 
no doubt that that can be done, and I should have no doubt that it 
could also be done by the Court of Chancery. — Lord Penzance, 
Lawrie v. Lees (1881), L. R. 7 Ap. Ca. 35. 

See 31, 32 helow. 

9. I should regard it as certainly a novelty in our jurisprudence if the 
regular order of a learned Judge could be affected, or qualified, or 
altered in the slightest degree by what some subordinate officer of 
the Court thought proper to say in writing about it, even though in 
so doing he committed this additional irregularity — that to that 
private correspondence he affixfed the seal of the Court. — Lord 
Halsbury, L.C., Stonor v. Fowle (1887),' L. R. 13 Ap. Ca. 27. 

See helow, 29 ; Criminal Justioe, 50 ; Public Servadt, 10 ; Rights, 3. 

10. The consolidating of several actions into one is certainly of very 
great public utUity.' — Lord Mansfield, Coote v. Thackeray (1773), 
LofEt. 152. 

iSee Litigation, 2. 

1 The statement of Lord Mansfield is dants but the questions in dispute are the 

obTious. If a person was allowed to same, the Court will on the application of 

bring two or more actions against another the defendants stay proceedings in all the 

for causes which might have been joined, cases but one. This kind of consolidation 

on its being shown to the Court that the can only be obtained at the instance of 

double or plural proceeding is vexatious , defendants, yet a somewhat analogous 

or oppressive, the Court will consolidate proceeding has been adopted in the con- 

them : that power has always laid in its verse case. Where a number of plaintiffs 

ordinary and de oursu jurisdiction to pre- have commenced actions against the same 

vent abuse of its own powers. Also when defendants on the application of the 

two or more actions are brought by the plaintifEs, the Court may enlarge the time 

same plaintiff against different defen- for taking the next step in the rest of the 

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Practice — continued. 

11. The constant and established proceedings of this Court are upon 
written evidence, like the proceedings upon the civil or 'canon law. 
This is the course of the Court, and the course of the Court is the 
law of the Court. — Eardvnoke, L.C., Graves v. Budgel (1737), West, 
Ch. Rep. 45. 

See 2, above, and references therefrom; also Affidavit, 1. 

12. I think it is the safest course to stand by the established practice 
which has prevailed for a long period of time in this country than 
to indulge in the introduction of a novelty which might be highly 
dangerous. — Grampton, J., Queen v. O'ConneU and others (1843), 
1 Cox, C. C. 392. 

See 5, above ; 13, helow ; Judges, 68 ; Judicial Decisions, 5 ; Tort, 1. 

13. It is much better to adhere to what has been the practice in the 
chambers of both divisions of the Court than that a single Judge 
shoidd attempt to set up what he considers a better practice. — 
Stirling, J., Liverpool and Manchester Aerated Bread Co. v. Firth 
(1890), L. J. 60 C. D. 154. 

See 12, above. 

14. It is the duty of the Court to repress sharp practice. — Bacon, V.-C, 
In re Swire ; MeUor v. Swire (1882) L. R. 21 C. D. 649. 

15. It is proper to inquire into the practice and precedents ; and to see 
whether they have been uniform and concomitant. — Yaies, J., Rex v. 
Wilkes (1769), 4 Burr. Part IV. 2548. 

16. 'Tis pity that the two Courts should differ in their practice upon an 
Act of Parliament.' — Lord Mansfield, Belither v. Gibbs (1766), 4 Burr. 
Part IV. 2117. 

17. In a case where there is not practice to support us, where we have 
not strong lights to guide us, and analogies so complete and satis- 
factory as not to admit of being mistaken, I cannot but think it the 
safest course for us to decline doing now, what it does npt appear 
that this Court has ever done before. — Eyre, C.J., Jefferson v. Bishop 
of Durham (1797), 2 Bos. and PuU. 128. 

See Administration of Justice, 33 ; Judges, 66. 

actions until one of them has been tried a right of action against him by a number 

as a test action, or as just stated, it may of other persons, if successive actions 

on the application of the defendants, as were allowed, it might become uselessly 

was the former practice, consolidate them, unfair and oppressive to him. In the 

—Amos V. C'hadwick (1877), L. E. 4 case of Avtos v. Chadwick, previously 

C. D. 869. The advantage of consolida- herein quoted, there were 78 plaintiffs, 
tion is very clear. It prevents several ' "Lord Mansfield, said there should 

suits for the same matter, thus entailing be a uniformity between the two Courts, 

waste of public time, and also when a And he recommended it to Mr. Justice 

person by an act of his, has given rise to Aston, to take a note of this matter, and 

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Practice — continued. 

18. I have no authority to alter the practice of the Court. — Lord Lang- 
dale, M.R., Balls V. Margrave (1841), 3 Beav. 449. 

19. I wiU not, without any authority, suffer the constant practice of this 
Court for thirty years to be broke through.^ — Lord Mansfield, Cases 
adjudged in the Court of King's Bench (1773), Hilary Term, 
13 Geo. in., Lofft. 155. 

See above, 5 ; Peeoedents, 8, 17. 

20. I do not think I can pass over the distinct words of Sir George 
Jessel, who knew practice as thoroughly as any Judge who ever sat 
on the bench.— Ze/ceioicfe, J., Woolf v. Woolf (1898), L. R. 1 C. D. 347. 

21. Practice does not make the slip of a Judge irrevocable. — Kekewich, J., 
Collins V. North British and Mercantile Ins. Co. (1894), L. R. 3 Ch. 
[1894], p. 235. 

See Judges, 60. 

22. No man is entitled, as of right, to add to the evidence on a motion, 
after electing deliberately to open it. — Sir G. Jessel, M.R., Jacobs v. 
Brett (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. Ca. 5. 

See CotJMSEL, 10, 11, 12 ; Opening Speech, 2 ; Rights, 3. 

23. Nothing is more apt to mislead than the suggestion of a supposed 
general practice, unsupported by any authority or decision. — Lord 
Mansfield, Reynolds v. Peering (1784), 3 Doug. 189. 

See Counsel, 10, 13. 

24. Every rule may be waived by the person for whose benefit it is 
introduced.— 4sMursf, J., Bickerdike v. BoUman (1787), 1 T. R. 405. 

See Consent, 3 ; Rights, 3. 

25. My opinion is, that all general rules, touching the administration of 
justice, must be so understood, as to be made consistent with the 
fundamental principles of justice : And consequently all cases where 
a strict adherence to the rule would clash with those fundamental 
principles, are to be considered as so many exceptions to it. — Sir M. 
Foster, J., Sir John Wedderburn's Case (1746), Foster's Cr. Ca. 38. 

ee Adm inisteation of Justice, 6. 

26. General rules are widely estabhshed for attaining justice with ease, 
certainty and dispatch. But the great end of them being " to do 
justice," the Court ought to see that it be really attained. — Lord 
Mansfield, Rex. v. Phillips (1756), 1 Burr. Part IV. 301. 

See Administration of Justice, 19. 

talk with the Judges of C. B. ahout it." — out of the regular course. — Lm-d Mans- 

Id. 2118. Jjeld, Rei v. Wilkes (1770), 4 Burr. 

1 We are not absolutely bound to do it Part IV., p. 2531. 
without some reason to excuse the going 

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Practice — continued. 

27. The Court must not depart from those rules which have been con- 
sidered necessary for the due administration of justice. — Lord Lang- 
date, M.R., Symonds v. The Gas Light and Coke Co. (1848), 11 Beav. 

28. To be sure the Court regularly adheres to regular judgments, if in 
support of the merits and justice ; but if against the merits and 
justice they always get rid of the mere formality of them. — L/jrd 
Mansfield, Lord Mexborough v. Sir John Delaval (1774), Lofft. 310. 

See Preoedekts, 15. 

29. Nothing imports us more, than to see the judgments of the Court 
be duly executed. — Lord Mansfi,eld, Rex v. Beardmore (1759), 2 Burr. 
Part rv. 795. 

See 9, above, and references therefrom. 

30. One great object of the Judicature Act would be defeated if, when 
a Judge says, "I remember what took place before me when the 
judgment was pronounced, and I am quite certain it was not intended 
to prejudice the defendant on this point,'' we were to say that the 
judgment which is quite capable of this construction is nevertheless 
to be construed otherwise. The scheme of the Judicature Act was 
that the Judge who had pronounced a judgment should have the 
carrying out of that judgment because he was more likely to under- 
stand it than another Judge who had not pronounced it. — Kay, L.J., 
Steers v. Rogers (1892), L. R. 2 C. D. [1892], p. 25. 

See 7, above, and references therefrom. 

31. An Order confirmed binds aU the world : But when discharged, it is 
binding only between the parties concerned. — Page, J., Rex v. 
Inhabitants of Cirencester (1734), Burrow (Settlement Cases), 18. 

See 8, above, and 32, below. 

32. If we go into presumptions upon special Orders, it will make them 
■ very imcertain. — Lord Hardioicke, Rex v. Inhabitants of Barton 

Turfe (1735), Burrow (Settlement Cases), 53. 
See 31, above ; Peesdmption, 1. 

33. The discretion of an experienced taxing master ought not lightly to 
be interfered with. — Gozens-Hardy, J., In re Maddock ; Butt v. 
Wright (1899), L. R. 2 C. D. 591. 

See 1, above. 


1. It is of dangerous consequence for Judges, in their judgments, to 
rely too much on precedents that perhaps went forth through the 

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Precedents — continued. 

necessity of the present times.* — Brampston, L.C.J. , Hampden's Case 
(1637), 3 How. St. Tr. 1245. 

See Judicial Decisioks, 3, 11 ; Law, 73 ; Law Eepoets, 3. 

2. I cannot bear to be told when an argument has been addressed to me 
by which I am not convinced, that there is a case decided which I am 
bound to foUow.— Zaj/, J., In re Hohnes (1890), L. J. (N. S.) 60 C. D. 

See helow, 18 ; Judicial Decisions, 5, 6. 

3. My duty is, as a Judge, to be governed by fixed rules and former 
precedents. — Alderson, B., Brownlow v. Egerton (1854), 23 L. J. Rep. 
Part 5 (N. S.), Ch. 364. 

See Judicial Deoisioiis, 10. 

4. He who will have advantage of precedents, ought to search for them 
at his peril, and for his speed, for, the Court will not search for them ; 
for if none, or no usual precedents are shewn, the Court ought to 
adjudge according to law and reason. — Lord Coke, Blade's Case 
(1602), 4 Rep. 94 a. 

See 12, n., below ; Equity, 3, n. ; Law, 17. 

5. K any precedent should be found, you should have time to make use 
of it. — Lord Mansfield, King against Skinner (1772), Lofft. 57. 

See 12, helxyw. 

6. It is dangerous to make a precedent, an innovation." — Pratt, C.J., 
Layer's Case (1722), 16 How. St. Tr. 132. 

7. It is hard, I confess, and so are many other things in the law ; 
but I am wonderfully tender of making precedents. — Je'fferies, L.C.J., 
RoseweH's Case (1684), 10 How. St. Tr. 267. 

See Judicial Decisions, 17 ; Law, 39. 

8. A course of precedents and judicial proceedings in Courts of justice 
make the law : it would be endless to cite cases upon it. A course of 
practice for a few years has been held to controul an Act of Parliament.* 
—Wilinot, L.C.J., Wilkes' Case (1770), 19 How. St. Tr. 1130. 

See Cases, 7, 9, 21 ; Practice, 5 ; Peecedents, 17. 

1 Hence we see so many old precedents To do a great right, do a little wrong, 
upset and not followed on the ground And curb this cruel devil of his will." 
that they do not apply to the exigencies g^^. ^^tsX is the answer ?— 

of the present times. ^ 

2 When Shylock, in the play, insists on " must not oe ; 

having bv virtue of his bond, the pound TwiU be recorded for a precedent, 

of flesh lying nearest to his debtor's And many an error by the same example 

heart, the friend of the unfortunate mer- WiU rush into the State." 

chant thus supplicates the Judge :- , 1 See Case of Bewdley Corporation, 

" I beseech you, 1 ?• Wms. 207. 
Wrest once the law to yonr authority ; 

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Precedents — continued. 

9. We must, as in all cases of tradition, trace backwards, and presume, 
from the usage which is remembered, that the precedent usage was 
the same. — Earl of Mansfield, Proceedings against the Dean of 
St. Asaph (1783), 21 How. St. Tr. 1036. 

See Practice, 1. 

10. From authorities I come to precedents ; though they be not judg- 
ments, yet they show the practice of the law : and what better book 
have we in the law than the book of precedents, or what is there 
of more authority than that, for we have not the twelve tables for 
our common laws ? The common law is but the common usage of 
the h,nd.— Finch, L.C.J., Hampden's Case (1637), 3 How. St. Tr. 

See Cases, 10 ; Common Law, 3, 9, 12 ; Equity, 18 ; Judicial 
Decisions, 13 ; Practice, 2, 11. 

11. Recognised precedents have the force of decisions, by which 
Courts and Judges individually must hold themselves bound. — 
Williams, J., Case of the SherifE of Middlesex (1840), 3 St. Tr. (N. S.) 

See Cases, 21 ; Judicial Decisions, 7. 

12. The precedents are all against you, every one of them, and what 
shall guide our judgments, since there is nothing alleged in this 
case but precedents ? ' — Hyde, C.J., Proceedings on Habeas Corpus by 
Sir T. Darnel and others (1627), 3 How. St. Tr. 57. 

See 5, above; Counsel, 3. 

13. Matters depending in our Courts are composed of an infinite number 
of special circumstances, and it therefore is as rare to find a precise 
correspondence between the facts of one case and those of another, as 
an exact resemblance in the face of one man to that of another. There- 
fore it is the wisdom of the sages of our law, by the analogy -with 

1 I hope we shall resolve according to qiue Prtetores edicere consu&rvM."* And 

the reason of former times, and according the Pandects directly recognise the same 

to our consciences. — Hyde, C. J., id., p. 50. doctrine. " Est enim juris civilis species 

See also i, above. consuetude ; enimvero, divturna con^ufitvdo 

The value of precedents, and the pro jure et lege, in his, qu(e non ex seripto 

importance of adhering to them, were deseendunt o'bserrari, sulet, S;c. Maxime 

deeply felt in ancient times, and nowhere atiiem prohatnr consuetudo ex rebus jiidi- 

more than in the Prastor's forum. " Con- oatis."\ — 1 St. Mf. Jur. 1-t. 
suetudinis autem jus esse putatu/r id ' ' 

(says Cicero), " quod, voluntate iomnium, * Cicero de Invent. Lib. 2, cap. 22 ; 

sine lege, vetustas comproldrit. In ea Mitford, Plead, in Eq., p. 44, note (b) ; 
autem jura sunt, guoedam ipsa jamh certa Heineccius, De Edictis Prsetorium, Lib. 1, 
propter xetustatem ; quo in genere et alia tit. 3, cap. 6, § 13, 30. 
sunt multa, et eorum multo maxima pars, f Pothier, Pand. Lib. I ; tit. 3, Art 6 n 

28, 29 ; Dig. Lib. 1, tit. 3, I. 33, I. 34. 

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Precedents — eontirvued. 

other cases, to investigate their doubts, and thus to satisfy their 
judgments.^ — Per Our.? Manby v. Scott (1672), 1 Levinz, 4 ; 2 Sm. 
L. C. (8th ed.) 455. 

See Cases, 7, 19 ; Judicial Decisions, 17 ; Law Reports, 3. 

14. What is determined upon solemn argument establishes the law, and 
makes a precedent for future cases : which is not the case of questions 
agreed by consent of parties, or never litigated. — Lord Mansfield, Case 
of John Wilkes (1770), 19 How. St. Tr. 1095. 

See 20, hdow. 

15. I have often thought since that there is sound sense in what was 
once said by the late Lord C. J. Eyre, that the sooner a bad precedent 
was gotten rid of, the better. — Lord Kenyan, C.J., King v. Stone 
(1801), 1 East, 648 n. (o). 

See Cases, 16 ; Doctrine, 2 ; Judicial Decisions, 5, 6 ; Law, 64, 74 ; 
Law Reports, 3 ; Practice, 28. 

16. I lay great stress upon the two precedents of near a century and a 
half ago, and no instance in contradiction of them. — Lord Mansfield, 
Mayor of Norwich v. Berry (1766), 4 Burr. Part IV., p. 2114. 

See Cases, 12, 21 ; Doctrine, 1 ; Judicial Decisions, 5, 20, 25 ; 
Practice, 5. 

17. I think what has been considered as settled law for thirty years past 
ought not now to be departed from. — Buller, J., Doe v. Staple (1788), 
2 T. R. 699. 

See Judicial Decisions, 17, 20 ; Practice, 19. 

18. Precedent indeed may serve to fix principles, which for certainty's 
sake are not suffered to be shaken, whatever might be the weight of 
the principle, independent of precedent. But precedent, though it be 
evidence of law, is not law in itself ; much less the whole of the law. 
—Lcn-d Mansfisld, Jones v. Randall (1774), LofEt. 386. 

See above, 2 ; Cases, 9, 15, 21 ; Judicial Decisions, 9, 12 ; 
Law, 53. 

19. Precedent goes in support of justice. — Lord Kenyan, Smith v. 
Bowles (1797), 2 Esp. 578. 

See JuDioiu- Decisions, 10, 24. 

20. I should be sorry that any opinion of mine should shake the 
authority of an established precedent ; since it is better for the subject 
that even faulty precedents should not be shaken than that the law 

1 Seldom will it happen that any one Ch. 25, p. 335. 
rule will exactly suit with many cases. — ' Mallet, Twitden and Terrill, JJ. 
Sir Wm. BUchstone (1765), Com. Bk. III., 

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Precedents — continued. 

skould be uncertain. — Grose, J., Heathcote v. Crookstanks (1787), 2 
T. R. 24. 
See 14, abo^^e ; Administration of Justice, 2 ; Cases, 21 ; Equit?, 19 ; 
Judges, 48, n., 52 ; Judicial Decisions, 5, 24 ; Law, 54 ; Libeett 
OF the Peess, 3 ; Mischief, 1 ; Pleadings, 4. 


1. Presumption means nothing more than, as stated by Lord Mansfield, 
the weighing of probabilities, and deciding, by the powers of common 
sense, on which side the truth is. — Best, J., King v. Burdett (1820), 
1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 114. 

See Evidence, 12 ; Practice, 32. 

2. It is a strong presimiption that that which never has been done 
cannot by law be done at all. — Ashhurst, J., BusseU v. The Men of 
Devon (1788), 1 T. R. 673. 

iSee 3, helow ; Law, 41, and references therefrom. 

3. It is a familiar principle that all things are presumed to have been 
rightly done unless there is reasonable ground shown for doubting it. 
— Sir James Eannen, Woodhouse v. Balfour (1887), L. R. 13 Pr. D. 4. 

See 2, above. 

4. When one or more things are proved, from which our experience 
enables us to ascertain that another, not proved, must have happened, 
we presume that it did happen, as well in criminal as in civil cases. — 
Best, J., King v. Burdett (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 111. 

5. It is certainly true, and I most ardently hope that it will ever continue 
to be the case, that by the law of England, as it was urged and 
admitted in the case of the Seven Bishops,' no man is to be convicted 
of any crime upon mere naked presumption. — Holroyd, J., King v. 
Burdett (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 125. 

6. No one can doubt that presumptions may be made in criminal as 
well as in civil cases. It is constantly the practice to act upon them, 
and I apprehend that more than one half of the persons convicted of 
crimes are convicted on presumptive evidence. — Bayley, J., Ejng v. 
Burdett (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 131. 

7. I readily admit that the law which requires presumption or custom 
to be carried back for a period of nearly 700 years, is a bad and 
mischievous law, and one which is discreditable to us as a civilised and 
enlightened people, but such is the law ; and while it so continues, I 
consider myself, in administering it, as bound to administer it as I 

1 See 1.^ How. St. Tr. 183. 

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Presumption — eontifiued. 

find it ; nor do I feel myself warranted in undermining or frittering 
it away by subtle fictions or artificial presumptions inconsistent with, 
truth and fact.— CocfebMm, C.J., Bryant v. Foot (1867), 15 W. R. 425 ; 
S. G. L. R. 2 Q. B. Ca. 179. 
See Law, 20 ; Usage, 8. 

8. It foUows almost necessarily, from the imperfection and irregularity 
of human nature, that a uniform course is not preserved during a 
long period : a little advance is made at one time, a retreat at another ; 
something is added, or taken away, from indiscretion, or ignorance, 
or through other causes : and, when by the lapse of years the evidence 
is lost which would explain these irregularities, they are easily made 
the foundation of cavils against the legahty of the whole practice. So 
also with regard to title : if that which has existed from time inune- 
morial be scrutinised with the same severity which may properly be 
employed in canvassing a modem grant, without making allowance for 
the changes and accidents of time, no ancient title will be found free 
from objection : that, indeed, wiU become a source of weakness, which 
ought to give security and strength. It has therefore always been the 
well-established principle of our law to presume everything in favour of 
long possession.— ZittZedaZe, J., R. v. Archdall (1838), 8 A. & E. 288. 

See Possession, 2. 

9. A presimiption of any fact is, properly, an inferring of that fact from 
other facts that are knovm ; it is an act of reasoning ; and much of 
human knowledge on all subjects is derived from this source. — 
Abbott, C.J., King V. Burdett (1820), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 140. 

10. Prima facie, every estate, whether given by vnU or otherwise, is 
supposed to be beneficial to the party to whom it is so given. — 
Abbott, C.J., Townson v. TickeU (1820), 3 B. & A. 36. 

11. If a man go into the London Docks sober without means of getting 
drunk, and comes out of one of the cellars very drunk wherein are a 
million gallons of vrine, I think that would be reasonable evidence 
that he had stolen some of the vnne in that cellar, though you could 
not prove that any vnne was stolen, or any wine was missed. — Maule, J., 
Reg. v. Burton (1854), Dearsly's C. C. 284. 

12. There is no presumption in this country that every person knows 
the law : it would be contrary to common sense and reason if it were 
ao.— Maule, J., Martindale v. Falkner (1846), 2 C. B. 720, and 
characterised by Blaekhum, J., in The Queen v. Mayor of Tewkesbury, 
L. R. 3 Q. B. 629. 

See Judges, 77 ; Law, 14. 

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Once privileged always privileged.^" — Goekhum, J., Bullock v. Corry 
(1878), 3 Q. B. D. 356. 
See also Rights, 4, supra. 

Privy Council. 
It is true that the decisions of the Privy Council are not theoretically 
binding on this Court; but in case of mercantile or admiralty law, 
where the same principles are professedly followed in the colonies and 
in this country, it is, to say the least, highly undesirable that there 
should be any conflict between the decisions of the Judicial Committee 
and those of the High Court or Courts of Appeal in this country. — 
lAndley, L.J., " The City of Chester " (1884), L. R. 9 Pro. Div. 207. See 
also per Sir James W. Colville, in Pitts v. La Fontaine (1880), L. R. 
6 App. Cas. 483. 
See Appeais, 4, 6 ; Cases, 21 ; Jodges, 14, 48, n., 56, n. ; Paeliament, 
18, 19. 


1. We are not to issue process here as instruments or conduit-pipes, but 
judicially as Judges : and it wiU not be an objection to say, that we 
may award process at all hazards, and let the party grieved come after 
and plead to it ; for we shall never grant an ill-writ, that the party 
may avoid it in pleading. — EoU, C.J., Lucy v. Bishop of St. David's 
(1702), 7 Mod. 59. 

See Pleadings, 6, 9, 10. 

2. There is no manner of doubt, but that a man may make use of legal 
process (legal in the ordinary course of proceeding) in such a 
manner as shall be a contempt to the Court, and a most grievous 
oppression. — Lord Mansfield, Anonymous (1773), Lofift. 328. 

See Corporations, 1 ; Courts, 2 ; Criminal Justice, 41, 45 ; Law, 75 ; 
Liberty of the Subject, 4 ; Relief, 3. 


1. A thing which is not in esse but in apparent expectancy is regarded 
in law. — Lord Coke, Case of Sutton's Hospital (1612), 5 Rep. 303. 

2. The power to regulate the disposal of property after death ought not 
to extend to doing it in a manner tending to the prejudice of the 
living. — Lord Truro, Brownlow v. Egerton (1854), 23 L. J. Rep. Part 5 
(N. S.), Ch. 403. 

See Will, 5, 13. 

1 See per Brett, M.E., Pearce v. Foster (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 119. 

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Property — eontiniLed. 

3. The Court has of late years been much more ready to decide questions 
as to interests in futuro than it formerly was. — Kekevnch, J., In re 
Freme's Contract (1895), L. R. 2 C. D. [1895], p. 262. 

4. Rules of property ought to be generally known, and not to be left 
upon loose notes, which rather serve to confound principles, than to 
confirm them. — Lord Mansfield, Goodtitle v. Duke of Chandos (1760), 
2 Burr. Part IV., p. 1076. 

5. Entry is not equivalent to possession. — Fry, J., Edwick v. Hawkes 
(1881), L. R. 18 C. D. 203. 

See Possession, 1. 

6. The law is so benignant in this country that it sometimes contradicts 
itself in order to preserve estates. — Lord St. Leonards, Browulow v. 
Egerton (1854), 23 L. J. Rep. Part 5 (N. S.), Ch. 407. 

See Husband and Wife, 7 ; Public Policy, 5. 

7. We must not be frighted when a matter of property comes before us 
by saying it belongs to the Parliament ; we must exert the Queen's 
jurisdiction.— Fott, C.J., Ashby v. White (1703), Lord Raym. 938. 

See Judges, 19, 20, 29, 37 ; Law, 59 ; Tort, 8. 

8. Personal property has no locality.' — Lord Loughborough, SiU v. 
Worswick (1791), 1 H. Bl. 690. 

9. Momunents are memorials of great use in questions of descent, and 
in mattei-s of family interest ; decency and propriety likewise require 
that they shoxdd not remain in a state of ruin and decay. — Sir 
Wm. Scott, Bardin v. Calcott (1789), 1 Hagg. Con. Rep. 16. 

10. There is nothing illegal in keeping up a tomb ; on the contrary, it 
is a very laudable thing to do. — lAndley, L.J., In re Tyler, Tyler v. 
Tyler (1891), L. R. 3 C. D. [1891], p. 258. 

11. I am afraid that the state of some other noble monuments of the. 
finest Grothic architecture in this kingdom is not very consoling ; that 
they are mouldering and crumbhng into ruins. I have heard it 
observed with grave and serious regret, that no funds have been 
appropriated for the preservation of them : perhaps a time will come 
when that which I take to be an error will be corrected, and when it 
will be found that all the property of the Church is a fund for the 

1 The meaning of that is, not that follows the law of the person. The owner 

personal property has no visible locality, in any country may dispose of personal 

but that it is subject to that law which property. If he dies, it is not the law of 

governs the person of the owner. With the country in which the property is, but 

respect to the disposition of it, with the law of the country of which he was a 

respect to the transmission of it, either by subject, that wiU regulate the succession, 

succession or the act of the party, it — Id, 

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Property — continued. 

sustentation of those fabrics.— Si/re, C.J., Jefferson v. Bishop of 
Durham (1797), 2 Bos. & PuU. 129. 

12. If a man will make a purchase of a chance, he must abide by the 
consequences.— Eie^ar-ds, L.C.B., Hitchcock v. Giddings (1817), 
4 Price, 135. 

See Commerce, 12 ; Fraud, 29 ; Jury, 8 ; Miscellaneous, 33 ; Money, 
2 ; Pleadings, 5 ; Relief, 1 ; Title, 4 ; Tort, 16 ; Words, 8. 

13. I may use mine own as I wiU.— Hobart, C.J., Robins v. Barnes 
(1614),Lord Hobart's Rep. 131. 

See Tort, 4, 14, 18 ; Trespass, 1. 

14. I know of no case in which you are to have a judicial proceeding, 
by which a man is to be deprived of any part of his property, without 
his having an opportunity of being heard.— Boi/let/, B., Capel v. Child 
(1832), 2 C. & J. 579. 

See Administration of Justice, 5 ; Criminal Justice, 18 ; Evidenob, 
21 ; Pleadings, 7. 


Those who make the attack ought to be very well prepared to support 
it.— Boohe, J., Almgin v. Pierson (1797), 2 Bos. & Pull. 104. 
See Doctrine, 3; Equity, 26; Miscellaneous, 48; Parliament, 9; 
Pleadings, 6 ; Relief, 3 ; Tort, 2, 9. 


1. A man wants no protection when his conduct is strictly right. — 
Lord Mansfield, Bird ■;;. Gunston (1785), 3 Doug. 275. 

See Liberty of the Subject, 4 ; Miscellaneous, 10 ; Reasonable, 3. 

2. To protect those who are not able to protect themselves is a duty 
which every one owes to society. — Lord Maenaghten, Jenoure v. 
Dehnege (1890), 60 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. 13. 

See Fraud, 19 ; Husband and Wife, 5 ; Judges, 27, 81, n. ; Justice, 
3 ; Law, 31 ; Liberty of the Press, 3 ; Miscellaneous, 9, 21, 33 ; 
Poor, 3 ; Title, 4 ; Tort, 6, 16. 

Public Policy. 

1. It is impossible to say what the opinion of a man or a Judge might 
be as to what public policy is. — Jessel, M.R., Besant v. Wood (1879), 
L. R. 12 C. D. 620. 

2. Public policy is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride 

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Public Policy — continued. 

it you never know where it will carry you.' — Burrough, J., Richardson v^ 
Hellish (1824), 2 Bing. 252. 
See Law, 54. 

3. Public policy is a high horse to mount, and is difficult to ride when 
you have mounted it. — A. L. Smith, M.R., The Driefonteia Consolidated 
Mines, Ltd. v. Janson (1901), Times L. R., Vol. XVU., 605. 

4. Public policy does not admit of definition and is not easily explained. 
It is a variable quantity ; it must vary and does vary with the habits, 
capacities, and opportunities of the public.'' — Kekewieh, J., Davies v. 
Davies (1887), L. R. 36 C. D. 364. 

5. The great end, for which men enter into society, was to preserve their 
property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all 
instances, where it has not been taken away or abridged by some 
public law for the good of the whole. . . . Distresses, executions, 
forfeitures, taxes, &c., are all of this description ; wherein every man, 
by common consent gives up that right, for the sake of justice and 
general good. — Lord Camden, Entick v. Carrington (1765), 19 How. 
St. Tr. 1066. 

See Husband and Wife, 7 ; Property, 6. 

6. There are many cases iu which individuals sustain an injury, for 
which the law gives no action ; for instance, pulling down houses, or 
raising bulwarks for the preservation and defence of the kingdom 
against the Bang's enemies. — Buller, J., Governor, &c. of Cast Plate 
Manufacturers v. Meredith (1792), 4 T. R. 797. 

See Sovereignty, 12. 

7. The principle of public pohcy is this : ex dolo mala non oritur <ietio. 
No Court wiQ lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action 
upon an immoral or illegal act. — Lord Mansfield, Holman v. Johnson 
(1775), Cowp. 343. 

See Administration of Justice, 18 ; Criminal Justice, 51 ; Fraud, 33 ; 
Judicial Proceedings, 9 ; Jury, 8 ; Law, 74 ; Miscellaneous, 31 ; 
Morals, 3 ; Reldef, 2. 

8. The argument of public policy leads you from sound law, and is 
never argued but when all other points fail. — Burrough, J., 
Richardson v. Mellish (1824), 2 Bing. 252. 

See Judges, 64 ; Judicial Decisions, 21. 

9. Whatever is injurious to the interests of the pubhc is void, on the 

I Quoted by Lord Bramwell in Mogul ^ ggg also Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, i 
Steamsliip Co. v. McGregor, Gow and H. L. C. 1. 
others, 66 L. T. Eep. 6. 

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Public Policy — continued. 

grounds of public policy. — Tindal, C.J., Homer v. Graves (1831), 
7 Bing. 743. 
See Judges, 61 ; Justice, 1 ; Pleadings, 3 ; Toet, 19, 23, 24. 

Public Servant. 

1. We are not to aBsume that pubHc officers will do anything unjust or 
tyrannical. — Willes, J., Booking v. Jones (1870), L. R. 6 Com. 
PL Ca. 35. 

See 10, helow; Parliament, 8, 11. 

2. A servant of the Crown ought not to be placed at a disadvantage in 
comparison with other subjects. — Field, J., Hennessy v. Wright 
(1888), L. R. 21 Q. B. D. 513. 

3. If public officers wiU. infringe men's rights, they ought to pay greater 
damages than other men, to deter and hinder other officers from the 
like offences.— ffott, C.J., Ashby v. White (1703), 2 Raym. 956. 

See Damages, 2 ; Teespass, 2, n. 

4. We are boxmd to assume that the Crown in the exercise of its grace 
and favour, will be guided solely by constitutional considerations, by 
regard to merit, loyalty, and public services. — Goleridge, J., 
Brownlow v. Egerton (1854), 23 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Eq. 372. 

See Honours; Peerage, 1. 

5. If the confidential communications made by servants of the Crown 
to each other, by superiors to inferiors, or by inferiors to superiors, 
in the discharge of their duty to the Crown, were liable to be made 
public in a Court of justice at the instance of any suitor who thought 
proper to say "fiat justitia mat eadum," an order for discovery 
might involve the country in a war.' — Field, J., Hennessy v. Wright 
(1888), L. R. 21 Q. B. D. 512. 

See Politics, 4. 

6. It is the principle of the common law, that an- officer ought not to 
take money for doing his duty. — Wilmot, J.,.Stote8bury v. Smith 
(1759), 2 Burr. Part IV., p. 928. 

See Pardon, 4, and references therefrom. 

7. It is proved that in passing . . . accotmts, the accountant took his 
fees, while others did the business, which I fear is too often the case 
of public officers. — Lord Mansfield, R. v. Bembridge (1783), 22 How. 
St. Tr. 152. 

See Auditor. 

' This was an action for libel by a publishing articles alleging that members 
Colonial Governor against The Times for of the Council of Government of Mauritius 

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Public Servant — eontinued. 

8. It is a disparagement of the Government, who put an ill man into 
office.— ffolt, O.J., Regina v. Langley (1703), 2 Raym. 1029. 

See Administration of Justice, 35. 

9. If a man accepts an office of trust and confidence, concerning the 
public, especially when it is attended with profit, he is answerable to 
the King for his execution of that office. — Lord Mansfield, R. v. 
Bembridge (1783), 22 How. St. Tr. 155. 

10. The Crown cannot ever be prejudiced by the misconduct or 
negligence of any of its officers. — Pollock, C.B., Reg. ■». Renton (1848), 
2 Exch. Rep. 220. 

See 1, ahone ; Criminal Justice, 50 ; Parliament, 11 ; Practice, 9. 

11. Men of honour will do their duty and will abide the consequences. 
—Eyre, B., Sutton v. Johnstone (1786), 1 T. R. 504. 


1. I have heard that it was the perfection of the administration of 
criminal justice to take care that the punishment shoidd come to few 
and the example to many." — Lord Kenyon, Eaton's Case (1793), 
22 How. St. Tr. 820. 

See below, 4, 6 ; Criminal Justice, 3, 30 ; Judges, 13. 

2. Punishment is intended for example ; but a person insane can have 
no design ; and to punish him can be no example." — Lord Swinton, 
Kinloch's Case (1795), 25 How. St. Tr. 1001. 

See Insanity, 2. 

3. It is a duty not only to punish, but to prevent aU manner of evU.^ — 
Lord Sinnton, Kinloch's Case (1795), 25 How. St. Tr. 1001. 

See Damages, 1 ; Pardon, 2. 

had charged him with sending to the - " Furiosui ahsentis loco est. Non 

Colonial OfiSce garbled reports of their multum distant a irutis qui ratione 

speeches. carent: A madman is like a man who 

1 No doubt punishments should be is absent. Those who want reason 

exemplary and deterrent. But a ceremony are not far removed from brutes. — t Co. 

of public degradation such as took place 126. 

in France in the Dreyfus case, seems to be Fvriosus solo furore pvmitur : Let a 

opposed to the spirit of the times, which is madman be punished by his madness 

averse to inflicting needless pain to the alone. — Co. Litt. 247. 

criminal. In England we have abolished " The execution of an offender is by 

not merely public executions, but the way of example, ut poena ad paueos, 

pillory and the stocks, and aU forms of tmtm adomnes perveniat" (_Co.Z Inst.S): 

punishment by which the criminal was but so it is not when a madman is 

exposed to the insults and contumelies of executed : but should be a miserable 

the crowd; and not very long ago a spectacle, both against law, and of extreme 

merciful and humane order was made inhumanity and cruelty, and can be of no 

which exempted convict witnesses from example to others. — Steph. Com. Vol. IV. 

being required to give evidence in their (8th ed.), Bk. VI., c. ii, 27. 

prison dress. ' MultiplieatcL trangressione creseat 

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Punishment — eontimied. 

4. The wishes of every huinan man are, that guilt may not be fixed 
upon any man ; but I confess I am one of those who have not the 
weakness — which weakness, a Judge at least, and a jury, must get 
rid of, before they fit themselves to fill the respective stations which 
they are to fill in the administration of the justice of the country — 
I say, therefore, I am not one of those who wish under false com- 
passion, inconsistent with the administration of criminal justice, that 
a person on whom guilt is fairly fixed, should escape the pimishment 
which the law annexes to his guilt. — Lor'd Kenyan, Stone's Case 
(1796), 25 How. St. Tr. 1423. 

See above, 1 ; below, 6 ; Criminal Justice, 2, 30 ; Pardon, 1, 2. 

5. In dispensing the criminal justice of the country, we have sometimes 
an arduous task to perform. It is not a pleasant thing, most 
certainly, to condemn any one of our fellow creatures to punishment ; 
but those who are entrusted with the administration of the criminal 
justice of a country, must summon up their fortitude, and render 
justice to the pubhc, as well as justice tempered with mercy to the 
individual.!— Z/ord Kenyan, Trial of the Earl of Thanet, and others 
(1799), 27 How. St. Tr. 939. 

See Administration of Justice, 32; Criminal Justice, 25, 26; 
Law, 48 ; Trial for Life, 1. 

6. . . . — a Court where neither favour nor interest can protect you ; but 
where punishment wUl be impartially inflicted, according to every 
man's demerit . . . examples become necefesary, pro salute reipublicce. 
It is not in the power of this supreme Court of criminal jurisdiction, 
considering the venality of the times, to cleanse the Augean stable,^ 
and therefore our only consolation must be "est aliquad pradire tenus 

•poena injHctU : Let infliction of punish- chant of Venice," Act IV., sc. i. 

ment increase with multiplied crime.— 2 The beautiful lines in the same play : 

Inst. i79. See also Puijishmbnt, 10, " The quality of mercy is not strained ; 

supra. It droppeth like the gentle dew from 

Poene potiv,s molliendee quam, exaaper- Heaven " 

anda mnt : Punishments should rather be are but an echo of Ecclus. xxxv., 20. 

softened than aggravated.— 3 Inst. 220. 2 The Augean stable, in Grecian myth- 

Melwr est justitia verS prceveniens, ology, is represented as belonging to 

quam severe pimiens : Justice truly pre- Augeas or Augias, one of the Argonauts, 

venting is better than severely punishing. and afterwards King of Elis. This prince 

— 3 Inst. Epil. kept a great number of oxen in a stable 

Prtsstat cautela quam medela : Caution which was never cleansed, until Hercules 

is better than cure.— Co. Litt. 304. See undertook the task ; a task which it 

also ante, JUDGES, 16. seemed impracticable to execute. Hence 

Prevention is better than cure.— Pr. the Augean stable came to represent what 

' I shaU temper so justice with mercy. is deemed impracticable, or a place which 

—Mtlton, " Paradise Lost," Bk. 10, line 77. has not, for a long time been cleansed — 

Mercy seasons justice.— (SAaA«., " Mer- Lempriere, Webs. Diet. 

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Punishment — contimied. 

si non datur ultra." — Willes, J., R. v. Bembridge (1783), 22 How. 
St. Tr. 157. 
See 1, 4, above ; Judges, 19, n., 20, 27, 37, 74 ; Justice, 3 ; Law, 
19 ; Rights, 4 ; Tort, 6. 

7. No legal punishment is inflicted for revenge ; all are for 
correction of the individual delinquent or others. All are pro salute 
animarum. — Brett, L.J., Martin v. Mackonochie (1879), L. R. 4 
Q. B. 753. 

See Law, 59. 

8. A power to imprison does not give a power to fine. I cannot accede 
to the proposition that in England in penal jurisdiction the admitted 
power to award a particular punishment involves the power of 
awarding every lesser punishment. — Brett, L.J., Martin v. Mackonochie 
(1879), L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 754. 

See Law, 59. 

9. A learned coiraty court judge told me that at first he used to make 
orders of committal for a short time and he found that the people 
went to prison. He then lengthened the period, and he found that 
fewer people went to prison ; and he found that the longer the period 
for which he committed people to prison for not paying, the shorter 
was the total amount of imprisonment suffered by debtors, because 
when they were committed for the whole six weeks they moved heaven 
and earth among their friends to get the fimds and paj'^ ; whereas if 
the term was a short one, they underwent the punishment.* — Lord 
Bramwell, Stonor v. Fowle (1887), L. R. 13 Ap. Ca. 28. 

See 10, helow. 

10. We cannot explore any mode of sentencing a man to imprisonment, 
who is imprisoned already, but by tacking one imprisonment to the 
otheT.'—Wilmot, L.C.J., Wilkes' Case (1763), 19 How. St. Tr. 1134. 

See 9, above; also 3, above, n. 

Sailway Company. 

1. Every person of any experience in Courts of justice, knows that a 
scintilla of evidence against a railway company is enough to secure a 
verdict for the plaintiff. I was once in a case before a most able 

1 This refers to the power of committal that may do good in an extremity, but the 

on judgment summons ; the last remnant use of them doth spoil the stomach, and it 

of a jurisdiction analogous to imprison- will require them stronger and stronger, 

ment for debt left in our law. and by little and little they will lessen 

• See Castro r. The Queen, L. E. 6 App. their own operation." — Co. i Inst. 47. 

Cas. 229. See also supra, Miscellaneous, 21. 

" Violent courses are like to hot waters 

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Railway Company — continued. 

Judge, the late Chief Justice Jervis, in which I was beaten, I dare say 
rightly, in consequence of an observation of his : " Nothing is so easy 
as to be wise after the event." — Bramwell, B., Cornman v. The Eastern 
Counties Bail. Co. (1859), 5 Jur. (N. S.) 658. 


2. Cases before the Railway Commissioners must not be cited as 
authorities to us. — Bramwell, L.J., Great Western RaU. Co. v. Railway 
Commissioners (1881), 50 L. J. Q. B. 489. 


1. There is no point on which a greater amount of decision is to be 
found in Courts of law and equity than as to what is reasonable ; for 
instance, reasonable time, reasonable notice, and the like. It is 
impossible a priori to state what is reasonable in such cases. You 
must have the particular facts of each case established before you can 
ascertain what is meant by reasonable time, notice, and the like.- — 
Lord Romilly, M.R., Labouchere t;. Dawson (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. Ca. 325. 

See Equity, 14, 33 ; Law, 52. 

2. A reasonable fine is such as the law will judge to be so .. . but 
what a reasonable fine is, and who shall be the judge of it, the law 
has established no rule. — Lord Hardwicke, Moore's Case (1736), 17 
How. St. Tr. 914. 

3. I take it that reasonable human conduct is part of the ordinary 
course of things. — Lindley, L.J., " The City of Lincoln" (1889), L. R. 
15 P. D. 18. 

See Law, 35 ; Miscellaneous, 24, 53 ; Peoteotion, 1, 2. 

4. To me the entire uselessness of such rules as practical guides lies in 
the inherent vagueness of the word " reasonable," the absolute 
impossibility of finding a definite standard, to be expressed in 
language, for the fairness and the reason of mankind, even of Judges. 
The reason and fairness of one man is manifestly no rule for the 
reason and fairness of another, and it is an awkward, but as far as I 
see, an inevitable consequence of the rule, that in every case where 
the decision of a Judge is overruled, who does or does not stop a case 
on the ground that there is, or is not, reasonable evidence for reason- 
able men, those who overrule him say, by implication, that in the 
case before them, the Judge who is overruled is out of the pale of 
reasonable men. — Lord Coleridge, Dublin, &c. RaU. Co. v. Slattery 
(1878), L. R. 3 App. Ca. 1197. 

See also Discketion, 1, 9. 

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1. Shall we relieve a man, that trusts when he needs not ? — Holt, C.J., 
Tawney's Case (1703), 2 Eaym. 1013. 

See Equity, 27 ; Fraud, 4, 10, 29 ; MiscELLAHi»ue, 33 ; Peopeett, 12 ; 
Title, 4 ; Tort, 16. 

2. A Court of justice ought not to relieve a plaintiff, upon a ground of 
action immoral or illegal.^ — Lord Mansfield, Stotesbury v. Smith 
(1759), 2 Burr. Part TV. 926. 

See Criminal Justice, 51 ; Fraud, 35 ; Law, 61, 69, 74 ; Morals, 1 ; 
PuBuo Policy, 7. 

3. It is a maxim in our law that a plaintiff must shew that he stands on 
a fair ground when he calls on a Court of justice to administer relief 
to him.— Lord Kenyan, C.J., Booth v. Hodgson (1795), 6 T. R. 409. 

See Administration of Justice, 1, 10 ; Equity, 26, 33 ; Fraud, 34 ; 
Law, 66 ; Parliament, 9 ; Pleadings, 6 ; Process, 2 ; ^'eoseoution ; 
Tort, 2, 9, 27. 


1. It is the office of Judges to advance laws made for rehgion, according 
to their end, though the words be short and imperfect. — Edbart, C.J., 
Colt V. Glover (1614), Ld. Hob. Rep. 157. 

See Bibm;, 2 ; Blasphemy ; Christianity, 3, 7 ; Commerce, 26 ; Law, 
56, 57 ; Matrimony, 3 ; Poor, 3. 

2. He that seemeth to be religious, and bridleth not his tongue, his 
religion is vain." — Quoted by lAsle (Lord President), in Hewet's Case 
(1658), 5 How. St. Tr. 894. 

3. I for one would never be a party, imless the law were dear, to 
saying to any man who put fom'ard his views on those most sacred 
things, that he should be branded as apparently criminal because he 
differed from the majority of mankind in his religious views or con- 
victions on the subject of religion. If that were so, we should get 
into ages and times which, thank God, we do not live in, when people 
were put to death for opinions and beliefs which now almost aU of us 
believe to be true.° — Lord Coleridge, L.C.J., Reg. v. Bradlaugh and 
others (1883), 15 Cox, C. C. 230. 

See Miscellaneous, 4. 

' See again a similar ruling ^er Zord ' AU persecution and oppression of weak 

Mamsjield, Holman «. Johnson (1775), 1 consciences on the score of religious per- 

Cowp. 343 (ante. Public Policy, 7), suasions, are highly unjustifiable upon 

quoted by Grantham, J., Burrows T. every principle of natural reason, civil 

Rhodes (1899), L. E. 1 Q. B. D. [1899], liberty, or sound religion.— Sir Wm. 

p. 823. JBlaekstone (1765), Com.l Bk. IV., Oh. i, 

2 James i., 26. p. 40. 

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Religion — continued. 

4. No laws can be of avail except in so far as they are founded on 
religion.— Porfe, J., Williams v. Paid (1830), 6 Bing. 653. 
See Bible, 1, n. ; Christianity, 6 ; Misoellaheous, 20. 


A man may be reputed an able man this year, and yet be a beggar the 

next : it is a misfortune that happens to many men, and his former 

reputation wUl signify nothing.' — HoU, L.C.J. , Reg. v. Swendsen 

(1702), 14 How. St. Tr. 596. 

See Administration OF Justice, 5 ; Character, 3, 5 ; Criminal Justice, 

2 ; Evidence, 20 ; Miscellaneous, 18, 40, 44, 47, 48 ; Pleadings, 3 ; 

Witness, 2. 


I can only repeat what I said on a former occasion, and what almost 
every other Judge has said, that the right of retainer is a relic of old 
law, not founded on justice, and working the greatest possible 
injustice.— Malms, V.-C, Crowder v. Stewart (1880), 16 L. R. C. D. 


1. No country ever takes notice of the revemie laws of another. — Lord 
Mansfield, Hohnan v. Johnson (1775), 1 Cowp. 343. 

2. One nation does not take notice of the revenue laws of another. — 
Lord Mansfield, Planche and another v. Fletcher (1779), 1 Doug. 253. 
See also per Abbott, C.J., James v. Catherwood (1823), 3 D. & R. 191 ; 
per Bolfe, B., Bristow v. Sequeville (1850), 5 Ex. 279. 


Every reward has its proper bounds. — Yates, J., Miliar v. Taylor (1769), 
4 Burr. Part IV. 2391. 

See Damages, 1 ; Pardon, 4, and references therefrom ; Toet, 15. 


1. Old rights must remain : it would be very unreasonable if it should 

be otherwise. — Yaies, J., Mayor, &c. of Colchester v. Seaber (1765), 

3 Burr. Part IV. 1872. 

See Usage, 2. 

' " Beputation is an idle and most false blaze of a, reputation cannot be blown 

imposition ; oft got without merit, and out, but it often dies in the socket." 

lost without deserving." — Shakspeare, —Dr. S.Johnson, Letter, 1st May, 1780, 

" Othello " (lago), Act II., So. iii. " The to Mrs. Thrale. 

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Aights — continued. 

2. A pretensed right is no right at all. — Powell, J., Reg. v. Mackarty 
(1705), 2 Raym. 1183. 

See ToET, 13. 

3. It shall not be in the power of any man, by his election, to vary the 
rights of two other contending parties. — Lord Mansfield, Drinkwater 
V. Goodwin (1775), Cowp. 251. 

See Consent, 2 ; Judicial Proceedings, 12 ; Litigation, 2 ; Pleadings, 
3 ; Practice, 7, 11, 22, 24 ; Statutes, 13. 

4. By the laws of England, there can be no special right, no particular 
interest or privilege whatever, of perpetual duration, but such as have 
respect to some Jdnd of inheritance. — Yates, J., Millar v. Taylor (1769), 
4 Burr. Part IV. 2385. 

See Diligence, 2 ; Equity, 15, 17, 37 ; Judges, 19, n. ; 37 ; Justice, 
3 ; Law, 19 ; Punishment, ,6 ; Tort, 6 ; Trespass, 2. 


1. A man's scholarship may be perfect, his character admirable, and yet, 
for want of the power to control subordinates and govern boys, he 
may be wholly unfit for a schoolmaster. — Sir B. Malins, V.-C, 
Hayman v. Governors of Rugby School (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. Ca. 85. 

See also Parent and Child, 4. 

2. An original thinker and able teacher very soon attracts a large 
class and vice versa. — Lord Watson, Caird v. Sime (1887), 57 L. J. 
P. C. 9. 

3. Let the soldier be abroad if he will, he can do nothing in this age. 
There is another personage, a personage less imposing in the eyes of 
some, perhaps insignificant. The schoolmaster is abroad, and I trust 
to him, armed with his primer, against the soldier in full military 
array. — Lord Brougham (1828), Speech (Jan. 28). 

See also Army, 1. 

4. A master should be paid liberally, in order to secure a person 
properly ,, qualified. — Sir J. Eomilly, Att.-G«n. v. Warden, &c. of 
Louth School (1852), 14 Beav. 206. 

See also Universities, 2. 


1. Of course, Scotsmen are not foreigners. They are fellow-subjects of 
ours, and they are in the same position as any other feUow-subjects, 
with the important exception that their system of jurisprudence 
differs in very important particulars from ours . . . and to call a 

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Scotland — continued. 

Scotsman an English subject is a perfect absurdity. — Bigby, L.J., 
Mac Iver v. Burns (1895), L. R. 2 C. D. [1895], p. 637. 

2. I do not discuss the Scotch cases. They are not binding on us as 
authorities, though of the greatest service, as containing the opinions 
and arguments of able and accomplished lawyers. — Bramwell, L.J., 
Johnson v. Eaylton (1881), L. R. 7 Q. B. 449.' 

3. I will venture to say, there is no country existing which is at present 
more flourishing ; no people whose general condition is better, or whose 
rights and liberties are more firmly secured. — Lord President, Downie's 
Case (1794), 24 How. St. Tr. 187. 

See also Judicial Peoceedings, 7 ; Matrimony, 7, n. 


1. A married woman having an estate settled for her separate use with- 
out power of anticipation can play fast and loose to a greater extent 
than if she were a feme sole. — lAndley, M.R., Lady Bateman v. Faber 
(1898), 77 L. T. Rep. 578. 

2. There is no merit in a settlement : it depends upon positive law. — 
Wilmot, J., Rex v. Corporation of Carmarthen (1759), 2 Burr. Part IV. 

3. Settlements are supposed in law to be indifferent to paupers ; though 
they are often in fact desirous of one in preference to another.^ — 
Wilmot, J., Rex v. Inhabitants of Burton-Bradstock (1765), Burrow 
(Settlement Cases), 535. 


1. I do really believe you, Mr. Sheriff ; you have done like an honest 
man.— Zeotiwg, C.J., Case of John Price and others (1689), 12 How 
St. Tr. 625. 

2. The sheriffs of London have been immemoriaUy the sheriff of 
Middlesex.— Fates, J., Case of John Wilkes (1763), 19 How. St Tr 

See Usage, 5. 

I Also pe,' Cotton, L.J , id 445 See ' It would be interesting to cite an 

also p^ Bramwell, L.J., 1 L. J Q. B 756. authority in a Settlement Case reported 

Per F^ld J., m Great Western Co. v. in rhyme, one of a very limited numb^of 

^^■i^Y„P°'"™T''^"'^(l?81) 50L. J. such cases. Amongst those cited by 

Q. B. 486 ; per Day, 3 m Morgan « counsel in the case of Rex ,,. Inhabitante 

London General Omnibus Co. (1883), of Norton (1738) (Burrow, S. C. 124), 

L. R. 12 Q. B. D. 205. was that of SUdwell and St. John 

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1. A salvage service which hardly exceeds ordinary towage is naturally 
remunerated on a very diEferent scale from an heroic rescue from 
imminent destruction. — lAndley, L.J., " The City of Chester" (1884), 
L. R. 9 Pr. Div. 202. 

2. The impulsive desire to save human life when in peril is one of the 
most beneficial instincts of humanity, and is nowhere more salutary in 
its results than in bringing help to those who, exposed to destruction 
from the fury of winds and waves, would perish if left without 
assistance. — Cockhum, C.J., Scaramanga v. Stamp (1880), L. R. 5 
Com. PI. D. 304. 

3. I am sorry to see a decreasing tendency to aid vessels that are broken 
down.— Butt, J., " The Benlarig" (1888), L. R. 14 Pro. D. 6. 

4. It is of great importance that the laws by which the contracts of so 
numerous and so useful a body of men as the sailors are supposed to 
be guided, should not be overturned. — Lord Kenyan, C.J., Cutter v. 
Powell (1795), 6 T. R. 320. 

See also Navy, 7. 

Solicitor and Client. 

1. What a solicitor is privileged from disclosing is that which is com- 
municated to him sub sigiUo eonfessionis — that is to say, some fact 
which the client communicates to the solicitor for the purpose of 
obtaining the solicitor's professional advice and assistance. — Sir W. M. 

Wappittg, which dealt with Poor Law The introduction of verses into a report 

settlement, in reference to which the makes the foregoing worthy of repro- 

reporter says : duction. A subsequent case apparently 

" I do not find the case of Shadwell and reversed this decision, for some verses 

St. John Wapping in any printed book or are extant to this efEect : 

manuscript : But I guess it to be the same u ^ ^ff^mB.^ having Settlement, 

case which I have heard reported in the Married a Man with none : 

form of a catch, to the following effect He flies and leaves her destitute, 

(If my memory serves me nght): What then is to be done ? 

A Woman haTOig a Settlement ..Q^otl, E^ ^^^ Chief Justice, 

Married a Man with none: In spite of Sir John Pratt, 

The Question was, he being dead. You'll send her to the parish 

'If that she had, was gmw.' I„ ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^ P^^^_ 

Quoth Sir Jo^»Pratt,»-' Her Settlement ,. gugpengion of a Settlement 

buspend^ did remain Is not to be maintained, 

Lmng the Husband : But him dead, ^hat which she had by birth subsists 

It doth rev^ve agam. p^til another's gained. 
(Chorus of Puisn^ Jvdges.) 

' Living the Husband : But him dead, (Chorus of Puisne Judges.) 

It doth revive again.' " . n i xhat which she had by birth subsists 

Until another's gained.' " 

* Then Lord Chief Justice. 

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Solicitor and Oieniy— continued. 

James, L.J., Ex parte Campbell, In re Cathcart (1870), L, R. 6 Ck. App. 
See Attoekeys, supra. 
2. It is of the highest importance that a man should be able to consult 
his solicitor without fear.— Caw, J., Be Arnott (1899), 60 L. T. 109. 
See Miscellaneous, 33. 


1. Let kings be as David was, men after God's own heart, yet they will 
not want a Shimei to rail on them.^ — Finch, L.C.J., Hampden's Case 
(1637), 3 How. St. Tr. 1232. 

2. The King can do no wrong ; he cannot constitutionally be supposed 
capable of injustice.^ — Sir John Nicholl, Goods of King George IH., 
deceased (1822), 1 St. Tr. (N. S.) 1287. 


3. The King of England is one of those princes who hath an Imperial 

the land does the House of Commons 
possess any powers at all ? " Ipse autem 
rex, ' ' says Bracton, " non debet esse sub 
homine, sed sub deo, et sub lege, quia lex 
facit regem. Attiibuat igitur rex legi, 
quod lex attribuat ei, vide licet domina- 
tionem et potestatem, non est enim rex 
ubi dominabituT voluntas et non lex. 
(^Zib. 1, c. 7, s. 5.) And though he con- 
siders the King to be the vicegerent of the 
Deity, he says still he should be subject 
to the laws. "Et quod sub lege esse 
debeat, cum sit Dei vicarius, evidenter 
apparet ad similitudinem Jesu Christi, 
cujus vices gerit in terris, quia verax 
Dei misericordia, cum ad reparandum 
humanum genus in effabiliter ei multa 
suppeteret hano potissimam elegit viam, 
quasi ad destruendum opus diaboli, non 
virtute nteretur potentise, sed justitias 
ratione ; et sic esse voluit sub lege, ut eos 
qui sub lege erant redimeret noluit enim 
uti viribus, sed ratione et judicio." " God 
himself," Jjord Bolinghroke (" Patriot 
King"), has, almost sublimely, said, " with 
reverence be it spoken, is not an absolute 
but a limited monarch, limited by the 
rule which infinite wisdom prescribes to 
infinite power." See further on the 
subject of this maxim, Blac. Cmn. I., 246 ; 
St. Tr. (N. S.) Vol. I., 1284; Broom's 
"Legal Maxims" (ed. 1884), p. 46. Also 
WoodfalVseA. of " Junius' Letters " (1812), 
Vol. L, 41. 

' See also Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. Gas. 
750 — 779. "The secrets were imparted 
to the solicitor for the client's benefit, and 
should not be used to his detriment." 
See also on this subject, the Gentleman's 
Magazine, Vol. XIV., 255. 

2 See 2 Sam. xvi., 5 et seq. 

' The prerogative is, that which the 
law presumeth, " That the King can do no 
wrong," and so it is in Bracton : " Hex 
potest facm-e qiwd de jure potest facere." 
11 Rep., Magdalen College Case, 246 ; 
Plowden's Comment. The King can do 
no wrong, nor any act to wrong the 
subject. Bracton : " Hoc non potest agm-e 
quod non potest agere juste." See also 
22 Edw. IV. B^x non potest peccare. 2 
RoUe, R. 304. 

Though it be a rule of the Constitution 
that the King can do no vyrong, at the 
same time the possibility that a subject 
may suffer a private injury from him, is 
recognised ; and in such a case does the 
Constitution say, that the subject has no 
remedy but by a petition to the Crovfn, to 
do him right if the King think fit ? No, 
but that on a petition to the Crown, the 
injury shall be referred to an ordinary 
Court of justice. In the British Constitu- 
tion, however, it has hitherto been con- 
sidered that the law ought to be supreme, 
that the law ought to be superior to the 
several powers of the State, because it is 
only by the law that those powers exist at 
all ; by what other title but by the law of 

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Sovereignty — continued. 

Crown ; what is that ? It is not to do what he will ; no, but it is that 
he shall not be punished in his own person if he doth that which in 
itself is unlawful. — Lord Bridgman, C.B., Case of Hugh Peters (1660), 
5 How. St. Tr. 1144. 

4. An hiatus in government is so detested and abhorred, that the law 
says, " the King never dies," that there may never be a " cesser " of 
regal functions for a moment.' — Wilmot, L.C.J., Case of John Wilkes 
(1763), 19 How. St. Tr. 1130. 

5. A people whom Providence hath cast together into one island or 
country are in effect one great body politic, consisting of head and 
members, in imitation of the body natural, as is excellently set forth 
in the statute of appeals, made 24 H. 8, c. 12, which stiles the King 
the supreme head, and the people a body politic (these are the very 
words), compact of all sorts and degrees of men, divided into spiritu- 
ality and temporality. And this body never dies. — Sir Robert Atkyns, 
L.C.B., Trial of Sir Edw. Hales (1686), 11 How. St. Tr. 1204. 

See 6, ielow. 

6. It is true that the King never dies ; the demise is immediately 
followed by the succession ; there is no interval : the Sovereign always 
exists; the person only is changed.^ — Lord Lyndhurst, Viscount 
Canterbniy v. Att.-Gen. (1843), 1 PhiU. 322. 

See 5, above. 

7. All Governments rest mainly on public opinion, and to that of his 
own subjects every wise Sovereign wiU. look. The opinion of his 
subjects wiU force a Sovereign to do his duty, and by that opinion 
win he be exalted or depressed in the politics of the world. — Lord 
Kenyan, Trial of John Vint and others (1799), 27 How. St. Tr. 640. 

8. The Queen is a subject.' — Lard Bridgman, C.B., Scot's Case (1660), 
5 How. St. Tr. 1069. 

9. As a subject sues by attorney, so does the King ; with a little variation 
of form, from decency : instead of saying, " The King sues by ," it is 

. said, "suesfor theKing"; and yet, "Coram domino rege venit dorrmms 
rex per attomatum suum, et inde produeit sectam," was held to be 
good. Hale, Chief Justice, said, it was but an unmannerly way of 

1 " Le Rm egt mort, mve le Roi." — Fr. death; and a political body, powerful, 
Rex nunguam montwr. — See Broom, perfect and perpetual. — ^flj'iAaj^, " Eights 
Leg. Max. (ed. 1884), p. 43 et seq. and of the Crown of England," 29. 
references. ' This refers to the Queen Consort. 

2 The person of the King is by law The Queen Eegnant is, of course, no 
made up of two bodies : a natural body, subject. 

subject to infancy, infirmity, sickness and 


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Sovereignty — eontinu^d. 

declaring for the Kiag.^— Lord Mansfield, Case of John Wilkes (1763), 
19 How. St. Tr. 1102. 
See also, Attoeney-General ; 1, supra. 

10. The Sovereign can only a^by advisers, and through the instru- 
mentality of those who are neither infallible nor impeccable — 
answerable, indeed, for all that the irresponsible Sovereign may 
do, but liable to err through undue influence, and to be swayed by 
improper motives." — Lord Brougham, (1854), Brownlow v. Egerton 
(1854), 23 L. J. Rep. Part 5 (N. S.), Ch. 390 ; 8 St. Tr. (N. S.) 258. 

See Fraud, 22 ; Libeety of the Press, 1 ; Liberty of the Subject, 3 ; 
MiscJELLANEOus, 54 ; Mistakes, 1, 4 ; Motives, 7 ; PoLiTioe, 4 ; 
Truth, 13. 

11. Menial servants attending the King must undoubtedly be privileged. 
—Lard Ellenborough, C.J., Batson v. McLean (1815), 2 Chitt. Rep. 52. 

12. The master is answerable for the negHgence of his servant, because 
it may be considered to have arisen from his own misconduct or 
negligence Ln selecting or retaining a careless servant ; that principle 
cannot apply to the Sovereign, to whom negligence or misconduct 
cannot be imputed, and for which if they occur in fact, the law aSords 
no remedy. — Lord Lyndhurst, Viscount Canterbury v. Att.-Gen. (1843), 
1 PhiU. Rep. 321. 

See Master and Servant, 3 ; Public Policy, 6. 

13. Compassing the death of the King is a legal conclusion from facts. 
So it is, almost, as to every other offence. — Lord Mansfield, Foxcroft v. 
Devonshire (1759), 2 Burr. Part IV. 937. 

14. The law was the golden met-wand, and measure to try the causes of 
the subjects ; and which protected his Majesty in safety and in peace.' 
Prohibition del Roy, Co. 12 Rep. 65. 

See Discretion, 7. 

Specific Performance. 

Specific performance is relief which this Court wiU not give, unless in 
cases where the parties seeking it come promptly, and as soon as the 

' " The King sues by his attorney," or form to another. It is the King, who, by 
"the attorney sues for the King," are his attorney, gives the Court to under- 
only different forms of expressing the stand and be informed of the fact corn- 
same thing. It is equally good either plained of. — Wilmot, L.C.J. (1763), id., 
way, as appears by the cases in 2 Lev. 82, p. 1128. 

and 3 Keb. 127 ; and no legal reason, but See Co. ith Ingt. cap. 11, " The 

good manners and decency, as Lord Hale Councell Board," p. 52. 

calls it, have given the preference of one ^ This is alluding to the law. 

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Specific Performance — continued. 

nature of the case will permit.' — Lord Cramoorth, Eads v. Williams 
(1854), 4 D. M. & G. 691. 


1. Acts of Parliament are the works of the legislature, and the publica- 
tion of them has always belonged to the King, as the Executive Part, 
and as the Head and Sovereign. — Lord Mansfield, MiUar v. Taylor 
(1768), 4 Burr. Part IV. '2404. 

2. Notwithstanding all the care and anxiety of the persona who frame 
Acts of Parliament to guard against every event, it frequently turns 
out that certain cases were not foreseen.— I/ord Kenyan, C.J., Farmer 
V. Legg (1797), 7 T. R. 190. 

See ADMonsTRATioN of Justice, 15 ; Cases, 21 ; Chancery, 10 ; 
Common Law, 4 ; Construction, 32 ; Criminal Justice, 29 ; Law, 
55, 62 ; Parliament, 3, n. 

3. There is nothing so common in the framing of instruments as that 
whilst the framer of them is studious to avoid one inconvenience, he 
incurs another which does not present itself to his view. This is 
often to be seen in Acts of Parliament. — Boohe, J., Lord Nelson v. 
Tucker (1802), 3 Bos. & PuU. 275. 

See Cases, 3 ; Construction, 8, 11, 12, 28, 32 ; Conveyance, 2 ; 
Judicial Decisions, 5 ; Law, 22, 55 ; Parliament, 15. 

4. Inconvenience arising from the operation of an Act of Parliament 
can be no ground of argument in a Court of law. — Lord Alvardey, 
C.J., Grigby v. Oakes (1801), 1 Bos. & PuU. 528. 

See CoNSTEUOTioN, 24, 31 ; Judges, 11, 13, 47 ; Law, 71 ; Parlia- 
ment, 13. 

5. Un Act de Parlement ■poet fair aucun chose, comme de fair une feme 
Mayor ou Justice de Paix, car [eeux sont les creatures des homes, mes 
ne 'poet alter le course del nature : An Act of Parliament [can do 
anything, as it may make a woman Mayor or Justice of the Peace, but 
it cannot alter the course of nature. — Wild, J., Crow v. Ramsey (1670), 
Jones's (Sir Thos.) Rep. 12. 

See also Woman, 2, suprd. 

6. The language of statutes is peculiar, and not always that which a 
rigid grammarian would use ; we must do what we can to construe 
them.— Grme, J., Lyons v. Tucker (1881), L. R. 6 Q. B. D. 664. 

See Cases, 15 ; Construction, 8, 20, 30 ; Judges, 62. 

1 Quoted by Stirling, J., in Levy v. Stogdon (1898), 1 Ch. D. [1898], p. 484. 
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Statutes — eontinued. 

7. There are two ways of construing an Act of Parliament — one to extend 
it to every case reasonably within its operation, and the other to lay 
hold of eveiy expression to limit and curtail the intention of the 
legislature. — Sir John Stuart, V.-C, In re Warner and Powell's 
Arbitration (1866), L. R. 3 Eq. Ca. 266. 

See 13, below; Constedotion, 11, 12, 16, 17, 28, 30; Equity, 10; 
Judges, 36, 67 ; Law, 21, 29, 45, 71 ; Motives, 15 ; Parliament, 
13, 17 ; Usage, 13. 

8. All Acts of Parliament are to be expounded according to the true 
meaning to be collected from the words of 'em.' — North, C.J., Carter 
V. Crawley (1681), Sir Thos. Eaym. Rep. 500. 

See 15, below; Construction, 6. 

9. It is safest to keep to the Statute. — Lord Mansfield, Rex v. 
Inhabitants of Hatfield (1758), 1 Burr. Part IV. 497. 

See Judges, 28 ; Law, 22. 

10. We ought not to decide hastily against the words of an Act of 
Parliament. — Lord Kenyon, C.J., King«. Justices of Flintshire (1797), 
7 T. R. 200. 

See 13, below ; Administration of Justice, 2 ; Judges, 12, 16 ; 
Pleadings, 3. 

11. The sense and meaning of an Act must be collected from what it 
says when passed into a law, and not from the history of changes it 
underwent in the House where it took its rise. That history is not 
known to the other House, or to the Sovereign. — Willes, J., Millar v. 
Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2332, cit. Caird v. Sime, L. R. 12 App. 
Cas. 356. 

See Common Law, 1 ; Judges, 46. 

12. No stops are ever inserted in Acts of Parliament, or in deeds ; but 
the Courts of law, in construing them, must read them with such 
stops as wiU give effect to the whole. — Lord Kenyon, C.J., Doe d. 
WiUis and others v. Martin and others (1790), 4 T. R. 65. 

See Will, 16. 

13. I do exceedingly commend the Judges that are curious and abnost 
subtil, Astiiti (which is the word used in the Proverbs of Solomon in 
a good sense, when it is to a good end) to invent reasons and means 
to make Acts, according to the just intent of the parties, and to avoid 
wrong and injury which by rigid rules might be wrought out of the 

' We must give effect to the plain the Act. — Abbott, C.J., Baildon v. Fitter 
language of the legislature, according to (1819), 1 Chit. Rep. 639. 
the fair interpretation of the words of 

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Statutes — continued. 

Act. — Hobart, C.J., Earl of Clanrickard's Case (1614), Lord Hobart's 
Rep. 277. 
See 7, above ; 27, helow ; Consteuotion, 10 ; Judges, 31, 42, 44, 46, 
47, 62, 67 ; Law, 49, 50, 54 ; Rights, 3 ; Tort, 17. 

14. With regard to the construction of statutes according to the 
intention of the legislature, we must remember that there is an 
essential difference between the expounding of modem and ancient 
Acts of Parliament. In early times the legislature used (and I 
believe it was a wise course to take) to pass laws in general and 
in few terms ; they were left to the Courts of law to be construed so 
as to reach all the cases within the mischief to be remedied. But in 
modern times great care has been taken to mention the particular 
cases in the contemplation of the legislature, and therefore the Courts 
are not permitted to take the same liberty in construing them as they 
did in expounding the ancient statutes. — Lord Kenyan, C.J., Bradley 
and another v. Clark (1793), 5 T. R. 201. 

See Common Law, 1 ; Consteuotion, 29, 32 ; Judges, 63 ; Judicial 
Decisions, 2. 

15. We must decide according to the intention of the legislature, which 
is to be collected from the general object of the Act and from the 
particTilar words used in it. — Grose, J., Farmer v. Legg (1797), 
7 T. R. 192. 

See 8, 10, above ; Consteugtion, 3 ; Foeeiqn Law, 5 ; Judges, 
9, 28, 63; Paeliament, 17; Will, 8. 

16. These laws must be construed according to the intention of 
them : and the circumstances of things at the time of enacting 
them ought to be taken into consideration.' — WUmot, J., Rex v. 
Inhabitants of Burton-Bradstock (1765), Burrow (Settlement Cases), 

17. If it were a doubtful point how the statute should be construed, I 
must consider myself as bound by the construction it has already 
received in two Courts in Westminster Hall. — Booke, J., Cox v. Morgan 
(1801), 1 Bos. &Pull.4n. 

See below, 18, 19 ; Consteuction, 30 ; Judges, 35. 

18. In the absence of all authority, I can only look to the language 

1 Onr limited function is not to say ever we might wish to provide for 

what the legislature meant, but to ascer- every hardship that may occur, we are 

tain what the legislature has said that it bound to put that construction on tlie 

meant —Mathem, J., Rothschild & Sons v. Act that the legislature intended.— Grose, 

Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1894), J., Farmer v. Legg (1797), 7 T. B. 193. 
L. B. 2 Q. B. D. [1894], p. 145. How- 

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Statutes — continued. 

of tke statute.' — Ghamhre/J., Barnes v. Headley (1807), 1 Camp. 

See above, 17. 

19. People cannot escape from the obligation of a statute by putting a 
private interpretation upon its language. — Lord Maenaghten, Nether- 
seal CoUiery Co. v. Bourne (1889), L. R. 16 Ap. Ca. 247. 

See above, 17, 18 ; Construction, 25 ; Judges, 42 ; Jueisdiotion, 13 ; 
Papliament, 17. 

20. There is a great difFerence between the Purview of an Act of 
Parliament, and a Proviso in an Act of Parliament. — Lord Mansfield, 
Rex V. Jarvis (1756), 1 Burr. Part IV. 153. 

21. A statute cannot alter by reason of time, but the common law may. 
—Ask, J., Anon. (1649), Style's Rep. 190. 

See Common Law, 5, 6. ,.' 

22. A Court cannot give itsdf jurifediction by misconstruing a document 
or statute. — Pollock, B., Queen v. County Court of Lincolnshire and 
Dixon (1887), L. J. (N. S.) 57 Q. B. D. 137. 

See Consent; 2; Jurisdiction, 7,^, 12. 

23. The statute is like a tyrant ; Where he comes he makes all void ; 
but the common law is like a nursing father, makes x>nly void that 
paH where the fault is, and preserves the rest. — Lord SobaH, C.J., 
quoted by Tviisden, C.J., in Maleverer v. Redshaw (1670), 1 Mod. 
Rep. 36 ; and by Wilmot, L.C.J., in Collins v. Blantem (1767), 2 
WHs. 351. 

24. The statute law is the will of the legislature in writing ; the 
common law is nothing else but statutes worn out by time ; aU our 
law began by consent of the legislature, and whether it is now law 
by usage or writing, it is the same thing. — Wilmot, L.C.J., Collins v. 
Blantern (1767), 2 WUs. 341. 

See Common Law, 1, 6 ; Judges, 65. 

25. Bind not the new statutes so to the common law, that their words 
increased for the King's advantage, should be deprived of their force. 
—Hobart, C.J., Sheffeild v. Ratcliffe (1614), Ld. Hob. Rep. 341. 

1 It is the duty of Judges, not to supply namelj', to give an Act of Parliament the 

the defects of the legislature by providing plain, fair, literal meaning of its words, 

a remedy, but simply to construe the pro- where we do not see from its scope that 

visions of the statute it has enacted. — such meaning would be inconsistent or 

Patteson, J., Gray ■!). The Queen (1844), would lead to manifest injustice.— Jerks, 

6 St. Tr. (N. S.) 150. C.J., Mattison v. Hart and another (1854), 

We ought to apply to this case what is 23 L. J. C. P. 1 14. 
called the golden rule of construction. 

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Statutes — continued. 

26. A very ingeniouB attempt to drive a coaeh-and-four^ through, this 
Act of Parliament.'' — Lindley, L.J., Queen v. Eegistrar of Joint Stock 
Companies (1891), 61 L. J. Rep. Q. B. 6. 

27. The Court is not bound to a strictness at once harsh and pedantic in 
the application of statutes. The law permits the qualification implied 
in the ancient maxim, de minimis non curat lex. Where there are 
irregularities of very slight consequence, it does not intend that the 
infliction of penalties should be inflexibly severe. If the deviation 
were a mere trifle, which, if continued in practice, would weigh little 
or nothing on the public interest, it might properly be overlooked. — 
Sir W. Scott, " The Reward " (1820), 2 Dods. Adm. R. 269, 270. 

See 13, above ; Ireegdlaeity. 


1. Working days in England are not the same as working days in 
foreign ports, because working days in England, by the custom and 
habits of the English, if not by their law, do not include Sundays. — 
Lord Esher, M.R., Nielsen v. Wait (1885), L. R. 16 Q. B. 71. 

2. Anciently, the Courts of justice did sit on Sundays. — Lord Mansfield, 
Swann v. Broome (1764), 3 Buir. Part IV., p. 1597.8 

3. It would hardly be decent to adjourn the Coui-t to Sunday. — 
Gockbum, C.J., Reg. v. Charlotte Winsor (1866), 10 Cox, C. C. 298. 

4. It is laid down in distinct terms by high authority, that of Lord Coke * 
and Comyns,' that Sunday is not a juridical day. — Gockbum, C.J., 
Winsor v. The Queen (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 308. 

5. I do not think there can be the smallest doubt that to sit judicially 
on Sunday on any business would be indecent and improper, and 
ou^t never to be done if it can be helped. — Blackburn, J., Winsor v. 
The Queen (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 317. 

Text Books. 

1. It is to my mind much to be regretted, and it is a regret which I 
believe every Judge on the bench shares, that text-books are more and 
more quoted in Court — I mean, of course, text-books by living 

1 This remark has been most generally 2 Wh. & T. Eq. Cas. 475, 513. 

made of the 4th section of the Statute of a Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. 

Frauds (29 Car. II. c. 3) in regard to c. 89). 

contracts concerning land having to be in » For a full exposition of this subject, 

writing. Equity, deeming great injustice see id. et seq. 

might occur by this rule being inflexibly * See Co. Litt. 135 {a). 

adhered to, in certain cases allows these ' See Com-. Dig. Temps, (B. 3 and 

contracts to be enforced if unwritten. — (C. 5). 
See Seton v. Slade ; Woollam v. Hearn, 

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Text Books — continued. 

authors — and some Judges have gone so far as to say that they shall 
not be quoted.^— Zefeetoicfe, J., Union Bank v. Munster (1887), L. R. 
37 C. D. 54. 

2. Brother,^ Viner is not an authority. Cite the cases that Viner quotes : 
that you may do.— Foster, J., Far v. Denn (1757), 1 Burr. Part IV. 364. 

See Law Reports, 1, n. 

3. I must treat with reverence everything which Lord Kenyon has said : 
but not everything which text writers have represented him to have 
said, which he did not Bay.— Lefroy, C.J., Persse v. Kinneen (1859), 
(It. Rep.) L. T. Vol. 1 (N. S.), 78. 

4. Stereotyped rules laid down by judicial writers cannot be accepted as 
iniaUible canons of interpretation in these days, when commercial 
transactions have altered in character, and increased in complexity ; 
and there can be no hard-and-fast rule by which to construe the multi- 
form commercial agreements with which in modern times we have to 
deal. — Bowen, L.J., Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais (1884), L. R. 12 Q. B. D. 
601 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 159. 

See Commerce, 13, 16, 20, 28, 29, 32 ; Conbtecotion, 19, 28 ; Parlia- 
ment, 13. 

1. It would certainly be a very great mistake to suppose that this Court 
does not attend to lapse of time.' — Lord Langdale, M.R., Att.-Gen. v. 
Pilgrim (1849), 12 Beav. 61. 

2. The time makes no difference in the reason of the thing. — Wilmot, J., 
Rex V. Inhabitants of Christchurch (1759), 2 Burr. Part IV. 949. 

See Chancery, 8. 

1 It is not very often that our leading Performance " (1881), 2nd ed. v.) re- 
text-books are judicially declared to be marks that "there is one notion often 
inaccurate, partly, it may be, because expressed with regard to works written 
text-book writers generally travel along or revised by authors on the Bench, 
roads wliich have been, so to speak, con- which seems to me in part at least 
solidated by the ample weight of statu- erroneous, the notion, I mean, that they 
tory and judicial authority, and partly possess a quasi-judicial authority. It 
because they forbear, as a rule, to ramble is hardly enough remembered how 
along the by-paths of speculation. Says different are the circumstances under 
Auttin (" Jurisprudence," Vol. I., p. 37) : which a book is written and a judgment 
" Respect for a law-writer whose works pronounced, or how much the weight and 
have gotten reputation, may determine value of the latter are due to the dis- 
the legislator or Judge to adopt his cussions at the Bar which precede the 
opinions, or to turn the speculative judgment." 

conclusions of a private man into actually a The term " brother " is explained 

binding rules. . . . Now till the legislator under Judges, 53. n. 

or Judge impress them with the character 3 « This I take notice of, only to shew 

of law ... the conclusions are the an uncertainty as to time." — Parker, 

speculative conclusions of a private or L.C.J., Purchase's Case (1710), 15 How.' 

unauthorised writer." Fry (" Specific St. Tr. 686. 

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Time — continued. 

3. Exatniaing by hours is not so unprecedented. It was the old custom 
among the Romans to examine by the hour-glass.^ — Marlay, L.C.J. , 
Trial of Maiy Heath (1744), 18 How. St. Tr. 23. 
See Jury, 30. 


1. I do not wish to shake titles, and I shaU do precisely what our 
predecessors have always done — leave the case where it is. It is a 

1 When Bishop Burnet preached, " he 
was often interrupted by the deep hum of 
his audience ; and when, after preaching 
out the hour-glass, which in those days 
was part of the furniture of the pulpit, he 
held it up in his hand, the congregation 
clamorously encouraged him to go on till 
the sand had run ofi once more." — Macau- 
lay's "Hist, of England," II., 177. 

Time, like a preacher in the days of the 
Puritans, turned the hour-glass on his 
high pulpit, the church belfry. — Lung- 
fellow, " Hyperion," IV., 5. 

Whether any limitation was imposed 
on the length of the oral pleadings in 
early times is uncertain ; but in the age 
of Cicero this seems to have been left to 
the discretion of the Judge, especially in 
private causes. In criminal trials Pompey 
made a, regulation, that the accuser 
should not be entitled to speak for more 
than two hours, nor the accused for more 
than three hours ; bat the parties were 
sometimes allowed to exceed these limits 
when the nature of the cause appeared to 
require more time. Not long afterwards 
the Judges were again invested with dis- 
cretionary power to regulate the period 
to be occupied by the speeches, according 
to the importance of the affair. In 
criminal causes the time was usually 
divided in the proportion fixed by the 
Pompeian regulation, so that if six hours 
were allowed to the accuser, nine hours 
were allowed to the accused. A clep- 
sydra was used in the tribunals for 
measuring time by water, similar in prin- 
ciple to the modern sand-glass. When 
the Judge consented to prolong the period 
assigued for discussion, he was said to 
give water dare aquam. " As for my- 
self," says Pliny, " whenever I sit upon 
the Bench (which is much oftener than I 
appear at the Bar), I always give the 
advocates as much water as they require ; 

for I look upon it as the height of pre- 
sumption to pretend to guess before a 
cause is heard what time it will require, 
as to set limits to an affair before one is 
acquainted with its extent, especially as 
the first and most sacred duty of a Judge 
is patience, which, indeed, is itself a very 
considerable part of justice. (On this 
see ante, Judges, 16, n.) But the advo- 
cate will say many things that are use- 
less. Granted. Yet is it not better to 
hear too much than not to hear enough ! 
Besides, how can you know that the 
things are useless till you have heard 
them ? " Marcus Aurelius we are told, 
was in the habit of giving a large 
measure of water to the advocates, and 
even permitting them to speak as long as 
they pleased. By a constitution of 
Valentinian and Valens, A.D. 368, advo- 
cates were authorised to speak as long as 
they wished, upon condition that they 
should not abuse this liberty in order to 
swell the amount of their fees. Some- 
times the pleadings were very long : for, 
if we are to believe Quintilian, it was a 
species of glory for an advocate that he 
had spoken a whole day for one party. 
Eegulus fatigued the Judges with inter- 
minable harangues. In the trial of 
Marcus Prisons before the Senate, Pliny, 
who opened the case, spoke nearly five 
hours. On another occasion, he tells us, 
he spoke for seven hours, before the cen- 
tumvirs and a crowded audience, with 
success equal to his great fatigue. 
According to ancient custom, one counsel 
only appears to have been allowed ou 
each side. Afterwards the number was 
increased. — Studies in Roman Law, with 
Comparative Views of the Laws of France, 
England and Ireland. By Lord Mac- 
kenzie, one of the Judges of the Court of 
Session in Scotland: London, ISRl, 

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Title — continued. 

rock ahead that everybody knows. — lAndley, L.J., In re Laskmar 
(1890), L. J. Rep. (N. S.) 60 Ch. 146. 

2. God forbid, that a man should lose his estate by losing his title 
deeds.— %re, C.J., Bolton v. Bishop of Carlisle (1793), 2 H. B. 263. 

3. There is not more difference betwixt a grant and feoffment, than 
betwixt one egg and another. — Bridgman, O.J., Jemot v. Cooley 
(1666), Sir Thos. Raymond's Rep. 159. 

4. No man ought to be so absurd as to make a purchase without 
looking at the title deeds; if he is, he must take the consequence 
of his own neghgence. — Ashhurst, J., Goodtitle v. Morgan (1787), 
1 T. R. 762. 

See Commerce, 12 ; Fraud, 10, 19 ; Miscellaneous, 10, 33, 40 ; 
Protection, 2 ; Relief, 1 ; Tort, 16. 

5. Immemorial enjoyment is the most solid of all titles. — Tindal,'C.J., 
In the Matter of the Serjeants-at-Law (1840), 6 Bing. New Cases, 


1. The general principle is, that in order that an action may be main- 
tained in this country in respect of a tort committed outside the 
JTirisdiction, the act complained of must be a wrongful act, both by 
the law of this country and by the law of the country where it was 
committed ; but it is not necessary that it should be the subject of 
civil proceedings in the foreign country. — Lopes, L.J., Machado v. 
Fontes (1897), 66 L. J. Q. B. D. 543. 

See Contract, 3 ; Foreign Law, 4 ; Law, 24, 66 ; Peaotioe, 12. 

2. To entitle a plaintiff to maintain an action, it is necessary to shew a 
breach of some legal duty due from the defendant to the plaintiff. — 
Erie, C.J., Cox v. Burbidge (1863), 13 C. B. (N. S.) 436. 

See also 9, helow ; Criminal Justice, 7 ; Discovert, 2 ; Equity, 26, 37 ; 
Law, 54, 66 ; Motives, 12 ; Parliament, 9 ; Pleadings, 6 ; Relief, 3. 

3. That great principle of the common law which declares that it is your 
duty so to use and exercise your own rights as not to cause injury to 
other people. — Williams, J., Gray v. North-Eastern Rail. Co. (1883), 
48 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 905. 

See also helow, 18 ; Mischief, 2 ; Miscellaneous, 11 ; Truth, 8. 

4. The well-known maxim that you must not, when you have the choice, 
elect to use your property so as to cause injury to your neighbour.' — 

1 The maxim is Sic liters two iitalienum non Imcias. — 9 Rep. 59, See Br. Leg. Max. 
Gth ed., 347. 

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Tort — continued. 

Brett, M.R., WhaUey v. Lancashire, &c. Rail. Co. (1884), 13 L. R. Q. B.D. 
See also 14, 18, helow ; Doctrine, 3 ; Equity, 38 ; Peopkrtt, 13. 

5. Sxirely every injury imports a damage, though it does not cost the 
party one farthing, and it is impossible to prove the contrary ; for a 
damage is not merely pecuniary, but an injury imports a damage, 
when a man is hereby hindered of his right. — B.oU, C.J., Ashby v. 
White (1703), 2 Raym. 955. 

See MisGELLAUEODS, 41 ; Trespass, 2 ; Truth, 8. 

6. La ley est un egal dispenser de Justice, et ne relinque aueun sans 
remedy sur son droit, sans son propre laches : The law is an equal 
dispenser of Justice, and leaves none without a remedy, for his right, 
without his own laches. — Vavjghan, J., Tustian v. Roper (1670), Jones's 
(Sir Thos.) Rep. 32. 

See 20, helow ; Judges, 27 ; Justice, 3 ; Law, 19, 32 ; Liberty of the 
Subject', 5 ; Politics, 3 ; Poou, 3 ; Protection, 2 ; Punishment, 6 ; 
Rights, 4 ; Trespass, 1. 

7. Personal injury is a more serious matter than damage to property. — 
Coekhwm, C.J., Reg. v. Heppinstale (1859), 7 W. R. 178. 

See Trespass, 2. 

8. An injured party may proceed in Westminster Hall notwithstanding 
any order of the House.' — Willes, C.J., Wynne v. Middleton (1745), 
1 Wils. 128. 

See Administration of Justice, 21 ; Judges, 19, 20, 37, 38 ; Justice, 4 ; 
Law, 66 ; Parliament, 9 ; Politics, 4 ; Property, 7. 

9. If a man sustains damage by the wrongful act of another, he is 
entitled to a remedy, but to give that title two things must concur, 
damage to himseH and a wrong committed by the other. That he has 
sustained damage is not of itself suflScient. — Bayley, J., R. v. Com- 
missioners of Pagham (1828), 8 B. & C. 362. 

See 2, above ; Prosecution ; Relief, 3. 

10. Actual perceptible damage is not indispensable as the foundation of 
an action ; it is sufficient to show the violation of a right, in which 
case the law wiU presume damage.' — Lord Holt, Ashby v. White 
(1703), 3 Ld. Raym. 938. 

1 See per Coekburn, C. J., in Onslow and an action will not lie even in the case of 

Whalley's Case, L. R. 9 Q. B. 225, and a wrong or a violation of a right, unless it 

per Denman, C.J. ,iii8tockdalevSa.nBa,Td, is followed by some perceptible damage 

9 A. & E. 142. which can be established as a matter of 

3 1 am not able to understand how it fact ; in other words, that injuria sine 

can be correctly said in a legal sense, that damno is not actionable. On the contrary. 

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Tort — continued. 

11. I am by no means sure that if a man kept a tiger, and lightning 
broke his chain, and he got loose and did mischief, that the man who 
kept him would not be liahW—Bramwell, B., Nichols v. Marsland 
(1875), L. R. 10 Ex. 260. 

See also Miscellaneocs, 12, n. 

12. To say that whenever the world grows wiser it convicts those that 
came before of negligence.^ — Bramwell, B., Carstairs v. Taylor (1871), 
L. R. 6 Ex. 222. 

See also Miscehaneous, 3, 6, 24. 

13. The public can have no rights springing from injustice to others.* — 
Lord Bmnilly, M.R., Walker v. Ware, Hadham, &c. RaU. Co. (1866), 
12 Jur. (N. S.) 18. 

See Equity, 37 ; Rights, 2. 

14. It is our duty to take care that persons in pursuing their own 
particular interests do not transgress those laws which were made for 
the benefit of the whole community. — Lord Kenyan, C.J., King v. 
Waddington (1800), 1 East, 158. 

See 4, above ; 15, below. 

15. Every man that is injured ought to have his recompence.* — 
HoU, C.J., Ashby v. White (1703), 2 Lord Raym. 955. 

See 4, above; 18, belcyw; Damages, 1 ; Pardon, 4; Reward. 

16. If a man who makes to another person, upon a solemn occasion, an 
assertion, upon which that person acts, he lies under an obhgation to 
make good his assertion. — Sir J. Boi/iiilly, M.R., Be Ward, (1862), 31 
Beav. 7. 

See Commerce, 12 ; Contract, 2 ; Equity, 24, 28 ; Fraud, 2, 14 ; Law, 
41 ; Miscellaneous, 9, 10, 33 ; Property, 12 ; Protection, 2 ; 
Relief, 1 ; Title, 4 ; Truth, 8 ; Words, 8. 

from my earliest reading I have considered not, when standing alone, evidence of 

it laid np among the very elements of the previous negligence. 

common law, that wherever there is a ^ Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. — 

wrong there is a remedy to redress it ; and Cowp. 343. 

that every injury imports damage in the * This again brings in the maxim TTbi 

nature of it ; and if no other damage is jus ibi revtedlmn. But this dictum 

established, the party injured is entitled (supra') is crowded with exception. For 

to a verdict for nominal damages. — Mr. instance, if a person is wrongfully accused 

Justice Story, Webb r. Portland Manu- of a crime and put to worry aud 

facturing Co., 3 Sumn. Rep. 189. expense and perhaps imprisoned, he is 

1 This is a dictum in relation to the entitled to no recompense : again, if a 
maxim Actus Dei nemini facU injuriam, person is injured by a person not 
See ante Miscbllahbous, 12, n. Also responsible, e.g., an ambassador, or the 
Br. Leg. Max., 6th ed. 224. Crown. Perhaps this is why Holt, C.J., 

2 This remark is made to show that uses the word " ought " and not "can" — 
increased precautions after accidents are and that it is used advisedly. 

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Tort — continued. 

17. None shall take advantage of his own wrong.' — Lord Coke, 
Dumpor's Case (1603), 4 Co. 119. 

See Equity, 6, 8, 28 ; Statotes, 13. 

18. He whose dirt it is must keep it that it may not trespass.'' — 
Eott, C.J., Tenants. Goldwin (1704), 1 Salk. 361. 

See 3, 4, 14, 15, above. 

19. I know of no duty of the Court which it is more important to 
observe, and no powers of the Court which it is more important to 
enforce, than its power of keeping public bodies within their rights. 
The moment pubhc bodies exceed their rights they do so to the injury 
and oppression of private individuals, and those persons are entitled 
to be protected from injury arising from such operations of public 
bodies. — lAndley, M.R., Roberts v. Gwyrfai District Council (1899), 
L. R. 2 C. D. 614. 

See 23, below ; Administration of Justice, 35 ; Corpoeationb, 1 ; 
Public Policy, 9 ; Trespass, 2. 

20. It is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy ; for want of 
right and want of remedy are reciprocal. — MoU, C.J., Ashby v. White 
(1703), 2 Raym. 953. 

See 6, above. 

21. Where a man has but one remedy to come at his right, if he loses 
that he loses his right.— Hott, C.J., Ashby v. White (1703), 2 Raym. 

22. It is not very consonant with the simplicity of the old law to give 
two remedies for the same evil. — E'tp-e^ C.J., Jefferson v. Bishop of 
Durham (1797), 2 Bos. & PuU. 122. 

23. Better that an individual should suffer an injury than that the 
public should suffer an inconvenience. — Ashhurst, J., Russell v. The 
Mayor of Devon (1788), 1 T. R. 673. 

See 19, above ; Administration of Justice, 35 ; Judges, 13 ; Public 
PoucY, 9. 

24. The advantage to the community outweigh the injury to the 
iadividual.* — Grove, J., Henwood v. Harrison (1872), L. R. 7 Com. PI. 
Ca. 613. 

25. What a man does in his closet ought not to affect the rights of 

1 Ex dolo malo non oritur actio (tupra, ^ Quoted by Charles, J., in Ponting r. 

13, n.). " Nva prendra advantage de son Noakes, L. E. 2 Q. B. D. 1894, p. 285. 

tort demesne." — 2 Imt. 713. Commod/wm s An illustration of this occurs in the 

ex ityurid sua nemo habere debet : No compulsory service of jurymen : that 

person ought to have advantage from his however great the private pecuniary loss, 

own wrong. — JenJi. Cent. 161. they must serve for the public weal. 

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Tort — corttirmed. 

third persons. — Lord Kenyan, C.J., Outram v. Morewood (1793), 
5 T. R. 123. 

See EvroENOE, 29 ; Mistakes, 1. 

26. No tort is assignable, in law or equity. It is not within any species 
of action at common law. — Yates, J., Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 
Part. IV. 2386. 

See Transfer of -Right of Action. 

27. The Court woidd not endure that a mere form or fiction of law, 
introduced for the sake of justice, should work a wrong, contrary to 
the real truth and substance of the thing. — Lord Mansfield, Johnson 
V. Hargreaves (1760), 2 Burr. Part IV. 962. 

See Relief, 3. 

Trade Union. 

Trade unions up to a certain point have been recognised now as organs 
for good. They are the only means by which workmen can protect 
themselves from the tyranny of those who employ them. But the 
moment that trade unions become tyrants in their turn, they are 
engines for evil : they have no right to prevent people from working 
on any terms that they choose. — Lindley, J., Lyons & Sons v. 
Wilkins (1896), 74 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 364. See also Mogul Steam- 
ship Co. V. MacGregor, Gow, & Co., 66 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 1 ; 
Temperton v. RusseU and others, 69 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 78. 

Transfer of Bight of Action. 

It was the pohcy of the common law to forbid the transfer of rights of 
action. If this were not forbidden men would often pay the debts of 
others and bring actions upon them to the great increase of litigation. 
—Heath, J., Scholey v. Daniel (1801), 1 Bos. & Pull. 541. 
See ToET, 26 ; Litigation, 2. 


1. The house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well 
for his defence against iQJury and violence, as for his repose.' — Lord 
Coke, Semayne's Case (1605), 3 Rep. 186. 

See Peopeety, 13 ; Pbotection, 2. 

2. By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it 
ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my 

1 For a man's house isl his castle, M domvs sua cuiaue tvtissimum refugiimi. Co 

3rd pt. ins. 162. 

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Trespass — eontimted. 

ground vrithout my licence, but he is liable to an action, though the 
damage be nothing.' — Camden, L.O.J., Entiek v. Carrington (1765),. 
19 How. St. Tr. 1066. 
See Judges, 27 ; Justice, 3 ; Law, 32 ; Pdblio Servant, 3 ; Punish- 
ment, 6 ; Rights, 4 ; Toht, 5, 7, 19. 
3. Though it is not always of necessity, nor perhaps here, to go upon 
the original foundation of a right of law, yet I will beg leave to 
observe, when we apply the maxim, that every man's house is his 
castle, we mean not to persuade the inhabiter of a poor hut, that it is 
provided with draw-bridges or portcullises, but only that it is under 
such sufficient protection as may provide for his security in a more 
pleasant, or perhaps, a better way — that it is fortified by the law.^ — 
Lord MansfieU, Lee v. Gunsell (1774), Lofft. 378. 

Trial for Life. 
1. Yea, such is the law of England, the tenderest law in the world of a 
man's life. I say again, that no such trial for life is to be found in 
the world, as in England. In any place but in England, a man's life 
may be taken away upon two or three vntnesses ; but in England two 
or three witnesses do not do it : For there are two juries besides, and 
you have four-and-twenty men returned; you have one-and-twenty 
men upon their oaths and consciences that have found you gmlty : 
And yet when you have done that, it is not enough by the law of 
England, but you are also to have twelve rational understanding men 
of your neighbours to hear all over again, and to pass upon your life. 
This is not used in any law in the world but in England, which hath 

1 This springs from the famous maxim, privilege, and the maxim which supports 

IHii jus ibi remedium. — Ashhy v. it, will admit of no extension. It must 

White, 1 Sm. L. C. 1. See Broom's be confined to breaking the outer door, or 

" Legal Maxims." It is because every window, for the protection of the family, 

man's house is his castle that a trespasser and security from without ; and it belongs 

may be personally ejected, and moderate to those whose domicile it is ; for it is not 

violence even be used if necessary ; also the sanctuary of a stranger. And when 

that a sheriff in civil process cannot break a man escapes from the arrest, he is not 

doors, &c. See also Hodder v. Williams, privileged by his house." — Foster, tit. 

L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 1895, p. 663 ; Foster's Horn. c. 8, § 20. 

"Discourse of Homicide," 319, 320; Sm. Whenever a. person has any authority 

L. C, 8th ed. 126. by law to do any particular act, and he 

" The rule that every man's house is his abuses that authority, he makes himself a 

• castle, when applied to arrests on legal trespasser ab initio. — The Six Carpenters' 

process, has been carried as far as political Case, 8 Kep. 146 ; Reed v. Sarrison, 2 Bl. 

justice will warrant ; and perhaps farther Rep. 1218. See also 11 Geo. II. c. 19 ; 

than the scale of reason and sound policy Taylor v. Cole, 3 T. R. 292. See also 

this will warrant. In the case of life, as Public Sbevant, 3, ante, p. 214. 
we have before hinted generally, — ^but in * Similem liabemus Demostlienis prcss- 

the case of life more particularly, — this tantissimum ^ notissimum loewn. 

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Trial for Life— continued. 

the most righteous and most merciful law in the world.' — Lord Keble, 
C.J., Lilburne's Case (1649), 4 How. St. Tr. 1311. 
See Administeation of Justice, 32 ; Criminal Jostioe, 31, 49 ; 
Evidence, 10, 29, 30 ; Judges, 76 ; Jury, 16, 22, 26 ; Law, 18, 
47, 48. 
2. Seroggs, L.CJ. — ^My rule is this, in doubtful cases, when men are 
upon their lives, I had rather hear what is impertinent, than not let 
them make a full defence. 

North, L.C.J. — I had rather hear things at a venture, than forbid 
things at a venture. 

—Whitehead's Case (1679), 7 How. St. Tr. 388. 
See above, 1. 


1. Truth is the same in aU persuasions. — J'efferies, C.J., Titus Gates' 
Case (1685), 10 How. St. Tr. 1262. 

2. Truth and falsehood, it has been well said, are not always opposed to 
each other like black and white, but oftentimes, and by design, are 
made to resemble each other so as to be hardly distinguishable ; just 
as the counterfeit thing is counterfeit because it resembles the 
genuine thing. — Cleasby, B., Johnson v. Emerson (1871), L. R. 6 Ex. 
Ca. 357. 

See below, 3 ; Commerce, 4. 

3. There are various kinds of untruth. There is an absolute untruth, 
an untruth in itself, that no addition or qualification can make true : 
as, if a man says a thing he saw was black, when it was white, as he 
remembers and knows. So, as to knoioing the truth. A man may 
know it, and yet it may not be present in his mind at the moment of 
speaking ; or, if the fact is present to his mind, it may not occur 
to him to be of any use to mention it. For example, suppose a man 
was asked whether a writing was necessary in a contract for the 
making and purchase of goods, he might well say "Yes," vdthout 
adding that payment on receipt of the goods, or part, would suffice. 

1 Jefferies, L.C.J. : Come Mr. Attorney, Att.-Gen: All this, my lord, is only in 

if in cases of common actions for words delay. 

there be such strictness required, ten times Jefferies, L.C.J. ; Mr. Attorney, "rfe 

more ought there to be in an indictment vita hominis nulla est cunctatio longa." I 

of treason, where a man's life, aod all, is think we ought to assign him counsel, and 

so much concerned. I am not satisfied, I the rest of my brothers are of that opinion 

assure you, that this indictment is weU too. — Bosewell's Case (1684), 10 How. 

laid, though I give no opinion ; but in all St. Tr. 264. See also for meaning of 

justice we ought to assign him counsel to " brothers," anti. Judges, 53, n. 
make out his objection. 

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Truth — continued. 

He might well think that the question he was asked was whether a 
contract for goods to be made required a writing like a contract for 
goods in existence. If he was writing on the subject, he woidd, of 
course, state the exception or quaUfication. — Lord Bramwell, Derry v. 
Peek (1889), L. R. 14 Ap. Gas. 348. 
See above, 2 ; Cojntract, 6. 

4. The interests of truth and justice must be allowed to prevail.' — 
Erie, C.J., Bartlett v. Lewis (1862), 12 C. B. (N. S.) 249. 

5. Truth is the thing that we are enquiring after ; and this is the thing 
we would have prevail, and I hope shall in all cases. — PoUexfen, 
L.C.J., Sir Richard Grahme's Case (1691), 12 How. St. Tr. 799. 

6. Ingenuity is one thing, and simple testimony another, and plain 
truth, I take it, needs no flowers of speech." — Lord Mansfield, Wilkes 
V. Wood (1763), 19 How. St. Tr. 1176. 

See Fraud, 27 ; Miscsellaiieous, 19. 

7. We live in an age, when truth passes for nothing in the world, and 
swearing and foreswearing is taken for a thing of course. Had his 
zeal ieen half so much for truth as it was for falsehood, it had heen a 
commendable zeal.' — Jefferies, L.C.J., Case of Braddon and another 
(1684), 9 How. St. Tr. 1198. 

See Fraud, 27 ; Misoellaneods, 2, 12. 

8. Every one disguising the truth from a man who has a right to the 
truth is wrong, and ought not to be encouraged. — Burnett, J., Chester- 
field V. Janssen (1750), 2 Ves. 125. 

See Commerce, 4 ; Contract, 2 ; Equity, 38 ; Fraud, 14, 16, 27 ; 
Intereogatories ; Judges, 48, n. ; Miscellaneous, 11 ; Tort, 3, 5, 
16 ; Witness, 4. 

9. God forbid the truth should be concealed any way. — Wright, L.C.J., 
Trial of the Seven Bishops (1688), 12 How. St. Tr. 310. 

10. Fiction is never admitted where truth may work. — Hohart, C.J., 
Wright V. Gerrard (1617), Lord Hobart's Rep. 311. 

11. Ay, ay, let truth come out, in God's name. — Jefferies, C.J., Lady 
Ivy's Case (1684), 10 How. St. Tr. 582. 

See ante. Blasphemy. 

1 " Great is truth, and mighty above ' gee also per Willes, J., in regard to 

all things." — \Esdr as, iy.,il. From this the admissibility of certain evidence of 

biblical saying we have the origin of confession in Reg. v. Reeve and another 

the maxim, Magna est Veritas, et (1872), L. R. Crown Gas. Res., Tol. 1., 

363 : " It seems to have been supposed, at 
a " Plain truth, dear Murray, needs no one time, that saying, ' Tell the truth ' 
flowers of speech." — Pope's " Imitation of meant, in effect, ' Tell a lie.' " 
Horace," Bk. I., Ep. 6. 

D.L.Q. 16 

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Truth — continued. 

12. Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely — ^may be 
pursued too keenly — may cost too much.* — Enight-Bruee, V.-C, Pearse 
V. Pearse (1846), 1 De Gex & Sm. 28, 29. 

13. We know that passioi^, prejudice, party, and even good-will, tempt 
many who preserve a fair character with the world to deviate from 
truth in the laxity of conversation.' — Laiorence, J., Berkeley Peerage 
Case (1811), 4 Camp. Rep. 411. 

See Criminal Justice, 23 ; Libeetz of the Press, 1 ; Misoellanbous, 
40, 54 ; Motives, 7 ; Politics, 8 ; Sovereignty, 10. 


1. Fellows of colleges in the universities are in one sense the recipients 
of alms, because they receive funds which originally were of an 
eleemosynary character. — Lord Coleridge, C.J., Harrison v. Carter 
(1876), L. R. 2 Com. PI. D. 36. 

2. I shall be as tender of the privileges of the University of Oxford ae 
any man living, having the greatest veneration for that learned body.* 
—Willes, L.C.J., Welles v. Trahem (1740), WiUes' Rep. 241. 

See helow, 3 ; Miscellaneous, 5. 

3. Two universities have been founded in this country, amply endowed 
and furnished with professors in the different sciences ; and I should 
be sorry that those who have been educated at either of them should 
undervalue the benefits of such an education. — Lord Kenyan, C.J., 
King V. The College of Physicians (1797), 7 T. R. 288. 

See above, 2 ; Schoolmaster, 4 ; Inns of Court, 3. 


1. No degree of antiquity can give sanction to a usage bad in itself. — Lord 
Mansfield, Case of John Money and others (1765), 19 How. St. Tr. 1027. 

See Law, 20. 

2. Rights of every kind, which stand upon the foot of usage, gradually 
receive new strength in point of light and evidence from the continu- 
ance of that usage ; as it implieth the tacit consent and approbation 

1 Veritas nihil veretur nisi abscondi : ^ 1 should have all manner of tenderness 

Jcb^O^^" "°*^"^ ^"* concealment.- fop the right of the College; they are 

a "There are cases when the simple nurseries of Eeligion and Learning, and 

truth is difficult to tell, therefore all donations for increase and 

When 'tis better that the truth augmentation of their revenue are to be 

So we-Ser ?e?/e heT^Ag at the '^^^f^ expounded.-C..^.., L. C, Devit 

bottom of the weU, "• College of Dublin (1720), Gilbert Eq. 

And agree to let both truth and Ca. 248. 
well alone." 

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Usage — continued. 

of every successive age, in wluch. the usage hath prevailed. But 
when the prerogative hath not only this tacit approbation of all ages, 
the present as well as the former on its side, but is recognised, or 
evidently presupposed, by many Acts of Parliament, I see no legal 
objection that can be made to it.* — Foster, J., Case of Alexander 
Broadfoot (1742), Foster's Rep. 179. 
See hdow, 11 ; Eights, 1. 

3. Private customs, indeed, are stiU. to be sought from private tradition. 
—Camden, J., Case of Seizure of Papers (1765), 19 How. St. Tr. 1068. 

4. Proof of the usage of a large capital such as London, is sufficient to 
show that of the whole world unless it is contradicted. — Eekewich, J., 
Wmiams v. Colonial Bank (1887), L. R. 36 C. D. 670. 

5. The custom of the city of London is a matter of fact. — Denison, J., 
Rex V. Davis (1758), 1 Burr. Part IV. 641. 

See Sheriff, 2. 

6. We shall go according to the constant usage within memory." — 
Jeferies, C.J., SachevereU's Case (1684), 10 How. St. Tr. 72. 

7. You say it was in the Saxons' time ; you do not come to any time 
within 600 years; you speak of those times wherein things were 
obscure. — Lord Bridgman, C.B., Scot's Case (1660), 5 How. St. Tr. 

8. In many cases a party undertakes to prove a custom from the time 
of legal memory, the reign of Richard the Second ; but that proof is 
generally established by evidence of acts done at a much later period, 
and frequently no evidence is given beyond the present century. — 
Lord Kenyan, C.J., WithneH v. Gartham (1795), 6 T. R. 397. 

See Law, 20. 

9. There can be very few cases, where a custom has been sufficiently 
proved, in which a Court could hold that it was unreasonable, for 
that it must be convenient is shown by the fact that it has been 
established and followed. — Ghannell, J., Moult v. HaUiday (1897), 
L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 130. 

10. I cannot draw a distinction as to what length of time wiU render a 
practice legal. — Dallas, C.J., Butt v. Conant (1828), Cow's Rep. 95. 

11. I know not how or where to ascertain when an usage becomes of age. 
— Dallas, C.J., Keyser v. Suse (1828), Gow's Rep. 65. 

See 2, above. 

1 As usage is a good interpreter of the Co. Zitt. t. 81. 

laws, so non-usage, where there is no ^ Time whereof the memory of man 

example, is a great intendment that the runneth not to the contrary. — SI. Comm. 

law will not bear it. — Lord Litt. sec. 180, Bk. I., sec. 3, p. 45. 


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Usage — continued. 

12. If the custom be general, it is the law of the realm : if local only, 
it is lex loci, the law of the place. Now, all laws are general, as far 
as the law extends ; and all customs of England are of course, 
immemorial.^ No usage, therefore, can be part of that law, or have 
the force of a custom, that is not immemorial." — Yates, J., Millar v. 
Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. Part IV. 2368. 

13. Whatever may be the efiect of the prevailing fashions of the times, 
I do not think that the argument of inconvenience, arising out of 
those fashions, can at any time be relied upon against a current of 
decisions.— Lord Eldon, C.J., Beard v. Webb (1800), Bos. & PuU. Rep. 

See Judges, 13, 66 ; Law, 26, 45 ; Statutes, 4, 7. 

14. All customs must be supposed to have had a good commencement, 
unless they appear to be inconsistent or against reason. — Per Cur., 
Burton v. Wileday (1737), Andrews' Rep. 39. 

15. Customs which are consistent may be pleaded against each other. — 
Butter, J., BaU v. Herbert (1789), 3 T. R. 264. 

See Pleadings, 9. 


1. Jewish usury was prohibited at common law, but no other.' — Hale, 
C.B., Anonymous (1665), Hard. 420. 

2. The true spirit of usury lies in taking an unjust and unreasonable 
advantage of their fellow creatures. — Burnett, J., Earl of Chesterfield v. 
Janssen (1750), 2 Ves. Sen. 141. 

See Fraud, 4, n. ; Miscellaneous, 10, 19, 47. 


1. A difficult form of virtue is to try in your own Hfe to obey what you 
believe to be God's wiU. — Lord Coleridge, Reg. v. Ramsey (1883), 
1 Cabab6 and EUis's Q. B. D. Rep. 145. 

2. Persecution is a very easy form of virtue. — Lord Coleridge, Reg. v. 
Ramsey (1883), 1 Cabab6 and Ellis's Q. B. D. Rep. 145. 


Let all people come in, and vote fairly ; it is to support one or the other 

1 See 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 71, s. 5. Co. 73. 

^ Modus et conventio vinount legem : ' According to Lord Coke, all usury is 

Custom and agreement overrule law. — 2 unlawful.— 2 i«ii. 89 ; 3 Inst. 151. 

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Voting — continued. 

party, to deny any man's vote. — Holt, C.J., Ashby v. White (1703), 
2 Eaym. Rep. 958. 
See Freedom of Speech ; Liberty of the Press, 9 ; Liberty of teie 
Subject, 5 ; Minorities ; Politics, 7, 8. 


Modem civilization has introduced great qualifications to soften the 
rigours of war ; and allows a degree of intercourse with enemies, and 
particularly with prisoners of war, which can hardly be carried on 
without the assistance of our Courts of justice. It is not therefore 
good policy to encourage these strict notions, which are insisted on 
contrary to morality and public convenience. — Eyre, C.J., Sparenburgh 
V. Bannatyne (1797), 2 Bos. & PuU. 170. 


1. There is no instance where men are so easily imposed upon, as at the 
time of their dying imder the pretence of charity." — Goioper, L.C., 
Att.-Gen. v. Barnes et uxor (1707), Gilbert Eq. Ca. 5. 

2. Of aU the cases which come before the Court for its decision, none 
can be more embarrassing and more unsatisfactory than those which 
arise upon the construction of wills. The Court has no real guide to 
enable it to arrive at a conclusion. The only things which can be 
called guides are certain irales which the Court has laid down, and 
which may be extracted from the decisions. Beyond that, the decisions 
are not of the slightest use. Except by adherence to those rules, 
there is nothing but what may, not irreverently, be called guessing as 
to what the words of the document can be held to mean." — Sir James 
Bacon, V.-C, In re Ingle's Trusts (1871), L. R. 11 Eq. Ca. 586. 

See Law, 28, n. 

1 In the state of languor in which dying cases in which the Court is bound to 

persons generally are, their assent could arrive at a conclusion without having any 

be easily got to statements which they satisfactory means of arriving at it. The 

never intended to make, if they were but only guide 1 have is this. I am entitled 

ingeniously interwoven by an artful to sit in the testator's chair as he wrote 

person with statements which were his own will. — Kehewich, J., Horlock r. 

actuaUy true.— ^. v. Fitzgerald, Ir. Cir. Wiggins (18S8), L. R. 39 C. D. 143. See 

B. 168, 169. aUo mde. Pleadings, 7 ; Wobds, 5, 

A will is often executed suddenly in a supra. 
last sickness, and sometimes in the article As lawyers we must construe the will 

of death . . . consequently the time of like any other document. — Cotton, L.J., 

the execution is the critical moment which Ralph v. Carrick (1877), L. B. 5 Ch. 984. 

requires guard and protection. — Lard See also per lAndley, L.J. , In re Morgan 

Camden, Doe d. Hindson v. Hersey, 4 (1893), L. R. 3 Oh. 228 ; id. M.R., In re 

Bum's Ecc. L. 27 ; 1 Jarman on Wills, 70. Birks, In re Kenyon i;. Birks (1899),. 

^ This seems to me to be one of those L. R. 1 C. D., C. A. 419, 

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Will — continued. 

3. The law has ever been watchful and jealous of wills made under 
religious influences, and especially so when those influences connect 
themselves with any individual who is the object of the testator's 
bounty.— Sir- J. P. Wilde, Smith v. Tebbitt (1867), L. R. 1 Pr. & D. 

4. I regret exceedingly that, not only ordinary laymen, but, as it seems 
to me, professional men, do not understand the great difficulty there 
is in drawing wills, and do not bestow a little more care and pains 
in endeavouring to draw them in such a way as that the numerous 
questions which often arise on them should be avoided. I regret to 
say that these questions often throw a great deal of expense on parties 
interested xmder the wiUs, and are the cause of great heartburnings 
and most bitter animosities. — Pearson, J., In re Wait ; Workman v. 
Petgrave (1885), L. R. 30 C. D. 622. 

See CoNVETAUCE, 2 ; Peoperty, 2. 

5. I quite admit that on the question of the construction of wills relating 
to real property the cases have always had greater attention given to 
them than in the case of personalty, because land in England passes 
by title, and it has always been the habit of the lawyers and Judges 
to look with greater strictness to the reported cases where it is a 
question of land than where it is a question of personalty. — Ghitty, J., 
In re Bright-Smith ; Bright-Smith v. Bright-Smith (1886), L. R. 31 
C. D. 318. 

See Property, 2. 

6. Speaking for myself, I do not look upon wills as Chinese puzzles ; 
they no doubt do present great difficulties, but I do not feel myself 
the serious difficulty which other learned Judges have. — Chitty, J., 
In re Roper's Estate (1889), L. J. Rep. (N. S.) 58 C. D. 442. 

See Words, 5. 

7. The Court is at liberty to transpose and mould clauses and words in 
a will so as to make the whole take effect. — BuUer, J., Doe v. Wilkin- 
son (1788), 2 T. R. 223. 

See helow, 11 ; Construction, 10, 18, 30. 

8. If we find from a wiU, as we do here, that a testator has used a word 
in a particular sense, we must give it that meaning wherever it occurs 
in the will. It is the same thing as if a foreign word were used — a. 
case of which I have known. In such a case we have to get at the 
meaning of the word in English from an ordinary dictionary, and 
then whenever it occurs give it that English meaning. Of course, the 
dictionary must be clear ; and if we cannot make out what the testator 

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Will — continued. 

meant, then we have not got the dictionary. — Sir F. H. Jeune, Be 
Birks ; In re Kenyon v. Birks (1899), L. E. 1 C. D., C. A. 419, 420. 
See Administeation of Justice, 11 ; Cases, 15 ; Construction, 3, 4, 20, 
21, 25, 31 ; Judges, 62, 65 ; Law, 65 ; Statutes, 15, 19 ; Words, 6. 

9. No previous will can be treated properly as a precedent for another 
which is expressed in different language, and no decision on the 
precise words of a former wiU can as a general rule be of the least 
service in guiding the Court as to the construction of other words. 
Unless you can get a principle from a case which is applicable generally 
to other cases, the precedent is of little use.^ — Bighy, L.J., In re 
Macdufi (1896), L. R. 2 Ch. D. [1896], p. 469. 

See 12, helow ; Cases, 21 ; Construction, 29. 

10. Let a will be ever so fair, a slip in form is fatal : which is a certain 
mischief. But if a wiU be fraudulent, though it is allowed to be 
formal, it may be set aside upon evidence and circumstances. — Lord 
Mansfield, Windham v. Chetwynd (1757), 1 Burr. Part IV. 423. 

See Construction, 2, 8, 10 ; Statutes, 13. 

11. My distinction is, that in incorrect wills the Court may take hberties, 
but that if the words are correct they have no power to make any 
alteration. — Buller, J., Doe et dem. Dacre v. Dacre (1798), 2 Bos. & 
PuU. 260. 

See above, 7. 

12. Every will stands on its own bottom and is various as anything 
whatsoever, and therefore it is hard to cite a case that can quadrate. 
I have mean thoughts of my ovsm opinion. I may say in this case, 
difficilius est invenire quam vineere, as Caesar said when he and his 
army ran about the Alps to find out a way. — Trehy, C.J., Monnington 
V. Davis (1695), Fortescue, 227. 

See 9, above. 

13. Men should not sin in their graves.^" — Sir John Strange, Thomas v. 
BritneH (1751), 2 Ves. 314. 

See Property, 2. 

1 I do not intend to encumber myself out of it by other cases or decisions in 

with cases. Decisions upon other words other cases. I always protest against 

something like those in question, in other anything of the sort. — lAnMey, L.J., In re 

wills, where the whole context of those Morgan (1893), 3 Ch. 228. 

other wills must be gone into, can afiord We must find out the meaning of the 

very little assistance. — Eyre, C.J., Doe et testator as well as we can. — Powell, J., 

rfe»i. Dacre «. Dacre (1798), 2 Bos. & Pull. Monnington i\ Davis (1695), Fortescue, 

258. 226. 

I do not see why, if we can tell what a 2 Observation upon the construction of 

man intends, and can give effect to his a will, 
intention as expressed, we should be driven 

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Will — continued. 

14. Teclinical rules are not to be relied upon in explaining the inten- 
tion of testators : and yet cases of intention are much embarrassed by 
authorities.— Bi/re, C.J., BurnsaU v. Davy (1798), 2 Bos. & PuU. 220. 

See Cases, 19, 21 ; Construction, 4, 15, 16, 21. 

15. Courts of justice ought to carry into effect the intentions of testators 
as far as they can consistently with the rules of law. — Lord Langdale, 
M.R., Biederman v. Seymour (1841), 3 Beav. 371. 

See 17, 18, lelow ; Consteuction, 25, 31. 

16. It is from the words, and from the context, not from the punctua- 
tion, that the sense must be collected. — Sir Wm. Grant, M.R., 
Sanford v. Raikes (1816), 1 Mer. 651 ; per Lord Wesibury, Gordon v. 
Gordon (1871), L. R. 5 H. L. 276. 

See Construction, 30 ; Statutes, 12. 

17. The intention of the testator is the polar star by which we must be 
gaided.—Buller, J., Smith v. Coffin (1795), 2 Hen. Bl. 444 ; id. 
Tindal, L.C.J., Wilce v. Wilce (1831), 5 M. & P. 694. 

See 15, above. 

18. The Court is to pronounce according to the apparent intent of the 
testator, but that intent must be found in the words of the will, and 
is not to be collected by conjecture dehors the wiU.' — Buller, J., Doe et 
dem. Dacre v. Dacre (1798), 2 Bos. & Pull 259. 

See Administration of Justice, 10 ; Construction, 8. 


1. Witnesses may lie, either be mistaken themselves, or wickedly 

intend to deceive others . . . but . . . circumstances cannot lie.' — 

1 Speaking of Sir Eichard Arden, Twelve Eminent Judges," Vol. 1, 149. 
M aster of the Rolls (afterwards Lord On one occasion the counsel said, that it 
Alvanley), on the painful necessity which was the duty of the Court to find out the 
his duty as an equity Judge imposed upon meaning of the testator. " My duty, sir, 
him, of cutting knots that no subtlety to find out his meaning I " exclaimed 
could untie, and interpreting meanings Lord Alvanley. " Suppose the will had 
w hich the unskilful persons who used contained only these words, ' Fwibu/m 
them, from the mistaken adaptation of funnidos tantaraboo.' Am I to find out 
legal words, and their inartificial handling the meaning of his gibberish 2 ' ' — Id. n. 
of the terms of art, would have found it See also ante, Administeation of 
difficult to explain, it is observed that he Justice, 15 ; Miscellankous, 20. 
would not unf requently dilate with much 2 These words have oftentimes been 
force and feeling. "I am, at last," he repeated from the Bench as almost to 
would say, " under the very disagreeable have become a judicial axiom ; but, 
necessity of giving judgment upon a case, observes a learned writer (Taylor on 
in which the judgment cannot be satis- Held., b. 66, p. 86, Vol. 1), " No pro- 
factory to the Court, and by which I position can be more false or dangerous, 
must be sure 1 am not pei-Eorming the If ' circumstances ' mean — and they have 
intention. The testator, it appears, must no other meaning — those facts which lead 
have totally forgotten the whole state of to the inference of the fact in issue, they 
bis property." — Townsend, "Lives of not only can, but constantly do, lie, in 

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Witness — continued. 

Mounteney, B., Annesley v. Lord Anglesea (1743), 17 How. St. Tr. 
1430. See also per Legge, B., R. v. Blandy (1752), 18 How. St. Tr. 
1186, 1187. 
See EnoESCE, 12, 32. 

2. I will not say that a witness shall not be asked to what may tend to 
disparage him : that would prevent an investigation into the character 
of the witness, which may often be of importance to ascertain. I 
think those questions only should not be allowed to be asked which 
have a direct and immediate efEect to disgrace or disparage the witness. 
— Lord Alvardey, Macbride v. Macbride (1805), 4 Esp. 242. 

See ADMINI8TEIA.TI0N OF JusTiOE, 5 ; Charaoter, 2, 4 ; Criminal Justice, 
2, 4, 16 ; Evidence, 8, 14 ; PLEADmas, 12 ; Reputation. 

3. Whether witnesses are material or not, does not depend upon the 
result, but upon this, whether a prudent attorney, having a due regard 
for the interests of his client, would have brought them. — Erie, C.J., 
Dods V. Evans (1864), 15 C. B. (N. S.) 627. 

See Evidence, 29. 

4. Grenerally speaking, a witness has no business to concern himself 
with the merits of the case in which he is called on to give evidence 
or whether, when given, it will be material to the cause. — Lord Lang- 
dale, M.R., Langley v. Fisher (1843), 5 Beav. 447. 

See Fraud, 27 ; Jury, 26 ; Truth, 8. 

5. There is no reason for assuming, that the time of medical men and 
attomies is more valuable than that of others whose liveUhood depends 
on their own exertions.* — Tindal, C. J., Lonergan v. The Royal Exchange 
Assurance (1831), 9 Bing. 731. 


1. A woman's notes wiU not signify much truly, no more than her tongue. 
— Seroggs, L.C.J., Trial of Richard Langhorn (1679), 7 How. 
St. Tr. 437. 

2. A woman cannot be a pastor by the law of God.' I say more, it is 

the sense that the conclusion deduced i This remark is in relation to the pay- 

from them is false." As an illustration ment of wituesses, i.e. persons in the 

of this, he cites the incident of the viper professions and surveyors or engineers or 

fastening itself on the hand of St. Paul, other scientific men. 

when the Apostle was shipwrecked on the > See I. Cor. 14, 34 ; I. Tita. 2, 11, 12. 

island of Melita. "No doubt," said the By the custom o£ the ancient Britons 

barbarians when they saw this, " this " women had prerogative in deliberative 

man is a murderer " ; but when they saw sessions touching either peace-goveru- 

no harm came to him they changed their ment, or martial affairs." — Selden's 
minds and said he was a god, " and," says Wurkg, Vol. 3, p. 10, cited in Chorlton 
Taylor,"bothconclusion8werealikefalse." v. Lings (1868),L.R. 4C.P.389. Coming 

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Woman — continued. 

against the law of the reabn. — EobaH, C.J., Colt and another v. 
Bishop of Coventry and Lichfield (1612), Hob. Eep. 148. 


1. There is no magic in words. — Lord Kenyan, King v. Inhabitants of 
North Nibley (1792), 5 T. R. 24 ; Lord Romilly, Lord v. Jeffldns 
(1865), 35 Beav. 16. 

See Conveyance, 1 ; Magic. 

2. Most of the disputes in the world arise from V70rds.^ — Lord Mansfield, 
Morgan v. Jones (1773), LofEt. 177. 

3. Rather commend yourself by your actions, than your expressions ; 
one good action is worth twenty good expressions. — Jefferies, C.J., 
Braddon and Speke's Case (1684), 9 How. St. Tr. 1185. 

See lelow, 8 ; Law, 25. 

4. Words pass from men lightly.^ — Quoted by Wilrmt, J., Pillans v. 
Van Mierop (1764), 3 Burr. Part IV. 1671. 

See Justification, 2. 

5. The words are like Jack in a Box, and nobody knows what to make 
of them.— Boll, C.J., Parker v. Cook (1650), Style's Rep. 241. 

See Construction, 31, 32 ; Judges, 12 ; Law, 28 ; Will, 2, n., 6. 

6. Is not the Judge bound to know the meaning of all words in the English 
language ; or if they are used technically or scientifically, to inform hit 
ownmind by evidence, and then to determine the meaning ? — Martin, B., 
HiUs V. The London GasUght Co. (1857), 27 L. J. Ex. 63. 

See Judges, 1 ; Will, 8. 

to Saxon times we find it stated "All Mod. 272. Under our present political 

fiefs were originally masculine, and system, the legislative, executive, and 

women were excluded from the succession judicialfnnctionsof the Government vmder 

of them because they cannot keep a Queen regnant are carried on in the name 

secrets." — West's Inquiry into the of a woman : " Her Majesty, &c., enacts," 

manner of creating Peers, 44, cited or " commands," &;c. ; yet women, because 

7 Mod. 272. Although it is uncouth in of their sex, are said to be " disqualified by 

our law to have women justices and com- the common law " from having any voice 

missioners and to sit in places of judica- or representation in the process of legis- 

ture, yet by the authorities this is a point lation or government. See also ante, 

worth insisting upon, both in human and Statutes, 5, n. 

divine learning ; for in the first commis- i Vide " Essay on Human Under- 

sion ever granted (Genesis i., 28), by standing," c. 9, 10, 11. 

virtue of the word dominamini in the ^ Plowden, 308 b. 

plural, God coupled the women in the Quee ad unwmjinem loqwnta sunt, non 

commission with man. (Callis (1685), dehent ad alium detorqueri : 'ihosa woxAs 

250.) The policy of the law thought which are spoken to one end, ought not to 

women unfit to judge of public things, be perverted to another. — 4 Co. 14. 

and placed them on a footing with "Nay, gentlemen, do not quarrel about 

infants; by7& 8 Will. III. c. 25, infants •words."— Wright, L.C.J., Trial of the 

cannot vote, and women are perpetual Seven Bishops (1688), 12 How. St. Tr. 

infants. — Per Strange, Sol. -Gen., 7 208. 

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Words — continued. 

7. He says one thing, but he does another ; it seems to me to be 
common sense to look at what is done, and not to what is said.^ — 
MaHin, B., Gaine v. Conlson (1863), 1 H. & C. 764 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 97. 

See Miscellaneous, 40 ; Motives, 10 ; Pleadings, 5. 

8. We must judge of men's intentions by their acts, and not by 
expressions in letters, which are contrary to their acts. — Lord Ahinger, 
Chapman v. Morton (1843), 11 M. & W. 534. 

See above, 3 ; Misceuaneous, 58 ; Motives, 2 ; Tort, 16. 

9. Words are transient, and vanish in the air as soon as spoken, and 
there can be no tenor of them . . . but when a thing is written, 
though every omission of a letter may not make a variance, yet, if 
such omission makes a word of another signification, it is fatal.^ — 
HoU, C.J., Queen v. Drake (1706), 3 Salkeld, 225. 

See CoNSTRUonoN, 30, 32. 

1 Acta exterlora indicant interiora ^ " But words are things ; and a small 

secreta.—S Eep. 291. drop of ink, 

"Deeds, not words." — Butler, "Hudi- Falling, like dew, upon a thought, 

bras," Part I., c. 1. produces 

" Words are women, deeds are men." — That which makes thousands, perhaps 

Hei-hert, " Jacnla Prudentum." millions, think." 

— Byron, " Don Juan," 
Canto III. St. 88. 

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ABSURDITY. See " Law," 51. 

ABUSE OP AUTHORITY. See "Trespass," 2, n. 

ACCIDENT. See " Tort," 12, n. 

ACCOUNTANT. See " PubUo Servant," 7. 

ACCUSATION. See " MisceUaneous," 29. 
wrougfiil. See " Tort," 15, n. 

ACCUSED. See " Character"; '," Criminal Justice," 3, 7, 10, 11, 27, 28. 
See also references from " Prisoner." 

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OP GUILT. See "Criminal Justice," 40. 

ACQUIESCENCE. See " Consent," 3, 4; " Equity," 33 ; "Practice," 7. 


right of prisoner to address after. See " Criminal Justice," 28. 
to labour for, of accused. See " Criminal Justice," 4. 
wrongful. See " Criminal Justice," 30. 

ACTION. See " Pleadings," 6 ; " Tort," 1, 2, 8, 10, 26 ; " Transfer of Right 
of Action " ; " Words," 7. 
against a Judge. See " Judges," 27, n. 
cause of. See " Public Policy," 7. 
for money had and received. See "Money," 5. 
for telling a lie. See " Fraud," 16 18. 
immoral or illegal. See " Relief," 2. 
iniquity as cause of. See " Fraud," 30. 
no. See " Public Policy," 6. 
remedy for. See " Fraud," 19. 
title to. See " Tort," 9. 

ACTIONABLE WORDS. See "Libel," 2. 

ACTIONS. See " Litigation." 

consolidation of. See " Practice," 10. 
for words. See " Trial for Life," 1, n. 
law not apt to catch at. See " Law," 25. 

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254 INDEX. 

ACTIVE IMAGINATION. See " MisoeUaneous," 31. 

ACT OF GOD. See " MisceUaneous," 12, n. 

ACT OF MAN. See "Miscellaneous," 12, n.; "Politics," 7; " Words," 3. 

ACT OF PARLIAMENT. See " Constraction," 32; "Dictum," 4; 
" Practice," 16 ; " Precedents," 8 ; " Statutes," 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 
13, 14, 20, 26. 

ACT OF THE COURT. See "Judges," 21. 

ACT, wrongful. See " Tort," 1. 

ACTS. See " Motives," 2, 3, 13 ; " Parliament," 3 ; " Words," 8. 

ADDRESS. See " Opening Speech," 3 ; " Criminal Justice," 28, n. 

ADJOURNMENT. See " Delay" ; " Jury," 29 et sej. ; " Parliament," 1 ; 
" Sunday," 3. 

Justice," 27, w. ; "Christianity," 5; "Corporations"; "Evil," 1; 
" Justice," 1 ; " Mistakes," 1 ; " Law," 59, 68 ; " Liberty of the 
Press," 1; "Pardon," 3; "Politics," 5; "Public Servant." See 
also references from " Goverrmient." 

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. See Text. See also "Affidavit," 
3 ; " Americans " ; " Appeals," 4 ; " Blasphemy " ; " Character " ; 
" Contempt of Court," 2, 9 ; " Costs," 2 ; "Counsel"; "Courts," 
1, 3 ; " Criminal Justice," 15, 25, 29, 36 ; " Discovery," 4 ; " Discre- 
tion," 9; "Equity," 5, 20; "Evidence," 29; "Evil," 1; "Judges," 
18, 19, 53, 61, 68, 69, 77, 78, 79, 80; "Judicial Proceedings"; 
" Justice," 1 ; " Law," 21, 54 ; " Legal Profession " ; " Liberty of the 
Press," 3; "Magistrates"; "Motives," 12; "New Trial," 2: 
"Obiter Dicta," 1; "Pardon"; "Perjury"; "Pleadings," 6; 
"Politics," 2; "Practice"; "Presumption," 7; "Punishment," 1, 
14; " Relief," 3 ; "Tort," 8, 19. 

arraignment of. See " Administration of Justice," 20. 

independence of. See " Judges," 27, n. 

the safe. See " Criminal Justice," 37. 

with mercy. See " Criminal Justice," 26. 


ADMIRALTY LAW. See " Privy Council. ' ' 

ADMIRALTY REPORTS. See "Admiralty," 3. 


ADULTERY. See " Husband and Wife," 8, 9, 10. 


to the community. See "Parliament," 13; "Tort," 24. 
unjust and unreasonable. See " Usury," 2. 

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INDEX. 255 

ADVEESE WITNESS. See " Evidence," 15. 

ADVICE. See " Miscellaneous," 33 ; " Pleadings," 5 ; " Sovereignty," 10. 
professional. See " Legal Profession," 3 ; " Solicitor and Client," 1. 
to Judges. See "Judges," 22, 45. 

ADVOCACY. See " Counsel," 19 ; " Time," 3, n. 

ADVOCATE. See " Counsel," 27. 

AFFAIRS, HUMAN. See'-MisceUaneous," 1. 

AFFIDAVIT. See Text. See also "Bible," 1, n.; "Criminal 
Justice," 36 ; " Pleadings," 11 ; " Practice," 3. 

AFPEBMATIVE. See "Jury," 27. 

APTEE EVENTS. See " MisceUaneons," 41. 

AGE. See "Law," 73; " Miscellaneous," 2; "Schoolmaster," 3; 
"Truth," 7; "Usage," 11. 
of laws. See "ParUament," 3, n. 

AGENT. See " Counsel," 26, 27 ; " Criminal Justice," 51. 

AGES. See "Usage," 2. 

remote. .See " Eeligion," 3. See oZso re/erewces ^om " Times. " 


AGEEEMENT. See "Consent," 5; "Fraud," U; "Jurisdiction," 
10, n. ; " Usage," 12, n. 

AGEEEMENTS, COMMEECIAL. See " Text Books," 4. 

AID. See " Shipping," 3. 

ALDEEMEN. See " Corporations," 4. 


ALMANACK. See ' ' Feasts. ' ' 

ALMIGHTY. See re/erences /row " God." 

ALMS. See " Universities," 1. See also " Charity." 

ALTEEATION. See " Statutes," 21. 
of the law. See " Parliament," 15. 

ALVANLEY, LOED. See " Miscellaneous," 57. 

AMBASSADOE. See " Tort," 15, n. 

AMENDMENTS. See Text. See also " Mistakes," 2, 3. 



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256 INDEX. 

AMICABLE SETTLEMENT. See " Compromise." 

AMICUS CXJBIJE. See "Judges," 48, n. 


" AN ANONYMOUS CASE." See "MisoeUaneous," 57, n. 

ANAECHY. See " Liberty of the Press, ' ' 6. 

ANCESTORS, OUR. See "MisoeUaneous," 2, 5. 


Britons. See " Woman," 2, n. 

mere-stones. See "Precedents," 3, n. 

morality. See "Morals," 2. 

times. See " Usage," 2, 7. See oJso re/erences /rowi " Times." 

ANGEL. See "Clergy," 1. 


or pity does not become a Judge. See " Criminal Justice," 23. 
the mark of a foolish woman. See " Criminal Justice," 23. 

ANIMOSITIES. See " Will," i. 

ANONYMOUS LETTERS. See "Judges," 82, n. 

ANSWER. See "Pleadings," 4. 

ANTICIPATION, POWER OP. See '• Settlements," 1. 

ANTIQUARIAN. See " Judicial Decisions," 22. 

ANTIQUITY. See " Usage," 1. 

APPEALS. See Text. See also "Cases," 21; "Chancery," 12, 13; 
" Criminal Justice," 3 ; " Judicial Decisions," 8 ; " Privy Council" ; 
"Practice," 7; "Reasonable," 4. 

Court of. See "Appeal," and references ; "Cases," 21; "Jurisdic- 
tion," 19 ; " Nonsuit," n. ; " Parliament," 19. 

to law of England. See " Law," 24. 

APPEARANCES. See " Perjury. ' ' 

APPRENTICE. See "Master and Servant," 3. 

APPROBATION. See ' ' Usage, ' ' 2, 

ARBITRARINESS. See " Judges," 69. 

ARBITRARY DISMISSAL. See " Master and Servant," 1. 

ARBITRATION. See Text. See also " Evidence," 33, n. 

ARCHITECTURE. See " Property," 11. 

ARGUMENT. See "Counsel," 21,22,23; "Fraud," 36; "Pleadings," 
7 ; " Politics," 8 ; " Precedents," 2, 14 ; " Public Policy," 8. 

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INDEX. 257 


ab inconvenienti. See " Oonstruotion," 23, n. 
political. See "Politics," 2, 5. 

AEMY. See Text. See aZso " Schoolmaster," 3. 

" Admiriistration of Justice," 20. 


escape from. See " Criminal Justice," 40. 
on legal process. See " Trespass, " 2,n. 

ARTFULNESS. See " MisoeUaneous, " 19 ; " Will," 1. 


ASHES OF THE LAW. See "Law," 20, n. 

ASSAULT. See " Damages," 8 ; " Infant," 2 ; " Justification," 2. 

ASSEMBLIES. See "Freedom of Speech " ; "Minorities." 

ASSENT. See " Consent." 

ASSERTION. See " Tort," 16. 


of counsel. See " Coimsel," 14 ; " Judges," 80, n. ; " Trial for Life," 

of tort. See "Tort," 26. See also "Transfer of Right of Action," 
and references therefrom. 

ASSISTANCE. See " Shipping," 2, 3. 

ASSUMPTION. See " Public Servant," 1. 

ATTACK. See " Prosecution." 

ATTORNEY-GENERAL. See Text. See also "Miscellaneous," 26; 
" Opening Speech," 3, n. ; " Politics," 4 ; " Sovereignty," 9 ; " Trial 
for Life," 1, n. 

ATTORNEYS. See Teat. See also "Consent," 5, to. ; "Counsel," 19; 
" Legal Profession " ; " Sovereignty," 9 ; " Witness," 3, 5. 

AUDITOR. See Text. 

AUGEAN STABLE. See " Punishment," 6. 


AUTHOR. See Text. Se« fflfeo "Books" ; "Invention" ; "Literature," 
1; "Miscellaneous," 55; "Text Books." 


abuse of. See "Trespass," 2, n. See also referenees from "Public 

mode of treating. See "Evidence," 6. 
D.L.Q. 17 

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258 INDEX. 

AUTHORITIES. See " Cases " ; " Judicial Decisions " ; " Practice," 4, 
5, 15 ; " Precedents " ; " Text Books." 

AVERMENT. See "Pleadings," 4. 

AWARD. See " Motives," 13, n. 

AXE, LAYING THE. S«e "Miscellaneous," 52. 

AXIOM, JUDICIAL. See " Witness," 1, n. 


advice to Judges. See "Judges," 26, n. 

Mr. Justice Hutton. See " Judges," 26, n. 

BAD LAW. See "Law," 42. 

BANC, COURT IN. See "Practice," 3. 

BANKER. See Text. 


BAR. See " Attorney-General " ; "Bible," 1, w. ; "Counsel"; "Inns of 
Court"; " Judges," 80, w.; "Law Reports," 2; " Legal Prof ession " 
"Opening Speech," 3, m. ; "Pleadings," 7; "Politics," 2 
"Precedents," 4, 5, 12. See also references from "Counsel" 
" Legal Profession. ' ' 

BARGAIN, PRIVATE. See " Criminal Justice," 42. 

BASENESS. See " Miscellaneous," 47. 

BASTARDY. See Text. 

BEGGAR. See "Reputation." 

BELIEF. See " Evidence," 9 ; " Religion," 3 

BENCH. See ' ' Law Reports, " 2 . 

Court of Queen's. See " Criminal Justice," 26. 
independence of. See "Administration of Justice," 20, 27, n.; 
"Judges," 20. 

BENEFICIAL. See ' ' Presumption, "10. 

BENEFIT TO THE PUBLIC. See "Counsel," 13. 

BENEVOLENCE. See " Charity. ' ■ 

BEST MEN, THE. See "Miscellaneous," 54. 

BIAS. See references from "Prejudice." 
in Judge. See " Judges," 58, 61. 

BIBLE. See Text. See also "Blasphemy"; "Christianity"- 
"Judges," 76; "Law," 62, 68; "Liberty of the Press," 2, n.'; 
"Miscellaneous," 42, n.; "Religion"; "Sovereignty," l 2 •' 
" Woman," 2, n. 

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INDEX. 269 



BINDING RULE OF LAW. See "Law," 53. 

BISHOP. See " Ecclesiastical," 4. 

BITTER WATERS. See " MisoeUaneous," 25. 

BLACK AND WHITE. See "Truth," 2, 3. 


BLESSINGS. See " Liberty of the Press," 9. 

BLOWING HOT AND COLD. See " Counsel," 23 ; " Pleadings," 9. 

BLOWS. See " Damages," 3 ; " Justification," 2. 

BLUNDER. See " Honesty " ; " Mistake." 

BOOK, KISSING THE. See "Bible," 3. 

BOOKS. See Text. See also " Author " ; " Invention " ; " Judicial 
Decisions," 1 ; " Literature " ; " Miscellaneous," 55. 
text. See " Text Books." 

BORROWING. See " Money," 2. 

BOUNTY. See " Will," 3. 

BOYS. See " Schoolmaster," 1. 

BRAIN. See ' ' Intoxication. ' ' 

coinage of the. See " Insanity," 1. 


of legal duty. See " Tort," 2. 

of the peace. See " Courts," i; " Libel," 5. 

BREAKFAST. See " Miscellaneous," 28. 

BREAKING. See " Trespass," 2, n. 

" BRETHREN." See references frcmi " Brother." 

BRIBERY. See " Public Servant," 6 ; " Punishment," 6. 


court of justice. See " Law," 6. 

justice. See " Parliament," 6. 

navy. See " Navy," 3. 

subjects. See "Judges," 13; "Jury," 4; "Law," 9, 61, 66, 67; 
" Liberty of the Press," 11 ; " Liberty of the Subject," 2 ; " Naturali- 
zation " ; " Navy," 7, n. ; " Parent and Child," 18 ; " Pleadings," 3 ; 
" Scotland," 1, and references from " Englishmen." 

BRITONS, ANCIENT. See " Woman," 2, n. 

VI— Z 

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260 INDEX. 

"BBOTHER JUDGES." See "Judges," 53, 54, 55,56; "New Trial," 
1, n. ; •' Text Books," 2 ; " Trial for Life," 1, n. 

BROTHERS. See " Parent and Child," 3. 

BUSINESS. See " Commerce " ; " Contract " ; " Fraud " ; " Name," w. 
fraud in. See " Fraud," 8, 14. 
men of. See " Money," 2, n. 

" BUT." See " MisoeUaneous," 39, n. 

CAKE, EAT YOUR. See "Miscellaneous," 59, n. 

CALENDAR. See " Feasts." 

CALUMNY. See " Judges," 82, n. 

CAMBRIDGE, UNIVERSITY OF. See " Universities," 1. 

CAMERA, PROCEEDINGS IN. See " Judicial Proceedings," 7. 

CANON. See " Matrimony," 4, n. ; " Perjury." 

CANON LAW. See " Ecclesiastical," 6, n. ; " Practice," 11. 


CAPRICE. See " Discretion," 4 ; "Equity," 31, n.; "Jury," 11; 
" Motives," 11. 

CARE. See aZso" Words." 

exercise of, by Judge. See " Judges," 16 ; " Time," 3, n. 

CARPENTERS' CASE, THE SIX. See " Trespass," 2, n. 


and conscience. See " Administration of Justice," 18, n. 

not to be cut into parts. See " Administration of Justice," 14. 

reading evidence in former. See " Evidence," 23. 

settled. See " Counsel," 10. 

settlement of. See " Evidence," 33. 


criminal. See " Criminal Justice. ' ' 

tard. See " Law," 42. 

how not decided. See " Administration of Justice," 11. 

must be judged as stated. See " Amendments," 6. 

not decided by fractions. See " Administration of Justice," 12. 

See Text. See also "Arbitration"; "Commerce," 32; "Common 
Law," 4; "Construction"; "Counsel," 17, 18, 21; "Courts," 
1, 3, n. ; " Criminal Cases " ; " Criminal Justice," 1, 5 ; " Equity," 
20, 26; "Evidence," 83; "Foreign Law" ; "Judges," 4, 11, 16, 
70, 71, 72; "Jurisdiction," 4; "Law," 2, 20, 26, 42; "Law 
Reports " ; "Limitation" ;" Litigation " ; "Miscellaneous," 57, to.; 
"Mischief," 1, 3; "Motives," 12; " Obiter Dicta " ; "Opening 
Speech " ; " Practice," 4, 25 ; " Precedents " ; " Presumption," 4 ; 
"Privy Council"; "Railway Company," 1; "Reasonable"; 

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INDEX. 261 

CASES — continued. 

" Scotland," 2 ; "Settlements," 3, «. ; "Statutes," 2, U; "Text 
Books " ; " Trial for Life," 2 ; " Truth," 5, 13, n. ; " Usage," 8, 9 ; 
" WiU," 2, 8 ; " Witness," i. 

CASES, CIVIL. See references from " Civil." 


CASTLE. See " Trespass," 1. 

CAT. See " MisoeUaneous," 39. 


a man may judge impartially even in his own. See " Administra- 
tion of Justice," 22. 

immediate. See "Motives," 13. 

no man is to be a judge in his own. See " Administration of Justice," 
23, 24 ; "Judges," 58. 

of action. See " Public Policy," 7 ; "Tort,"2. 


impertinent interposition in, by parties. See " Administration of 

Justice," 20, 21. 
measure to try. See " Sovereignty," 14. 

CAUTION. See " Judges," 67. 

CESAR'S WLPE. See "Judges," 2. 

CENSOR, KING'S COURT AS. See " Morals," 1. 

CEREMONY. See "Bible," 3; "Criminal Justice," 46, w. ; "Matri- 
mony," 7. 

CERTAIN JUSTICE. See "Justice," 2. 

law. See references from " Law, Certain." 

CERTAINTY. See " Mischief," 1. 

CERTAINTY'S SAKE. See " Precedents," 18. 

CHAINS, HANGED IN. See " New Trial," 1, n. 

CHALLENGES. See " Jury," 28. 

CHAMBERS, JUDGE'S. See " Practice," 1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 13. 

CHAMPERTY. See " Litigation, ' ' 3. 

CHAN CE. See • • Fraud, " 29 ; " Judges, " 73 ; " Jury, "8. 
purchase of a. See " Property," 12. 

CHANCELLOR, LORD. See "Chancery," 12; "Christianity," 10; 
" Common Law," 10 ; "Equity," 20, 31. 
unconscientious. See " Equity," 31, n. 


conscience. See " Equity," 31, n. 
foot. See " Equity," 19. 

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262 INDEX. 

CHANCERY. See Text. See also "Common Law," 9; "Discovery"; 
" Equity," 3 ; " Praotioe," 5, 8 ; " Parent and Child," 18. 

CHANCES, LAW OF. See " Criminal Justice," 29. 


given to. See "Miscellaneous," 20. 
in legal condition. See " Law," 67. 
of name. See " Name." 

CHANGES, HISTORY OP. See "Statutes," 11. 

CHARACTER. See Text. See also "Commerce," 17; "Contempt of 
Court," 3 ; " Judges," 26, n. ; '• Libel," 1 ; " Master and Servant," 
1; "Schoolmaster," 1; "Truth," 18; "Witness," 2. 

injury to private. See " Judicial Proceedings," 2, 6. 

of the Judges. See " Judges," 75, 76. 


against accused. See "Criminal Justice," 15, 16, 31. 
wrongful. See " Tort," 15, n. 

CHARITY. See Text. See also "Christianity," 11; "Costs," 3; 
" Poor " ; " Property," 10, 11 ; " Universities," 11. 
pretence of. See " Will, " 1. 

CHEATING. See "Infant," 3. 

CHICANE. See " Costs," 2 ; " Pleadings," 10. 

CHICKENS OP DESTINY. See " Obiter Dicta," 1. 

CHIEF JUSTICE. See " Discretion," 3 ; " Judges," 14, 56, n. 

CHILD. See " Bastardy " ; "Infant " ; "Parent and Child." 

CHILDREN. See " Husband and Wife," 7. 
of the light. See "Miscellaneous," 2, n. 
of the world. See " Miscellaneous," 2, n. 

CHINESE PUZZLES. See " Will," 6. 

CHRIST. See " Sovereignty," 2, n. 

CHRISTIANITY. See Text. See also "Bastardy"; "Bible" 

"Blasphemy"; "Charity"; "Ecclesiastical"; "Evil," 3 

" Goverimient " ; "Husband and Wife," 10; "Judges," 76 

" Liberty of the Press," 2, n. ; " Matrimony," 2, 3, 5 ; " Poor," 1. 

laws of. See " Husband and Wife," 6. 

CHURCH. See " Charity," 2 ; "Christianity"; "Clergy"; "Corpora- 
tions," 4; "Criminal Justice," 48; " Doctrine," 3 ; Ecclesiastical"; 
"Feasts " ; " Government " ; " Matrimony, " 2, 5 ; " Property, ' " 
10, 11 ; "Religion " ; " Sovereignty," 5 ; " Time," 3, n. 
primitive. See " Government." 

CHURCHYARD. See " Charity, ' ' 2. 


cannot lie. See " Witness, "1. 
good. See "Miscellaneous," 44. 

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INDEX. 263 

CIBCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. See "Evidence," 12; "Presump- 
tion," 5. 

CITIES. See " Corporations. ' ■ 

CITY OF LONDON. See "Usage," 4,5. 


cases. See "Amendments," 1 ; " Criminal Justice, " 1 ; "Evidence," 
1; "Jury," 18; "Law," 14; "Pleadings," 1, n. ; "Presump- 
tion," 4, 5. 
debt. See " Punishment," 9. 
law. See " Fraud," 20, n. ; " Law," 69 ; " Practice," 11. 

Courts of. See " Judges," 48. 
liberty. See "Criminal Justice," 32, n. 
process. See " Trespass," 2, n. 
society. See " Matrimony," 6. 
suit. Judge exempt from. See " Judges, ' ' 27. 
the. See "Cqurts," 7. 

CIVILIZATION. See " Law," 61 ; " War." 

CLAIM. See"Oriminal Justice," 51; "Law,"6,66; "Punishment," 9. 
right to make. See " Justice," 4. 

CLAUSES. See"WiU,"7. 

CLEAN HANDS. See "B(iuity," 25, 26, 27, 28. 

CLEAR. See"MisceUaneous,"40. 

CLBEGY. See Text. See also "Christianity," 5; "Ecclesiastical," 
7; "Religion." 

CLERK. See " Practice, " 2,n. 

CLIENT. See "Consent," 5, n.; "Counsel," 7, 12, 14. 
and counsel. See " Criminal Justice," 27, 28. 
solicitor and. See " Witness," 3. 

CLOSET. See "Tort," 25. 

CLUB. See Text. 

COBLER. See ' ' MisceUaneous, "46. 


COOK SWAN, THE. See " Husband and Wife," 12. 

COERCION. See Text. See also " Minorities," 2. 

COIN. See "Money." 

COINAGE OF THE BRAIN. See " Insanity." 

COKE. See Text. 

advice to the judges. See " Judges," 26 n., 45 n. 

COLD, BLOWING HOT AND. See " Counsel," 23 ; " Pleadings," 9. 
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264 INDEX. 

COLLATERAL ACT. See "Fraud," 23. 

COLLEGE. See " Universities," 1. 

COLLUSION. See " Fraud, ' ' 9, 16, 17. 

COLONIES. See "Criminal Justice," 3; "Judges," 45, n., 80, n.; 
"Judicial Proceedings," 6; "Law," 67; "Parliament," 3, ii.; 
"Privy Council." 

COLOUR. See " Pleadings," 10, n. 

COMBINATION. See "Criminal Justice," 50; " Equity," 35. 

COMMAND. See "Navy," 8. 

COMMENCEMENT. See "Usage," 14. 

COMMENDATION. See " Statutes," 13. 

COMMERCE. See Text. See also "Banker"; "Bankruptcy"; 
"BOlof Lading" ; "Companies," 7; "Contract"; "Discovery," 
4; " Liberty of the Subject," 5, w. ; "Name," n.; "Text Books," 
4; " Usage." 


agreement. See "Text Books," 4, 
morality. See " Commerce," 16. 
principles. See " Commerce," 28. 
transactions. See " Text Books," 4. 

COJIMISSION. See " Commerce," 8. 

COMMISSIONS OP THE JUDGES. See "Judges," 20, w. 

COMMITMENT. See " Contempt of Court"; "Judges," 14; "Punish- 
ment," 9. 

COMMITTAL. See " Contempt of Court." 
by Parliament. See " Parliament," 5. 
orders of. See ' ' Punishment, "9. 


good. See "Judicial Proceedings," 2, n. 

jury. See "Jury," 23. 

people. See "Money," 3. 

Pleas, Court of. See " Common Law," 9, n. 

race of men. See " Miscellaneous," 8. 

sense. See "Judges," 5 ; "Presumption," 1, 12; "Words," 7. 

justice and. See " Criminal Justice," 30. 
usage. See " Precedents," 10. 

COMMON LAW. See Text. See also "Dictum," 4; "Equity," 2, 
18,20,31, n.; "Feasts"; "International Law"; "Ireland," 3; 
"Judicial Decisions," 13, 19; "Law," 3, 17, n. ; "Matrimony," 
7; "Mischief,"l, n. ; " Parliament, " 13 ; "Poor," 2; "Practice," 
8; "Precedents," 10; "Public Servant," 6; "Statutes," 21, 23, 
24, 25; "Tort," 3, 10, n., 26; "Transfer of Right of Action"; 
"Usury," 1; " Woman," 2, n. 
Courts. See "Judges," 65. 

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INDEX. 265 

COMMONS, HOUSE OP. See "Parliament," 5, n., 8, 10, 11; 
" Sovereignty," 2, n. ; " Statutes," 11. 


COMMUNICATION, PRIVILEGED. See " Solicitor and Client," 1. 


COMMUNITY. See "Liberty of the Subject," 5; "Minorities"; 
" Money," 6 ; " Parliament," 13 ; " Tort," 14, 24. 
advantage to the. See " Parliament," 13. 

COMPANIES. See Text. See aZso " Corporations." 

COMPARATIVE. See " Miscellaneous, "38. 

COMPASSING DEATH. See " Sovereignty," 13. 

COMPASSION, FALSE. See " Punishment," 4. 

COMPENSATION. See " Chancery," 7 ; " Damages," 6. 

COMPETITION IN TRADE. See " Commerce," 15. 

COMPROMISE. See Text. See also "Criminal Justice," 41, 42; 
"Evidence," 33; "Litigation," 8. 



CONCESSION. See " Evidence," 33. 

CONCURRENT JURISDICTION. See "Jurisdiction," 19. 

CONDEMNATION. See ' ' Punishment. ' ' 

without hearing. See " Criminal Justice," 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17. 

CONDITION. See " Liberty of the Subject," 5, n. 

CONDUCT. See " Character " ; " Courts," 3; "Damages," 2 ; " Protec- 
tion," 1; "Reasonable," 3. 

CONDUIT-PIPES. See " Process," 1. 

CONFEDERACIES. See " Equity," 33. 

CONFESSION. See "Criminal Justice," 38, 39, 40; "Solicitor and 
Client," 1; "Truth," l,n. 

CONFIDENCE. See " Public Servant," 9 ; " Relief," 1. 


CONFLICT. See " Privy CouncU. " 
of oases. See " Jurisdiction," 4. 
of justice. See " Cases," 16. 

CONFLICTING EVIDENCE. See " Evidence, ",^22. 
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266 INDEX. 

CONFLICTS OF PUBLIC LIFE. See " Commerce, " 10. 

CONJEOTUBE. See " WiU," 18. 

CONSCIENCE. See "Administration of Justice,'' 20; "Courts," 8; 

"Equity," 19, to., 31, m., 32 ; "Judges," 26, 37, 76; "Law," 46; 

"Morals," 2; "Pardon," 2; "Precedents," 12, «. ; "Trial for 

Life," 1. 
Court of. See " Chancery," 9. 
law and. See " Law," 30. 

of the case. See " Administration of Justice," 18, n. 
relief against. See " Equity," 33. 
weak. See "Eeligion," 1, w. 

CONSENT. See Text. See also "Admission"; "Equity," 13, 33; 
"Jurisdiction," 8, 9, 10; "Precedents," 14; "Statutes," 24; 
" Usage," 2. 

CONSEQUENCES. See "Miscellaneous," 41. 

CONSIDBB, TIME TO. See " Time to Consider." 

CONSOLATION. See " Punishment," 6. 

CONSOLIDATION OF ACTION. See " Practice," 10. 

CONSTITUTION. See "Equity," 9; "Judicial Proceedings," 11; 
"Jury," 8; "Justice," 4; "Parliament," 8, 19; "Politics," 4; 
" Sovereignty," 2. 


CONSTBUCTION. See Text. See also "Administration of Justice," 
8,9; "Dictum"; "Equity," 10; "Judges," 70, 71, 72; "Juris- 
diction," 7 ; "Liberty of the Subject," 2 ; " Miscellaneous," 22, 23, 
24; "Parliament," 13, 17; "Practice," 16, 30; "Property," 3; 
" Beasonable," 4 ; " Beligion," 1 ; "Shipping," 4; " Statutes," 6, 
7, 12, 14 ; " Text Books," 4 ; " Universities," 2, n. ; " WiU," 2, n., 5, 
9, 18, n. ; " Words," 6. 
golden rule of. See " Statutes," 18, n. 

CONSULTATION. See " SoUcitor and CUent," 2. 

CONTEMPT OF COUBT. See Text. See also "Administration of 
Justice," 20, 21; "Courts," 3, 4; "Judges," 82, n. ; "Judicial 
Proceedings," 11 ; " Miscellaneous," 36, n. ; "Process," 2. 

CONTEMPTIBLE THING. See "Miscellaneous," 47. 

CONTENDING PABTIES. See " Bights," 3. 

CONTEXT. See " Will," 16. 

CONTINGENCIES. See " Judges," 8. 

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INDEX. 267 

CONTRA BONOS MOBES. See " Morals," 1. 

CONTRACT. See Text. See also " Consent," 3 ; " Construction," 27 ; 
"Fraud," 14; "Matrimony," 5, 6; " Miscellaneous," 11 ; "Ship- 
ping," 4 ; " Statutes," 26, n. ; " Tort," 16 ; " Truth," 3. 

CONTRADICTION. See " Precedents," 16. 



CONTROL. See "Magistrates," 2; "Schoolmaster," 1. 

CONVENIENCE. See " Commerce," 23; "Equity," 33, 36; "Judicial 
Proceedings," 2, TO. ; "Usage," 9; "War." 
public. See "Limitation," 1. 
reasons of public benefit and. See " Judges," 47. 

CONVEYANCE. See Text. See also "Covenant"; "Presumption," 
10 ; " Statutes," 12 ; " Title " ; " Will," 4. 

CONVERSATION. See " Truth," 13. 

CONVICT. See "Punishment." 

CONVICTION. See " Appeals," 3 ; " Criminal Justice," 4, 10, 11 ; " Judg- 
ment " ; " Presumption," 5. 

judgment an essential pari in every. See " Criminal Justice," 55. 

must be good in all its parts. See " Criminal Justice," 54. 

not in the nature of a verdict and judgment. See " Criminal 
Justice," 53. 

previous. See " Punishment," 10. 

CO-ORDINATE JURISDICTION. See "Construction," 13; "Judicial 
Decisions," 12, 16 ; " Jurisdiction," 20 ; "Law." 53. 

COPYHOLD. See " Land." 

COPYRIGHT. See " Books," 1. 

CORONER. See " Evidence," 17. 

CORPORATIONS. See Text. See also " Tort," 19. 

CORPUS DELICTI. See " Criminal Justice," 3, 9. 

CORRECTION. See " Punishment," 7. 

CORROBORATION. See " Evidence, "31. 

CORRUPTION. See " Administration of Justice," 35 ; " Discretion," 7, 
9; "Judges," 76. 

COST. See "Will," 5. 

COSTS. See Text. See also •■Amendments," 9, 10, 11; "Construc- 
tion," 26; "Damages," 5; "Demurrer"; "Expense"; "Litiga- 
tion," 4. 

COUNCIL, PRIVY. See " Privy Council" ; " Criminal Justice," 3. 
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268 INDEX. 

COUNSEL. See Text. See also "Administration of Justice," 16; 
" Amendments," 7 ; " Appeals," 4 ; " Attorney-General " ; " Bible," 
1, TC. ; "Consent," 6,n.; "Courts," 4, n. ; "Criminal Justice," 3, 
13, 27, 28; "Evidence." 13, 15, 16, 23; "Interrogatories"; 
"Judges," 26, /i., 51, 70, 71, 72; "Jury," 15, 31, n. ; "Nonsuit," to. ; 
" Opening Speech "; " Pleadings," 7, 12 ; " Politics," 2 ; " Practice," 
U; " Precedents," 4, 5, 12 ; "Public Policy," 8; "Scotland," 2; 
" Time," 3, n. ; " Will," 18, n. ; " Witness," 2. See also references 
from " Bar " ; " Legal Profession. ' ' 

assignment of. See " Trial for Life," 1, n. 

Judges as, for the prisoner. See " Judges," 77, 78, 79, 80. 

COUNTERFEIT. See " Truth," 2. 
COUNTBRPLEA. See " Pleadings," 9. 


fellows, ignorant. See " Jury," 10. 

foreign. See " Revenue." 

the good of the. See "Politics," 1. 

to be tried by God and. See " Criminal Justice," 48, n., 49. 


of nature. See " Statutes," 5. 

of the Court. See references from " Law of the Court." 


contempt of. See references from " Contempt of Court. ' ' 
frustrating sentence of the. See " Criminal Justice," 50. 
in Banc. See "Practice," 3. 
Inns of. See " Counsel" ; " Inns of Court." 
law of the. See " New Trial," 3. 
of Appeal. See " Appeals " ; " Parliament," 19. 
of Chancery. See references from " Chancery." 
of Common Pleas. See " Common Law," 9, n. 

of co-ordinate jurisdiction. See references from " Co-ordinate Juris- 
of error. See " Appeals," 4, n. 
of morals. See " Fraud," 21 ; " Morals," 3. 
officers. See •' Criminal Justice," 50 ; " Practice," 1, 19, 29, 33. 
payment into. See " Payment into Court." 
permanent. See " Parliament," 1. 
piepoudre. See " Judicial Decisions," 8. 

protecting the dignity of the. See " Administration of Justice," 20. 
rules of. See " Chancery," 3. 
standing. See " Parliament," 1. 
tying the hands of the. See " Judges," 18. 
wards of. See " Parent and Child," 3. 

COURT LEET. See Text. 


abstain from deciding more than immediate point requires. See 
" Administration of Justice," 7, 8. 

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INDEX. 269 

COXyR'SS— continued. 

British. See " Criminal Justice," 26; "Law," 6; "Parliament,"!, 
6, 18, 19. 

casting votes in. See " Judges," 53. 

common law. See " Judges," 65 ; " Practice," 8. 

decisions of House of Lords binding upon all. See "Parliament," 18. 

faoUity to be given to all persons for redress. See " Parliament," 9. 

foreign. See " Foreign Law.", 

must adjudge according to law and reason. See " Precedents," i. 

of Appeal. See " Privy Council." See also references from " Appeals." 

of justice and principles of honour. See "Administration of Justice," 

of record. See "Administration of Justice," 4; " Judicial Decisions," 8. 

rights and prerogatives of the Crown as to. See "Crown.'' 

wUl not search for precedents. See " Precedents," 4. 

See also Text, infra, and the following: — "Contempt of Court"; 
Counsel," 8, 9, 19, 20, 24; "Criminal Justice," 25; "Delay"; 
"Dictum"; "Discretion"; "Doctrine"; "Ecclesiastical," 6, n.; 
" Ejectment," 2 ; "Equity," 33; "Evidence," 10, n.; "Evil," 1' 
"Fiction"; "Forfeiture"; "Fraud," 14, 15, 23; "Husband and 
Wife," 5 ; " International Law," 3 ; " Judges," 14, 21, 48, 73, 81. 82; 
"Judicial Decisions," 8, 12, 26; "Judicial Proceedings," 7; 
"Justice," 5; "Law," 38; "Law Reports," 3, ,n.; "Legal Pro- 
fession"; "Litigation," 2; "Magistrates," 6; "Married 
Woman"; "Morals," 1, 3; "Motives," 12; "New Trial"; "Non- 
suit"; "Opening Speech," 1; "Pardon"; "Parliament," 6, 7; 
" Payment into Court " ; " Perjury " ; "Pleadings," 6 ; " Politics," 
2,5; "Practice," 7, 11, 13, 14, 26; "Precedents"; "Process"; 
" Public Servant," 5 ; " Punishment," 6 ; " Railway Company," 1 ; 
"Reasonable"; "Belief." 3; "Statutes," 12, 14, 17; "Sunday," 
2; " Supreme Court " ; "Time"; "Tort," 8, 19, 27; "Transfer of 
Eight of Action " ; " War » ; " Will," 2, 7, 15. 

COVENANT. See Text. 

COW, THE. See " Miscellaneous," 59. 

CREDIT. See " Commerce," 17. 18, 21, 27. 

CREDITOR. See " Dihgence," 1. 

CRIME. See "Law," 32, 59. 

mode of trial for. See " Criminal Justice," 31. 
profit of. See " Criminal Justice," 51. 


branded as. See " Religion," 3. 

cases. See " Criminal Justice," 1 ; " Evidence," 1 ; " Presumption," 
flight in. See " Criminal Justice," 39, 40. 
importance of public judgments in. See "Judges," 48, n., 52. 
combination. See " Criminal Justice," 50. 
conduct. See " Husband and Wife," 15. 
information. See " Attorney-General," 1. 

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270 INDEX. 


jurisdiotion. See " Punishment," 6. 

justice. See Text. See also -Appeals," 3; "Character"; 
" Counsel," 14 ; " Courts," 5 ; " Discretion," 14 ; " Evidence," 11, 
23; "Husband and Wife," 15; "Insanity"; "Judges," 77, 78,79, 
80; "Jury," 9; " Law," 65 ; "New Trial," 1, n. ; "Pardon"; 
"Pleadings," 1, n. ; "Politics," 4; "Presumption," 5, 6, 11; 
" Punishment," 4, 5 ; " Trial for Life." 

law. See " Criminal Justice," 35, 52 ; " Fraud," 33 ; "Insanity"; 
" Judges," 52. 

practice. See " Criminal Justice," 27, 28. 

suit, the. See " Courts," 7. 

trials. See " Criminal Justice," 29 ; "Judges," 70, n. 


public. See " Judges," 82, n. ; " Judicial Proceedings," 7. 
unfair. See " Judges," 70, n. 

CEOSS-BXAMINATION. See " Counsel," 5 ; " Evidence," 15, 18, 19, 21. 

CROW, THE. See " MisoeUaneous," 37. 

CROWD, WHAT CONSTITUTES A. See " Evidence," 30, n. 


mercy the prerogative of the. See "Administration of Justice," 33, n. 

Ofiace. See " Practice," 2, n. 

See Text. See also " Corporations," 3 ; " Costs," 4, 5 ; " Criminal 
Justice," 26, 41; "Delay"; "Government"; "Highway" 
"Judges," 20, n.; "King"; "Magistrates," 3; "Mistakes" 
"Opening Speech," 3; "Pardon," 1; "Public Servant" 
" Sovereignty " ; " Tort," 15, n. 

CRUELTY. See " Husband and Wife," 4, 8. 

CUNNING. See " Miscellaneous," 19 ; " Pleadings," 12 ; " Truth," 6. 

CXJB. ADV. YTJLT. See re/ereraces/rom "Time to Consider." 

CURIOSITIES, COLLECTION OP. See "Judicial Decisions," 22. 

CURRENCY. See " Commerce," 33 ; " Money," 4. 

CURTAILMENT. See " Statutes," 7. 


and habits of the English. See " Simday," 1. 

of Judges. See "Will," 5. 

of lawyers. See " Will," 5. 

See also "Banker," "Christianity," 6; "Commerce," 22, 24,25; 

" Common Law," 3, 8 ; " Parliament," 5 ; " Usage " ; " Woman," 


CUTTING KNOTS. See "Chancery," 8; "WiU," 8, n. See also 
reference from " Gordian Knot." 

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INDEX. 271 

DAMAGE. See "Fraud," 18; "Miscellaneous," 12, n. ; "Tort," 5, 9, 
10, 11. 
to property. See " Tort," 7. 

DAMAGES. See Text. See also " Jury," 12 ; " Motives," 13, n. ; " Public 
Servant," 3. 

DANGEE. See " Miscellaneous," 10. 

DAVID. See " Sovereignty," 1. 

DAY. See Text. 

juridical. See " Sunday," 4. 

labourer. See "Master and Servant," 1. 

DAYS, WOEKING. See '• Sunday," 1. 

DEATH. See "Property," 2; "Eeligion," 3; "Will," 1, n. 
compassing. See " Sovereignty," 13. 

DEBATES AMONG JUDGES. See " Judges," 48. 

DEBT. See "Bankruptcy," 5; "Bctuity," 33, n.; "Gambling"; 
" Limitation " ; " Transfer of Eight of Action." 
imprisonment for. See "Punishment," 9, to. 

DEBTOE. See "Precedents," 1, n. ; "Punishment," 9. 

DECEIT. See " Fraud," 6, 8, 10, 16 ; " Miscellaneous," 10, 19, 48. 

DECENCY. See " Counsel," 11 ; "Courts," 3, 4, n. ; " Magistrates," 6 ; 
" Property, ' ' 9. See also reference from " Deoorousness. ' ' 
laws of. See " Law," 61. 


epitome of the. See " Judicial Deoisio);is," 25. 

in a Court of honour. See " Administration of Justice," 18. 

Judge quoting his own. See " Judges," 15. 

of a Lord Chancellor. See " Chancery," 12, 13 ; " Common Law," 10. 

of the House of Lords. See "Parliament," 18. 

overruling a. See " Judicial Decisions," 20. 

reasons for. See " Judges," 48, n. 

See aZso " American Decisions " ; "Appeals"; "Cases"; "Counsel," 
17, 18 ; " Criminal Justice," 6 ; " Dictum " ; " International Law," 
4; "Ireland," 4; "Judgment"; "Judicial Decisions"; "Law 
Eeports " ; " Obiter Dicta " ; " Practice," 4, 5, 6. 

DECLAMATION. See " Politics," 1. 

DECOEOTJSNESS. See " Opening Speech," 2, w. See also references 
from "Decency." 

DECOEUM OF JUDGES. See " Judges," 82. 

DECEEE. See " Equity, ' ' 7, 29. 

DEED. See " Construction" ; " Conveyance" ; " Covenant " ; " Statutes," 

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272 INDEX. 

DEEDS. See " Words," 7, n. 
title. See " Title," 2, 4. 

DEFENCE. See "Criminal Justice," 10, 11, 13, 18, 27, 28; "Fraud," 
7;"Law,"54; "Limitation," 1, ra.; "Navy," 3, »s., 6, 7 ; "Plead- 
ings," 5 ; "Prosecution" ; " Trespass," 1. 
full. See •• Trial for Life," 2. 
iniquity as a. See " Fraud," 30. 
of prisoners. See " Judges," 77, 78, 79, 80. 
of the kingdom. See " Public Policy," 6. 


Judges as counsel for. See " Judges," 77, 78, 79, 80. 

right to speak by counsel. See " Criminal Justice," 27. 

See also "Chancery," 4; "Construction," 22; "Costs," 2; " Criminal 

Justice," 1,2,7; "Discovery," 2; "Fraud," 11; "Jury," 10, ra. ; 

"Justice," 6; " Motives," 5, to. ; "Pleadings," 7; "Practice," 10, n., 

80; "Tort," 2. 

DEFINITION. See " Construction," 20. 

DEITY. See " Sovereignty," 2, n. 

DELAY. See Text. See also "Appeals," 4, n. ; "Construction," 26; 
"Diligence," 1; " Judges," 26, w. ; "Jury," 24; "Trial for Life," 
1, n. 

DELINQUENT. See " Punishment," 7. 

DEMAND, STALE. See "Equity," 33, 34 ; " Limitation," 1, n. 

DEMAECATION. See " Jurisdiction." 5. 

DEMEEIT. See " Punishment," 6. 

DEMUBEEB. See Text. 

DENIAL. See "Pleadings," 9. 

DEPOSITIONS. See " Evidence," 17. 

DESCENT. See " Property," 9. 

DESPEBATE EASHNESS. See " MisoeUaneous," 35. 

DESTINY, CHICKENS OF. See " Obiter Dicta," 1. 

DESTEUCTION, EESCUB FEOM. See " Shipping," 1, 2. 

DEVIATION. See "Statutes," 27. , 

DICTA, OBITEE. See " Obiter Dicta." 

DICTIONABY. See "WiU," 8. 

Johnson's. See " Literature," 2. 

DICTUM. See Text. See also " Law Eeports," 1, n. ; " Practice," 4. 

DIFFEEENCE. See ' ' Statutes, ' ' 20. 
of opinion. See " Judges," 54, 55. 

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INDEX. 273 

DIGNITY. See " Contempt of Court," 2 ; " Parent and Child," 1. 

DILIGENCE. See Text. See also " Equity," 33. 

DIRECTION. See " Jury," 18. 

DIRECTOR. See " Companies," 5, 6, 8. 

DIRT. See " Tort," 18. 

DISCIPLINE. See "Contempt of Court," 2; "Courts," 6; "Navy," 
5, 8. 

DISCOVERY. See Text. See also "Chancery," 6; "Public Servant," 
5 ; " Solicitor and Client," 1. 

DISCRETION. See Text. See also "Counsel," 25; "Equity," 3; 
"Evidence," 16, 18; "Judges," 68; " Judicial Decisions," 7; "New 
Trial," 3; "Practice," 83; "Reasonable," 4. 

DISCUSSION. See " Judges," 18. 

free. See " Liberty of the Press," 9. 
political. See " Politics," 2, 5. 


act, law upholding a. See " Law," 74. 
Judges. See " Judges," 59. 

DISHONESTY. See "Corruption"; "Discretion," 9; "Fraud," 24; 
" Honesty," 2. 

DISMISSAL, ARBITRARY. See "Master and Servant," 1. 

DISPARAGEMENT. See ' ' Public Servant, ' ' 8. 

DISPENSATION. See " Necessity," 1. 
of law. See " Law," 62. 

DISPOSAL OP PROPERTY. See "Property," 2. 

DISPUTES. See " Words," 2. 

DISREPUTATION. See " Libel," 8. 

DISSENSION. See " Husband and Wife," 5 ; " MisoeUaneous," 25, 26. 

DISTRESS. See " Christianity," 11 ; " Evidence," 29. 

DIVORCE. See " Judicial Proceedings," 10. 

DOCTOR. See " Ecclesiastical," 3. 

DOCTRINE. See Text. 

DOCUMENTS. See " Costs," 1. 

DOE, JOHN. See "Jury," 10, n. 

DOG. See "Miscellaneous," 51. , 

D.L.Q. 18 

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274 INDEX. 

DOMIOIL. See Text. 

DONATIONS. See " Universities," 2, n. See also references from 

DORMANT LAWS. See " Law," 73. 

DOUBLE SENTENCE. See " Punishment," 10. 

DOUBT. See " Oases," 14 ; " MisoeUaneous," 2, 40 ; " Precedents," 13 

DOWER. See "Law," 18. 

DRUNKENNESS. See " Intoxication " ; " Presumption," 11. 

DURATION, PERPETUAL. See " Rights," 4. 

DUTY. See "Public Servant," 6, 11 ; " Tort," 3. 
breach of legal. See " Tort," 2. 
legal. See " Equity," 38. 
neglect of. See " Miscellaneous," 11. 
to God, King, and Commonwealth. See " Judges," 76. 
to prosecute or not. See " Criminal Justice," 41. 
to society. See "Protection," 2. 

DYING PERSONS. See " Will," 1. 

EARLY TIMES. See references from " Times." 

EAR-MARK. See ' ' Money, "4. 

ECCLESIASTICAL. See Text. See also "Bible"; "Christianity"; 
" Church " ; " Criminal Justice," 48 ; " Matrimony " ; " Religion." 
Courts. See " Coke," 4. 

EDUCATION. See " Parent and Child'," 2 ; " Schoolmaster " ; "Univer- 
sities," 2. 

EGG. See "Title," 3. 



ELECTION. See " Law," 14, n. ; " Politics," 4 ; " Rights," 3 ; " Tort," 4. 

ELOQUENCE. See " Jury," 15 ; "Law," 28. 

EMPLOYMENT. See " Master and Servant," 1. 

ENACTMENTS. See " Parliament," 13 ; " Statutes." 

ENEMY. See " Navy," 5 ; " War." 

ENGINEER. See " Witness," 5. 

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INDEX. 275 

ENGLAND. See " Christianity," 5, 7, 12; " Oommeroe," 2 ; " Husband 
and Wife," 4; "Ireland," 2; "Privy Council"; "Property," 11; 
"Punishment," 8; " Trial for Life," 1. 

appeal to the law of. See " Law," 24. 

Church of. See " Ecclesiastical," 1, 6. 

Commons of. See "Parliament," 11. 

customs of. See " Usage," 12. , 

enemies of. See " Ecclesiastical," 3, n. 

feudal law in. See " Law," 4. 

increase of population in. See " Ecclesiastical," 3, n. 

land in. See " Will," 5. 

law of. See "Cases," 15; "Criminal Justice," 46; "Doctrine," 2; 
"Husband and Wife," 6; "International Law," 3; "Judges," 62; 
" Law," 88, 47, 48, 56, 57, 66 ; " Law of England " ; " Liberty of the 
Press," 7; "Mischief," 2; "Parliament," 3, n. ; "Presumption," 
6; " Property," 6 ; "Eights,"4; "Sovereignty"; "Trespass," 2 ; 
"Trial for Life," 1. 

legal power in. See " Law," 59. 

liberty of the press in. See "Liberty of the Press," 5. 

professional advice in. See "Legal Profession," 3. 

the naval dominion of. See "Navy," 3, n. 

the royal navy of. See "Navy," 5. 

the salvation of. See " Navy," 5. 

working days in. See " Sunday," 1. 

ENGLISH. See "Law," 65 ; " Sunday," 1 ; " WiU," 8 ; "Words," 6. 
ectuity. See "Equity," 31, n. 
Courts of law. See "Administration of Justice," 11; "American 

Decisions," 2 ; " Courts," 1. 
law. See references from " England, Law of." 
liberty. See " Liberty of the Press," 2. 
public. See " Commerce," 7. 
subjects. See "British Subjects." 

ENGLISHMEN. See "Administration of Justice," 20, n.; "Amuse- 
ments"; "Ecclesiastical," 5, n.; "Judges," 62; "Law," 91 
" Liberty of the Press," 2, 9 ; "Litigation," 1 ; " Parliament," 8 ; 
" Presumption," 7 ; " Sovereignty," 5. 


ENLIGHTENED MEN. See "Mistakes," 1. 

ENSNARING QUESTION. See "Evidence," 14. 

ENTRY. See ' ' Property, "5. 

EPITOME. See " Judicial Decisions," 25. 


in equity. See " Equity," 8, n. 
in law. See "Law," 19. 
in society. See " Justice," 3. 
of votes. See "Parliament," 19. 


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276 INDEX. 

EQUITY. See Text. See also "Chancery"; " Commeroe," 4, 20, 32 
"Common Law," 9: "Construction," 28; "Courts," 1, 8, 9 
"Fiction," 2, n.; "Fraud," 34; "Law," 14, n., 17, 32, 51 
"Pardon," 1, n. ; "Practice," 3 ; " Statutes," 26, n. ; " Tort." 
Courts of. See " Limitation," 1. 

EEROR. See "Amusements"; "Chancery," 12; "Consent," 4, n. ; 
" Criminal Justice," 52 ; "Irregularity " ; "Judges," 17, 18, 48, n., 
60 ; " Law Reports," 3, n. ; " Liberty of the Press," 1 ; " Mistakes " ; 
"Practice," 21; "Words." 
writ of. See "Appeals," 1, 4, TO. 


from arrest. See " Trespass," 2, n. 

of guilty persons. See " Criminal Justice," 32, 87. 

of prisoner. See " Criminal Justice," 30, 38, 39, 40. 

ESQUIRE. See Text. 

ESSENCE OP JUSTICE. See "Criminal Justice," 16. 

ESTATE. See "Money," 2, n.; "Presumption," 10; " Property," 6 ; 

" Settlements," 1 ; " Title," 2. 
ESTIMATE. See Text. 
ETERNAL JUSTICE. See " Money," 5. 
ETYMOLOGY. See " Construction," 20 ; " Will," 8. 
EVASION OF THE LAW. See " Law," 15. 
EVENT. See " Miscellaneous," 15. 
EVENTS, AFTER. See " MisceUaneous," 41. 

EVIDENCE. See Text. See also "Administration of Justice," 5; 
" Affidavit," 1, w. ; "Chancery," 11; "Character," 2, ». ; "Com- 
merce," 34; " Coimsel," 12; "Courts," 1, 8; "Criminal Justice," 
1, 2, 16; "Foreign Law," 4 ; "Husband and Wife," 14 ; "Inter- 
rogatories " ; " Judicial Proceedings," 6, n. ; " Jury," 4, 14, 16, 17, 26 ; 
" Limitation," l,n. ; " Miscellaneous," 40, 43 ; "Opening Speech," 
1, 4 ; " Perjury " ; " Politics," 7 ; " Practice," 22 ; " Presumption," 
8; "Punishment," 1, n. ; "Reasonable," 4; "Reputation"; 
"Time," 3; "Trial for Life," 2; "Truth," 3, 7; " Usage," 8 ; 
"WiU," 10; "Witness," 4. 

disbelief of. See " Criminal Justice," 36. 

information to be supported by. See " Criminal Justice," 54. 

judgment founded upon. See " Delay," 1. 

legal, no prisoner convicted except on. See " Judges," 80. 

of guilt. See " Criminal Justice," 38. 

of law. See " Precedents," 18. 

presumptive. See " Presumption," 6. 

reasonable. See " Presumption," 11. 

rules of. See " Criminal Justice," 1,5; " Law," 27, 28, 46. 

scintilla of. See " Railway Company," 1. 

suppression of. See " Costs," 1. 

written. See " Practice," 11. 

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INDEX. 277 

EVIL. See Text. See aUo " Doctrine," 3 ; " Miscellaneous," 58 ; " Punish- 
ment," 3 ; " Tort," 22. 
of war. See " Navy," 7. 

EXAMINATION. Se« " Interrogatories " ; "Time," 3; " Witness," 2. 
cross. See " Counsel," S. 
of witness. See " Evidence," 15, 16, 17, 18. 

EXAMPLE. See " MisceUaneous," 20, 32 ; " Punishment," 1, 2, 6. 

EXCEPTION. See " Evidence," 15, n. ; " Practice," 25. 

EXCESS OE JUEISDICTION. See " Dictum," 4 ; " Magistrates," 3. 

EXCOMMUNICATION. See " Corporations," 6. 

EXCUSE. See " Damages," 4 ; " Libel," 1 ; " MisceUaneous," 29. 

EXECUTION. See " Practice," 29 ; " Punishment," 2, n. 


EXECUTIVE. See " Government " ; " Pardon," 3 ; " Statutes," 1. 

and legislative power in the State. See " Administration of justice," 

EXISTENCE. See " Property," 1. 

EXPECTANCY. See " Property," 1. 

EXPENSES. See " Construction," 26; "Costs," 1; "Discretion," 15; 
" Litigation," 4 ; " WiU," i. 

EXPEEIENCE. See " Practice," 2, 83. 
men of. See " Money," 2, n. 
of mankind. See " Miscellaneous," 6. 

EXPEBT. See " Insanity," 2, n. 

EXPRESSIONS. See " Words," 3, 8. 

EXTORTION. See " Fraud," 4, n., 8. 

EXTRA-JUDICIAL OPINION. See " Judges," 24, 25. 


of the law, the. See references from " Words." 
witness. See " Evidence," 81, n. 

EYRE, LORD. See " Precedents," 15. 

PACES, MEN'S. See " Motives," 10. 

PACT. See "Jury"; "Perjury"; "Precedents," 13; "Presumption," 
7, 8, 9 ; " Reasonable," 1 ; " Witness," 1. 
known. See "Law," 72. 
law upon the. See " Law," 36. 
question of. See " Equity," 14 ; " Evidence," 6, 30 ; " Fraud," 13. 

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278 INDEX. 


admission of. See " Evidence," 33. 

drawing inference or oonolusion from. See "Administration of 

Justice," 5 ; " Evidence," 6. 
suppression of. See " Costs," 1. 
traveUing beyond. See " Judges," 63. 

FAILURE TO ENSURE JUSTICE. See " Administration of Justice," 
15 ; " Chancery," 10. 

FAIR TRIAL. See " Criminal Justice," 31. 

FAIRNESS. See " Reasonable,' ' 4. 

FALLIBILITY IN A JUDGE. See "Discretion," 7. 

FALL OP MAN. See " Matrimony," 2. 


colours, hanging out. See " Miscellaneous," 48. 
compassion. See "Punishment," 4. 
judgment. See " Appeals," 1. 
representations. See " Fraud," 2, 7. 
statement. See " Perjury." 

FALSEHOOD. See " Fraud," 10, 27 ; " Judges," 26 ; " Libel," 2 ; " Lie " ; 
" Name " ; " Truth," 1, 7 ; " Witness," 1. 

FAME. See " Literature," 1. 

FAMILY. See Text. See also " Husband and Wife " ; " Literature," 2. 
afiair. See " Compromise." 
estate. See " Money," 2, n. 
interest. See " Property," 9. 
life. See " Parent and Child," 2, n. 

FASHIONS OF THE TIMES. See "Law," 45; "Usage," 13. 


and loose. See " Settlements," 1. 
rule, hard and. See " Text Books," 4. 

FATHER. See " Parent and Child," 1, 2, 3, 6. 
a nursing. See " Statutes," 23. 
of equity. See " Equity," 30, n. 

FATHERS, OUR. See " Miscellaneous," 2, n. 

FAULT, EVERY MAN'S. See " MisoeUaneous," 33. 

FAULTY PRECEDENT. See "Precedents," 20. 

FAVOUR. See " Punishment," 6. 
fear or. See " Judges," 74. 

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INDEX. 279 

FAVOURS IN THE LAW. See "Law," 18. 


God. See " Miscellaneous," 20. 
or favour. See " Judges," 74. 

FEASTS. See Text. 

FEELINGS, MEN'S. See " Motives," 10. 

FEES. See " PubUo Servant," 7 ; " Time," 3, n. ; " Witness," 5. 


creature. See " Usury," 2. 

subjects. See references from " British Subjects." 

FELLOWS OF COLLEGES. See " Universities," 1. 

FELONY, DOCTRINE IN. See "Criminal Justice," 33. See also 
" Criminal Justice," 39, 40 ; " Evidence," 17. 

FEMALE. See " Husband and Wife," 12. 

FEME SOLE. See " Settlements," 1. 

FEOFFEE. See " Morals," 2. 

FEOFFMENT. See " Title," 2. 

FEOFFOR. See " Morals," 2. 

FETTERS. See " Discretion," 12, and references there given. 

FEUDAL LAW. See "Law," 4. 

FICTION. See Text. See also " Presumption," 7 ; " Truth," 10. 
of law. See "Tort," 27. 


name. See " Commerce," 27 ; " Jury," 10, n. 

proceedings. See " Administration of Justice," 6 ; " Jury," 10, n. 

FIGHT. See '• Pleadings," 7. 

PINE. See " Cent mpt of Court," 8 ; " Forfeiture " ; " Reasonable," 2 ; 
" Statutes," 27. 
power to. See " Punishment," 8. 

FIRST IMPRESSIONS. See " MisceUaneous," 43. 
FISH. See "Miscellaneous," 50. 
PLIGHT IN CRIMINAL CASES. See " Criminal Justice," 39, 40- 
FLOWERS OF SPEECH. See " Truth," 6. 
FOOL, MAKING, OP ANOTHER. See "Criminal Justice," 44. 
FOOLISH WOMAN. See " Criminal Justice," 23. 
FORBEARANCE. See " MisceUaneous," 21. 
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280 INDEX. 

FORCE, MATTEBS OP. See " Hostility." 


country. See " Equity," 2 ; " Law," 66, 67 ; " Revenue " ; " Tort," 1. 

government. Se« "Foreign Law." 

jurisdiction. See " Tort," 1. 

kingdom. See " Husband and Wife," 4. 

language. See " Law," 65. 

law. See Text. 

ports, working days in. See " Sunday," 1. 

tongue. See " Law," 65. 

word. See " Will," 8. 

FOREIGNER. See " Contract," 2 ; " Scotland," 1. 

FORESWEARING. ,See "Truth," 7. 


FORGIVENESS. See " Husband and Wife," 10. 

FORM. See "Construction," 32; "Law," 46; "Practice," 28. 
and principles. See " Judges," 66. 
of law. See " Tort," 27. 
sUp in. See " Will," 10. 

FORMAL OBJECTIONS. See " Criminal Justice," 3 ; " Pleadings," 12. 

FORTRESS. See " Trespass," 1. 

FOWLS. See • • Husband and Wife, "12. 

FRAMER. See " Statutes," 2, 3. 

FRAMING OF INSTRUMENTS. See "Conveyance," 2; "Statutes," 

FRANCE. See " Ecclesiastical," 3, n. 

FRAUD. See Text. See also ' ' Commerce, " 34 ; " Companies, " 3 ; " Con- 
tract " ; " Criminal Justice," 51; "Equity," 28; "Infant" 
"Miscellaneous," 48; "Motives," 8; "Name"; " Will," 10. 

FRAUDS, STATUTE OP. See "Fraud " 7 ; " Statutes," 26, n. 


discussion. See " Liberty of the Press," 9. 
to be. See " Liberty of the Press," 3. 


of speech. See Text. 

of trade. See " Commerce," 8 ; " Liberty of the Subject," 5, n. 

FREEHOLD. See Text. 

FRIEND. See " Judges," 48, »i., 81. 

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INDEX. 281 

FRIVOLOUS PLEA. See " Pleadings." 

Justice," 50. 

PULL DEFENCE. See "Trial for Life," 2. 

FUNDS. See " Universities," 1. See also " Charity." 

GAIN. See " Oommeroe," 9. 

GAMBLING. See Text. 

GAME. See Text. 

GAMING. See ' ' Cockfighting. ' ' 

GAZETTE. See Text. 

GENERAL GOOD. See " Public Policy," 5. 

GENEROSITY. See " MisceUaneous," 21. 

GENTLEMAN. See "Counsel," 1, 2; " Eso[uire," 3; "Legal Profes- 
sion," 2. 
disregarding principle of conduct of. See " Damages," 2. 

GIBBETS, LAW OP. See " New Trial," 1, n. 

GIFT. See " Charity " ; " Judges," 81, n. 

of God, communication of thoughts, &c., the. See "Freedom of 


hour. See "Time," 3. 
sand. See " Time," 3, n. 

GLOVE. See " Miscellaneous," 39. 

GOD. See "Ireland," 2; "Matrimony," 2; " Mistakes, " 4 ; "Motives," 

4, 5, 6, 7; "Parent and Child," 2; "Poor," 1; "Religion," 3; 

" Sovereignty," 1, 2, n. ; " Woman," 2, n. ; " Words." 
act of. See " Miscellaneous," 12, n. 
and ooimtry. See " Criminal Justice," 48, 49. 
duty to. See " Judges," 76. 
fear. See "MisceUaneous," 20. 
forbid. See references from " Words." 
gift of. See " Gift of God." 
in Gloucester. See " MisceUaneous," 57. 
Judges and. See "Pardon," 2. 
law of. See "Christianity," 4, 5, 8, 9; "Criminal Justice," 11; 

"Government"; "Judicial Proceedings," 9; "Law," 56, 57, 62; 

"Parent and ChUd," 6; " Woman," 2. 
made man. See " Law," 57. 
man and. See " PoUtios," 3. 
taking name of, in vain. See "Blasphemy"; "Criminal Justice," 

20 ; " Liberty of the Subject," 5, n. 
thank. See " Politics," 6. 

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282 INDEX. 


acre. See " Charity," 2. 

arrow. See " Miscellaneous," 12. 

house. See " Charity," 2. 

name. See " Judges," 73 ; "Truth," 11. 

saints. See " Clergy," 1. 

servants. See " Clergy," 2. 

thoughts. See " Law," 68, n. 

will. See " Virtue," 1. 


mete-waud. See " Discretion," 7 ; " Sovereignty," 14. 
rule. See " Construction," 31 ; " Statutes," 18, n. 

GOOD. See "Evil," 2; "Law," 68. 

circumstances. See " Miscellaneous," 44. 

faith. See " Commerce," 29 ; " Equity," 33. 

men. See " Parent and Child," 3. 

ofaoer. See " Pardon," 4. 

policy. See " Navy," 7. 

sense. See "Law," 17. 

things. See " Truth," 12. 

win. See " Truth," 12. 

women. See " Parent and Child," 3. 

GOODS, CONSIGNMENT OF. See " Commerce," 18. 

GOBDIAN KNOT. See "Miscellaneous," 22; also references from 
" Cutting Knots." 

GOTHIC ARCHITECTURE. See " Property," 11. 

GOVERNMENT. See Text. \See also "Corporations," 4; "Court 
Leet"; "Crown"; "Libel," 4; "Liberty of the Press," 1, 6; 
"Liberty of the Subject," 3 ; "Schoolmaster," 1; "Sovereignty," 
7; "War"; " Statutes," 1 ; "Woman," 2, n. ; also references from 
"Administration of Government," supra. 

by law. See " Liberty of the Press," 3. 

foreign. See " Foreign Law." 

true principles of. See " Mischief," 2. 

GOVERNOR. See " Ecclesiastical," 3. 
GRAMMAR. See " Will," 8. 
GRAMMARIAN. See " Statutes," 6. 
GRANT. See " Presumption," 8 ; " Title," 2. 
GRAY'S INN. See " Counsel," 6, n. ; " Courts," 4, n. 
GRAVE. See " WiU," 13. 

GRAVES OP PRINCES. See " MisoeUaneous," 16. 
GREAT MEN. See "MisoeUaneous," 3. 

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INDEX. 283 

GREEDINESS OP GAIN. See " Money," 2. 

GRIEVANCE, REDRESS FOR. See " Law," 66 ; " Parliament," 9. 

GROUND OP ACTION, PAIR. See " Relief," 3 ; " Tort," 1. 

GROWTH OP LAWS. See " Law," 3 ; " Parliament," 3, n. 


GUESSING. See " WiU," 2. 

GUIDE. See " WiU," 2. 

GUILT. See " Punishment," 4. 

acknowledgment of. See " Criminal Justioe," iO. 
evidence of. See " Criminal Justioe," 38. 
plea of. See " Criminal Justioe," 47, 48, 
shrine of. See " Criminal Justice," 30. 


escape of the. See " Criminal Justice," 82. 
punishment to the. See " Damages," 1. 

HABEAS COBPUS. See " Liberty of the Subject," 2. 


lifting up the. See " Bible," 3, n. ; " Criminal Justice," 46. 
in hand, law and justice. See " Equity," 8 ; " Law," 50. 

legality and oppression. See " Law," 75. 

wickedness and weakness. See " Miscellaneous," 58. 
poUuted. See " Fraud," 32. 



clean. See " Equity," 25, 26, 27, 28. 

grip of our. See " Miscellaneous," 23. 

taking the law into one's. See " Judges," 44 ; " Law," 10. 

HANGED IN CHAINS. See " New Trial," 1, n. 

HANGING. See " Execution," 2, n. 

out false colours. See " Miscellaneous," 48. 


and fast rule. See " Text Books," 4. 
cases. See " Law," 42 ; " Precedents," 7. 

HARDSHIP. See " Judicial Proceedings," 3 ; "Law," 39, 43. 

HASTY JUSTICE. See " Judges," 16, n., 17, 52, n. 


note. See " Judicial Decisions," 25. 

supreme. See " Sovereignty," 5 ; " Statutes," 1. 

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284 INDEX. 


oondenmation without. See " Criminal Justice," 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 

in person. See " Criminal Justice," 28, n. 

HEARSAY EVIDENCE. See " Evidence," 31, n., 32. 

HEART-BURNINGS. See " Will," i. 

HEART OP MAN. See "Law," 68. 

HELP. See " Shipping," 2. 

HIATUS. See " Sovereignty," 4. 


Court. See " Privy Council." 
horse. See " Public Policy," 3. 

HIGHWAY. See Text. 

HISTORY OP CHANGES. See " Statutes," 11. 

HOME, THE WAY. See " MisoeUaneous," 27. 


blunder. See " Honesty." 

men. See " Miscellaneous," 49 ; " SheriS," 1. 

HONESTY. See Text. See also " Law," 26. 

and honour. See " Administration of Justice," 17. 

HONESTLY, ACTING. See " Administration of Justice," 38. 

HONOUR. See " Jadges," 71 ; " Parent and ChUd,' ' 1. 
a Court of. See " Administration of Justice," 18. 
and honesty. See " Administration of Justice," 17. 
debt of. See " Gambling." 
hunting for. See "Judges," 76. 
men of. See "Public Servant," 11. 
principles of. See "Administration of Justice," 16. 

HONOURS. See Text. 

HORSE, UNRULY. See "PubUc Policy," 2. 
HOSTILE WITNESS. See " Evidence," 25. 

HOT. See " Politics," 7. 

and cold, blowing. See " Counsel," 23 ; " Pleadings," 9. 

HOUR GLASS. See " Time," 3. 

HOURS, EXAMINING BY. See " Time," 3. 

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INDEX. 285 

HOUSE. See " Trespass," 1. 

of Commons. See " Parliament," 5, n., 8, 10, 11 ; " Sovereignty," 2, n. ; 

"Statutes," 11; "Tort," 8. 
of Lords. See " Appeals," 6 ; " Parliament," 5, n., 6, 18 ; " Tort," 8. 


afiairs. See " Miscellaneous," 1. 

conduct. See " Reasonable," 3. 

heart. See " Motives," 4, 5, 6, 7. 

infirmity. See " Law," 35. 

judgment. See " Motives," 7. 

knowledge. See " Presumption," 9. 

law. See " Parent and Child," 2. 

life, saving. See " Shipping," 1, 2. 

man. See " Punishment," i. 

nature. See " Discretion," 9 ; " Miscellaneous," 53 ; " Parent and 

Child," 1 ; " Presumption," 8. 
opinion, progression of. See " Law," 3. 
society. See " Parent and Child," 1. 
tribunal. See " Motives," 2. 

HUMANITY. See " Justice," 5 ; " Law," 3 ; " Poor," 3. 

HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Text. See also " Courts," 1 ; |," Miscel- 
laneous," 26 ; " Settlements," 3, n. 

IDENTrPICATION. See " Criminal Justice," 46, n. 

IDIOSYNOBACY. See " Discretion," 16. 

IGNORANCE OF LAW. See "Law," 9, 12, 13, 14, 16. 


country fellows. See " Jury," 10. 
people. See "Money," 3. 

ILLEGALITY. See Text. See also references from "plegal Act." 

ILLEGAL ACT. See "Ecclesiastical," 7; "Fraud," 35; "PubUc 
Policy," 7; "Belief," 2. 

ILLEGITIMAOY. See " Bastardy." 

ILL-LANGUAGE. See " Justification," 1. 

ILL-MAN. See " PubUc Servant," 8. 

ILL- WRIT. See " Process," 1. 

IMAGINARY CASES. See " Cases," 6. 

IMAGINATION, ACTIVE. See " MisceUaneous," 31. 

IMMEDIATE CAUSE. See " Motives," 13. 


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286 INDKX. 


act. See " Character," 5 ; " Husband and Wife," 11. 
action. See references from " Action " ; " Public Policy," 7 ; 
" Belief," 2. 

IMPARTIALITY. See " Law," 19 ; " Punishment," 6. 

IMPEACHMENT. See " Politics," 4, n. 

IMPERFECT MORALS. See "Miscellaneous," 31. 

IMPERTINENCES. See " Mischief," 3, n. 

IMPLICATION. See " Fraud," 35 ; " Reasonable," i. 

IMPOSITION. See " Will," 1. 

IMPRESSIONS, FIRST. See " MisceUaneous," 43. 

IMPRISON, POWER TO. See " Punishment," 8. 

IMPRISONMENT. See " Contempt of Court," 4 ; " Punishment," 9, 10. 

IMPROPER MOTIVES. See " Sovereignty," 10. 

IMPROPRIETY. See " Sunday," 5. 

IMPROVEMENT IN LEARNING. See '• MisceUaneous," 5. 

IMPROVIDENCE. See " Equity," 24. 

IMPULSION. See "Motives," 13. 

IMPUNITY. See " Infants," 1 ; " MisceUaneous," 51. 

IMPUTATIONS. See " Parent and ChUd," 1. 

INACTIVITY, MASTERLY. See "MisceUaneous," 35. 

IN CAMERA, PROCEEDINGS. See " Judicial Proceedings," 7. 

INCOME. See " Money," 6. 

INCONVENIENCE. See " Compromise," 1, n. ; " Construction," 23, n., 
38, 31 ; "Fiction," 1, n. ; "Judges," 13 ; Jury," 21 ; "Law," 22,71 ; 
" Mischief," 1, 3 ; " Statutes," 2, 3, 4 ; " Tort," 23 ; '■ Usage," 13. 
private. See "Mischief," 2 ; "Navy," 7, n. 

INCREASE IN STATUTES. See " ParUament," 8. 
INDECENCY. See " Sunday," 5. 

INDEPENDENCE OP THE BENCH. See "Administration of 
Justice," 20, 27, n. ; " Judges," 19, 26, 27, n., 37, 38, 81. 

INDIA. See " Criminal Justice," 3. See also reference from " Colonies." 

INDICTMENT. See " Criminal Justice," 2, 3, 15, 16, 18, 44, 45 ; " Judges," 
27, n. ; Politics," 4, n. ; " Trial for Life," 1, n. 

INDIGNATION. See '• Miscellaneous," 34. 
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INDEX. 287 

INDIVIDUALS. See "Libel," 5. See also references from "Man" ; 

INEQUITABLENESS. See " Construction," 28. 

IN ESSE. See " Property," 1. 

INFANT. See Text. See also " Parent and Child." 

INFECTION. See " MisoeUaneous," 12. 

INFEEENCE. See " Presumption," 9. 

INFERIOR TRIBUNALS. See "Judicial Decisions," 12; "Magis- 
trates," 3, 4, 7 ; " Parliament," 19. 

INFIRMITY, HUMAN. See "Law," 33. 

INFLEXIBILITY. See " Law," 54. 

INFLUENCE. See " Judges," 74 ; " Pardon," 4 ; " Politics," 4. 
human. See " Sovereignty," 10. 
parental. See " Parent and Child," 4. 
religious. See " WiU," 1, 3. 
undue. See " Fraud," 22 ; " Sovereignty," 10. 

INFORMATION, CRIMINAL. See " Attorney-General," 1; "Criminal 
Justice," 54. 

IN FUTURO. See " Property," 3. 

INGENUITY. See " Statutes," 26 ; " Truth," 6. 

INHERITANCE. See " Parliament," 5 ; " Rights," 4. 

INIQUITY AS A DEFENCE. See " Fraud," 30, 31, 32. 

INJURY. See "Damages " ; " Doctrine," 3 ; "Fiction," 1, n. ; "Fraud," 
2, 16; "Judicial Proceedings," 2, n. ; "Motives," 13, n. ; "Public 
PoUoy," 6, 9 ; " Sovereignty," 2, n. ; " Statutes," 13, 14, 15 ; 
" Tort," 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 15, 19, 24 ; " Trespass," 1. 

imports a damage. See " Damage," 4. 

to interests of the State. See " Liberty of the Subject,' ' 5. 

to rights of the subject. See " Liberty of the Subject," 2. 

INJUSTICE. See "Public Servant," 1; "Retainer"; "Sovereignty," 
2; "Tort," 13. 

INNOCENCB. See " Criminal Justice," 3, 19, 20, 22, 37, 46, n. ; " Fraud," 

17, TO. 


hand. See " Criminal Justice," 46. 
meaning of. See " Criminal Justice," 21. 
one. See " Criminal Justice," 32, 39. 

INNOVATION. See " Precedents," 6. 

INNS OF COURT. See Text. See also " Counsel," 1, n. 

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288 INDEX. 

INSANITY. See Text. See also " Intoxication " ; " Punishment," 2. 

INSTRUMENTS. See " Construotion " ; " Conveyance " ; " Process," 1. 
framing of. See " Statutes," 2, 3. 

INSULT. See " Contempt of Court." 

INSURANCE LAW. See " American Decisions," 1, to. 

INTEGRITY. See " Law," 21. 
judicial. See " Judges," 76. 

INTENTION. See " Law," 41 ; " Libel," 1 ; " Motives," 7 ; " Statutes," 
7, 8, 11, 13, 16 ; " WiU," 9, n., 14, 15, 16, 18 ; " Words," 8. 

INTEREST. See " Courts," 7 ; " Punishment," 6 ; " Rights," 4. 
family. See " Property," 9. 
infutwro. See " Property," 8. 
interposition of. See " Pardon," 4. 
private. See "Judicial Proceedings," 2, n. 


of justice. See " Legal Profession," 1. 

of the State. See " Liberty of the Subject," 5. 

public. See " Public PoUoy," 9 ; " Statutes," 27. 


INTERPOSITION. See " Pardon," 4. 

INTERPRETATION. See ' ' Construction.' ' 
canons of. See " Text Books," 4. 
golden rule of. See " Statutes," 18, n. 
private. See " Statutes," 19. 

INTERPRETERS OF LAWS. See " Judges," 64 ; " Usage," 2, w. 



INTRODUCTORY. See " Opening Speech," 4. 

INVASION OP PROPERTY. See " Trespass," 2. 


of reasons and means. See " Statutes," 13. 

IRELAND, See Text. 

IRISHMEN. See "Ireland." 

IRREGULARITY. See Text. See also "Consent," 4; "Criminal 
Justice," 52 ; "Mistakes" ; " Statutes," 27. 

JERVIS, C.J. See " Railway Company," 1. 
JESSEL, SIR GEORGE. See "Practice," 10. 

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INDEX. 289 

JESUIT. Se«" Ecclesiastical," 5. 

JEWS. See " Christianity," 7, 10 ; " Usury," 1. 

JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY. See " Literature," 2. 


above party. See "Politics," 2, 3. 

action against, of record. See " Administration of Justice," 34. 

an overspeaking. See "Counsel," 13, n. 

anger or pity in a. See " Criminal Justice," 23. 

Bacon's advice to Mr. Justice Hutton when swearing him. See 

" Judges," 26, n. 
" brother." See references from " Brother-Judges." 
cannot alter the law. See " Law," 29, 71. 

corruption not to be imputed or supposed in. See " Discretion," 7. 
duty in dispensing criminal justice. See " Punishment," 4, 5. 
eloquence in. See " Jury," 15. 
fallibility in. See " Discretion," 7. 
freedom of, from action and question. See "Administration of 

Justice." 35. 
in his own cause. See " Administration of Justice," 22, 23, 24, 25, 26. 
mode of sentencing to imprisonment. See " Punishment," 9, 10. 
oath of. See " Judges," 26, n., 76, 81 ; " Pardon," 1. 
patience, first and sacred duty of. See " Time," 3, n. 
protection to. See " Administration of Justice," 20. 
province of, to expound law only. See " Parliament," 13. 
summing up by. See " Judges," 70, n. ; " Jury," 18. 
the act of a single. See " Judges," 21. 

JUDGE'S CHAMBERS. See "Practice," 1, 3, 7. 

Coke's advice to. See " Judges," 26, n. 
Lord Mansfield's advice to. See " Judges," 45. 
not monks and recluses. See " Evidence," 29. 
See also ''Administration of Justice," 23, 33; "Appeals," 1, 7 
"Blasphemy"; "Cases"; "Christianity," 7; "Common Law," 
11 ; " Construction," 19, 28 ; " Contempt of Court " ; " Counsel" 
"Criminal Justice," 1, 2, 3, 23, 27, 28, 36, 37; "Crown" 
" Dictum " ; " Discretion," 3, 4 ; " Equity " ; " Evidence," 6, 10, 16, 
18, 23, 29 ; " Evil," 1 ; " Foreign Law," 4 ; " Judicial Decisions," 2 
"Judicial Proceedings," 6, n. ; "Jurisdiction," 14; "Jury" 
" Law," 21, 23, 36, 37, 43, 45, 53 ; " Liberty of the Subject," 1, 2 
" Money," 2, re. ; " Morals," 1 ; " Motives," 12, 13 ; " New Trial," 3 
" Obiter Dicta," 1; "Pardon"; "Parliament," 5,n., 12, 14, 17 
" Pleadings," 7 ; " Politics," 2, 3, 4, 6 ; " Practice" ; " Precedents " 
" Process," 1 ; " Public Policy," 1 ; " Punishment," 4, 6 ; " Reason- 
able," 2, 4; "Religion," 1; "Retainer"; "Statute," 12; "Text 
Books," 1 ; " Tort," 14, 19, 25 ; " Truth," 5 ; " Will," 5, 6, 18, n. ; 
" Words," 6. 
JUDGMENT. See Text, infra. 

an essential point in every conviction. See " Criminal Justice," 55. 
and honour. See "Administration of Justice," 18. 
D.L.Q. 19 

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290 INDEX. 

JUDGMENT— coniMiMed. 

conviction in the nature of verdict and. See " Criminal Justice," 53. 

debtor. See " Punishment,' ' 9. 

delay considerable influence in. See " Delay," 1. 

dishonest. See " Judges," 58. 

false. See " Appeals," 1, 3. 

fleeing from. See " Criminal Justice," 38, 39, 40. 

founded upon information and evidence. See " Criminal Justice," 54 ; 

"Delay," 1. 
give no reason for. See "Judges," 45, 48. 
how declared. See " Administration of Justice," 13. 
human. See " Motives," 7. 

in a Court of record by grant and prescription. See "Judicial 
Decisions," 8. 
piepoudre. See " Judicial Decisions," 8. 
not to be talked about. See " Administration of Justice," 20. 
reason for. See "Parliament," 5, n. 
rule of. See " Mischief," 3. 
time to consider. See " Justice," 52, n. 
to be delivered in public. See " Judges," 48. 
vfhere Judges differ. See " Judges," 54, 55. 
See also " Appeals " ; " Conviction " ; " Counsel," 8, 9, 19 ; " Diligence," 

1; " Equity," 7, 29 ; "Intoxication"; "Judges," 7, 13, 23, 37,63, 

70, 73; "Law Reports," 1; "Magistrates," 7; "Opinion"; 

"Politics," 4; " Practice," 28, 29, 30 ; "Precedents." 

JUDICATURE ACT. See "Practice," 10. 

authorities. See " Judicial Decisions." 

axiom. See " Witness," 1, 91. 

caprice. See " Equity," 31, n. 

Committee. See "Privy Council." 

extra, opinion. See " Judges," 24, 25. 

integrity. See " Judges," 76. 

of&cers. See " Discretion," 9. 

opinion. See " Judges," 52 ; " Judicial Decisions," 11. 

writers. See " Text Books," 4. 


decisions of House of Lords binding upon aU Courts. See " Parlia- 
ment," 18. 

if no reason given for, authority of more weight. See " Judges," 46. 

mode of quoting. See " Miscellaneous," 57, n. 

where no reason given for. See " Judges," 48. 

See also Text, infra. See also " Administration of Justice," 4, 13, 14 ; 
" Admiralty," 3 ;" American Decisions " ; "Appeal"; "Cases"; 
"Chancery," 12, 13; "Common Law," 10; "Counsel," 17, 18; 
" Criminal Justice," 6 ; " Dictum" ; " Evidence," 7 ; " International 
Law," 4; "Ireland," 4; "Judges," 15; "Jurisdiction," 19, 20; 
" Law Reports " ; " Obiter Dicta " ; "Practice," 4, 5, 6; "Prece- 
dents"; "Privy Council"; "Railway Company," 1; "Reasonable," 
1 ; " Scotland," 2 ; " Text Books," 1 ; " Usage," 13 ; " WiU," 2, 5, 9. 

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INDEX. 291 

JUDICIAL DISCRETION. See " Disoretion," 13. 

respect of the law for. See " Administration of Justice," 4. 

free from bias or prejudice. See " Judges," 61. 

See also Text. See also " Equity," 9 ; " Property," 14. 

JUDICIAL EECORDS. See "Judicial Decisions," 1. 
JURIDICAL DAY. See " Sunday," i. 

Court of co-ordinate. See " Construction," 13 ; " Judicial Decisions," 
12,16; "Law," 58. 

criminal. See " Punishment," 6. 

encroaoliment of. See " Common Law," 11. 

excess of. See " Dictum," 4 ; " Magistrates," 3, n. 

ousting. See " Jurisdiction," 10, n. 

paternal. See "Parent and Child," 8. 

penal. See " Punishment," 8. 

/Se«ako" Admiralty," l,n.; "Cases," 21 ; "Chancery,"? ; "Consent"; 
"Criminal Jurisdiction," 1, n., 29; "Equity," 16, 30; "Judges," 
26, n.; "Judicial Decisions," 12; "Magistrates," 2; "Property," 
7 ; " Rules of Court," 1 ; " Statutes," 22 ; " Tort, " 1. 

JURISPRUDENCE. See " Courts," 1 ; " Judicial Decisions," 2 ; " Legal 
Profession," 1 ; " Practice," 9 ; " Scotland," 1. 

JUROR. See " Evidence," 3 ; " Jury." 


assisting the, in the administration of justice. See " Judges," 79. 

compulsory service of. See " Tort," 24, n. 

trial by. See " Common Law," 11. 

See also " Criminal Justice," 28, 36, 48, n. ; " Damages " ; " Disoretion," 

7,9; "Equity," 14; " Judges," 26, «., 73 ; " Justice," 2 ; "Liberty 

of the Press," 8 ; " Navy," 7, n. ; " Nonsuit," n. ; " Punishment," 4 ; 

" Trial for Life," 1. 
See also Text, infra. 
JUST AND REASONABLE. See "Necessity," 2. 

administered in mercy. See " Administration of Justice,' ' 32. 
administered where authority recognised, &c. See " Administration of 

Justice," 3, 4. 
advancement and expedition of. See " Practice," 7. 
and common sense sacrificed. See " Criminal Justice," 30. 
conflict of. See "Cases," 16. 
Courts of. See " Courts," 3. 

done according to law. See " Criminal Justice," 37. 
due to defendant as well as plaintifi. See ' ' Administration of Justice, ' ' 

essence of. See " Criminal Justice," 16. 
faUure to ensure complete. See "Administration of Justice," 15; 

"Chancery," 10. 
hasty. See " Judges," 16, n. 


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292 INDEX. 

JUSTICE— c<w*i«M«d. 

in administration of, no person to be suspected, &o. See "Administra- 
tion of Justice," 27, 28, 29. 

in England . See " Courts, " 1 . 

in the House of Lords. See "Parliament," 6. 

interference in course of. See "Administration of Justice," 20, 21, n. 

law and. See " Law," 50. 

law the handmaid of. See "Law " 54. 

mercy with. See " Criminal Justice, " 25. 

merits and. See " Practice," 28. 

natural. See " Counsel, " 20. 

not to be administered by persons interested. See "Administration 
of Justice, "27, 28. 
' perversion of . See "Judges," 82. 

political. See "Trespass," 2,n. 

principles of. See "Money," 5; "Practice," 25, 26. 

prostrate. See "Law," 54. 

publicity the very soul of. See " Judicial Proceedings, " 6, n. 

purity of public. See ' ' Criminal Justice,' ' 32, n. 

running away from. See " Criminal Justice," 38. 

spirit of. See " Law," 54. 

the true way to come at. See "Administration of Justice," 4, n. 

to be administered with great caution. See "Administration of 
Justice," 2. 

way to do complete. See " Administration of Justice," 1, 10, 11, 19, 
23 to 29 inclusive. 

See also " Administration of Justice " ; " Americans " ; " Blasphemy " ; 
"Courts," 3; "Criminal Justice," 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17; "Dis- 
cretion " ; "Equity," 7, 8 ; " Fiction " ; " Judges," 81, n. ; " Law," 
22; "Law Reports," 3; "Legal Profession"; "Litigation," 2; 
"Pardon"; "Perjury"; "Precedents," 19; "Pleadings," 6; 
"Politios,"2; " Public Policy," 5 ; "Punishment"; "Sunday"; 
"Tort," 6,27; "Truth," 4. 

See also Text, infra. 

JUSTICE OP THE PEACE. See " Judges," 26, ra. ; "Magistrates"; 
"Statutes," 5. 

JUSTIFICATION. See Text. See also "Libel," 1. 

KALEIDOSCOPE. See "Miscellaneous," 1. 


on the dignity of the Court. See "Administration of Justice," 20. 
See also "Law Reports," 3, w. ; "Miscellaneous," 13, n. ; "Text 
Books," 3. 

KID. See " Miscellaneous," 42. 


duty to the. See " Judges," 76. 

honour the. See "Judges," 20; " Miscellaneous," 20. 

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INDEX. 293 

KING — continued. 

may stop prosecutions. See "Politics," 4. 

the vicegerent of the Deity. See " Sovereignty," 2, n. 


Bench. See " Parliament," 4. 

Court. See "Morals," 1. 

enemies. See "Public PoUoy," 6. 

highway. See " Highway." 

subjects. See "Judges," 13; "Jury," 4; "Navy," 6. 

See also "Bible," 2; "Costs," 4, 5; "Criminal Justice," 26 
"Delay," 2; "Forfeiture"; "Judges," 20, 81; "Pardon," 1, 3 
" Politics," 4 ; " Property," 7 ; " Public Servant," 9 ; " Sovereignty,' 
1, 2, 3, 9, 13 ; "Statutes," 1, 25 ; "Usage," 8. 

KINGDOM, DEFENCE OP THE. See "Public Policy," 6. 

KISSING THE BOOK. See "Bible," 3. 

KNAVE. See " MisceUaneous," 18. 


cutting the. See " Chancery," 8 ; " Will," 18, n. 
Gordian. See " Miscellaneous," 22. 
untie the. See " Miscellaneous," 22, n. 


human. See " Presumption," 9. 

of law. See " Law," 14. 

See also " Consent," 3 ; " Miscellaneous," 2, n. 

LABOITB. See "Author," 1 ; " Literature," 2. 

LABOUREE. See " Master and Servant," 1 ; " Trade Union." 

LACHES. See references from " Negligence." 

LADIES. See " Miscellaneous," 26. 

LADING. See " BiU of Lading." 


action for recovery of. See " Jury," 10, n. 

compulsory taking of. See " Navy," 7, n. 

in England. See " WiU," 5. 

law of the. See " Counsel," 20. 

See fflZso "Conveyance"; "Ejectment," 1 ; " Esquire," 4 ; "Money," 
8; "Statutes," 26, n.; "Title." 
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See "Notice to Quit." 
LANDMARK. See " Courts," 1 ; " Judges," 26, n. ; " Law," 23. 


ill. See " Justification," 2. 
of lawyers. See " Commerce," 11. 

Seealso " Construction" ; " Judges," 62 ; "Law," 65 ; " Miscellaneous," 
18, «. ; " Statutes," 6, 18, 19 ; " Will," 9. 

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294 INDEX. 

LAPSE OF TIME. See " Time," 1. 

LATIN, BAD. See "Miscellaneous," 13, n. 


administration of the. See " Counsel," 13. 

an equal dispenser of justice. See "Tort," 6. 

and justice. See " Law," 50. 

and liberty. See " Liberty of the Subject," 3. 

and reason. See " Precedents," i, 12, n. 

as a science. See " Law," 20. 

ashes of the. See "Law," 20, n. 

authentication of. See " Law," 73. 

benignant. See " Property, " 6. 

certain. See " Cases," 21 ; " Equity," 19 ; " Judges," 48, n, 52 ; 

"Judicial Decisions," 14; "Law," 54; "Liberty of the Press," 3; 

" Mischief," 1 ; " Precedents." 20. 
criminal, auxiliary to the law of morality. See " Criminal Justice," 
reasonable and intelligible. See " Criminal Justice," 35. 
to be certain and known. See " Judges," 52. 
evasion of the. See " Law," 15. 
evidence of. See " Precedents," 18. 
feudal. See " Law," 4. 
fiction of. See " Tort," 27. 
form of. See " Tort," 27. 
fraud in point of . See " Fraud," 1. 
golden mete-wand of the. See •' Discretion," 7. 
good. iSee " Miscellaneous," 13, n. 
grows. See " Law," 3 ; " Parliament," 3. 
human. See "Parent and Child," 2. 
insurance. See "American Decisions," 1, n. 
interpreters of the. See " Judges," 64 ; " Usage," 2, n. 
irregularities not subject of criminal. See "Criminal Justice," 42. 
Judges cannot alter the. See "Judges," 34, «.., 35, 37; "Law," 29, 

49, 71 ; "Parliament," 12. 
justice done according to. See " Criminal Justice," 37. 
knowledge of . See "Law," 14; " Presumption," 12. 
merchant. See " Bill of Lading " ; " Commerce,' ' 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 32. 
multiplicity in. See " Parliament," 3, n. 
mute in. See " Criminal Justice," 48. 
nine points of the. See " Possession," 2. 
no. Sce"La5V," 64. 

nothing is, that is not reason. See " Judges," 50. 
obedience to the. See " Law," 69. 
of^chances. See " Criminal Justice," 29. 
of decency. See " Law," 61. 
of God. See " Christianity," 4, 5, 8, 9; "Government"; "Judicial 

Proceedings," 9 ; " Law," 56 ; " Woman," 2. 
of God and nature. See " Parent and Child," 6. 
of man. See " Law," 62. 

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INDEX. 295 

LAW — continued. 

of Moses. See " Law," 68. , 

of nations. See " International Law," 5. 

of nature. See " Judicial Proceedings," 9 ; " Law," 68, 69. 

of necessity. See "Necessity," 1,2. 

of Parliament. See " Parliament," 4. 

of reason, law of God. See " Law," 56. 

of the Court. See " New Trial," 3 ; " Practice," 2, n., 11. 

of the land. See " Counsel," 20. 

of the realm. See " Usage," 12. 

of tyrants. See "Discretion," i. 

on the fact. See " Law," 72. 

policy. See " Married Woman " ; " Mischief," 2. 

positive. See " Law," 5 ; " Settlements," 2, 3. 

principles. See " Morals," 1. 

repeal of. See " Law," 70. 

reports. See Text, mfra. See also "Cases"; "Courts," 3, n.; 
" Property," 4. See also further references from " Reports." 

reporter. See " Law," 68 ; " Law Eeports," 1, 2. 

respect of, for Courts of records, &o. See " Administration of Justice," 

retrospective. See " Law," 60. 

rhetorical phrases in. See " Law," 23. 

right of. See " Trespass," 3. 

sages of our. See " Precedents," 13. 

settled. See " Precedents," 17. 
rule of. See "Law," 63. 

simplicity of the old. See " Tort," 22. 

statute. See " Parliament," 13. 

student. See " Inns of Court " ; "Law,"l, «.; " Law Reports," 3, w. 

submission to the. See " Criminal Justice," 40. 

suit. See " Litigation." 

supremacy of the. See " Law," 37. 

taking the, into one's hands. See " Judges," 44 ; "Law," 10. 

tenacious of private peace. See " Litigation," 3. 

the handmaid of justice. See " Law," 54. 

to vindicate poUcy of the. See " Judges," 6. 

triumphant. See " Law," 54. 

uncertain. See references from " Law, Certain." 

unwritten. See "Law," 55, 64. 

upholding a dishonest act. See " Law," 74. 

want of knowledge in matter of. See " Judges," 77. 

where known and clear. See " Construction," 28. 

wisdom and goodness of our. See " Evidence," 10, n. 

written. See " Parliament," 13. 

wrong in point of. See " Judges," 60. 

See also "Banker"; "Bills of Sale"; "Blasphemy"; "Cases" 
"Chancery"; " Christianity," 3, 12 ; "Coke"; "Commerce" 
"Common Law"; "Construction"; "Delay"; "Dictum" 
"Diligence"; "Doctrine," 2; "Ecclesiastical," 2; "Ectuity" 
"Evidence"; "Evil," 2; "Eye of the Law"; "Eiotion" 

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296 INDEX. 


"Fraud," 20, n.; "Game"; "International Law"; "Judges,"' 
28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37; "Jury"; "Justice"; "Legal 
Profession"; "Liberty' of the Press," 3; "Limitations"; 
"Litigation"; " Miscellaneous," 8 ; "Mischief,"!; "Parliament," 
15; "Politics," 3; "Precedents"; "Presumption," 1,7; "Privy 
Council"; "Property,"!; " Public Policy," 8 ; " Eeasonable," 2 ; 
"Eeligion," 1, 4; "Revenue"; "Scotland," 1; "Shipping," i; 
"Sovereignty," 11; "Statutes"; "Sunday," 1; "Tort," 26; 
"Usage," 12; " WiU," 3. 
See also Text, mfra. 

LAW, COMMON. See references from " Common Law." See also 
" Statutes," 21, 23, 24, 25. 


a law of liberty. See " Liberty of the Press," 7. 

appeal to the. See " Law," 24. 

books written of the. See " Judicial Decisions, ' ' 1. 

consists of judicial decisions. See " Judicial Decisions," 14. 

See also "Criminal Justice," 46; "Ecclesiastical," 2; "Judicial 

Proceedings," 9; "Law," 33, 47, 48, 56, 57, 66; "Eights," 4; 

"Trespass," 2 ; "Trial for Life," 1. 


LAWYER. See "Counsel," 19; "Judges," 62; "Money," 2, n.; 
" Parliament," 18 ; " Scotland," 2 ; "WiU," 2, n., 5 ; and references 
from " Bar." 

LAYMEN. See "WiU," 4. 

LEADING QUESTION. See " Evidence," 13, 17, 18. 

LEARNED MEN. See "MisceUaneous," 7. 

LEARNING. See " MisceUaneous," 5 ; " Universities,' ' 2. 

LECTURER. See •• Miscellaneous," 55 ; " Schoolmaster," 2. 

LEBT, COURT. See "Court Leet." 

LEGACIES TO WOMEN. See " Courts," 1. 


advice. See " Legal Profession," 3. 
coercion. See " Coercion." 
condition. See "Law," 67. 
dUigence. See "Diligence," 1. 
duty. See " Equity," 38 ; "Tort," 2. 
evidence. See "Evidence," 10; "Judges," 80, 
fraud. See "Fraud," 3. 
knowledge. See " Presumption,' ' 12. 
memory. See "Usage," 8. 

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INDEX. 297 

LEGAL — continued. 

power in England. See " Law," 59. 

process. See " Trespass," 2, n. 

profession. See Text, infra. Seeafoo " Amendments," 7; "Appeals,'.' 
4; "Attorneys"; "Christianity," 5; "Consen,t," 5; "Con- 
veyance"; "Criminal Justice," 27, 28; "Judges," 71, 72, 73; 
"Miscellaneous," 59, to. ; "Money," 3; "Practice," 14; "Pre- 
cedents," 4, 5, 12; "Scotland," 2; "Solicitor and Client," 1; 
"Will," 4, 5; "Witness," 3; and references from "Bar"; 
" Counsel." 

punishment. See "Punishment," 7. 


and oppression. See "Law," 75. 
question of. See "Fraud," 36. 
See aXso " Courts," 14 ; "Law," 70. 


convenient course in new. See " Parliament," 8, re. 
increase in. See " Parliament," 3, n. 
power of. See "Parliament," 12. 
See also "Woman," 2, to. 


and executive power. See " Administration of Justice, ' ' 27, to. 
power, assumption of. See "Judges," 67. 

LEGISLATUEE. See "Law," 49, 62; "Motives," 14, 15; "Navy," 1; 
"Parliament," 13, 14, 15; "Poor," 3; "Statutes," 1,7,14,15, 

LENGTH OF TIME. See " Usage," 10. 

LETTEES TO JUDGES. See "Judges," 81. 
See also "Words," 8. 

LIBEL. See Text, infra. See also " Character," 4 ; " Judges," 26, «., 
82, TO.; "Jury," 8, to. ; " Miscellaneous," 13, to. 


civil. See " Criminal Jurisdiction," 32, to. 

law and. See " Liberty of the Subject," 3, 5. 

life and. See " Judges," 73. 

of the Press. See Text, infra. See also " Commerce," 3 ; " Contempt 

of Court " ; " Judges," 18 ; " Libel " ; " Liberty of the Press," 2, 11. 
of the subject. See Text, infra. See also " Construction," 7 ; 

"Freedom of Speech." 
See aiso " Law," 18, 47 ; "Liberty of the Press," 2,11; "Religion," 

1, TO. 

LICENCE. See " Liberty of the Press," 3, 5, 6. 
LIE. See " Fraud," 10, 16, 18 ; " Judges," 48, to. ; " Witness," 1. 
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298 INDEX. 


family. See " Parent and Child," 2, n. 

raking into man's, and opinions. See " Character," 2, 4, 5, 

saving. See " Shipping," 1, 2. 

trial for. See " Criminal Justice," 48, w. ; "Evidence," 10, n.; 

" Trial for Life." 
Seealso "Law," 18; "Trespass," 2, n. ; "Virtue," 1. 

LIGHT, CHILDREN OF. See " MisoeUaneous," 2, n. 

LIMITATION. See Text. See also " Statutes," 7. 

LINCOLN'S INN. See "Counsel," 1. 

LINE, STRAIGHT. See "Miscellaneous," 37. 

LITERATURE. See Text. See also "Author"; "Books"; "Inven 

LITIGATION. See Text, mfra. See aZio " Arbitration ";" Chancery," 
4; "Compromise"; " Motives," 12 ; "Practice," 7; "Precedents," 
14 ; "Transfer of Eight of Action." 

LIVELIHOOD. See "Witness," 5. 

LIVING. See "Property," 2. 

LOAN OP MONEY. See " Commerce," 18. 

LOCALITY. See "Property," 8. 

LOGIC. See "Law," 50. 

LONDON. See "Corporations," 4, 5 ; " Sheriff," 2 ; " Usage," 4, 5. 
Gazette . See ' ' Gazette . ' ' 


possession. See "Presumption," 8. 
robe. See " Counsel," 1, n. 


fast and. See " Settlements," 1. 
notes. See " Property," 4. 


ChanceUoj. See "Chancery," 12; "Christianity," 10; "Common 

Law," 10. 
Chief Justice. See " Judges," 14, 56, n. 
Mayor. See " Corporations," 4. 

LORDS, HOUSE OP. See " Appeals," 6 ; " Judges," 14 ; " Parliament," 
5, TO., 6, 18; "Statutes," 11. 

LOSS, PECUNIARY. See " Tort," 24, n. 

See also "Commerce," 9 ; "Motives," 18, ji. 

LOYALTY. See "Public Servant," 4. 

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INDEX. 299 

MACPHERSON MOTTO. See " Miscellaneous," 39, n. 

MADNESS. See " Insanity " ; " Punishment," 2. 

MAGIC. See Text. See also " Conveyance," 1 ; " Words," 1. 

MAGISTRATES. See Text, infra. See also " Administration of Justice," 
35; "Appeals"; " Contempt of Court"; " Criminal Justice," 29 ; 
" Evidence," 17 ; " Judges," 26, 53, 81 ; "Judicial Decisions," 12; 
"Jurisdiction" ; "Perjury" ; "PTmishment,"9 ; "Reasonable," 2. 

MAINTENANCE. See "Bastardy"; "Litigation," 3; "Property," 

MAJESTY. See "Sovereignty," 14. 

MAJORITY. See " Judges," 53 ; " Jury," 21 ; "Minorities." 

MALICE. See " Criminal Justice," i8, n. ; " Judges," 26. 


act of. See " Miscellaneous," 12, n. 
and God, Judges before. See "Politics," 3. 
and wife. See " Husband and Wife." 
fall of. See "Matrimony," 2. 
law of. See "Law," 62. 


caprices. See "Motives," 11. 

faiilt. See " Miscellaneous," 33. 

heart. See " Motives," 4, 5, 6, 7. 

life. See " Trial for Life," 1, n. 

See also " Administration of Justice," 23, 25, 26, 28, 30 ; " Admiralty," 
1; "Author," 2; "Bankruptcy," 3; "Chancery," 4, 10 
"Character," 1,2,3,4; "Christianity," 12, n.; "Commerce," 9 
"Companies," 5; "Coimsel," 16, 19; "Criminal Justice," 14, 17 
19, 23, 44, 49, 51 ; " Ecclesiastical," 7 ; " Ejectment," 2 ; "Fraud,' 
4; " Husband and Wife," 1; "Law," 57, 68, 69; "Libel," 4 
" Liberty of the Subject," 2, 3 ; "Miscellaneous," 10, 18, 20, 35, 44 
47; "Motives," 9; "Name"; "Pleadings," 5; "Politics," 6, 8 
"Property," 12; "Public Policy," 1, 5; " PubUo Servant," 8 
" Punishment," 4; " Reasonable," 4 ; "Relief,"l; "Reputation" 
" Rights," 3 ; " Settlements," 3, n. ; " Sheriff," 1 ; " Solicitor and 
Client," 1 ; " Title," 2,4;" Tort," 5, 9, 11, 15, 16, 21, 25 ; " Trial for 
Life," 1 ; " Truth," 8 ; " Usage," 6, n. ; and references from " Men." 


common sense of. See " Equity," 22. 
experience of. See '" Miscellaneous," 6. 
reason of. See "Reasonable," 4. 
right and good of. See " Miscellaneous," 7. 

See also " Miscellaneous," 42, n. ; " Mistakes," 2 ; " Parliament," 11 ; 
"Religion," 3. 

MANNERS, PUBLIC. See " Morals," 1. 

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300 INDEX. 

MANSFIELD, LOBD. See "Judges," 45, 46; "Law Eeports," 3, w. ; 

"Miscellaneous," 13, n. 
MANUFACTUEER. See " Commerce," 5. 
MARGINAL NOTE. See " Cases," 12. 
MARINES. See "Navy," 1. 
MARK. See references from " Land Mark." 
MARRIAGE. See " Matrimony," 6, 7. 

MARRIED WOMAN. See Text, infra. See also " Courts," 1; "Equity," 
20; " Husband and Wife " ; " Settlements," 1. 


and servant. See Text, infra. See aZso " Sovereignty," 12 ; "Trade 

of the Rolls. See " Christianity," 10. 
taxing. See "Practice," 33. 

MASTERLY INACTIVITY. See " MisceUaneous," 35. 

MATHEMATICS. See " Miscellaneous," 55. 

MATRIMONY. See Text, infra. See aZso " Judicial Proceedings," 10. 

MAXIM. See "Dictum," 5; "Evidence," 17; "Judges," 65, 71; 
" Judicial Decisions," 2 ; " Law," 58 ; " Navy," 7, n. ; " ReUef," 3 
" Statutes," 27 ; " Trespass," 3 ; "Truth," 4; "Words." 


Lord. See " Corporations,' ' 4. 
woman. See " Statutes," 5. 

MEANING. See " Construction" ; " Motives," 8; " Statutes," 8, 11, 16 ; 
"Will," 8, 9, n. ; "Words," 6. 

MEANNESS. See " Miscellaneous," 47. 


end may not sanctify. See " Criminal Justice," 43. 
invention of reasons and. See " Statutes," 13. 
the. See " Miscellaneous," 56. 

MEASURE TO TRY CAUSES. See " Sovereignty," 14. 

MEASURING TIME. See " Time," 3, n. 

MEDICAL MEN. See " Ecclesiastical," 3 ; " Witness," 5. 

MEDDLING, GIVEN TO CHANGE AND. See "Miscellaneous," 20. 

MEMBERS OP PARLIAMENT. See " Parliament," 8, 11, 19. 

MEMORIAL. See "Property," 9, 11. 

MEMORY, STRENGTH OP. See " Evidence," 4. 

See also " Practice," 1 ; " Truth," 3 ; " Usage," 6, 8. 

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INDEX. 301 


acts of. See " Politics," 7. 

argue differently. See " Politics," 8. 

class of. See " Politics," 6. 

common race of. See " Miscellaneous," 8. 

imposed upon. See " Will," 1 

of business. See " Money," 2, n. 

of experiraioe. See " Money," 2, re. 

of honour. See "Public Servant," 11. 

of war. See " Navy,' ' 2, re. 

stealing women. See " Abduction." 

the best. See "Miscellaneous," 54. 

iSfee also "Abduction" ; "Banker"; "Chancery"; "Character," 5 
"Clergy," 2; "Commerce," 18, 30; "Discretion," 8; "Infants," 3 
"Majorities," 1; "Minorities," 2; "Miscellaneous," 2, 3, 48, 49 
"Mistakes," 1; "Money," 6; "Morals," 2; "Motives," 2, 8, 10 
"Parent and Child," 3; "Shipping," 4; "Transfer of Bight of 
Action"; "'WiU," 13; " Words," 4, 8; and references from" 'M&n." 


feelings. Se« " Motives," 10. 

lives, raking into. See " Character," 2, 8, 4, 5. 

rights. See " Public Servant," 3. 

MENIAL SEEVANT. See " Sovereignty," 11. 


law. See "Bill of Lading"; "Commerce," 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 32; 

" Privy Council." 
marine. See " Admiralty. ' ' 

MERCHANT. See " Commerce." 

Shipping. See " Navy," 2, re. ; " Shipping." 


and justice. See " Administration of Justice," 32 ; " Criminal 

Justice," 25. 
shrine of. See " Criminal Justice," 30. 
the prerogative of the Crown. See "Administration of Justice," 

32, re. 
Seealso "Criminal Justice," 23; "Justice," 5; "Law," 48; "Pardon," 

1, 3 ; " Punishment," 5. 

MERE-STONE. See " Judges," 26, re. 

MERIDIAN. See " Mischief," 3, re. 

MERIT. See " Honours " ; " Public Servant," 4. 

MERITS AND JUSTICE. See " Practice," 28. 

METAPHYSICAL REASONING. See " MisoeUaneous," 24. 

METE-WAND. See " Discretion," 7 ; " Sovereignty," 14. 

MIDDLESEX. See " Sheriff," 2. 

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802 INDEX. 

MILITAEY. See " Schoolmaster," 3. 

MILK, TO SUP THE. See "MisoeUaneous," 20. 

MIND OF MAN. See "Motives," 2, 8. 

MINISTEE. See " Clergy," 1. 

MINISTERS. See "Politics," 1. 



difEerence in, &c. See " Judges," 53. 

sentiments of, not divulged. See " Judges," 48, n. 

See also "Infants," 1 ; "Jury," 21. 

MIRROR, THE. See "Poor," 2. 

MISCELLANEOUS. See Text, infra. See also "Administration of 
Justice," 17; " Character," 2 ; "Evil"; "Words." 

MISCHIEF. See Text. 

to the nation. See " Miscellaneous," 20. 


See also "Fraud," 24; "Injury," 1, n. ; "Judges," 75; "Statutes," 
14 ; " Will," 10. 
MISCONDUCT. See " Public Servant," 10 ; " Sovereignty," 12. 
MISCONSTRUCTION. See " Judges," 70 ; " Statutes," 22. 
MISDEMEANOUR. See " Criminal Justice,' ' 33. 
MISFEASANCE. See " Companies," 3, 8. 
MISFORTUNE. See " Reputation." 

inSTAKE. See " Fraud," 21, 31 ; " Judges," 17, 18, 48, n.,60; "Honesty," 
1 ; " Law Reports," 3, n. ; " Practice," 21 ; " Statutes," 2. 

MISTAKES. See Text. 

MITIGATION OF SENTENCE. See " Criminal Justice," 24. 

MODE OF SENTENCE. See " Punishment," 10. 


3, TC. 

MONARCHY. See " Government " ; " Sovereignty." 

MONEY. See Text. 

into Court, payment of. See " Payment into Court." 
lent. See " Fraud," 27. 
paid. See " Fraud," 20. 

See also "Commerce," 18; "Pardon," 4; "Parent and Child," 5 ; 
"Public Servant," 6; "Punishment," 6. 

MONKS. See " Evidence," 29. 
MONOPOLY. See "Gambling." 

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INDEX. 303 

MONUMENTS. See " Charity," 2 ; " Property," 9, 11. 


duty. See " Criminal Justice," 41. 
law. See "International Law," 3; "Law," 68. 
man. See " Fraud," 20, n. ; " Law," 69. 
obligation. See" Equity," 37, 38 ; " Money," 1. 
ofEenoe. See " Libel," i. 


Court of. See " Fraud," 21 ; " Morals," 3. 

criminal law auxiliary to the law of. See " Criminal Justice," 52. 

public. See " Judicial Proceedings, "7. 

See also "Administration of Justice," 18; "Commerce," 16. 21; 

"Evidence," 29; "Evil," 2; "Law," 61; "Miscellaneous," 31; 


MORALS. See Text. 

MORTGAGE. See " Commerce," 18. 



MOTHER. See " Parent and Child," 7. 

MOTHER'S MILK. See " Miscellaneous," 42. 

MOTION. See " New Trial," 2, 3 ; "Practice," 22. 


improper. See " Sovereignty," 10. 
interested. See "Administration of Justice," 27. 
See also "Abduction"; "Chancery," 2; "Criminal Justice," 41; 
"Fraud," 2. 

MOTIVES. See Text. 

MOTTO. See "MisceUaneous," 39. 

MULTIPLICITY OF LAWS. See " Parliament," 3, n. 

MUNICIPALITY. See ' ' Corporations, "4. 

MURDER. See • ' Navy, "8. 

MUTABILITY, LAW OF. See "MisceUaneous," 55. 

MUTE IN LAW. See "Criminal Justice," 48. 

NAME. See Text. 

aniU. See'" Criminal Justice," 49. 

good. See "Libel," 6, w. 

See also " Commerce," 7, 27 ; " Judges," 14. 


government of the. See "Pqlitics," 5. 
the. See "Navy," 4, 7; "Revenue," 2. 

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804 INDEX. 


law of. See " International Law," 5. 

usage and practice of. See " International Law," 5. 


justice. See " Counsel," 20; "Criminal Justice," 17. 
law. See " Matrimony," 6. 
reason. See "Beligion," 1, w. 



course of. See " Statutes," 5. 

human. See " Discretion," 9 ; " Miscellaneous, " 53. 
law of. See "Equity," 3, to. ; "Fraud," 20, n.; "JudiciaJ Pro- 
ceedings," 9; "Law," 68, 69; "Parent and Child," 6. 
See also " Courts," 5. 

NAVY. See Text. See also " Admiralty " ; " Shipping." 

NECESSARIES. See " Husband and Wife," 4. 


of the times. See "Precedents," 1. See also references from 

See also " Jury," 80 ; "Navy," 7, n. ; " Words." 

NEGATIVE. See " Jury," 27. 

NEGLECT OP DUTY. See " Administration of Justice," 35; "Miscel- 
laneous," 11. 
See also "Pleadings,' ' 5. 

NEGLIGENCE. See "Public Servant," 10; "Sovereignty," 12; 
"Title," i; "Tort," 6, 12. 


country. See " Law," 67. 
legislation. See " Parliament, " 3, M. 

NEW TRIAL. See Text. 

NINE POINTS OP THE LAW. See "Possession," 2. 
NISI PRIUS. See "Nonsuit," 1. 
NO LAW. See "Law," 64. 

NOLLE-PROSEQTJI. See "Attorney-General," 1. 
NOMINAL DAMAGES. See " Damages," 5, 6 ; " Tort," 10, n. 
NONCONFORMIST. See " Christianity," 10. 
NONSUIT. See Text. 
NON-USAGE. See " Usage," 2, n. 

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INDEX. 305 

NOT GUILTY, PLEA OF. See "CriminalJustioe," 47. 


marginal. See "Oases," 12. 

taking. See " Law," 1, n. ; "Law Reports." 

See also " Cases," 13 ; " Counsel," 5. 

NOTES, WOMAN'S. See "Woman," 1. 
See also "Property," 4. 


NOTICE, REASONABLE. See "Reasonable," 1. 
See also " Criminal Justice," 17 ; " Gazette." 

NOTORIETY, PUBLIC. See " Judicial Proceedings," 12. 

NOTTINGHAM, LORD. See " Equity," 30, n. 

NOVELTY. See "Practice," 12. 

NUISANCE. See " Christianity," 12, n. 

NUMEROUS LAWS. See " Parliament," 3, n. 

OAK, THE. See " Land," n. 

OATH OP A JUDGE. See references from " Jnige," supra. 

See also "Bihle," 3; " Criminal Justice," 36; "Evidence," 2,9, 29; 
"Fraud," 16; " Judges," 3, 48, to. ; "Jurisdiction," 14; "Politics," 
3 ; " Trial for Life," 1. 

OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW. See " Law," 69. 


dicta. See Text. SeeaZso" Administration of Justice," 8; "Practice," 4. 
opinion. See " Obiter Dicta," 2. 

OBJECTION, FORMAL. See " Criminal Justice," 3 ' Pleadings," 12. 


imperfect. See " Discretion," 10 ; " Miscellaneous," 8. 
moral. See " Equity," 37, 38 ; " Money," 1. 
of an oath. See " Evidence," 29. 


See also " Liberty of the Subject," b,n. ; " Matrimony," 7 ; " Tort," 16. 

OCCUPATION. See " Esquire,'! 1, 2. 

ODIUM. See " Discovery," 4. 

OFFENCE, COMPASSING. See "Sovereignty," 13. 

OFFENCES, ALL, PERSONAL. See "Husband and Wife," 15, n. 
See also "Fraud," 7. 
D.L.Q. 20 

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306 INDEX. 

OFFENDERS, ESCAPE OF. See " Criminal Justice," 3, 37, 38. 


of trust. See " Public Servant," 9. 
public. See " Public Servant," 8. 
See also "Judges," 14. 

OFFICER. See "Navy," 8; "Public Servant." 

of the Court. See " Criminal Justice," 50 ; " Practice," 1, 2, 9, 29, 33. 

OPEN COURT. See " Judicial Proceedings," 7. 

OPENING SPEECH. See Text. See aZso " Nonsuit," w. ;" Practice," 22. 


difference of, among Judges. See " Judges," 54, 55; " Politics," 3. 

human. See " Law," 3. 

Judges'. See " Judges," 23, 24, 25 ; " Pardon," 2. 

judicial. See " Judicial Decisions," 11. 

of the law. See " Law," 28. 

precedence of Judges in delivering. See " Judges," 56, 57. 

public. See " Contempt of Court," 9 ; " Sovereignty," 7. 

See also " Judges," 26, n., 51, 52, 53. 


not declared piece-meal. See " Administration of Justice," 13. See 

also " Practice," 6. 
of early times. See " Miscellaneous," 4. See also references from 
" Times." 


appearance of. See " Criminal Justice," 45. 
engines of. See "Liberty of the Subject," 2. 
legality and. See "Law," 75. 

See also "Liberty of the Subject," 4; "Process," 2; "Religion," 
1, n. ; " Tort," 19. 

OPPRESSIVE PROSECUTION. See "Criminal Justice," 43; "Prac- 
tice," 10, n. 

ORAL EVIDENCE. See " Criminal Justice," 36. 

ORDER IN CHAMBERS. See "Practice," 7, 8, 9, 81. 

ORDERS OF COMMITTAL. See "Punishment," 9. 
See also " Practice," 31, 32. 

ORIGIN OF THINGS. See " Miscellaneous," 3. 

ORIGINAL. See ' ' Dictum, "4. 

OUTLAWRY. See " Corporations," 6 ; " Criminal Justice," 39. 


OVERSIGHTS, &c. See "Criminal Justice," 29. 

OVERT ACTS. See " Motives," 3. 

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INDEX. 807 

OXFORD, UNIVERSITY OP. See " Universities," 2. 


on legislative and judicial funotions. See "Administration of 
Justice," 27, n. 

PANDORA'S BOX. See " Liberty of the Press," 3. 

PAPER CURRENCY. See " Commerce," 33. 

PAPIST. See " Ecclesiastical," 2, 3, 5, 6. 

PARCHMENT, See "Magic." 

PARDON. See Text. See also "Administration of Justice," 32; 
" Politics," i. 



influence. See " Parent and Child," 4. 

jurisdiction. See "Parent and Child," 8. 

See also " Bastardy " ; " Family " ; " Infant " ; " Matrimony," 6. 


Act of. See "Dictum"; "Practice," 16; "Precedents," 8; 

judgments in. See " Judicial Decisions," 1. 

publicity of proceedings in. See " Judicial Proceedings," 6. 

See also Text, mfrd. See also " Cases," 18 ; " Chancery," 1 ; " Chris- 
tianity," 10; "Foreign Law"; "Judges," 19; "Law," 49; 
"Minorities," 2; "Motives," 14; "Politics"; "Property," 7; 
" Sovereignty," 2, to. ; " Statutes," 11 ; " Tort," 8. 

PAROL EVIDENCE. See " Construction," 2. 

PART PERFORMANCE. See " Matrimony," 6, to. 

PARTIES. See '• Politics," 1, 3. 

PARTS. See • ' Truth," 13 ; " Voting." 

of evidence, reading. See "Evidence," 23, 24. 

PASSION. See "Criminal Justice," 23; "Discretion," 4; "Miscel- 
laneous," 84, 54; "Truth," 13. 

PASSIVE. See " Equity," 33, to. 

PASTOR. See "Woman," 2. 

PATIENCE. See "Counsel," 12, 13, w. ; "Judges," 16, 26, n. ; "Time," 
3, TO. 

PAUPER. See " Settlements," 3. See also " Poor." 


PAYMENT OP WITNESSES. See "Witness," 5. 


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308 INDEX. 


breach of the. See "Courts," 4; "Libel," 5. 

justices of the. See " Magistrates." 

of families. See "Husband and Wife," 14. 

women as justices of the. See " Statutes," 5. 

See also "Litigation," 3; " MisoeUaneous," 26; "Sovereignty," 14. 

PECUNIARY LOSS. See " Tort," 24, to. 

PEERAGE. See Text. 

PEERS, HOUSE OP. See " Parliament," 5, to. 

PENAL JURISDICTION. See "Chancery," 7; "Christianity," 10; 
" Punishment," 8. 

PENALTIES. See " Statutes," 27. See also references from " Mne." 


common. See " Money," 3. See also " Jury," 10. 
representatives of the. See " Parliament," 10. 
rights of the. See " Jurisdiction," 2. 
the. See " Voting" ; " Words." 


part. See " Matrimony," 6, n. 
specific. See " Specific Performance." 
See also " Practice," 29. 

PERIL. See " Shipping," 2. 

PERJURY. See Text. See also " Criminal Justice," 36 ; " Evidence," 
22 ; " Fraud," 27 ; " Truth," 7. 

PERMANENT COURTS. See " Parliament," 1. 

PERPETUAL DURATION. See " Rights," 4. 

PERPETUITIES. See " Equity," 20. 

PERSECUTION. See " Religion," 8 ; " Virtue," 2. 

PERSON INSANE. See " Punishment," 2. See also " Insanity." 


injury. See " Damages," 3 ; " Tort," 7. 
property. See "Property," 8. 

PERSONALTY. See " WiU," 5. 

PERSUASION. See " MisoeUaneous," 30 ; " Truth," 1. 

PERVERSION OF JUSTICE. See " Judges," 82. 

PETITION. See " Sovereignty," 2, to. 

PHENOMENA. See " Motives," 8. 

PHILOLOGIST. See " Judges," 1. 

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INDEX. 309 


PHYSICAL COMFORT. See " Parent and Child," 5. 

PHySICIAN. See " Ecolesiastioal," 3. 


PITY. See " Criminal Justice," 23. 

PLAIN TRUTH. See " Truth," 6. 

Justice," 27. 
See afeo " Discovery " ; "Jury," 10, n. ; "Motives," 5, n.; "Plead- 
ings," 6; "Practice," 10, n.; "Prosecution"; "Railway Com- 
pany," 1 ; "Relief," 3 ; " Tort," 2. 

PLEA. See " Criminal Justice," 47, 48 ; " Damages," 4 ; " Pleadings." 

PLEADINGS. See Text. See also "Admission"; "Process," 1; 
"Time," 3, re.; "Usage," 15. 

POETRY. .See "Matrimony," 7, w.; " Settlements," 3, ro. 

POINTS OF THE LAW, NINE. See " Possession," 2. 


i. See " Navy," 7. 
of the law. See "Judges," 6 ; " Liberty of the Subject," 5 ; "Married 

Woman"; " Mischief," 2. 
public. See " Public Policy." 
See aZso "Doctrine," 2 ; "Justice," 1; "Pleadings"; "Transfer of 

Right of Action " ; " Trespass," 2, tc. ; "War." 

POLITICAL JUSTICE. See "Trespass," 2, n. 

POLITICS. See Text. See also " Sovereignty," 7 ; "Voting." 

POOR. See Text. See aZso " Christianity," 11 ; " Justice," 3 ;" Law," 
19,31; "Libel," 6, n. 

POPERY. See " Ecclesiastical," 2, 8, 5, 6. 

POPULAR APPLAUSE. See "Judges," 76. 

POPULARITY, SEEKING FOR. See " Judges," 76. 
See also " Judges," 26. 


POSITIVE LAW. See "Law," 5; " Settlements," 2. 
See also " Miscellaneous," 88. 


POSSESSION OP LAND. See " Ejectment," 2. 

See also "Master and Servant," 2; "Presumption," 8; "Property," 5. 

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310 INDEX. 

POVERTY. See " Judges," 80. 


of anticipation. See " Settlements," 1. 
of legislation. See " Parliament," 12. 
to fine. See " Punishment," 8. 
to imprison. See " Punishment," 8. 
See also " Pardon," 1, n. 


a course of, controls an Act of Parliament. See " Precedents," 8. 
of Judges in delivering judgment. See " Administration of Justice," 

13, 14 ; " Judges," 56, 57. 
travelling beyond the facts. See "Judges," 63. 
See oZso " Admission " ; "Affidavit"; "Amendments"; "Arbitration"; 

"Compromise"; "Consent," 5; "Counsel," 3; "Courts," 13; 

"Criminal Justice," 27, 28; "Demurrer"; "Ejectment," 2; 

"Evidence," 23; "Judges," U, 68, 72, 81; "Law," 14, 28, 29; 

" New Trial," 3 ; " Nonsuit," n. ; " Opening Speech," 2 ; " Payment 

into Court"; "Precedents," 8, 10; "Presumption," 6; "Statutes,"' 

27; "Sunday"; "Time"; " Transfer of Right of Action" ; "Usage," 

See also Text. 

PRECEDENCE. See " Judges," 56. 

PRECEDENTS. See Text. See also " Cases" ; " Criminal Justice," 6 ; 
" Judicial Decisions," 1, 10 ; " Law Reports " ; " Practice," 15 ; 


PREJUDICE. See " Judges," 61 ; " Judicial Proceedings," 2, n. ; " Jury,'' 
11, 25 ; " Property," 2 ; " Public Servant," 10 ; " Truth," 13. 


PRESENTS. See " Judges," 81, n. 

PRESERVATION. See " Property," 6, 9, 11. 


liberty of the. See " Commerce," 3 ; " Contempt of Court " ; " Liberty 

of the Press." 
mendax mfamia. See " Judges," 82, n. 
See also " Judges," 18, 26, 70, n. ; " Jury," 25 ; " Libel." 

PRESSING. See "Navy," 7. 

PRESUMPTION. See Text, infra. See also " Character," 3 ; " Criminal 
Justice," 8; "Diligence," 2; "Illegality"; "Law," 14, 46, Ji. ; 
" Limitation," 1, n. ; " Magistrates," 4, 5 ; " Motives," 8 ; " Practice," 
32 ; " Precedents," 9. 

PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE. See " Presumption," 5. 
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INDEX. 311 


PRETENSED RIGHT. See " Rights," 2. 

PREVARICATION. See " Pardon," 2. 

PREVENTION. See " Punishment," 3, and references from " Restraint." 

PREVIOUS SENTENCE. See " Punishment," 10. 

PRIEST. See " Eoolesiastioal," 5. 

PRINCES. See " MisoeUaneous," 16 ; " Soyereignty," 3. 

PRINCIPAIi AND SURETY. See "Equity," 33, w. 

PRINCIPLE. See " Cases," 9, 21 ; " Common Law," i, 12 ; " Construc- 
tion," 1, 32 ; " Counsel," 17, n. ; " Public Policy," 7 ; " Statutes," 13 ; 
"Tort," 1,3; "Will," 9. 


adherence to. See " Judges," 66, 70 ; " Judicial Decisions," 9, 12. 

of law. See " Morals," 1. 

of justice. See " Practice," 25. 

See also "Doctrine," 2; "Judges," 10, 11, 70; "Judicial Decisions," 

21 ; " Law," 2, 3, 53 ; " Limitation," 1, n. ; " Motives " ; " Parliament," 

13 ; " Precedents," 18 ; " Property," 4. 

PRINT. See " Libel," 1, 3. 

PRINTING. See " Statutes," 1. 

PRISON. See "MisceUaneous," 16 ; "Punishment," 9. 
dress. See "Punishment," 1, n. 


Judges as counsel for. See "Judges," 77, 78, 79 80. 

of war. See "War." 

rights of. See " Criminal Justice," 37. 

right to be heard in his own person. See " Criminal Justice," 28. 

speak by counsel. See " Criminal Justice," 27. 
See also "Character " ; " Counsel," 14 ; " Criminal Justice," 2, 3, 7, 9, 

10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 24, 27, 30, 31, 46, 47, 48; "Insanity" ; 

"Intoxication"; "Judges," 81; "Jury," 25, re.; "Punishment," 

10; "Presumption," 6; " Trial for Life." 


bargain. See "Criminal Justice," 42. 
customs. See " Usage," 3. 
interest. See "Judicial Proceedings," 2, n. 
interpretation. See " Statutes," 19. 
jurisdiction. See " Jurisdiction," 13. 
man. See " Libel," i. 
mischiefs. See "Navy," 7. 
peace. See " Litigation," 3. 

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312 INDEX. 

PRIVATE— coMJimted. 

prejudice. See " Judicial Proceedings," 2, n. 
property. See " Trespass," 2. 
tradition. See ' ' Usage," 3. 

PRIVATIVE. See "MisceUaneous," 38. 

PRIVILEGE. See Text. See also "Counsel," 13, 16; "Executors" 
"Judicial Proceedings," 13; "Rights," 4; "Sovereignty," 11 
"Universities;" 2. 

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION. See " Solicitor and Client," 1. 

56, n. See also Text, ■mfra; " Criminal Justice," 3 ; " Judges," 14. 

PROBABILITY. See " Courts," 12 ; " Evidence," 12, 28 ; "Presumption,"!. 

PROCEDURE. See " Practice." 


at law. See " Litigation," 4 ; " Magistrates," 4. 
in camerd. See " Judicial Proceedings," 7, 
in equity. See " Equity," 31. 
judicial. See " Judicial Proceedings." 

PROCESS. See Text, infra. See also "Courts," 2; "Judges," 81, n.; 
"Jury," 10, n.; "Trespass," 2, •«. 

PROFESSION. See " Esquire," 1, 2 ; "Witness," 5. 
legal. See "Amendments," 7; " Legal Profession." 


advice. See " Legal Prof ession " ; " Solicitor and Client," 1. 
men. See"WiU,"4. 

PROFESSOR. See " Universities," 2. 

PROFIT. See "Public Servant," 9. 

of crime. See " Criminal Justice," 51. 

PROHIBITION. See "Dictum," 4 ; " Magistrates," 3, n. 

PROMISE. See " Contract " ; " Tort," 16. 

PROOF. See " Usage," 4, 8. 

PROPERTY. See Text. 

damage to. See "Tort," 7. 
real. See"WiU,"5. 

See also "Commerce," 32; "Land," 4; "Libel," 6; "Money"- 
"Tort," 4; " WiU," 18, n. 

PROPOSITION. See " Counsel," 22 ; " Law," 23. 
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INDEX. 313 

PEOPEIETY. See " Courts," 3 ; " Property," 9. 

PROSECUTE, DUTY TO, OR NOT. See " Criminal Justice," 41. 



Crown. See " Costs," 5. 
King may stop. See " Polities," 4. 
oppressive. See " Criminal Justice," 43. 
suppression of. See " Criminal Justice," 42. 
vexatious. See "Corporations," 1. 

PROTECTION TO THE INNOCENT. See " Criminal Justice," 32, n., 
See also "Protection" in Text, infra; also "Counsel," 13 ; "Law," 
31, 32; "Liberty of the Press," 3; "Liberty of the Subject," 4 ; 
"Punishment," 6; " Sovereignty," 14; "Tort,"19; " Trade Union " ; 
" Trespass," 3 ; "Will," 1, n. 

PROTESTANTISM. See " Ecclesiastical," 3. 

PROVERBS. See " Words." 

of Solomon. See " Statutes," 13. 

PROVISO. See "Statutes," 20. 

PROVOCATION. See " Justification," 2 ; '*Libel," 5. 

PROXIMATE LOSS. See "Motives," 13, n. 

PRUDENCE. See "MisceUaneous," 35; " Commerce," 30 ; "Motives," 

PUBLIC. See " Punishment," 5 ; " Tort," 23. 
benefit. See " Counsel," 13 ; "Judges," 47. 
bodies. See " Tort," 19. 

can have no right springing from injustice. See " Tort," 13. 
convenience. See "Equity," 33, 36; "Judges," 47; "Limitation," 

1; "War." 
criticism. See "Judges," 70, n. ; 82, n. 
good. See " Common Law," 12 ; " Litigation," 2, «. ; " Parliament," 

interests. See "Judicial Proceedings," 8; "Navy," 4; "Public 

Policy," 9 ; " Statutes," 27. 
law. See "Law," 11. 
liberty. See " Liberty of the Press," 10. 
manners. See "Morals," 1. 
measures. See "Law," 70. 
mischief. See "Mischief," 2. 
morality. See "Judicial Proceedings," 7. 
notoriety. See " Judicial Proceedings, " 12. 
officer. See "Public Servant." 

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314 INDEX. 

PUBLIC — continued. 

opinion. See " Contempt of Court," 9 ; " Sovereignty," 9. 
policy. See Text, mfra. 

decisions based upon grounds of. See "Judicial Decisions," 21. 
judicial proceedings to be free from bias, &c. See "Judges," 61. 
See also "Judges," 64; "Judicial Proceedings," 3; "Liberty of 
the Subject," S, n. 
scandal. See "Husband and Wife," 13 ; "Law," 74. 
security. See "Liberty of the Subject," 2. 

servant. See Text. See also "Administration of Justice," 35; 
"."Auditor"; "Honours"; "Navy," 8; "Practice," 1, 9; "Tres- 
pass," 2, n. 
services See "Public Servant," 4. 
undertakings. /See " Navy," 7, m. 
utUity. jSee "Judicial Proceedings," 2, n. 
weal. See"l!oxt," 2i,n. 

PUBLICATION. See "Libel," 1; "Liberty of the Press," 7, 8; 
"Statutes," 1. 

PUBLICITY. See " Judicial Proceedings " ; "Public Servant," 5. 

PUNCTUATION. See "Criminal Justice," 24 ; " Insanity" ; "Intoxica- 
tion"; " Morals," 1, 3 ; "Statutes," 12 ; "WiU,"16. 


the fear of. See "Criminal Justice," 3, 10, 11, 12. 
to the guilty. See "Damages," 1. 

See also "Law," 59; "Miscellaneous," 20; "Sovereignty," 3; 
" Statutes," 27. 

PURCHASE . See" Title, "4. 

of a chance. See "Property," 12. See also references from "Chance." 

PURCHASEB. See " Fraud," 21. 

PURITY OP PUBLIC JUSTICE, ^ee " Crimin al Justice," 32, n. 

PURVIEW. See " Statutes," 20. 

PUZZLES, CHINESE. /See "Will," 6. 

QUEEN. See " King," and references therefrom ; " Sovereignty," 8. 
Consort. See " Sovereignty," 8, n. 
Regnant. See " Sovereignty," 8, n. 


Bench. See "Criminal Justice," 26. 
jurisdiction. See "Property," 7. 

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INDEX. 315 


ensnaring. See "Evidence," 14,19. 

leading. See "Evidence," 13, 17, 18. 

objection to, as leading. See " Evidence," 13, 17. 

of fact. See " Equity," 14 ; "Evidence," 6; " Fraud," 13. 

of interests infuturo. See "Property," 3. 

of law. See " Fraud," 36 ; " Law," 14. 

See also " Miscellaneous, " 2 ; " Witness," 2. 

QUIET. See " Mischief," 1. 

QUIT, NOTICE TO. See " Notice to Quit." 

QUOTATIONS. See " Books," 1. 

RAILWAY. See " Navy," 7, n. 
company. See Text. 

RAKING INTO MEN'S LIVES. See "Character," 2, 4, 5. 

RANK. See " Justice," 3. 

RASHNESS. See " MisceUaneous," 85. 


law. See " Counsel," 15. 

parts of the evidence. See "Evidence," 23. 

REAL PROPERTY. See " Commerce," 32 ; " Will," 5. 

REALM, LAW OP THE. See " Usage," 12 ; " Woman,' ' 2. 

REAP, TO. See " MisceUaneous," 41. 


common law nothing but. See " Law," 17, n. 

difference in, of opinion. See " Judges," 26, n., 53. 

differing from a man without knowing his. See " Judges," 49. 

for judgment. See " Parliament," 5, n. 

if none given, authority might have had more weight. See " Judges," 

invention of, and means. See " Statutes," 13. 
law founded in. See " Equity," 3, n. ; " Law," 17 ; " Precedents," 4, 

12, n. 
law of, law of God. See " Law," 56. 
no, for judgments. See " Judges," 45. 
nothing is law that is not. See " Judges," 50. 
of mankind. See " Reasonable," 4. 
of public benefit and convenience. See " Judges," 47. 
of State. See " PoUtics," 4. 
the, and spirit of cases. See " Cases," 10. 
where no, given for decision. See " Judges," 48. 
See also " Cases," 18 ; " Miscellaneous," 30 ; " Presumption," 12 ; 

" Religion," 1, n. ; " Time," 2 ; " Trespass," 2, n. ; " Usage," 14. 

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316 INDEX. 


and intelligible. See " Criminal Justice," 35. 

evidence. See "Presumption," 11. 

ground. See " Judges," 73 ; " Presumption," 3. 

just and. See " Necessity," 2. 

the law is. See " Law," 52. 

See also " Statutes," 7. 

BBASONING, METAPHYSICAL. See "Miscellaneous," 24. 

BBBELLION. See " Politics," i. 

BECKLESS TBADING. See " Companies," 7. 

BECLUSES. See ' ' Evidence," 29. 

BECOGNIZANCE, See " Forfeiture." 

BBCOMPENSE. See " Tort," 15. 

BECONCILIATION. See " Husband and Wife," 10. 


collection of. See " Judicial Decisions," 22. 
keeper of. See " Chancery," 5. 
See also " Courts," 13. 

BECOVBBY OE PBOFITS OP CBIME. See " Criminal Justice," 51. 

BEDBBSS FOB GBIEVANCE. See " Parliament," 9. 

See also " Equity," 26 ; " Master and Servant," 1 ; " Tort," 10, n 

BEFOBMATION, THE. See " Ecclesiastical," 5, 6 ; " Matrimony," 6, n. 

EEGAL FUNCTIONS. See " Sovereignty," 4. 

BEGISTBY. See " Practice," 8. 

BELIEF. See Text. 

against conscience. See " Equity," 38. 
against fraud. See " Fraud," 34. 

See also " Christianity," 11 ; " Discovery," 2 ; " Equity," 6, 35 ; 
" Specific Performance." 

BELIGION. See Text. See also "Bible"; "Blasphemy"; "Chris- 
tianity"; " Commerce." 26; "Corporations," 4; "Ecclesiastical;" 
" Evidence," 29 ; " Judges," 3 ; " Liberty of the Press," 1 ; " Matri- 
mony"; "Poor"; "Truth," 1; "Universities," 2, m. ; "Virtue," 
1; "Will," 1, 3; "Words." 

See also " Beligion," 2. 

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INDEX. 317 


See also "Law," 66 ; "Parliament," 11 ; "Sovereignty," 2, n. ; " Tort," 
e, 9, 20. 

EEMUNBRATION. See " Shipping," 1 ; - Witness," 5. 

REPAIRS. See " Charity," 2, n. 

REPEAL. See "Law," 70; "Liberty of the Press," 2. 

REPLY. See " Amendments," 8. 

REPORTER, LAW. See " Law," 68 ; " Law Reports," 1, 2. 

REPORTS, IMPERFECT. See " Law Reports," 3. 

Su also " Admiralty," 3 ; " American Decisions " ; " Cases " ; " Courts," 
3, re. ; " Judicial Decisions" ; " Precedents." 

REPOSE. See " Limitation," 1, n. ; " Trespass," 1. 


REPRISAL. See " Aggression." 

REPUDIATION. See " Consent," 5. 

REPUTATION. See Text. See also " Criminal Justice," 49 ; " Judicial 
Decisions," 26 ; " Libel," 3, 6. 

RESCUE. See " Shipping," 1. 

See also " DomicU." 


of trade. See " Contract," 4 ; " Damages," 2 ; " Dictum," 4. 
on alienation. See " Equity," 20. 
upon liberty. See " Liberty of the Subject," 4, 5. 
See also ' ' Administration of Justice," 35 ; " Commerce," 4 ; " Equity," 
8 ; "Morals," 1 ; " Punishment," 3. 

RETAINER. See Text. 


REVENGE. See " Punishment," 7. 

REVENUE. See Text. See also " Universities," 2, n. 

REVOLUTION, THE. See " Liberty of the Press," 2. 

REWARD. See Text. See also " Criminal Justice," 3 ; " Public Servant," 
6; "Tort," 15. 

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318 INDEX. 

EHYME. See " Settlements," 3, n. 

RICH. See " Justice," 3 ; " Law," 19, 31 ; " Poor," 3. 

RICHAED I. See " Law," 20 ; " Presumption," 7. 

RICHARD II. See " Usage," 8. 

RIDICULOUS. See " Law, " 51. 


discovery not matter of. See " Discovery," 1. 

of action. See " Transfer of Right of Action." 

of law. See " Trespass," 3. 

of retainer. See " Retainer." 

to keep one's sentiments. See " Motives," 8. 

See also "Costs," 2; "Damages," 4; "Equity," 8, 17; "Miscel- 
laneous," 34 ; " Public Policy," 5 ; " Sovereignty," 2, n. ; " Tort," 6, 
10, 20. 

EIGHTS. See Text. 

and duties, sacred. See " Parent and Child," 2, n. 

and obligations. See " Law," 67. 

and prerogatives. See " Crown." 

of an accused person. See " Criminal Justice," 27, 28, 37. 

of British subjects. See " Law," 66. 

of family life. See " Parent and Child," 2, n. 

of individuals. See " Doctrine," 3. 

of the subject. See " Liberty of the Subject," 2. 

sleeping on one's. See " Diligence," 2 ; " Equity," 15, 33. 

See also " Counsel," 19 ; "Equity," 36 ; " Justice," 4 ; " Minorities," 1 ; 

" Public Servant," 3 ; " Tort," 3, 5, 13, 19, 25 ; " Universities," 2, n. ; 

" Usage," 2. 

RISK. ;Sce " Commerce," 30. 

RITUALISM. See " Ecclesiastical," 7. 

ROAD. &e "Highway." 

ROBE, LONG. See " Counsel," 1, n. 

ROE, RICHARD. See " Jury," 10, n. 

ROLLS, MASTER OP THE. See " Christianity," 10. 

ROMAN LAW. See " Precedents," 12, n. 

ROMANISM. See " Ecclesiastical," 2. 

EOMANS. See " Time," 3. 

ROME, POPE OP. See " Ecclesiastical," 6. 

ROMISH CHURCH. See " Matrimony," 6, n. 

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INDEX. 319 


navy. ^e« "Navy," 2, 3. 
trustee. See " Forfeiture." 

BOYALTY. See " Sovereignty." 

RUIN AND DECAY. See " Property," 9, 11. 

RULE. See " Oonstruotion," 32 ; " Judges," 68, 69 ; "Practice," 24, 25, 26, 
27 ; " Precedents," 13, n. ; " Reasonable," 2, i; " Statutes," 13 ; 
" wm," 2. 

for drawing deeds. See " Construction," 32. 

golden. See " Construction," 31 ; " Statutes," 18, n. 

hard-and-fast. See " Text Books," i. 

of law. See " Character," 1 ; " Equity," 7 ; " Evidence," 17 ; "Judges," 
65 ; " Law," 27, 53, 62 ; "Parliament," 16 ; " Will," 15. 


and precedents, fixed. See " Precedents," 3. 
, of Court. See " Chancery," 3 ; " Commerce," 32 ; " Court," 1. 
of equity. See " Equity," 20. 
of evidence, artificial. See " Evidence," 27. 

in civil and criminal cases. See " Criminal Justice," 1, 5. 
of pleading. See "Pleadings," 1. 
property. See " Property," 4. 
stereotyped. See " Text Books," 4. 
technical. See " Judicial Decisions," 19 ; " Will," 14. 

SACRAMENT. See " Matrimony," 4, 5. 

SACRED RIGHTS AND DUTIES. See " Parent and Child," 2, n. 

SAGES OP OUR LAW. 5ee " Precedents." 13. 

SAILORS. See " Shipping," 4. See also " Seamen." 

SALE, BILL OP. See " Bill of Sale." 


SALVAGE. See " Shipping," 1. 

SAND-GLASS. See " Time," 3, n. 

SAVING LIFE. See " Shipping," 1, 2. 

SAXON. See " Charity," 2, n. ; " Usage," 7. 
times. See " Woman," 2, n. 

SCANDAL. See " Discretion," 3 ; " Husband and Wife," 13 ; " Law," 74. 

SCHOLARSHIP. See " Schoolmaster," 1. 

SCHOOL. See " Universities." 


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320 INDEX. 

SCIENCE. See " Law," 20 ; " Law Eeports," 3 ; " Miscellaneous," 55. 

SCIENTIFIC MEN. See " Witness/' 5. 

SCINTILLA OF EVIDENCE. See "Eailway Company," 1. 

SCOTCH LAW OF MAEBIAGE. See " Matrimony," 7, n. 

SCOTLAND. See Text. See also " Judicial Proceedings," 7. 

SCOTSMEN. See " Scotland," 1. 

SCRIPTURE. See " Bible," 1, «., 2 ; " Christianity " ; " Criminal Justice," 
11,12; " Judges," 26, w. ; "Law," 62, 68; "Liberty of the Press," 
2, n, ; "Matrimony," 4, n. ; " Miscellaneous," 2, n.,li, 17, n., 20, 41 ; 
" Motives," 2, n. ;" Poor," 1 ; " Religion," 2 ; " Sovereignty," 1, 2, n. ; 
" Statutes," 13 ; "Witness," 1, n. 


SEAL. .See " Practice," 9. 

SEAMEN. See " Navy," 1. See also '• Sailors." 

SECRECY. .See " Fraud," 25 ; " Judicial Proceedings," 3. 


proceedings. See "Judicial Proceedings," 3, 6, n., 7 et seq. 
recesses. See " Motives," 4, 5. 
thoughts. See " Motives," 4. 

SECURITY. .See " Limitation," 1, n. ; " Trespass," 3. 
of the public. See " Liberty of the Subject," 2. 

SENSE. See " Statutes," 11 ; " Will," 16. 
common. See " Presumption," 1. 
good. See " Law," 17. 

SENSES. See " Insanity " ; " Intoxication." 


frustrating, of the Court. See "Criminal Justice," 50. 
mitigation of. See " Criminal Justice," 24. 
no, without notice. See " Criminal Justice," 17, 18. • 
previous. See " Punishment," 10. 

See also " Counsel," 8, 9 ; " Punishment," 9, 10. 

See "New Trial," 1, n. 

SEPARATE USE. See " Equity," 20 ; " Settlements," 1. 


master and. See " Master and Servant " ; " Trade Union." 
menial. See " Sovereignty," 11. 
public. See " Public Servant." 
See also " Miscellaneous," 14. 

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INDEX. 321 


case. See " Counsel," 10. 

law. See "Law," 63; " Precedents," 17. 

SETTLEMENT. See " Compromise" ; " Evidence" 33. 


SEVEN BISHOPS, CASE OF. See " Presumption," 5. 

SHARP PRACTICE. See " Practice," 14. 

SHEBEPP. See Text. See also " Ecclesiastical," 4 ; " Parliament," 11 ; 
" Trespass," 2, n. 

SHCMEI. See " Sovereignty," 1. 

SHIPPING. See Text. See also "Admiralty"; "Bill of Lading"; 
"Navy," 2, n. 

SHIPS. ySee " Navy," 2, w. 

SHYLOCK. See " Precedents," 6, n. 

SIGNATURE. See " Judges," U. 

SILENCE. See " Motives, " 9. 

SIMPLE TESTIMONY, ^ee" Truth "6. 

SIMPLICITY. See ' ' Tort, " 22. 

SISTERS. See " Parent and Child," 3. 

SIX CARPENTERS' CASE. See " Trespass." 2, n. 

SLANDER. See " Damages," 3 ; " Infant," 2 ; " Libel," 8. 

SLEEPING ON ONE'S RIGHTS. ^S^ee " Diligence," 2; "Equity," 15, 
33. See also " Consent," 5, n. ; " Pleadings," 4, 5. 

SLIP. See " Practice," 21. 
in form. See " WiU," 10. 

SOBRIETY. /See "Intoxication." 

SOCIAL LAW. See " Morals," 3. 


civil. ,S«e "Matrimony," 6. 

duty to. See " Protection," 2. 

equality in. See "Justice," 3. 

good of. See "Miscellaneous," 9 ; " Public Policy," 5. 

human. See "Parent and Child," 1. 

See also "Criminal Justice," 3 ; " Husband and Wife," 6 ; " Poor," 3. 

SOCIETIES. ^«e "Companies"; "Corporations." 

SOLDIER. See " Army " ; " Schoolmaster," 3. 

D.L.Q. 21 

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322 INDEX. 

SOLICITOR. See " Attorneys " ; " Counsel," 19 ; " Legal Profession '' ; 
"Miscellaneous," 59, n. 
and client. See Text, infra. See also "Consent," 5 ; " Witness," 3. 

SOLITUDE. See "Parent and ChUd," 3. 

SOLOMON, PROVERBS OP. See " Statutes," 13. 

SON. See " Parent and Child," 1, 6. 

SORROW. See "Criminal Justice," 24. 


SOURCE. See " Miscellaneous," 25. 


power of the, to call upon all subjects, &o. See " Navy," 7, n. 
prerogative of the, in regard to the peerage. See "Peerage," 1. 
See also "Bible," 2; "Costs," 4; "Criminal Justice," 26; "King"; 
"Statutes," 1, 11. 

SOVEREIGNTY. See Text. See also " Crown " ; " Delay " ; " Govern- 
ment " ; " Jurisdiction," 2. 

SPECIAL RIGHT. ;Sc« "Rights," 4. 

SPECIFIC AGREEMENT. See " Fraud," 14. 


SPECULATION. See " Fraud," 8. 

SPEECH. See " Opening Speech," 2, n. 
flowers of. See " Truth." 6. 


of justice. See "Law," 54. 

of the times. See " Punishment," 1, n. 

SPIRITUAL TYRANNY. See " Ecclesiastical," 6. 

STABLE, AUGEAN. See " Punishment," 6. 

STALE DEMAND. See "Equity," 33, 34 ; "Limitation," 1, n. 


reasons of. ^«e "Politics," 4. 

the. /See " Government " ; " Liberty of the Subject," 5. 

STATEMENT. See ' ' Evidence. " 

STATESMAN. See "Parliament," 13. 


direct opinion as to obscure. See "Administration of Justice," 9. 

law. /See "Parliament," 13. 

of Frauds. See " Fraud," 7, 26, n. 

of Limitations. See "Limitation," 1. 

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INDEX. 823 

STATUTES. See Text. 

increase In. See "Parliament," 3, n. 

See also "Construction"; "Dictum"; "Motives," 14, 15; " Parlia- 
ment," 3; "Practice," 16. 

STBEEOTYPED EULES. See "Text Books," 4. 

STOPS. 5'ee " Statutes," 12. 

STRAIGHT LINE. ^«e "Miscellaneous," 37. 


STRANGEK. ^See "Money," 2. 

STREET. See ' ' Highway. " 

STRENGTH OE MEMORY. ,S'ee "Eyidenoe," 4. 

STUDENT, LAW. ^^ee " Inns of Court " ; "Law,"l,». ; "Law Reports, 
3, n. 


fellow. ;See "Scotland," 1. 

liberty of the. See "Construction,"?; "Freedom of Speech"; 

" liberty of the Subject." 
of the Queen. ,See "Liberty of the Press," 11; "Navy," 6. 
Protestant. See " Ecclesiastical," 3. 
See also "Magistrates," 3; "Pleadings," 3; "Precedents," 20; 

" Public Servant," 2 ; " Sovereignty," 2, n., 7, 8, 9. 


SUBORDINATES. See "Schoolmaster," 1. 

SUBPOENA. See "Morals," 2. 


civil and criminal. See " Courts," 7. 
law. See "Litigation." 
limitation of. See "Limitation," 1. 
motive for. See " Motives," 12. 

SUITOR. See ' ' Pleadings, " 11 ; " Precedents," 4, 5, 12 ; " PubUc Servant," 
Sj^" Sovereignty," 9. 

SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS, ^ee " Magistrates," 2. 

SUMMING UP. See " Judges," 70, n. ; " Jury," 18. 

SUMMONS. See " Courts," 2 ; " Criminal Justice," 3. 
judgment. See "Punishment," 9, n. 

SUN. See "Mischief," 3, n. ; " Judges," 26, n. 

SUNDAY. See Text. See also " Day." 


Court. See " Magistrates," 3, 4, 7. 
officer. See "Navy," 8. 


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324 INDEX. 

SUPERVISION. See " Eoolesiastioal," 3. 


of documents. See " Costs," 1. 

of prosecution. See " Criminal Justice," 42. 



Court. See " Magistrates," 7 ; "New Trial"; "Practice"; "Privy 

Council"; "Punishment," 6. 
head. See " Sovereignty," 5. 
Law-Giver. See "-Law," 62. 

SURETY. See "Equity," 33, M. 

SURNAME . See" Name, " i, n. 

SURVEYOR. See ' ' Witness,' ' 5. 

SUSPICION. See "Evidence," 7, 8, 9 ; " Judges," 2, 61, 73 ; " Justice," 
6; "Magistrates," 1. 

SWAN, THE COCK. See " Husband and Wife," 12. 

"Criminal Justice," 20. 
See also "Bible," 3, n. ; " Truth," 7. 

SYNAGOGUE. See •' Christianity," 7. 

TACKING IMPRISONMENT. See " Punishment, 10. 
TAXATION. See " Navy," 7, n. 
TAXING MASTER. See "Practice," 33. 
TEACHER. See " Schoolmaster," 2. 
TEMPER. See "Libel," 2. 
TEMPLERS. See " Inns of Court." 
TENANT, LANDLORD AND. See " Notice to.Quit." 
TENDENCY. See " MisoeUaneous," 31. 
TESTATOR. See " WiU," 2, n., 8, 9, n., 14, 15, 17, 18. 
TESTATOR'S BOUNTY. See "Will," 3. 
TESTIMONY, SIMPLE. See " Truth," 6. 
TEST OP INSANITY. See "Insanity," 2, n. 

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INDEX. 325 


books. See Text. See also " Cases." 
writers. See "Parliament," 13. 

THIEVES. See "MisoeUaneous," 49. 

THING NOT IN ESSE. See " Property," 1, 


at a venture. See ' ' Trial for Life," 2. 
good. See " Truths," 12. 

THINKEE. See " Schoolmaster," 2. 

THOUGHTS. See " Motives," 4. 

" Administration of Justice," 16. 

TIME. See Text: 

immemorial. /See " Presumption," 8. 
lapse of. See ' ' Time," 1. 
length of. See "Usage," 10. 
of dying, ^-ee " Will," 1. 
of execution. /See "Will," 1, ra. 
of Richard I. ,S'ee " Law," 20. 
reasonable. See "Reasonable," 1. 
to consider. /See " Judges," 52, n. ; "Politics," 3. 
to search for precedents. See " Precedents," 5. 
See also " Chancery," 8 ; "Delay" ; "Jury," 30; "Limitation," 1, n. ; 
"Miscellaneous," 22, ra. ; "Punishment," 9; "Statutes," 21, 24; 
ge," 6, 7, 8 ; " Witness," 5. 


changing oirovunstances of the. See " Law," 3. 
early. See " Miscellaneous," 4 ; "Statutes," 14. 
fashions of the. ,See "Courts," 4, ». ; "Judges," 76; "Law," 45; 

"Usage," 13. 
former. See "Law Reports," 3 ; "Precedents," 12, n. ; " Usage," 2, 7. 
humour of the. See " Judges," 73. 
necessity of the. See "Precedents," 1. 
present. See " Schoolmaster," 3. 
remote. See " Religion," 3. 
Saxon. See " Woman," 2, n. 
spirit of the. See " Punishment," 1, n. 
venality of the. See " Punishment," 6. 

TITLE. See Text. See also "Ejectment," 1 ; "Presumption," 8; 
"Statutes," 12; "WiU,"5. 
to action. See " Tort," 9. 

TOMB. ,See "Property," 10. 

TONGUE. iSee " Religion," 2 ; " Woman," 1. 

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326 INDEX. 

TORT. See Tesit. See also " Administration of Justice," 35 ; " Books," 1 ; 
"Christianity," 12, re. ; "Commerce," 32; "Contract"; "Damages"; 
"Doctrine," 3 ; " Sovereignty," 2, n. 

TORTURE OP LAWS. See "Law," 40, n. 

TOWAGE. See "Public Policy," 6; "Shipping," 1. 

TRADE. See "Commerce"; "Companies," 7; "Consent," 3; "Usage." 
freedom of. See "Liberty of the Subject," 5, n. 
restraint of. See " Contract," i. 


TRADITION. See ' ' Practice,' ' 1 ; " Precedents," 9. 

TRANSACTION. See "Commerce," 34 ; " Consent," 3 ; " MisoeUaneous," 
private. See "Usage," 3. 


TRANSGRESSION. See " Common Law," 3. 

TREASON. See " Corporations," 6 ; " Criminal Justice," 89. 

TREE. See " MisoeUaneous," 45. 

root of the. See " Miscellaneous," 52. 

TRESPASS. See Text. See also " Christianity," 12, n. ; " Ejectment," 2 ; 
"Tort," 4, 18. 


by Jury. See " Common Law," 11. 

criminal. See "Evidence," 11. 

for life. See Text. See also "Criminal Justice," 48, n. ; "Evidence," 

10, n.; "Judges," 73. 
new. See " New Trial." 
shrinking from. See " Criminal Justice," 40. 
See also ' ' Criminal Justice," 13, 37, 46, 48, 49 ; " Judges," 81 ; " Jury,' ' 

24 ; " Law," 65. 

See " Criminal Justice," 29. 

TRIBUNAL, HUMAN. ^Tee " Motives," 2. 

TROUBLED WATERS. See "Miscellaneous," 50. 

"Fraud," 16 ; " Judges," 48, n. 

TRUST, to "Morals," 2; " PubHo Servant," 9 ; "Relief," 1. 

TRUSTEE. See " Forfeiture.' ' 

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INDEX. 327 

TRUTH. See Text, infra. 

oonoealment of. See "Fraud," 12, 27. 

enforcement of. See " Fraud," 27. 

See also "Christianity," 2, n. ; "Commerce," 4 ; "Construction," 22 ; 

" Criminal Justice," 3, 5; "Libel," 2; "Perjury"; "Pleadings," 2; 

"Presumption," 1, 7; "Tort," 27. 

TURPITUDE. See " Equity," 28. 

TWELVE TABLES, THE. See " Precedents," 10. 

TYRANT. See " Statutes," 23. 

TYRANTS, LAW OF. See " Discretion," 4. 

TYRANNY, SPIRITUAL. ^See " Ecclesiastical," 6. 

See also "Construction," 9; "Liberty of the Press," 6; "Public 
Senrant," 1 ; " Trade Union." 

UNANIMITY. See " Judges," 55, 56, n. ; " Jury," 21. 


justice. See " Justice," 2. 
law. See " Precedents," 20. 

UNDUE INFLUENCE. See " Fraud," 22 ; " Sovereignty," 10. 


suspicion of. See " Magistrates," 1. 
See also " Usury," 2. 

UNION, TRADE. See " Trade Union." 

UNITED STATES. See " Ameiio&ns" ; " American Decisions." 

UNIVERSAL CUSTOM, See " Commerce," 22, 24. 

UNIVERSITIES. See Text. See also " Counsel," 1, n. 

UNREASONABLE. See " Rights," 1 ; " Usage," 9 ; " Usury," 2. 

UNTRUTH. See " Truth," 3, and references therefrom. 

UNWILLING WITNESS. See "Evidence," 18, 26. 


contract. See " Statutes," 26, n. 
law. ^e« " Law," 55, 64. 

USAGE. See Text. See also "Commerce," 24; "Common Law," 3; 
"Precedents," 9, 10; "Statutes," 24. See also references from 
" Times. " 
and practice of nations. See " International Law," 5. 

USE. See " Morals," 2. 

separate. See " Equity," 20; " Settlements," 1. 

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328 INDEX. 

USUBY. See Text. See also ""Em-oA," i,n. 
UTILITY, PUBLIC. See "Judicial Proceedings," 2, n. 

VACATION. See "Judges," 21 ; " Practice," 1. 
Court. See " Parliament," 1. 

VENALITY. See " Punishment," 6. 

VENDOR. ;See "Fraud," 21. 

VERDICT. See ' ' Justice, " 2 ; " Railway Company, "1. 

conviction in nature of, and judgment. See " Criminal Justice," 53. 

VERSES. See " Settlements," 3, n. 

VESSELS. See " Shipping." 

VEXATION, PROMOTING. See "Discretion," 11. 


delay. See "Delay," 2. 

prosecution. ,Sce " Corporations," 1 ; "Practice," 10, m. 

VIEW. ;S'ee"Jury,"24. 

VIGILANCE. See " DiUgence." 

VINER. See " Text Books," 2. 

VIOLATION OF BIGHT. See "Tort," 10. 

VIOLENCE. ;S'ee "Trespass," 1, 2, n. 

VIRTUE. See Text. See also " Fraud, 26; "Justice," 5. 

VIRTUOSO. See " Judicial Decisions,' ' 22. 

VISITATION OF GOD. See "Criminal Justice," 48, n. 

VITUPERATION. See "Liberty of the Press," 4. 

VOID. See " Statutes," 23. 



equality of. See "Parliament," 9. 

in Courts of justice. See "Judges," 66, n. 

VOTING. See Text. -S'ce a/so " Minorities." 

WAGER. See "Miscellaneous," 36. 

WATVEB. 5ee "Consent," 4, ?i.; "Practice," 24. 
of defence, ^ee "Pleadings," 5. 

WAR. See Text, ^yseafeo "Navy," 7; "Public Servant," 5. 
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INDEX. 329 

WARDS OF COURT. -See " Parent and Child, " 8. 

WARNDSra ^ee "Eoclesiastioal,"7; "MisoeUaneous," 20. 

WARRANT. See ' ' Chief Justice." 

WASTE. See "Chancery,"!; "Dictum," 4; "Equity," 20. 

WATER. See "Time," 3, n. 

troubling the. See " MisoeUaneous," 50. 

WATERS, BITTER. See "Miscellaneous," 25. 

WAX. See "Magic." 

WEAKNESS. See " Fraud," 4, n. ; " Miscellaneous," 58 ; "Punishment," 4. 

WESTMINSTER HALL. See "Judges," 5; "Judicial Decisions," 6 ; 
" Statutes," 17 ; "Tort," 8. 

WHITE, BLACK AND. ^e« "Truth," 2, 3. 

WICKEDNESS. See "MisoeUaneous," 47, 58. 

WIPE. See " Husband and Wife" ; " Settlements," 3, n. 

WILL. See Text, infra. See o&o " Construction " ; "Presumption," 10; 
"Property," 2. 

WINDS AND WAVES. /Je* "Shipping," 2. 

WISDOM. See " Precedents," 13. 
of the nation. See "Navy," 7. 

WITNESS. See Text. 

hostUe. .See " Evidence," 25. 

judged by appearances. See "Perjury." 

one eye, worth more than ten ear- witnesses. See " Evidence," 31, n. 

reading evidence of absent. See "Evidence," 17. 

unwilling. See "Evidence," 18, 26. 

See also "Administration of Justice," 5 ; "Evidence," 3, 8, 13, 14, 15, 

16, 30, 31; "Husband and Wife," 14; "Interrogatories"; 

"Judicial Proceedings," 6, n.; "MisoeUaneous, "43, 44; "Time,"3. 


not to be numbered but weighed. See "Evidence," 29. 
two enough. See " Evidence," 30. 

5'ee d&o" Affidavit," 1, «.; "Jury," 26; "Limitation," 1, n.; "Per- 
jury" ; "Punishment," 1, n. ; "Trial for Life," 1. 

WOMAN. See Text. 

as justice of the peace. See " Statutes," 5. 

as mayor. See " Statutes," 5. 

married. See " Husband and Wife," 4 ; " Married Woman " ; 

" Settlements," 1. 
See also " Criminal Justice," 23. 

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330 INDEX, 


legacies to. See " Courts," 1. 

men stealing. See " Abduction." 

See also " Miscellaneous," 26 ; " Parent and Child," 3 ; " Words," 7, n. 


" Ab inconvenienti." See " Construction," 23, n. ; " Judges," IS. 

" Ab initio." See " Trespass," 2, n. 

" Absurdam est qfirmare {re judicata) eredendum," &c. See " Counsel," 

" Abundans cautela non nocet." See " Judges," 16, n. 

"A Chancellor's foot." See "Equity," 19, n. 

' ' A comparative necessarily supposes a positive," &o. See " Miscel- 
laneous," 38. 

"Acta exteriora indicant," &o. See "Words," 7, n. 

" Actus Dei nemini" &o. See " Miscellaneous," 12, n.; " Tort," 11, n. 

" Actus nonfacit reum nisi mens sit rea." See " Bankruptcy," 2. 

"Ad ea quce frequentius acddunt jura ada/piantur." See "Construc- 
tion," 11, n. 

" A defendant is entitled to put his back," &o. See " Pleadings," 7. 

"A difficult form of virtue," &c. See " Virtue," 1. 

" Ad qucestionemju/ris non respondent juratores" &o. See " Juiy," 2. 

" Ad gucestionesfacti," &o. See " Jury," 2, n. 

" jEquitas sequiiur legem." See "Equity," 1, n. 

" A gentleman of Gray's Inn." See " Counsel," 1, ii,. ; " Courts," 4, n- 

" A gentleman of Lincoln's Inn." See " Counsel," 1. 

" A gentleman of the long robe." See "Counsel," 1, n. 

" A good name is better than precious ointment." See " Libel," 6, n. 

" A legal fiction is always consistent with equity." See " Fiction," 2, n. 

" Aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa." See "Administration 
of Justice," 23, n. 

^'Allegans contraria non est audiendus.'' See " Counsel," 23, n. 

" Allegans turpiludinem. suum.'' See "Fraud," 31. 

"All private mischiefs must be borne," &o. See " Navy," 7. 

" A madman is like a man," &o. See " Punishment," 2, n. 

" A man is not born a knave," &c. See " Miscellaneous," 18. 

"A man should be able to consult his solicitor," &c. See "Solicitor 
and Client," 2. 

" A man who does not speak when he ought," &c. See " Consent," 5, n. 

" A man who has done one contemptible thing," &o. See " Miscel- 
laneous," 47. 

" A man who lives upon his own." See " Ejectment," 2. 

" A man who sleeps upon his rights," &o. See " Diligence," 2. 

" A mere evasion, colour, &o., to evade the law." See ' ' Law," 15. 

" An error as to a name," &c. See " Name," n. 

"A new road, not an old one, often deceives the traveller." See 
" Miscellaneous," 27, n. 

" Anglicejura in omni casu Ubertatis," &c. See " Law," 47, n. 

" Annuo parliamento." See " Parliament," 2. 

" An over-speaking Judge is a no well-timed cymbal," &o. See 
" Counsel," 13, n. 

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INDEX. 331 

WO'B'DS— continued. 

"Any man who spends his income," &o. See " Money," 6. 
"A party who seeks equity must do equity." See "Equity," 12. 
"A people whom Providence has oast together," &o. See "Sove- 
reignty," 5. 
" A person having breakfast overnight," &c. See " Miscellaneous," 28. 
"A person intends to do that which, &o., he does." See "Law," 41. 
" Apices Utigandi." See " Costs," 2. 

*' A popular Judge is a deformed thing," &c. See " Judges," 26, n. 
" A popular Judge is an odious, &o., character." See "Judges," 26. 
"A priori." iSee " Reasonable," 1. 
"A pure, innocent hand does set forth," &o. See "Criminal 

Justice," 46. 
"Arbitrio domini reacestimari debet." See " Commerce," 19, n. 
"Argumentum ad hominem." See "Fraud," 36. 
"A rock ahead that everybody knows." See " Title," 1. 
" As sure as God is in Gloucester." See " Miscellaneous," 57. 
" As the crow flies." See ' ' Miscellaneous," 37. 
"As the sun arising in the horizon," &a. See " Mischief," 3, n. 
"As the wind blows." See "Judges," 73. 
"Astuti." See " Statutes," 13. 

" As you sow, y' are like to reap." See " Miscellaneous," 17, n., 41, n. 
"Aiictoritates philosophorvmi, medicorum," &o. See " Foreign Law," 2, n. 
"Aueitpia verborum sunt judice irtdigna,.'' See " Judges," 12. 
"Atbdi alteram partem." See " Criminal Justice," 11, n. 
"Aut Ccesar aut JSPuUus." See " Miscellaneous," 61, ii. 
"A very ingenious attempt to drive a coach-and-four," &c. See 

" Statutes," 26. 
" A very large order." See " Discovery," 4, n. 
" A woman having a settlement," &o. See " Settlements," 3, n. 
"A woman's notes wiU not signify much," &o. See "Woman," 1. 
"Ay, ay, let truth come out," &c. See " Truth," 11. 
" Beneath this starry arch," &o. See " Miscellaneous," 55. 
" Better that ten guilty persons escape," &c. See " Criminal Justice," 

" Better that an individual," &o. See " Tort," 23. 
"Between the prisons and graves of Princes," &o. See " Miscellaneous," 

" Between the stirrup and the ground," &c. See " Amendments," 8, n. 
" Bien mal acquis," &a. See " Miscellaneous," 47, n. 
"Bind not the new statutes so to the common law," &c. See 

" Statutes," 25. 
"Blessed is the mending hand." See "Amendments," 1, 4. 
" Blowing hot and cold." See " Counsel," 23. 
' ' £oni justicis est, ampUare justitiam." See ' ' Administration of Justice," 

1, n. 
" Bonos mores est decorum." See " Morals," 1. 
" Brevi Manu." See " Contempt of Court," 6. 
" But words are things," &o. See " Words," 9, n. 
" Caesar's wife." See " Judges," 2. 
" Gasu^ omissus." See " Construction," 12. 

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332 INDEX. 

WOBDS— ccOTimMed. 

" Oatohing at words," &o. See " Judges," 12. 

" Oaum proxima." See " Motives," 13. 

" Oausa proxima, non remota spectatur." See " Motives," 13, n. 

"Caution is better than cure." See " Puuishment," 3, k,. 

" Caveat emptor." See " Christianity," 12, n. 

" Certainty is the mother of quiet." See " Mischief," 1. 

"Chicane." See "Costs," 2; "Pleadings," 10. 

"Cleanse the Augean stable." See " Punishment," 6. 

" Coaoh-and-four." See " Statutes," 26. 

" Commodum ex injurid sud nemo," &o. See " Tort," 17, n. 

" Communis error facit jus." See " Law," 28. 

" Communis opinio." See " Law," 28. 

" Concencus, non concubitis, facit inatriirwnium." See "Matrimony," 

6, n. 
" Conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence." See "Equity," 33. 
" Consensus tollit errorem." See " Consent," 4, n. 
" Consuetudo mercatorum." See " Commerce," 22. 
"Contain the jurisdiction of your Court within the ancient mere- 
stones," &c. See " Judges," 26, n. 
" Contemporia expositio legis est optima." See "Law," 8. 
" Coram, domino rege venit," &c. See " Sovereignty," 9. 
" Corpus delicti." See "Criminal Justice," 8, 9. 
" Corruption shall say, I am thy father," &c. See " Judges," 76. 
" Corruptissima respublica, plurivruB leges." See " Parliament," 3, n. 
"Courts of justice have nothing to do with political discussions." 

iSec" Politics," 2. 
"Credit is to be taken to the later decisions." See "Judicial 

Decisions," 6, n. 
"Cruelty may lead up, &c., to wife's adultery." See "Husband and 

"Wife," 8. 
" Cuilibet in arte sud perito est credendum." See " Foreign Law," 2, n. 
" Cursus Curiae est lex Curies." See " Practice," 2, n. 
" Custom and agreement," &c. See " Usage," 12, n. 
" Debet esse finis litium." See " Litigation," 2, n. 
"Decisions and the reasons of them," &o. See "Judges," 48, n. 
"Deeds not words." See "Words," 7, n. 
"De minimis non curat lex." See " Statutes," 27. 
" De non apparentibus, et non existentibus," &c. See " Law," 64, n. 
" De vita hominis nulla est," &c. See " Trial for Life," 1, n. 
" Diffieilius est invenire quam mneere," &c. See " WUl," 12. 
" Discretio est discernere per legem quid sit justvm,. See "Discretion," 

3, n. 
" Discretio est scire per legem," &c. See " Discretion," 8, n. 
"Discretion." See "Discretion," 1, 10. 
" D— n it, my lord," &o. See " Courts," 3, n. 
"Do as you like." See " Discretion," 10. 

" Dormiimt aliquando leges, nunquam moriuntur." See " Law," 73, n. 
" Dotem regni." See " Navy," 2, n. 
" Dulcia defecta modulatur carmine lingua," &c. See "Husband and 

Wife," 12. 

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INDEX. 333 


"Each is bound to decide by and deliver that opinion," &o. See 

" Judges," 55. 
' ' Ecclesia est domus mansionalis Omnipotenti Dei. " See ' ' Eoolesiastioal," 

"Ecclesia non moritur." See " Christianity," 2, n. 
"Eduobus malis, minimum digendum." See " Evil," 1, n. 
" Ego hoc animo semper fui," &a. See " Judges," 26. 
"Ei nihil turpe," &o. See " Miscellaneous," 47, n. 
"Englishmen have no greater enemies," &c. See "Ecclesiastical," 

3, re. 

"Eos qui otium perturbant reddam otiosos." See " Judges," 26, re. 

" Equality is equity." See " Equity," 8, re. 

"Equity acts in personam." See " Equity," 29, n. 

"Equity is a roguish thing," &o. See "Equity," 3, re., 19, re. 

" Errors are like felons and traytors," &c. See " Judges," 18, re. 

"Est aliqtiod prodire terms,'' &o. See " Punishment," 6. 

"Et domus stia cuigue," &c. See " Trespass," 1, re. 

"Et quod sub lege esse debeat," &c. See " Sovereignty," 2, re. 

"Et sup' totain materiam petunt discrelionem justidariorum.''' See 

" Discretion," 3, re. 
" Every benevolent purpose is not charitable." See "Charity," 1, re. 
' •■ Every man has a right to keep his own sentiments." See ' ' Motives," 

" Every man that is injured," &o. See " Tort," 15. 
"Every moral man is as much bound to obey the civil law," &c. 

See " Fraud," 20, re. 
"Every one disguising the truth," &c. See "Truth," 8. 
" Every one who is skilled in his own art," &c. See "Foreign Law," 

4, re. 

" Every will stands on its ovTn bottom." See " WiU," 12. 

" Exceptio probat regulam." See "Evidence," 17. 

"Ex dolo malo non oritur actio.'' See "Public Policy," 7; "Tort," 

13, re., 17. 
"Ex fade." See " Contempt of Court," 9. 
"Ex hypothesi." See " Criminal Justice," 84. 
" Expedit reipublicce ut sit finis litium." See " Litigation," 2, n. 
" Extreme care does no mischief." See " Judges," 16, re. 
" Eye of the Court." See " Fraud," 17." 
"Eye of the law." See "Contract," 4; "Husband and Wife," 1; 

" Liberty of the Subject," 4. 
" Facimtis fatetur quijvdicium fugit." See " Criminal Justice," 40. 
" Fama, qtue suspidonem inducit," &c. See "Judicial Proceedings," 

11, re. 
" Past and loose." See " Settlements," 1. 
" Fear God, honour the King." See " Judges," 26, n. ; " Miscellaneous," 

" Festmatio justitioe est noverca infcyrtunii." See " Judges," 16, re. 
" Fiat justitia ruat coelum." See "Politics," 4 ; " Public Servant," 5. 
" Fiction is never admitted," &o. See " Truth," 10. 
' ' Firmiter 'Miibemus rie dnguam pro aliqud, " &o. See ' ' Matrimony," 4. 

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334 INDEX. 

WOEDS — contmued. 

"For a man's house is his castle," &o. See "Trespass," 1, n. 

"For as you sow," &e. See "Miscellaneous," 41, n. 

" For those things which were done either by our fathers," &o. See 

"Miscellaneous," 2, n. 
" Fortified by the law." See " Trespass," 3. 
" Fraud in point of law." See "Fraud," 1. 
"Fraus est celare fraudem." See "Fraud," 25, n. 
" From the cradle to the grave." See " Commerce," 6. 
" Ftmosus absentis loco est," &c. See " Punishment," 2, n. 
" Fvriosus solo furore punitur." See " Punishment," 2, n. 
"Fustum funnidos tantaraboo." See "WiU," 18, n. 
" Give your judgments, but give no reasons." See " Judges," 45. 
" God forbid." See " Criminal Justice," 7 ; " Jurisdiction," 1 ; "Jury," 

25, n. ; " Politics," 4 ; " Title," 2 ; " Truth," 9. 
" God hath made man Paulo inferiorem Angelis." See " Clergy," 1. 
" God Himself is not an absolute monarch." See " Sovereignty," 2, n. 
" Good matter must be pleaded in good form," &o. See "Pleadings," 

1, n. 
" Gravely to doubt is to affirm." See " Appeals," 2. 
" Great is truth," &o. See "Truth," 4, -a. 
"ffabeant Curice Prcetorim poteatatem tarn subveniendi," &c. See "Equity," 

31, n. 
" Had his zeal been half so much for truth," &c. See "Truth," 7. 
" Happy is he, that by other men's harms take heed." See 

"Miscellaneous," 20. 
"Hard cases make bad law." See "Law," 42. 

" Hasty justice is the mother of misfortune." See " Judges," 16, n. 
" He acts prudently, who obeys," &o. See " Law," 69, n. 
"He is not deceived who knows himself to be deceived." See 

" Fraud," 4, n. 
" He is not to be heard," &a. See " Counsel," 23, n. 
" He revealeth the deep and secret things," &c. See " Motives," 2, n. 
" He says one thing, but he does another," &o. See " Words," 7. 
" He that filches from me my good name," &c. See " Libel," 6, n. 
" He that has an ill name is half -hanged." See " Criminal Justice," 

" He that is greatest among you," &c. See " Miscellaneous," 14. 
" He that kyllyth a man drunk, sobur,'" &c. See " Intoxication," 2, n. 
" He that seemeth to be religious," &c. See " Religion," 2. 
" He which soweth sparingly," &o. See " Miscellaneous," 41, n. 
"He who asks equity must do equity," See " Courts," 1. 
" He who flees judgment confesses his guilt." See " Criminal Justice," 

40, n. 
•■ He whose dirt it is," &o. See " Tort," 18. 
" He who sows ought to reap." See " Miscellaneous," 41. 
" He who will have advantage of precedents," &c. See " Precedents," 4. 
" His pound of flesh." See " Discovery," 4, ■». ; " Precedents," 6, n. 
" Hoc non potest agere," &c. See " Sovereignty," 2, n. 
" Homo potest esse habilis ct inhabilis diversis temporihis." See 

" Intoxication," 2, •«. 

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INDEX. 335 

WOEDS — continued. 

" Honour the King and respect the people." See "Judges," 26. 

" Hot and cold were in one hody fixt," &c. See " Counsel," 23, n. 

" Hot in political excitement." See " Politics," 7. 

" How happy could I be with either," &o. See " Miscellaneous," 60. 

" Htiman nature is imperfect." See " Miscellaneous," 53. 

" Humamwm est errare." /Sec " Discretion," 7. /Sec afeo " Sovereignty," 

" Hungry after jurisdiction." See " Jurisdiction," 6. 
" I am by no means sure that if a man kept a tiger," &c. See 

" Tort," 11. 
" I am entitled to sit in the testator's chair," &c. See " WiU," 2, n. 
"I beseech you, wrest once the law to your authority," &o. See 

" Precedents," 6, ■». 
" Ideas are free." See " Author," 1, 

"If a man will make purchase of a chance," &c. See "Property," 12. 
" If people are drunk or delirious," &c. See " Matrimony," 7, n. 
" Ignis fatuus." See "Law Reports," 3, n. 
" Ignorantia juris rum excusat." See " Law," 14. 

" I had rather hear things at a venture," &c. See " Trial for Life," 2. 
" I know not when an usage," &c. See "Usage," 11. 
" I like that ancient Saxon phrase," &o. See " Charity," 2, n. 

" rn be d d to h 1 if I sit here," &c. See " Courts," 3, n. 

•• Illegal." See " Fraud," 24. 

" Illegality." See " Fraud," 24. 

" I may use mine own as I vriU.' ' See " Property," 13. 

" I might as well say to you, ' U.B.D.' " See " Courts," 3, n. 

" Impriinatur." See " Liberty of the Press," 7. 

" In amore liace omnia sunt vitia, injurice," &o. See " Miscellaneous," 

"In as much as you did feed, clothe, lodge the poor," &o. See 

" Poor," 1. 
" In camerd." See " Judicial Proceedings," 7. 
"In esse." See " Property," 1. 

" Infeece Bomuli quam inpoUtia Anglice." See "Judges," 76. 
" In fictione jwris semper oeguitas eadstit." See " Fiction," 2, n. 
" In futuro." See " Property," 3. 
" Iniquum est aliquem rei sum esse judicem,'" &o. See "Administration 

of Justice," 23, n. 
" Injuria sine damno." See " Tort," 10, n. 
" Innocent." See " Criminal Justice," 21. 
" Inperpetua/m rei memoriam." See " Judicial Decisions," 18. 
" In poenam." See " Criminal Justice," 37. 

" In the place where the tree falleth," &c. See " Miscellaneous," 45, n. 
'• Intolerable yoke upon any one's neck." See "Judges," 69. 
"Ipse autem rex non debet esse," &c. See " Sovereignty," 2, n. 
"Ipso/acto." See "Naturalization." 

" I shall temper so justice with mercy." See " Punishment," 5, n. 
" It is always difi&oult, &c., for a man to decide between," &c. See 

" Administration of Justice," 30. 
" It is a vain thing to imagine a right," &c. See " Tort," 20. 

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336 INDEX. 

WOEDS — continued. 

"It is better for the Bubjeot that faulty subjects," &o. See "Pre- 
cedents," 20. 
" It is better that an individual should occasionally suffer a wrong," 

&o. See " Administration of Justice," 35. 
" It is every man's own fault if he does not take such advice," &o. See 

"Miscellaneous," 33. 
"It is impossible to dive into the secret recesses," &c. See 

" Motives," 5. 
" It is not madness that I have uttered," &c. See " Insanity," 1. 
" It is the duty of the wife to submit to her husband." See " Husband 

and Wife," 6. 
" It were infinite for the law to judge the causes of causes,' ' &o. See 

" Motives," 13. 
"I will attain supreme eminence, or perish in the attempt." See 

" Miscellaneous," 61, n. 
" I would have the chastity of my wife," &c. See " Judges," 2, n. 
" I yield to authority." See " Practice," 5. 
" Jack in a Box." See " Words," 5. 
" Jam tua res agitur pqries cum proximus ardet. " See " Judicial 

Proceedings," 2, n. 
" Judex lion potest esse testii in proprid causa. See " Administration of 

Justice," 23, n. 
" Judex non potest injuriam sibi datam punire." See " Administration 

of Justice," 23, n. 
" Judges are not bound to explain the reason of their sentence." See 

" Judges," 45, •«. 
"Judges do not answer questions of fact," &c. See " Jury," 2, n. 
" Judges must move steadily upon their right poles." See " Judges," 

" Jvdicet non tenentur exprimere causam lenteniice suce." See " Judges," 

" Judicia posteriora sunt in lege fortiora.'' See" Judicial Decisions," 6, n. 
" Judidis posterioribut fides est adhibenda." 5'ee " Judicial Decisions," 

6, n. 
" Judicis est jus dicere non dare.'' See " Judges," 28, n. 
" Jure naturoe cequum est, neminem cum alterius" &c. See " Author," 

2, n. 
" Jurisdictionem.'' See " Administration of Justice," 1, n. 
" Justice and common sense," &c. See " Criminal Justice," 30, n. 
" Justice the mother of security." See " Judicial Proceedings," 6, n. 
" Justice truly preventing," &a. See " Punishment," 3, n. 
" La ley est un egal dispenser de Justice," &c. See " Tort," 6. 
" Law is best applied, when subservient to the honesty of the case." 

;SM"Law," 26. 
"Laws come to the assistance of the vigilant," &c. See "Diligence," 

2, n. 
" Laws of nature are God's thoughts," &o. See " Law," 68, n. 
" Laying the axe to the root of the tree." See " Miscellaneous," 52. 
"Leaping before one come to the stile." See "Miscellaneous," 16, 


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INDEX. 337 


" Leave the case where it is." See " Title," 1. 

" Leges et consfitutionesfuturis certum est dare," &c. See " Law," 60 . 

"Zeges in lonum et sahitem hominum" &o. See "Miscellaneous" 

42, n. 
" Leges posteriores priores, contrarias abrogant." See " Law," 2, n. 
" Le roi est mart," &c. See " Sovereignty," 4, n. 
" Let a madman be punished," &o. See " Punishment," 2, n. 
" Let him who sins when drunk," &c. See " Intoxication," 2. 
"Let infliction of punishment increase," &c. See "Punishment" 


"Let Mngs be as David was," &o. See " Sovereignty," 1. 

" Let me have no lying," &c. See '• Commerce," 4, ,i,. 

" Let no cobler go beyond his last." See " Miscellaneous," 46. 

" Let the oobler stick to his last." See " Miscellaneous," 46, n. 

" Let us do evil," &o. See " Evil," 2, n. 

" Let us pursue the plot a God's name." See " Judges," 73. 

" Lex ceterna." See " Law." 

" Lac aliquando sequitur cequUatem." See " Equity," 2, n. 

" Lex Anglice est lex misericordim." See " Law,' ' 48, n. 

"Lex dilationes semper exhoTret." See " Delay," 2, n. 

" Lex est sanctio jubens," &o. See " Law," 17, n.. 

" Lex est swmma ratio." See " Law," 17, n. 

" Lex loci." See " Usage," 12. 

" Lex mercatoria. " See " Commerce," 22. 

" Lex Farliamenti." See " Parliament," 4. 

" Lex prospidt non respicit." See " Law," 60, n. 

" Lex reprobai moram ." See " Delay," 2, n. 

"Lex vult potius privatum incmnmodum qitam publicum," &o. See 
" Justice," 2, n. 

" Look before you leap." See " Miscellaneous," 17, n. 

" Lord Chief Justice." See " Judges," 14. 

" Magna est Veritas, et prevalebit." See " Truth," 4. 

" Malwn in se." See " Fraud," 20. 

" Malwm prohibitum." See " Fraud," 20. 

" Many know many things, no one everything. ' ' See " Miscellaneous," 
2, m. 

"Masterly inactivity may be prudence," &c. See "Miscellaneous," 

"May one be pardoned and retain the ofEence." See " Pardon," 1, n. 

"Meddle not with them that are given to change." See "Miscel- 
laneous," 20. 

" Melior estjvstitia veri prcevaiiens," &o. See " Punishment," 3, n. 

" Men shoiild not sin in their graves." See " Will," 13. 

" Mendax infamia." See " Judges," 82, n. 

"Men intoxicated are sometimes," &c. See " Intoxication," 1. 

" Men's feelings are as different as their faces. " See " Motives," 10. 

" Mercy seasons justice." See " Punishment," 5, n. 

" Meum and twwm." See " Judges," 9. 

"■ Mimdatw imnocentibus qui pareit nocentibus," &o. See "Criminal 
Justice," 30, n. 

D.L.Q. 22 

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338 INDEX. 

WOKDS— continued. 

" Ministers were tlie better for being, &c., peppered," &o. See 
"Politics," 1. 

" Modtis et conventio vincunt legem." See " Usage," 12, n. 

"Modiis in rebus." See " Miscellaneoiis," 13. 

" Money paid." See " Fraud," 20. 

" Mr." See "Esquire," 3, n. 

"Multi multa, nemo omnia novit." See "Miscellaneous," 2, n. 

" MuUiplicata transgressione crescat," &c. See " Punishment," 3, n. 

" MuUitudinem decern faciunt." See " Evidence," 30, n. 

" My duty, sir, to find out his meaning? " See "Will," 18, n. 

" Nam genus et proavos, et qua non/ecimus," &c. See " Miscellaneous," 
2, n. 

"Necessitas est lex temporis et loci." See "Necessity," 1, n. 

"Necessitas non habet legem." See " Necessity," 1, n. 

" Necessity creates the law," &c. See " Necessity," 2. 

"Necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties," &c. See 
" Husband and Wife," 11. 

' ' Necessity is the law of the time and action, " &c. See ' ' Necessity," 1, n. 

"Necessity justifies that which it compels." See "Jury," 30. 

"Necessity, the tyrant's plea." See "Necessity," 1, n. 

"Neither." See " Miscellaneous," 60. 

"Neminem portet esse sapientiorem legibus." See " Law," 17, n. 

"Nemo debet esse judex in proprid sud causa." See " Administration of 
Justice," 23, n. 

"Nemo nasciiur artifex." See " Law," 17, n. 

" Never mention HeU to ears polite." See " Courts," 3, n. 

" Nihil facit error nominis cum de compare constat." See " Name," n. 

"Nihil inde expectantes." See "Judges," 26, n. 

"Nine points of the law. " See " Possession," 2. 

"Nobiles magis plectuntur pecunid," &c. See "Damages," 2, n. 

"No dog is entitled to have one worry," &c. See "Miscellaneous," 51. 

" No man is to be condemned unheard." See " Criminal Justice," 13. 

" No man ought to be so absurd," &c. See "Title," 4. 

" No man out of his own private reason," &c. See " Law," 17, n. 

"No man should, &o., have an interest against his duty." See 
" Administration of Justice," 31. 

" Nominal damages." See " Damages," 6. 

" Non deeipitur qui scit se decipi." See " Fraud," 4, n. 

" None shall take advantage," &o. See "Tort," 17. 

" Non numcrentur seS, ponderentur." See " Evidence," 29. 

" Non prosequitur." See " Nonsuit," n. 

"No polluted hand shall touch the pure fountains of justice." See 
"Fraud," 82. 

"Non sum docivs rere instructus." See " Jury," 25. 
" Nothing is law that is not reason." See " Judges," 50. 
"Nothing is so easy as to be wise after the event." See "Miscel- 
laneous," 15 ; " Eailway Company," 1. 
"Nothing is so siUy as cunning." See "Miscellaneous," 19. 
"Nothing shall be presumed one way or the other," &c. See 
" Magistrates," 4. 

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INDEX. 339 

VfOB.DS— continued. 

" Nova constitutiofuturisformam impunere," &o. See " Law," 60, n. 

" Nulla, vetita aut turpia p^-osswmuntur," &o. See " Law," 17, n. 

" Nullum simile qvMuor pedibus eurrit." See " Miscellaneous," 32, ». 

" Nul prendra advantage," &o. See " Tort," 17, n. 

" Nursing father." See " Statutes," 23. 

"Nutshell, point lies in a." See " Miscellaneous," 23, ■«. 

" Obedientia est legis essentia." See " Law," 69, n. 

"Obiter dicta, like the proverbial chickens of destiny," &o. See 

" Administration of Justice," 8. 
" Observe reader your old books," &o. See " Books," 2. 
" Of two evils, I have chosen the least." See " Evil," 1, n. 
" Of two evils, choose the least." See "Evil," 1. 
" Of two evils, the less is always to be chosen." See " Evil," 1, n. 
'• Omnis innovatio plits novitate perturbat," &c. See " Cases," 9, n. 
" One of the corner stones of the law." See " Law," 23. 
" One of the land marks." See " Law," 23. 
'■ Ostiis apertis." See "Judicial Proceedings," 7. 
'■ O Time, thou must untangle this," &c. See " Miscellaneous," 22, n. 
"Out of thine own mouth will I judge thee." See " Criminal Justice," 

11, ». 
"Par Diea." See " Liberty of the Subject," 5, n. 
" Parties should not sleep on their rights." See " Equity," 15. 
" PoBncB potius noUiendce quam" &c. See " Punishment," 3, ». 
"People must not be wiser," &c. See " Miscellaneous," 6. 
" Persecution is a very easy form of virtue." See " Virtue," 2. 
"Personal property has no locality." See " Property," 8. 
"Piepoudre." See " Judicial Decisions," 8. 
" Plain truth, dear Murray," &c. See " Truth, " 6, n. 
"Polar star." ;See " WiU," 17. 
" Popularity which follows ; not that which is run after." See 

" Judges," 26. 
" Pound of flesh." See " Discovery," 4, n. • " Precedents," 6, n. 
" Power should follow justice, not precede it." ;5iee "Pardon," 1, n. 
" Pray let us so resolve cases," &c. See " Cases," 10. 
'•ProEStcU cautela guam," &o." See " Punishment," 3, n. 
" Precedent goes in support of justice." See " Precedents, " 19. 
" Prevent men hanging out false colours." See " Miscellaneous," 48. 
" Prevention is better," &o. See " Punishment," 3, n. 
" PriinA facie." See " Presumption," 10. 
" Primum mobile." See " Judges," 76. 
" PH/ncipivm. urbis et quasi seminarium, reipublicce." See " Matrimony," 

6, n. 
" Privatum ineommoditm, publico bono pensatwr." See " Navy," 7, m. 
" Pro salute ani/marv/m.^ ' See " Punishment," 7. 
" Pro salute reipviiUae." See " Punishment,' ' 6. 
" Prudenter agil quiprcecepto legis obtemperat." See " Law," 69, n. 
" Publicity is the very soul of justice." ;See " Judicial Proceedings," 6. 
" Public policy is a very unruly horse," &c. See " Public Policy," 2. 
" Punishment should rather be softened," &c. See " Punishment," 3, n. 
" Quae ad unum frnem loqunta sunt," &o. See " Words," i, n. 

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340 INDEX. 


" Quoe mfla sunt inekoata," &c. See " Miscellaneous," 47, n. 

" Quceritv/r, ut crescunt tot magna volvmina legisV See "Parliament," 3. 

" Qui consuUa joatrum, qui leges jwaque servat." See " Equity," 31. 

" Quicksands in the law," &o. See "Law," 43. 

" Quicquid necessitas cogit, defendit." See "Necessity," 1, n. 

" Qui peccat ehrius, luat sobrius," See " Intoxication," 2. 

" Qui s'excuse s'accuse." See " Miscellaneous," 29. 

" Quod datum est ecclesice, datum est Deo." See " Charity," 2, n. 

" Qiws Dens vult perdere prius dementat.'' See " Miscellaneous," 58. 

" Quoties in verbis nulla est ambiguitas," &o. See " Construction," 3, n. 

" Bather commend yourself by your actions," &c. See "Words," 3. 

" Satio decidendi." See " Parliament," 19. 

" Satio est a^ima legis." See " Law," 17, n. 

"Reading, maketh a, full man, conference a ready man," &c. See 
" Law," 1, 71. 

" Reasonable human conduct," &c. See " Reasonable," 3. 

" Render justice to the public," &o. See " Punishment," 5. 

" Report , which induces suspicion," &o. See " Judicial Proceedings," 
11, n. 

"Reputation is a most idle and false imposition," &o. See "Reputa- 
tion," n. 

" Hes pro/ecto stulta est neguitioe modus.'" See " Miscellaneous," 47, «. 

'^ Sex nunquam moriiur." See " Sovereignty," 4, n. 

" Bex potest facere quod dejure" &c. See " Sovereignty," 2, n. 

" Boy n'est lie per ascun Statute" &c. See " Costs," 4, n. 

" Rule which will tie the hands of the Court." See " Judges," 68. 

" Scepe viatorem nova, non vetus, orbita fallit." ;Sc« " Miscellaneous," 
27, n. 

" Salus populi suprema lex." See " Navy," 7, n. 

" Salus reipublic<e suprema lex." See " Common Law," 12. 

" Salva reverentia." See " Coke," 3. 

" Saxon phrase." See " Charity," 2, n. 

" Secundem discretionem boni viri." See " Equity," 31. 

" Seldom will it happen that any rule," &c. See " Precedents," 13, n. 

" Semper presumitur pro negante." See " Parliament," 19. 

" Sequi debet potentia juslitiam rum prcecedere." See " Pardon," 1, n. 

" Sic utere two ut alienum," &o. See " Tort," 4. 

" Similem habemum Demosthenis," &c. See " Trespass," 3. 

" Sir." See " Esquire," 3„ n. 

" Stare decisis." See " Cases," 19. 

" Stick to your good law, and leave ofi your bad Latin." See " Miscel- 
laneous," 13, n. 

" Stile, leaping before one come to the." See "Miscellaneous," 17. 

" Strictissimi juris." See " Criminal Justice," 37. 

" Strict law and justice hand-in-hand together." See "Law," 50. 

"Sub sigillo confessionis." See " Solicitor and Client," 1. 

"Sure as I hope before my Judge to live," &c. See "Husband and 
Wife," 10. 

" Talis discretio discretionem conundit." See "Discretion," 8. 

" Take the thing in the grip of our hands." See " Miscellaneous," 23. 

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INDEX. 341 

'WOUBS— continued. 

" Ten constitute a crowd." See " Evidence," 30, n. 

" Testis oculatus unus plus valet quam auriti decern." See "Evidence," 

31, n. 
•■ Thank God." See " Politics," 6 ; " Religion," 3. 
" That whom he could not by the sword destroy," &o. See " Law," 7. 
"The admitted power to award a particular punishment," &B. See 

"Punishment," 8. 
" The advantage to the community," &c. See " Tort," 24. 
" The best character is generally that which," &o. See " Character," 6. 
" The best men are but men," &c. See " Miscellaneous," 54. 
"The better day the better deed." See " Day." 
" The blaze of a reputation," &o. See " Reputation." 
"The children of the world are in their generation," &o. See 

" Miscellaneous," 2, n. 
" The church is the mansion-house of the Omnipotent God." See 

"Ecclesiastical," 1, n. 
" The common law is but the common usage," &o. See " Precedents,'' 

"The course of the Court is the law of the Court." See "Practice," 

2, 11. 
" The end directs and sanctifies the means." See " Miscellaneous," 66. 
" The end justifies the means." See " Miscellaneous," 56. 
" The end may not always sanctify the means." See " Criminal 

Justice," 43. 
" The equality of mercy," &o. See " Punishment," 5, n. 
" The execution of an ofEender," &o. See " Punishment," 2, n. 
" The eye of the law." See " Contract," 4 ; " Fraud," 17 ; " Husband 

and Wife," 1 ; " Liberty of the Subject," 4. 
" The farthest way about," &c. See " Miscellaneous," 27. 
" The father of eotuity." See " Ec[uity," 30, n. 
" The four bars." See " Counsel," 1, n. 
" The higher classes are more punished in money," &c. See 

" Damages," 2, n. 
" The house of every one is to him as his castle," &c. See " Trespass," 1. 
" The hungry Judges soon the sentence sign," &c. See "Jury," 29, n. 
" The interests of truth and justice," &o. See " Truth," 4. 
" The King can do no wrong," &c. See " Sovereignty," 2. 
" The King is not bound by any statute," &c. See " Costs," 4, n. 
" The King never dies." See " Sovereignty," 4, 6. 
" The King sues by," &c. See " Sovereignty," 9. 
"The later decisions are the stronger in law." See "Judicial 

Decisions," 6, ■«. 
"The law dislikes delay." See " Delay," 2, n. 
" The law is but the handmaid of justice and inflexibility." See 

"Law," 54. 
" The law is so benignant," &o. See " Property," 6. 
"The law is well known and is the same for all ranks." See 

"Justice," 3, n. 
" The law knows no favourites." See "Law," 19. 
" The law looks forward, not backward." See " Law," 60, «.. 

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342 INDKX. 

WORDS— coreiimied. 

" The law was the golden mete-wand and measure," &o. See 
" Sovereignty," 14. 

"The laws sometimes sleep, never die." See "Law," 73, n. 

" The man who laugh'd but once to see an ass," &c. See " Jury," 3, n. 

" The most learned doubteth most." See " Cases," 14, n. 

"The next way home's," &o. See " Miscellaneous," 27, n. 

" The oak scorns to grow except on free laud." See " Land," n. 

"The opinions of philosophers, physicians," &o. See "Foreign Law," 
4, M. 

" The orthodox Judge." See "Judges," 20, n. 

" The paternal jurisdiotion of Courts of equity." See " Equity," 30. 

" The point lies in a nutshell." See " Miscellaneous," 23, n. 

"The power to regulate the disposal of property," &c. See "Pro- 
perty," 2. 

"The practice of the Court is the law of the Court." See "New 
Trial," 3; "Practice," 2. 

"The private must sufier for the public cause." See "Judicial 
Proceedings," 2, n. 

" The reason and fairness of one man is manifestly no rule," &c. See 

" The reason why money cannot be followed," &c. See " Money," 4. 

"The royal navy of England has ever been," &c. See "Navy," 3. 

" The sooner a bad precedent is gotten rid of, " &o. See " Precedents," 15. 

"The sparks of all the sciences in the world are raked up," &o. See 
"Law,"20, ». 

" The statute is like a tyrant," &c. See " Statutes," 23. 

" The tree must lie," &c. See " MisceUaueous," 45. 

"There are cases when the simple truth is difficult," &o. See 
"Truth," 13, K. 

"There is no entering into the secret thoughts of a man's heart." 
/Sec "Motives," 4. 

" There is no mean in wickedness," &o. See " Miscellaneous," 47, n. 

" There is no more difference between a grant," &o. See " Title," 3. 

" There must be an end of things." See " Miscellaneous," 13. 

" T/iesauri absconditi." See " Judicial Decisions," 1. 

" Thesauri aperti." See " Judicial Decisions," 1. 

" These are my sentiments." See " New Trial," 1, n. 

"They moved heaven and earth." See " Punishment," 9. 

" They that once begin first to trouble the water," &c. See " Miscel- 
laneous," 50. 

" Things bad in principle," &c. See " Miscellaneous," 47, n. 

" Things which do not appear," &c. See " Law," 64, n. 

" Thou shalt not feethe a kid in his mother's milk." See "Miscel- 
laneous," 42. 

" Time whereof the memory of man," &c. See " Usage," 6, it. 

" Times wherein things were obscure." See ' ' Usage," 7. 

" To be tried by God and your Country." See " Criminal Justice," 48, n. 

" To do justice." See " Practice," 26. 

" To say that whenever the world grows wiser," &c. See " Tort," 12. 

"To whom nothing is sufficient," &c. See "Miscellaneous," 47, n. 

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INDEX. 343 

^OnDS— continued. 

" Touch not a cat," &c. See " Miscellaneous," 39. 

" Toiit exemple cloche." See " Miscellaneous," 32. 

" Truth fears nothing but concealment." See " Truth," 12, n. 

" Truth is the thing that we are enquiring after," &c. See " Truth," 5. 

" Truth, like all other good things," &o. See " Truth," 12. 

" V. B. D." See " Courts," 8, n. 

" Ubijus ibi remedium." See " Tort," 15, n. ; " Trespass," 2, n. 

"Upon your honour, sir! pray speak by your honesty." See 
" Administration of Justice," 17. 

" Utpcena adpaucos," &c. See " Punishment," 2, n. 

" Veritas nihil veritur nisi abscondi." See " Truth," 12, n. 

" Vigilainiibus et non dormientibus succurunt jura." See " Diligence," 1. 

" Vigilantibus mm dormientibus jura subveniunt." See " Diligence," 2, n. 

" Violent courses are like^to hot waters," &o. See " Punishment," 10, n. 

" Fir acer et vehemens." See " Coke," 4. 

" Vir bonus est quis" &c. See " Equity," 31. 

" Vita reipublicos pax, et animus libertas et lihertatis," &o. See 
" Damages," 2, n. 

" Vitium clerici nocere non debet." See " Amendments," 7, n. 

" Want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal." See " Tort," 20. 

" War a great evil chosen to avoid a greater. " See " Navy," 7. 

" Way, &c., the farthest." See " Miscellaneous," 27. 

" Weigh in golden scales." See " Politics," 7. 

" We know that passion, &o., tempt many to deviate," &o. See 
" Truth," 13. 

" We must judge of men's intentions by their acts," &c. Sec 
" Words," 8. 

" What a man does in his closet," &c. See " Tort," 25. 

" What is one man's gain is another's loss." See " Commerce," 9, 10. 

" What passes in the mind of man," &o. See " Motives," 2. 

" Whatsoever a man soweth," &o. See "Miscellaneous," 41, n. 

" When thieves fall out," &o. See " Miscellaneous," 49. 

" Where Irishmen are good, it is Impossible to find better," &c. See 
" Ireland," 1. 

" Wherever a man neglects to take any advantage," &o. See 
" Pleadings," 5. 

" Whilom there was a dweUyng in my country," &c. See " Ecclesias- 
tical," 6, n. 

" Who prov'd, as sure as God's in Gloucester," &c. See " Miscel- 
laneous," 57. 

" Whosoever ministers to the poor," &o. See " Poor," 1. 

" WUl of the legislature." See " Statutes," 24. 

" Wise after the event." /See " Miscellaneous," 15. 

" Witnesses may lie, either be mistaken," &c. See " Witness," 1. 

" Words are women, deeds are men. '' See " Words," 7, n. 

" Would to God you were innocent." See " Criminal Justice," 20. 

" Would yee both eat your cake and have your cake ? " See " Miscel- 
laneous," 59, n. 

" You are a gentleman Of the long robe," &c. See " Counsel," 1, n. 

" You may not sell the oow," &o. See " Miscellaneous," 59. 

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344 , INDEX. 

yfOWDS— continued. 

"You must not when you have the choice," &o. See " Tort," 4. 
" You shall not do evil that good may come." See " Evil," 2, 3. 
"You shall not turn what was designed," <fco. iSse "Miscellaneous," 

42, ». 
" Zeal and indignation,'' &o. See " Miscellaneous," 34. 

actions for. See " Trial for Life," 1, n. 
catching at. See " Judges," 12. 

See further Text, infra. See also " Character," 2 ; " Commerce," 7, 30 ; 
" Construction " ; " Conveyance," 1 ; " Fraud " ; " Hushand and 
Wife"; "Intoxication"; "Ireland"; "Judges," 2, 70; "Judicial 
Proceedings," 13; "Libel," 2; "Magic"; "Miscellaneous"; 
"EeUgion," 1; " Statutes," 8, 9, 13, 15, 25 ; "WiU," 2, 7, 8, 9, 11, 
16, 18. 
WOEKING DAYS. See " Sunday," 1. 
WOEKMEN. See " Trade Union." 
WOEKS. See " Literature " ; " Miscellaneous," 55. 
WOEEY. ^Sce "Miscellaneous," 51. 

WEIT. See " Courts," 2 ; " Jury," 10, n. 
an ill. See " Process," 1. 
of error. See " Appeals," 1. 

WEITEE'S FAME, ^fee " Literature," 1. 


judicial. See " Text Books," 4. 
text, ^ee "Text Books." 

WEITING. See " Libel," 1 ; "Words,' ' 9. 


contract. See " Statutes," 26, re.; " Truth," 3. 
instruments. See " Construction," and references tlierefrom. 
law. See " Law," 64 ; " Parliament," 13 ; " Statutes," 24. 

WEONG. 5e« "Administration of Justice," 35; "Judges," 27; "Tort" 
" Sovereignty," 2 ; " Statutes," 13; 


acquittal. See " Criminal Justice," 30. 
act. See " Tort," 1, 15, re. 

YEAR BOOKS, ^'ce "Judicial Decisions," 1. 
YEOMAN. See " Estiuire," 5. 
YOKE. See " Judges," 69. 

ZEAL. See " Miscellaneous," 34. 


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